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Abstract
Housing in Britain, and public housing in particular, has undergone a decade of
turbulent flux. This thesis analyses the developments which have resulted in a
changed emphasis and attitude towards council housing, investment patterns and
systems, management organisations and forms of ownership. These changes mean
that local housing authorities must adapt their policies and seize the new opportunities
which present themselves. The discussion in chapter 2 provides the context for the
main contribution of the thesis, which is an assessment of the Department of
Environment's Estate Action (EA) initiative. The thesis argues that EA springs from
this new housing context and, therefore, provides a useful framework with which to
examine trends in English public housing, since it enables the changes and frictions
between central and local government to be analysed, as well as indicating the
potential consequences and outcomes of adaptation to the new housing setting.
A series of issues are examined which form the focus of the empirical analysis.
Particular attention is placed on the following aspects: the structure of central/local
relations arising from implementing the EA initiative, the effects of EA on financial
and management effectiveness and EA's housing policy consequences. Chapter 3
discusses the policy context and outlines the methodology to be employed.
The main empirical analysis is presented in five chapters. In chapter 4, interviews
with the EA Central team are reported as well as an analysis of documentary material
on the background to EA. This discussion allows the origins and objectives of EA to
be established from both the government's and the Department of Environment's
viewpoints. In chapter 5, the results of a postal survey of all local authorities
involved in EA are analysed in detail. This enables chapter 6 to develop a general
assessment of the local authority response to the EA initiative. Chapter 7 presents the
responses of EA Central and Department of Environment Regional Offices to the
survey findings. Finally, chapter 8 reports on four case-studies which assess EA in
the context of specific localities. The analysis attempts to establish EA's success in
implementing schemes via a discussion of managerial data, tenant opinions and staff
assessments. EA's wider impact on local housing authorities' policies towards
public housing is also evaluated and found to be influential.
Chapter 9 synthesizes the main empirical and theoretical findings and assesses the
implications of the research for an understanding of the council housing system in
general and EA in particular. Issues worth further investigation are also discussed.
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Preface
Local authority housing is a rapidly evolving field. There has been a flurry of
legislation affecting its operation and it must be stressed that this research covers the
period up to February 1990, when the Housing Investment Programme (HIPs)
system of capital investment was still in place. While it also refers to the latest
fmanciaI arrangements, these are beyond the remit of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The subject of the thesis
Until the late 1970s, the council housing sector in Britain steadily expanded
reaching 32% of the total housing stock. This expansion was largely due to a broad
post-World War II consensus regarding the necessity of a welfare state in general and
the value of public housing in particular. However, with worsening economic
conditions and the steady impact of monetary controls, public housing expenditure
was to come under close scrutiny and eventually became a prime target for cuts. This
started with the Labour government in 1975n6 but accelerated after 1979 with the
election of a Conservative administration. Since 1974 council housing has declined
rapidly to 25% of the stock, although it remains a major public service.
The Thatcher governments were particularly keen to reduce housing
expenditure (one of the biggest local government expenditure items) in order to divert
these resources to the private sector, help bring inflation under control and meet the
commitment to 'rolling back the frontiers of the state', leading towards a 'free
market' society and economy:
"The monetarist approach was therefore to rely on the private sector for economic
growth through the control of the monetary supply, interest rates and the Public
Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). Government expenditure plans reflected
this philosophy and substantial reductions were made in the planned expenditure on
housing in the belief that private investment would make good the losses and allow
housing requirements to be met." (Cooper, 1985, p.ll).
In consequence, capital investment, revenue subsidies and Housing Benefits
were pared back dramatically thus contributing to a build-up of a major backlog of
repairs. At the same time, the major political parties had come to accept owner
occupation as the 'natural' form of tenure. This fitted smoothly with the
Conservatives' policies towards privatisation and the creation of a 'property owning
democracy'. The stage was, therefore, set for a re-assessment of the role of the state
in housing:
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"... during a period in which the welfare state came to be regarded as a barrier to
economic recovery, where governments deliberately chose to meet the gap between
the resources necessary to finance public expenditure and the revenue actually
raised by cutting back on social services and on public housing in particular and
when there was a general loss in confidence in state intervention and its desirability
was seriously questioned" (Cooper, 1985, p.18).
In such a context, it was inevitable that council housing should experience an
unprecedented period of turbulence. Housing has borne the brunt of the cuts in
public expenditure in the 1980s with construction of new council units falling to
below 8,000 per annum. Combined with the government's 'right to buy' legislation,
this sector has experienced both a relative and an absolute decline in size and
importance, resulting in a process of 'residualisation'. In addition, there have been
changes in the characteristics of the people living in council housing and the quality
of accommodation available to them. This has resulted in a 'polarisation' of the
social characteristics of councils housing tenants. Nevertheless, the trends towards
residualisation and polarisation cannot be ascribed solely to the Conservatives as their
origins stretch back to the 1960s - they are processes which have merely been
accelerated and exacerbated, largely as a result of recent housing policy. Such a
focus on the inter-relationship between tenures means that:
"Attention has been drawn to the increasing coincidence between council housing
and what may loosely be called the relatively poor or deprived, and between owner
occupation and the non-poor. The argument is basically that, with a low level of
new building, inadequate maintenance and the sale of substantial numbers of
proportionately better quality houses, the public sector more and more provides
poor accommodation for poor households which are unable to achieve the 'normal'
tenure of owner occupation." (English, 1987, p.3).
At the same time, the debate has also moved on from discussion of the effects
of council house sales, residualisation and polarisation, to confront issues of
management and ownership of council housing in the mid 1980s and early 1990s
(see Clapham and English, 1987). The aim of this thesis is to focus on these
management questions by analysing the change in the housing role played by local
authorities in England, particularly in the last decade and secondly, to analyse one of
the main initiatives, Estate Action, which has sought to improve the situation.
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There can be little doubt that the traditional style of council housing
management has had its problems. These stemmed largely from an over-riding
concern with the production of council units as opposed to the management and
maintenance of the stock: "The almost exclusive reliance on councils as direct
landlords caused the scale of council housing to be out of all proportion to the
management skills or community needs of the local areas" (Power, 1987b, p.xiv),
Council housing undoubtedly provided scope for change and intervention. The vast
scale of council housing developments, its inefficiency and the remote style of
council housing management (Burbidge et al.; 1981) created problems such as long
delays for essential repairs, and insensitive and discriminatory allocation policies (see
HRG, 1981). Here it provided the government with the opportunity:
"... to relieve tenants from the oppression of public sector landlords whose
management style could be considered excessively bureaucratic, insensitive,
discriminatory and paternalistic. The inefficiency displayed by public authorities in
the management of their housing stock certainly provided ground for revision ...
The belief that home ownership would improve standards of maintenance,
geographical mobility and dwelling choice provided sufficient justification for a
change in tenure." (Cooper, 1985, p.113)
Consequently, criticism of the traditional housing management style formed the
justification for the proposals for smaller scale, more efficient and responsive forms
of housing management, as well as for alternative landlords. This resulted in a phase
of individual privatisation under the 'right to buy' policy which has been highly
successful, topping the one million mark within a decade. However, the government
has also explored other forms of management style and encouraged the development
of alternative housing agents such as Co-operatives and Housing Associations.
These have received an unprecedented profile as more responsive and efficient, and it
was expected that they would eventually take over responsibility for the provision of
social housing. Recently, even more radical provisions have been made by the
government enabling both the management and the ownership of council blocks or
whole estates to be transferred to other landlords such as Housing Associations,
Management Trusts, Housing Action Trusts and approved private landlords. This
has led to a belief that the government is intent on total 'de-municipalisation' for
political, ideological and economic reasons.
The reasoning behind the majority of these central policies results from
government policies regarding monetarism, the welfare state, privatisation and
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efficiency. Many councils have responded to the changed housing context and have
begun to restructure their traditional management style, organisation and
administration. There has been much debate on the merits of decentralisation along
Neighbourhood Office lines as pioneered in Walsall and Islington (Seabrook, 1984;
Hambleton and Hoggett, 1984; 1987); Housing Co-operatives ofvarlous sorts as in
Islington and Glasgow (see Clapham et al., 1987; Clapham, 1989; and Birchall,
1987); or Trusts as in Liverpool and Greenwich; and Housing Associations (See
Maclennan et al.; 1989).
These developments have been extensively analysed and evaluated. However,
with the launching of the Priority Estates Project (PEP) in 1979 and The Urban
Housing Renewal Unit (later renamed Estate Action) in 1985, central government
also started to become involved in this debate in "an increasingly exhortatory if not
directive role" (English, 1987, p.ll). This role has been increasingly one of central
government creating initiatives which attempt to work in partnership with councils in
order to improve the situation which currently exists.
This set of issues provides the focus for the thesis. - Both PEP (already well
researched and directed essentially at estate based management) and Estate Action in
particular, spring from an awareness of the problems confronting many authorities
and represent a desire to help spread new ideas and practices, as well as
promulgating central government policy. The thesis uses the example of Estate
Action in order to evaluate the government's rationale for becoming involved in
promoting certain management and ownership forms, the administrative and
procedural issues involved and finally, the effect of the initiative.
Apart from its growing significance, there are two main reasons why Estate
Action (EA) has been chosen as the focus of the thesis. First, EA attempts to
promote a wide range of management initiatives which appeal to both local authorities
and to central government. Hence, it provides a most useful example for evaluating
the degree to which both authorities and government are serious about experimenting
with and developing new housing management styles. Secondly, and as important
from the point of view of the thesis; there has been no major independent research
yet conducted on EA, unlike all the other initiatives mentioned above. Although a
DoE sponsored study has begun at the time of writing (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte),
its independence and focus is very different from that of this thesis. Given that
nothing of an academic nature has been written or published on the EA programme, a
series of specific issues are used to focus this investigation:
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• Central-local relations: EA represents a central policy directed at localities which
may not agree or approve of it. It is also directive in that resources can only be
obtained and used in government-determined ways. Local government may not
agree with the principles of privatisation or tenant consultation, but is increasingly
drawn into participation through pressures to obtain additional housing resource.
How this translates itself in terms of the relationship between EA and local
authorities, the balance of power and autonomy are central questions.
• ProcedurelImplementation issues: This issue is important because the
implementation of the initiative influences the relationship between EA and local
authorities and draws out problems which may result in inefficiencies. Charting
these tensions and developments over time reveals a great deal about how
government programmes evolve and whether governmentpolicy is actually impacting
upon authority thinking and practice.
• Management issues: central government is highly critical of the 'traditional',
centralised council management style and seeks to encourage authorities to
experiment, in conjunction with the tenants, with a variety of alternatives including
estate management The extent to which EA has influenced authorities to decentralise
their management structures, the tensions that arise from 'new' concepts such as
privatisation and whether estates are improved as a result, are thus of major concern.
• Financial issues: the general housing investment system (the Housing Investment
Programme, or HIPs) is seen by central government as being inadequate and failing
as regards 'problem' estates. The Estate Action alternative (EA HIPs) squares with,
and is a key example of, the government's philosophy of diverting and 'targeting'
resources to where they are considered (by central government) to be really needed.
This is one of several such financial mechanisms which are much discussed but
under-researched. It is important to analyse how authorities have reacted to these,
the problems and advantages created and whether a better system results.-
• Housing policy issues: this aspect relates to the government's insistence that local
services be economic, efficient and effective. The question must be addressed as to
whether this government initiative has achieved better conditions than the previous
situation. Are the EA schemes having a positive impact on the estates'] Are the
tenants, for whom the service is being provided, satisfied with the results? What
have been the wider impacts of the initiative upon housing policy, for example in
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affecting authorities' attitudes to tenant consultation and difficult-to-let estates? These
and other relevant policy issues are also analysed in this thesis.
1.2 Plan of the thesis
The above are the main themes which run throughout the discussion. The
thesis is organised into three sections. Part I reviews the relevant literature, theory
and describes the methodology employed in undertaking the research (chapters 2 and
3). In Part II (Chapters 4 to 8) the main empirical evidence is presented and
analysed. A summary and a synthesis of the main empirical and theoretical
conclusions together with the implications for policy are presented in Part III
(Chapter 9).
The nature of the subject dictates that the thesis should begin by establishing the
reasons which have created a powerful political stimulus for a shift in emphasis from
production of dwellings to a deep concern with management, investment and
ownership (Chapter 2). A series of factors are discussed which have given rise to
the debate on the alternative to council housing envisaged by the current central
administration, namely 'social' housing.
Having established the council housing context Chapter 3 moves on to analyse
the policy setting that EA operates in. The rationale for the choice of initiative is
expanded on followed by a discussion on the EA policy context, the relevant
theoretical concepts and the methodology to be employed in the thesis. The overall
hypotheses to be tested and the specific issues to be addressed are outlined.
The empirical analysis of the thesis (Part II) begins with an evaluation of the
reasons behind the formation of the EA initiative, its priorities and its aims so as to
try to pin-point the government's own motives in establishing EA, as well as the
objectives of the civil servants charged with designing and running the initiative
(Chapter 4). The views of the key agencies involved in its inception are considered.
This is followed by a review of EA's published aims which makes use of secondary
sources of information and interviews with the civil servants closely involved in
generating the initiative (EA Central and their consultants) as well as those charged
with implementing it (Regional Officers).
Given the virtual absence of data on EA, the next stage of the analysis uses a
postal survey to allow a national perspective on the EA initiative to be developed. An
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attempt is made to understand how the initiative has been received by local
authorities, how they have begun to reacted to it and how the implementation process
has evolved. This is achieved through a survey of all authorities participating in the
initiative. This was considered to be essential as there has been no independent
research data on EA. Chapter 5 analyses this national survey data.
Because of the wide range of issues discussed in Chapter 5, the next chapter
seeks to draw out the main themes that arise from the survey results. It also seeks to
push the discussion further by investigating the local authorities' belief that EA
resources are 'topsliced'; and concludes with an evaluation of the extent of EA's
success in achieving each of the stated objectives in its remit. Chapter 6 thus seeks to
present a coherent analysis of the operation of the initiative in a national context It is
a discussion based primarily on the local authorities' point of view.
This on its own, was not considered to be adequate in bringing out the main
issues and tensions which arise out of an initiative which is substantially unlike
anything which local housing authorities have been used to until fairly recently.
Such a government-inspired scheme forces hard and novel decisions to be made.
Frictions arise not only because of the unfamiliar relationships which have to be
forged but also because of the perceptions of central control. These administrative
and implementation issues are addressed in Chapter 7 through a further set of detailed
interviews with the other two crucial actors in the policy community, namely, EA
Central staff and the civil servants operating the DoE Regional Offices. Feedback is
also sought on the main issues uncovered in the survey.
Chapter 8 reviews the results of four case-study schemes selected to provide a
spread of regions, initiatives and types of authority. The purpose of the case-studies
is to illustrate the detailed issues, processes and problems identified in the previous
chapters. The chapter starts with a description of the history and context of each
estate and scheme selected. This is followed by an analysis of the existing statistical
information on the EA procedures and the management statistics on the effectiveness
of the four EA schemes. Reference is made to the effects of the schemes using both
the assessment of housing officers involved with the developments taking place on
the estates and tenant interviews, however, the latter aspect is conducted on a less
'rigid' basis. The second section analyses effectiveness by discussing the main
procedural and implementation problems in each locality (as opposed to the national
perspective) and is based upon interviews conducted with the key local authority
officers involved with EA (such as housing directors and financial programmers).
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The final section of chapter 8 analyses the effectiveness of the EA scheme in terms of
its impact upon various aspects of housing policy. In this way, the case-studies both
reflect and amplify the results obtained via the national survey, the Regional Offices
and EA Central interviews.
In Part III of the thesis (chapter 9), the overall conclusions are presented by
relating the empirical evidenceto the five objectives set above for the thesis. The
chapter synthesizes the empirical and theoretical findings of the thesis, provides some
policy recommendations and concludes with suggestions of potentially fertile
avenues for further research on the EA programme.
20
Chapter 2
Local Authority Urban Housing Management:
Past, present and future
2.1 Introduction: a turbulent period for council housing
The growth of council housing (the provision of subsidised accommodation by
local authorities) has been a major social achievement. From a position at the turn of
the century where 90% of the housing was private rented in nature, today this
accounts for roughly 8.5%. By contrast, the public rented sector soared to comprise
about 30% of the total housing stock in the mid 1970s (about 5-5.5 million units),
and rehoused 300,000 families per annum. The value of. this stock has been
conservatively estimated at £100bn (Architects' Journal, 1986).
Nevertheless, council housing is no longer regarded as a success. By the mid
1970s the ambivalence which characterised much of the post-war housing policy,
was replaced by a view that owner occupation was the natural and normal form of
tenure on both sides of the political spectrum and that the function of council housing
was to provide a more 'residual' or 'enabling' service for those who were neither able
to afford home ownership nor capable of managing housing on their own. The 1977
Housing Policy Review certainly accepted such an analysis, taking the complacent
view that the major housing problems had been dealt with and that minor problems
were all that needed to be solved (Ball, 1983, p.3). This analysis was intensified and
extended by the Conservative government from 1979 onwards, so that at the present
time, the emphasis seems to be a radical one. 'De-municipalisation', or an end to
council housing has become a feasible objective. These changes in attitude have had
a profound effect on the local authority housing role, and naturally, the combination
ofchanges in the late 1970s and 1980s has greatly affected housing policy:
"They imply a new era of council housing in which a concentration on special needs
is accompanied by a reduction in the actual size of the council stock, a nominal rate
of new building, a decline in the quality of new and existing council dwellings and
a reduction in the subsidy for council housing (but not owner-occupation) ••• It
involves a •.. rejection of the ideas of optimal public service provision and a
reassertion of the role of the market backed by a minimal poor law service."
(Murie and Loughlin, 1986, p.96)
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This chapter seeks to analyse the reasons for this dramatic change in attitude
towards the provision, management, maintenance and ownership of council housing.
It analyses each of the elements which have stimulated and reinforced these changes
in housing policy in order to context and explain the background to the development
of newer housing management initiatives such as neighbourhood offices, co-
operatives and the Priority Estates Project. This leads to a focus on Estate Action,
which is the particular initiative which forms the thrust of this thesis.
2.2 The legacy of' system-built and high-rise housing
High rise accommodation, which was widely opposed and rejected in the 1930s
and 1940s in favour of suburban estates of cottage houses with gardens, eventually
'came to be seen instead as inevitable and unexceptional' (Dunleavy, 1981, p.2).
This was predominantly because of the 'advocacy' of such a policy, in particular, the
claims that it would cut completion times, increase productivity, lower costs and so
offer hope of easing the burgeoning housing waiting lists and other problems. These
proved stronger arguments than those against, which concerned the costs of the
policy and the effect on residents of living in high-rise accommodation. These
objections were swept aside and the system-built, high-rise housing policy ran its
course. Between 1945 and 1975 about 440,000 high-rise flats were built and
approximately 3 million people in British cities were displaced and rehoused by the
clearance and redevelopment programme.
In fact, in the 1960s, all forms of high-rise were more than twice as expensive
per square foot as three bedroom houses preferred by the general public. In addition:
fl ••• over 37 percent more dwellings could have been built at no extra cost
[representing a housing gain of 78,000 dwellings at a time of acute housing crisis],
while the dwellings provided could have been on average over 30 percent larger than
the high flats actually built" (Dunleavy, 1981, p.87). This did not tum out to be a
cheaper policy than constructing 'traditional' dwellings.
The vast majority of the British population would prefer to live in a house rather
than a flat yet the great majority of the dwellings built in this period were in the form
of high flats. The residents themselves tend to be critical of theirappearance and
sterile environment and arguments exist that this type of local authority
accommodation may have unfavourable effects on families with children. Similarly,
theelderly are critical of the loneliness and isolation and this type of housing is also
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said to lead to more anxiety of safety, for example of children, and greater scope for
vandalism and crime (see Power, 1987b; Coleman, 1985).
Recently further issues have arisen which seem to have sealed the fate of this
type of public housing - at least in Britain (but see Bulos and Walker, 1987, for a
contrast with other European countries). They tended to be oppressively built at high
density with a ugly grey finish. The intense communality, the block structure and
height, the ubiquitousness of common parts that were neither clearly public nor
private and the fact that there was actually too much unused open space in these
constructions, all added to the difficulties in many of these estates (Power, 1987b,
p.142). Communal parts of the buildings such as lifts, entrances, underground
garages and the decks and bridges represented added problems as these were easily
damaged or inadequately designed and unable to stand up to the wear and tear of so
many users. The police found them hard to protect, caretakers problematic to
maintain, and residents frightening (Hough and Mayhew, 1983).
Structural defects arising from system-building techniques are coming to light,
bringing important financial implications. Apart from the issue of structural
soundness (eg. the Ronan Point disaster), certain industrial building systems have
failed to weather-proof, resulting also in poor soundproofing, as well as in
condensation and mould formation (Burbidge et al., 1981). The Association of
Metropolitan Authorities' (AMA) study 'Defects in Council Housing' found that over
£5bn would have to be spent on the five million system-built dwellings, including the
tower blocks built in the 1960s and 1970s in order to reverse the years of decline in
public housing maintenance investment as well as to bring them back into a fit and
acceptable state (AMA, 1984). This is discussed in greater detail in section 2.3.
All these findings suggest that high-rise flats are more unpopular than houses.
The social stigmatisation resulting in part from inadequate lettings and management
policies was also crucial in causing some estates to become unpopular and set in train
the cycle of decay, neglect and finally abandonment of dwellings and facilities.
Stigmatisation eventually became so overwhelming that councils had little choice but
to demolish a number of blocks and even whole estates. Liverpool and Glasgow
among other councils, have already carried out major demolitions of fairly new
housing of this form and type - very often housing which has yet to be paid for and
which is much needed.
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The perceived failure of system-built and high-rise housing and the socio-
managerial problems which they give rise to, have been important factors in helping
to stimulate a willingness to search for different solutions to the council housing
sector. It is here that some of the greatest housing management problems occur, in
the so-called 'difficult-to-let' or 'problem' estates, where the design problems are just
one element of a predicament which traditional housing management organisation,
methods and policies have been unable to cope effectively with. On a more positive
note, recent work has begun to demonstrate that contrary to normal assumptions:
"... far from high rise housing being a physical and social disaster, many of the
blocks provided satisfactory accommodation for which there was sustained demand
... It is vital that new and imaginative schemes are tried and advertised, to
demonstrate that high rise can, in proper circumstances, be appropriate and decent
dwellings." (Bulos and Walker, 1987, p.5)
Two major trends highlighted in various works (English, 1982; Clapham and
Maclennan 1983; and more recently Forrest and Murie, 1988) also have enormous
implications for the housing management task facing local authorities. These are the
fact that a huge backlog of disrepair in housing of all tenures is mounting and
secondly, the changes in the nature and composition of council tenants themselves
have quickened over the last decade. These are discussed in tum.
2.3 The changing nature and condition of the stock
"The maintenance of council houses affects not only the quality of life for the
families living in them, but also the value of the public assets involved. Yet, there
has been a history of neglect of maintenance of many of the 4.8 million council
houses in England and Wales." (Audit Commission, 1986c, p.1)
The opening statement of the Audit Commission's report, 'Improving Council
Housing Maintenance' was critical of the build-up of a backlog of maintenance work
which leads to the provision of an unsatisfactory service for tenants. The
Commission considered that there were too many areas of wastage (eg. too much
work done on an expensive jobbing basis) and called for steps to remedy the backlog
of maintenance work as: "The benefits of improved management are likely to be
substantial ... as much as £700 million a year." (Audit Commission, 1986c, p.3).
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The Commission's report endorsed the AMA's estimate of £20bn as the cost of
dealing with immediate repairs. It was also critical of local authority housing
management, such as the unrealistic rents, excessive units, administrative costs and
excessive staffing levels which co-existed with falling numbers of council houses. It
recommended that central government release £8bn in accumulated council house sale
receipts for housing capital expenditure; that local authorities shed staff; and attract
private investment in new partnership building programmes.
There are undoubtedly problems with the maintenance of council property.
Authorities are only too aware that this constitutes the biggest single tenant complaint
and that it serves as a motive for the creation of Tenants Associations (TAs) and
provides a stimulant for tenants to either buy or manage their own dwellings. The
National Consumer Council notes that the problem has been exacerbated by the fact
that local authorities have traditionally had a repair rather than a maintenance policy
and that inefficiency in local authority operation has meant that the stock has
deteriorated (National Consumer Council, 1979). Many local authorities are thus
struggling with the basic problem of trying to keep their stock in a wind and water-
tight position, let alone ensuring that it meets the needs and aspirations of tenants.
One must, however, be wary of being overly critical of local authorities as
factors largely beyond their control have helped accelerate the process of decay and
decline. A result of the 'right to buy' legislation is that predominantly the best
properties, usually houses with gardens in good locations, are sold, with the
consequence that the public sector is increasingly left with the less popular properties
(see section 2.4). This is exacerbated by the fact that housing sales are occurring at a
time when the construction defects of much mass/system-built local authority
property of the 1960s and 1970s are coming to the fore, so that many tenants
presently live in dwellings which are damp, difficult to heat and may be injurious to
health. To these must be added other problems already alluded to (in section 2.3)
such as the design and estate layout which often create oppressive and hostile
environments. Local authorities are now having to come to terms with the age of
some of their stock, particularly those that were built between the wars, much of
which is in urgent need of modernisation and renovation.
This situation has perversely coincided with an unprecedented squeeze by
central government on investment in public housing (see section 2.6.2). The
reduction in capital spending means that repair and modernisation programmes have
had to be cut back. There has also been pressure on Housing Revenue Accounts
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(HRAs) as a result of the reduction in central government subsidy, and a squeeze on
Rate Fund Contributions (RFC). This has helped force up rents dramatically which
has coincided with high levels of arrears. In effect, all this has meant that lack of
income has prevented necessary repairs from being carried out by many councils.
The combined effects of the council house sales policy, a legacy of an ageing and
often structurally unsound stock and central government restrictions on capital
expenditure are, not surprisingly, helping to exacerbate the seemingly intractable
nature of housing management problems.
The AMA's detailed study of defects in council housing concludes that the
capital cost of reversing the drastic slide in the maintenance of property would total
£19 billion:
,. £5bn on special repairs to 500,000 non-traditional houses built in 1945-1955;
• £5bn on 1 million system-built dwellings including tower blocks built in the 1960s
and 1970s, including an undisclosed sum to finance demolitions;
• £8bn on 450,000 pre-war traditionally built dwellings nearing end of 60 year life;
• £lbn on urgently needed repairs of post-war traditionally built council houses.
(A~, 1983; 1984; 1985)
The National Federation of Housing Association's (NFHA) influential 'Inquiry
in British Housing', which was chaired by the Duke of Edinburgh concluded that it
was necessary to deal with the urgent maintenance problems. It also recommended
the immediate release by central government of council house sale funds for local
authority capital expenditure and the introduction of a wider based system of rent
pooling in order to make £6bn 'available at once' to deal with the most urgent repairs
and alterations needed (NFHA, 1985). 'Faith in the City', commissioned by the
Archbishop of Canterbury, unlike the government, was not confident about the
private sector's ability to take over the local authorities' housing task and concludes:
"We can see no alternative to, and recommend an expanded housing programme of
new building and improvement financed by public expenditure." (Archbishop of
Canterbury's Commission, 1985). More generally it also recommended
decentralisation of local authority services and a complete overhaul of the system of
housing finance, including the cost of mortgage tax relief.
These numerous reports stress that council housing has been allowed to fall into
a disgraceful condition and advocate rapid change in order to arrest the downward
spiral. This unsatisfactory state of affairs has acted as a powerful stimulus for
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innovation and change in terms of management organisation and practices which
attempt to stabilise and even improve the situation by generating greater efficiency.
The development of the new housing management initiatives which begun to emerge
in the 1980s both at local and central government level (such as the Priority Estates
Project and Estate Action) testify to this.
2.4 Changing socio-economic characteristics of tenants
"Stated simply. there is a closer association between the lowest income groups in
the population and the shrinking public housing sector" (Forrest and Murie, 1990)
This section discusses what is generally termed the 'residualisation' and
'polarisation' of the public housing sector. It is now accepted by most housing
commentators that the public sector is catering increasingly for the lower income and
the most dependent groups in society such as the elderly. the unemployed. one-parent
families. long-term sick. low paid and ethnic minorities (Forrest and Murie, 1990;
Pinto. forthcoming c). This has profound implications for the local authorities'
landlord role. as the proportion of council tenants living in poverty increases and
more of them come to rely on various elements of the welfare state. In future. the
arrears case of a housing assistant is also likely to be a social security recipient. a
frequent user of health services or on a case-load of a social worker. Tenants'
problems tend to be multidimensional, therefore, many agencies may be involved in
its solution, thereby necessitating effective co-ordination between the housing
department and various other council departments and agencies such as the DSS
(HRG. 1981). The demands of groups with special housing needs such as the
elderly and the mentally handicapped are forcing housing managers into contact with
other professionals. In other words. housing departments have found themselves
drawn into a more social role and: "The increasing portion of society's vulnerable
groups who live in the public sector is putting increasing strain on housing
management and posing a challenge which traditional methods are unable to meet."
(Clapham. 1987a, p.112) These have acted as further stimuli for authorities to
develop policies and management initiatives capable ofdealing with the situation.
Although the twin problems of a deteriorating stock and the changing social and
economic status of tenants affect most of the public sector to some degree. the impact
varies from place to place. For example, the 'right to buy' is having a differential
geographical impact and is exacerbating tenure differences between areas (Hamnett
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and Randolph, 1987; Forrest, 1987). Nevertheless: "..• the direction of change for
all or virtually all local housing authorities is the same, as are the resultant pressures,
even if their weight may vary." (Clapham, 1987a, p.112). There is also a
geographical dimension to the incidence of the changes within local housing
authorities - the problems are concentrated in certain areas or estates. These tend to
be the areas with the most unpopular and badly deteriorated housing or'difficult
estates' which, because of the allocation system, are usually inhabited by the most
deprived populations (Clapham and Kintrea, 1986), and which represent 'the
residualised part of a residual sector' (Clapham and Maclennan, 1983). They are
subject to stigma and alienation from the rest of society.
The breakdown of social order in these areas and the high rates of
unemployment, poverty, vandalism and rent arrears suggest a need to alter traditional
methods of housing management which are somehow inadequate. It has also brought
to the fore the uncertainty and conflicts surrounding the council housing management
role and has resulted in its reappraisal and in attempts to change existing council
practices through local experiments. However, no consensus has emerged and three
different emphases are being pursued. The first stresses the contractual nature of the
landlord-tenant relationship and seeks to distance housing management from a social
role (see HRG, 1981); the second approach seeks to embrace the social role more
fully (such as Neighbourhood Decentralisation); and the last to devolve control over
housing management to tenants themselves, such as through TMCs (see Clapham,
1987a, pp.114-123, Emphasis Added).
2.5 Housing management: the previously forgotten issue
Council housing, once a privilege, has gradually become housing to be
avoided. Commentators contend that the council housing management system has
become:
"•.• increasingly centralised, much of it uniform and top-down, and parts of it are in
the process of breaking down. Today it is public housing which is often regarded
as slum housing; it is local authority housing departments which are frequently seen
as inefficient seemingly uncaring landlords of the poor ... we can no longer take for
granted the viability of the old housing system, with the old agenda, ideals and
methods." (Bonnerjea, 1987)
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In order to obtain a firmer understanding of why so much emphasis is now
being placed on improved public housing management (as well as alternative
landlords) and why traditional practice is so criticised by the government as well as
organisations such as the Audit Commission, it is necessary to adopt an historical
perspective which analyses the organisation and development of housing
departments; the main problems facing public housing management in Britain; and
finally, the formation of a 'consensus' on the need for new thinking and the re-
assessment of public housing management and its structures.
2.5.1 Organisation and evolution of housing departments
It is important to note that council housing management is in a unique position
in local government in the sense that the Secretary of State and the DoE have virtually
"no jurisdiction in regard to the management of the local authorities' housing stock"
(Macey, 1982, p.51), except for limited responsibilities under the 1957 and 1980
Acts. There are few enforceable standards and the government plays an advisory role
in the running of the local authority housing stock. Central government has not laid
down a framework for local government to carry out its duties as a landlord, such as
requiring local housing authorities to set up a committee to run its housing stock and
appoint housing managers. This compares with the political and legal framework
concerning other local services and has led to the argument that it is not the lack of
control and decision-making but the lack of a basic frame of operations which makes
it difficult for local authorities to operate as good landlords and managers (Power,
1987b, p.88). To understand why this is, it is pertinent to review the origins and
history of housing departments.
The first real attempt to chart the history of council housing management was
Power's work (1987) which contends that the main reason why attention to housing
management perse has been neglected, is because local authorities became landlords
concerned primarily with housing construction and finance. Little attention was
spared on how to go about maintaining and running council housing and this is borne
out by a detailed analysis of the evolution of local authority housing departments,
concentrating on a series of reports on council housing by the Central Housing
Advisory Committee (ClIAC).
In its reports on the management of council estates (especially 1945; 1953;
1955), CHAC argued that the approach to council management was too piecemeal
and disjointed because of the conflicting roles of different professional departments in
charge of housing functions. The reports also illustrated that the landlord
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management structure was remote, badly organized and unconcerned with the wider
social dimensions of the slum clearance and rehousing policies being carried out. In
the mid 1950s came even greater housing activity due to the twin policies of mass
slum clearance and construction. As flats became more fashionable, blocks became
dense and waiting lists rose dramatically. Under the intense pressure for housing,
allocations became the critical area of housing management and estate level
management was sacrificed. Landlord-tenant contact became more limited, arrears
were generated and neglected, as were repairs and cleaning.
A further report found that less than 50% of local authorities in its survey had
created housing departments and that these were normally only responsible for limited
parts of housing management such as lettings and welfare which were based in other
departments (CHAC, 1959, p.3). It advocated detailed, unitary, localised
management including door-to-door rent collection, local management control of
repairs, close co-operation between landlord and tenants, need for management
training and even called for tenant and manager involvement in housing design.
However, it failed to suggest coherent strategies for local authorities to follow.
The 1960s saw an important swing away from new housing construction in
'green field' sites and back to inner city slum clearance and replacement. A large
proportion of those becoming council tenants were from the poorer sections of the
working class and the houses they moved into were usually large new high-rise,
high-density blocks of flats, many of which were later to become the least desirable
of the council housing stock. This period of great dynamism and change was to
revolutionise the the housing management policy and structure of local authorities, as
well as to intensify the problems faced by housing management because of the
complex and weak housing management structure (see Cullingworth, 1966).
Perversely, these became almost unworkable when all local authorities were
reorganised in 1974. Housing departments expanded hugely from an average of
1,400 units per local authority to 14,000 units in 1975 thus making them even more
remote to tenants and adding confusion and unwieldy structures into the management
organisation (Power, 1987b).
The last development came with the Housing Services Advisory Group
(HSAG), the body which replaced CHACo Its report 'Organising a Comprehensive
Housing Service' was received as a progressive step towards giving more coherence
to fragmented housing management. It prescribed a central housing directorate
covering housing policy, development management, private sector matters and
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advisory issues (HSAG, 1978 and HRG, 1981, p.56). However, the Achilles Heel
of what would have been a significant development was the scale of the operation
which acted to reinforce the centralised organisation of local housing departments:
"The Housing Services Advisory Group was so concerned to advance the
unification of housing functions in a single department that it paid no regard at all
... to the urgent need to address the size and scale of the public housing stock, and
the economic and management viability of an operational unit of the size it was
proposing" (Power, 1987b, p.88).
Nevertheless, it did contribute to a search for alternative housing management
organisations which were less complex, cumbersome and slow. Thus it was only
after management problems became startlingly obvious that the preoccupation with
house-building began to dissipate and serious thought began to be given to the
management organisation and role. The current situation in many local authorities has
largely stemmed from this haphazard history and evolution of local authority housing
management structures. It has also proved a natural focus for Conservative attention
and reform.
2.5.2 The main problems confronting council housing
One of the most thoughtful and comprehensive, though sadly neglected
analyses of the problems faced by many council housing departments, is the Housing
Research Group's study of four local authorities (HRG, 1981). It is worth listing the
immediate housing problems which it identified:
• General concerns: variations in the cost of management and maintenance; levels of
rent arrears; anti-social behaviour; problem estates; and social and tenure polarisation.
• Difficulties in getting the basic work done: the cost of keeping rent arrears down;
delays and difficulties of re-letting empty council properties; over-stretched and
unreliable repairs service; difficulties in the maintenance of communal areas;
increasingly bureaucratic housing management; and the increasing but uncertain social
role of local housing management.
• Contradictions within the housing management role: large scale housing
management versus the ability to respond to individual circumstances; allocation to
those in need versus minimising management problems; easier to manage versus
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cheaper to build; higher expectations but assumed ineffectiveness; and organisational
simplicity versus integration.
• Operational problems in housing management: uncertainty for staff and tenants
about what to achieve and expect; lack of definition about certain types of work;
difficulties in supervision; difficulties for staff and tenants in contacting each other;
overloading of many housing staff; inappropriate use of staff; lack of routine
checking of work done; lack of regular 'feed-up' of information from local to head
office; and the lack of co-ordination between housing and other departments and
agencies.
• Weaknesses underlying thepractical difficulties/aced by authorities and tenants:
ambiguities in the definition of the obligations of councils and tenants and how they
should 'normally' operate; lack of standards for monitoring activities and services;
confusion over the responsibility for 'unavoidable' social problems; and the lack of
control over the quality of services provided by other departments (HRG 1981,
pp.148-155 ; and see chapter 8 for its policy recommendations).
This analysis of the management problems faced by council housing has been
substantiated and expanded more recently by a series of influential papers by Anne
Power who argues that the state of council housing has become critical because of
scale of construction, provision for the homeless and slum clearance which combine
to force upon local authorities conflicting requirements and obscure the growing
problems of management. These lie: "... at the root of the crisis and it was inevitable
that local authorities would first be overtaken by the scale of their operation and then
be prevented by the very scale from responding to the crisis it provoked." (Power,
1987a, p.7), although she later stresses that these issues were by no means sufficient
reasons for necessarily forcing local authorities to be bad and inefficient managers
(Power, 1988).
The central contention is that while local authorities did achieve many of the
post-war housing goals, they were forced into trying to provide for a variety of needs
requiring commensurably complex and varied housing management responses.
However, given their size, inflexibility, fragmentation and centralised housing
management structure, they could not provide flexible and adaptable renting styles
and systems, but being the major landlords they were forced into precisely that role.
The result was that whole groups wereeither uncatered for (eg. single people) or
allocated inappropriate accommodation (eg. families with young children in tower
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blocks). The housing service also had some unusual characteristics compared to
other services which compounded the difficulties and inhibited the development of
appropriate management organisations. These characteristics were:
• A failure to distinguish between housing administration and housing service, which
resulted in thorough administrators but poor housing managers.
• Political control to a larger degree than in other services resulted in politicians trying
to keep rents down (to retain votes), which lead to low levels of public stock
maintenance. The better off tenants moved to superior accommodation by either
exercising their 'right to buy' or by using the transfer system. The more vulnerable
households, given their lack of political power, were generally forced to accept poor
services in unpopular estates.
• Thirdly, the widespread belie/thathousing management was unnecessary. In other
words, council housing provision per se was seen as being both sufficient and the
solution. Better housing conditions would get rid of the slum problem, hence
integrated locally based housing management was considered to be unnecessary.
Staff training was almost non-existent; housing management did not offer high
professional status; and vital jobs such as repairs and caretaking were reduced and
downgraded (Power, 1987a, pp.7-18).
The culmination of all these factors was first officially identified by the DoE's
'An Investigation of Difficult to Let Housing', in terms of poor design,
discriminatory allocation procedures, incompetent management, serious lack of
demand, high turnover of tenants and general neglect of the worst estates. The
investigation concluded that the structure of housing departments was too inflexible,
too remote from tenants and too fragmented to cope with the pressures of a then
rapidly expanding stock (Burbidge et al., 1981, Vol.l). It confirmed the existence of
major housing problems and the seriousness of the state of council housing.
There is evidence in all major cities, and particularly London, that the heavy
concentration of public housing, difficulty in letting, the concentration in flats and
high levels of deprivation have all had a direct bearing on management performance
(see Bonnerjea, 1987; Duncan and Kirby 1983, p.97). But the fact that such a crisis
also afflicts the estates in smaller and relatively trouble-free authorities suggests that
additional factors also affect both the unpopularity and the problems of the
management of certain estates (CES, 1984). These include such factors as poverty,
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isolation and stigma so that there exists almost everywhere in Britain,' some form of
unpopular or neglected council housing which ends up being 'hard-to-let', or
otherwise known as 'dump' or 'difficult' estates.
There is an appreciable sense of mounting crisis in the most distressed local
authorities which has been intensified by the loss of confidence (exemplified by the
demolitions taking place and degree of staff tum-over in housing departments), which
has resulted from such recent developments as the 'right to buy' legislation, the cuts
in public subsidy and the encouragement of alternative housing agents at all costs (see
section 2.6). All these issues can be regarded as further stimuli which were to create
an atmosphere extremely conducive to change.
2.5.3 Need for re-assessment and new thinking
To summarise, the 1980s was a period when it became clear that there was an
urgent need for re-thinking and re-assessment in the area of local authority housing.
Today, housing management is not only dealing with a wider range of stock and
tenants than ever before, but for a variety of reasons, the stock is also' deteriorating
more rapidly (sections 2.2 and 2.3) and an ever increasing portion of council tenants
require some form of special response (section 2.4). This is all aggravated by the fact
that it is occurring in a period of economic stagnation. Under the impact of a severe
economic climate, the staunch commitment to increasing owner occupation, the
continuing decline of the private rented sector (see Figure 2.1 for the tenure changes
which are occurring) and severe public expenditure cuts (see section 2.6), it can be
argued that what it is happening is not merely a short term fluctuation (lIRG, 1981,
p.35). The fundamental problems are not likely to be reversed in the foreseeable
future. The public sector in general, and council housing management in particular,
have entered a new phase. There is a growing awareness that a major re-assessment
is required and that there is a need to move away from the traditional systems which
have been shown to be either unsatisfactory or unworkable. If management is to
make a significant contribution to the maintenance of the social and physical
conditions of council housing in the 1990s and to respond to the challenges set by the
new government policies, it must adapt quickly and in ways which meet the real
needs of both the tenants and the properties.
New and innovative management structures are emerging and developing (see
sections 2.6.3 and 3.1), but it is also important to stress that there is general
agreement that council housing will continue to beimportant well into the future. The
Conservatives, despite with their over-riding commitment to owner occupation and
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revitalisation of the private renting sector, no longer believe that large numbers of low
income households can, or indeed should, buy their homes. Additionally, because
households go through stages in life requiring temporary rented accommodation, it is
imperative that rented housing is provided for many different ages, social groups and
incomes (Institute of Housing, 1987).
There now exists a degree of consensus in both academic and political circles
that council housing is beset with major problems and that this crisis is not merely a
matter of resources and capital expenditure restrictions, but that the scale and size of
council management are wrong and that the monopoly local authorities exercise over
rented housing should be changed (Griffiths and Holmes, 1985). We have already
analysed the academic literature, but a political awareness of the debate has also
emerged. Tenure strategy strongly influences voting behaviour and the two main
parties have traditionally had very different interests vis avis council housing, one to
protect and preserve it and the other to reduce or eliminate it (Short, 1982).
However, with the success of the 'right to buy' legislation, Labour has had to
reappraise its council housing policy, which has converged' towards that of the
current government.
The housing debate is today dominated by questions which challenge many of
the basic assumptions underlying the last 70 years of council housing development.
Many traditional policies and practices are being questioned, including the very
necessity of council housing. The next section thus analyses in detail the factors
which have brought to a head the revolution in council housing in the last decade,
although the origins date back to long before 1979 (Malpass, 1990).
2.6 A new era of council housing
Previous discussion has tried to pin-point what is going wrong with council
housing and why the management element has been left out of the equation. This
section seeks to illustrate some of the crucial elements which have contributed to the
current state of what has been described as a 'crisis' in the council housing sector
(English, 1982; Audit Commission, 1986a; 1986b). The aim is to demonstrate that
the present government has had an explicit vision ofhow council housing fits into the
economic and social priorities of the nation. These issues are analysed below,
together with an account of the legislation enacted by the government in order to meet
itsobjectives.
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2.6.1 Conservative ideology and policy towards council housing
A Conservative government took office in 1979 seeking to transform the
British economy by a return to the values and practices of the free market. From the
Budget of 1980, it was clear that Britain had a government for which improving
living standards for families and helping the worst housed to get decent
accommodation were not urgent priorities. Rather, inflation was to be brought down
at all costs, tax on income was to be reduced, as was the whole scale of the public
sector of the economy (Donnison and Ugerson, 1982, pp.l60-163).
By the late 1970s the function of council housing was firmly relegated to
providing a 'residual' service for those who were neither able to afford owner
occupation nor capable of managing housing on their own. From the Conservatives'
ideological stance, housing should be seen as a private commodity which is best
provided through the market. The role of the state has effectively changed to cater for
the needs of this residual section of the population which cannot fend for itself in the
private market. The basic Conservative housing tenets can be seen as being rather
straight-forward: owner occupation is the 'natural' tenure; the (mass) housing crisis is
over; the private sector can, and should be revived; and the public sector is over
subsidised and too generally subsidised (Short, 1982).
This is too simple a characterisation. Conservative housing policy has evolved
and changed rapidly in the 1980s (see Minford et al.; 1987; Henney, 1985; Coleman,
1988; 1989), but since it is argued that the housing problem has basically been solved
and owner occupation is a superior tenure form, it is not surprising, therefore, that
council housing in particular has received the brunt of the public expenditure cuts
(75% in real terms since 1979), along with attempts to privatise council housing
(right to buy) and to transfer it away from local authority ownership (Housing
Associations, Tenants' Choice and Housing Action Trusts). Needless to say, such
policies have created intense opposition from local government and hostility between
central and local government (see Cochrane, 1985; Karn, 1985; Duncan and
Goodwin, 1988; and McCoshan and Pinto, 1991).
The rest of the chapter analyses the ways in which central government has
influenced council housing since 1979. It is important to bear in mind that, in many
ways, these developments represent the extension of trends established under the
previous Labour government or even before that (see Malpass, 1990). The difference
is that since the late 1980s, the emphasis has changed and become more extreme so
that the aim now seems to be an end to council housing itself. The details are
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presented below, starting with the important changes to local government housing
finance and investment as this is pertinent to the rest of the thesis (particularly the
capital element); before going on to analyse various policies which have affected
council housing significantly in the last decade; as well as those which will sculpt the
future shape of council housing.
2.6.2 Investment: financial policies towards council housing
i) The Housing Revenue Account (HRA)
Given the Conservatives' commitment to reduce the burden of public
expenditure (PSBR), it was inevitable that major changes would occur to public
housing finance. Accordingly, another subsidy system was introduced in Part VI of
the Housing Act, 1980 based on the principle of deficit financing. Basically this
means that the amount of subsidy received by an authority depends upon: an
evaluation of its annual expenditure on servicing its debt and its management and
maintenance (reckonable expenditure); and the amount which the authority can be
expected to raise from rent and rate fund contributions (reckonable income) towards
meeting the costs. Local authorities were expected to balance their books with regard
to housing expenditure and any shortfalls were to be borne by income from increased
rents and/or rates. Combined with the fact that the Secretary of State was given much
greater discretionary powers to determine subsidy levels, this legislation has been
used to reduce the general exchequer subsidies, thus undermining the main
mechanisms behind the creation of council housing, such as historic cost financing
and rent pooling (Hughes, 1987, pp.14-15). In 1980-81 the subsidy was £1,423m.
This was reduced in 1990-91 to £51Om (see Table 2.1).
By reducing the level of subsidies the finance system resulted in dramatically
increased rent levels throughout the housing authorities. Loughlin argues that the
government's objective was to destroy the historic cost financing system by using the
subsidy system to push up rents to a level nearer to current market value. Such an
objective is confirmed by the fact that: "what is essentially taking place is not a
reduction in subsidy but a restructuring of the nature of subsidies" (Loughlin, 1986,
p.l08). Thus although the housing subsidies fell by £1,000 million between 1981
and 1985, this was totally offset by the growth of income-related rent assistance
claimed by council tenants. It is worth noting, however, that because of the increase
in rents, the level of council tenant rent arrears significantly increased (Audit
Commission, 1984). But, as importantly, a powerful incentive was created for the
better-off council tenants to exercise their right to buy which thus reinforced the
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transformation of the public rented sector into a residual or targeted welfare sector
(see Malpass, 1990).
ii) The Capital Account
Until the late 1970s local authorities were largely free to set their own capital
programmes on housing expenditure, while central government generally only
exercised indirect influence via the operation of the subsidy system. However,
increasing pressure on public expenditure, high inflation and interest rates resulted in
a perceived need to rationalise public housing investment. The result was an attempt
to introduce cash limits to control public expenditure and so a system of annual local
authority bids and central government allocation began under the Housing Act, 1974.
This culminated in a major review of housing policy, the 1977 Green Paper 'Housing
Policy a Consultative Document', which proposed the creation of the Housing
Investment Programmes (HIPs). It was sold to authorities as a:
"New form of housing plan, based on a comprehensive assessment of the local
housing situation. The main element will be a reasoned capital budget covering the
local authority's own capital spending plans - related to its broad housing strategy -
for the coming 4 years. On the basis of these plans the government will make
capital spending allocations to each authority. Once the allocations are settled,
authorities will be free to go ahead with the minimum of intervention by central
government." (DoE, 1977, para 9.06)
However, there was another aspect to HIPs of crucial importance - something
which became patently obvious after 1980 under the Conservatives, namely: "... the
unprecedented degree of control which central government could henceforth exercise
over local authority housing provision" (Aughton, 1986, p.5), though undoubtedly
this was also the intention of the Labour government that introduced it. The control
of housing capital expenditure became of crucial importance in Conservative policy,
not least because housing accounts for over half the total local authority capital
expenditure. Such control was achieved via HIPs and the 1980 Local Government,
Planning and Land Act. HIPs steadily came to be used as a tool through which
central government could more easily control a steadily diminishing aggregate
housing allocation. The results are clear from Table 2.3.
Since the introduction ofHIPs housing expenditure has more than halved in real
terms, with the result that local authority housing construction has dramatically
declined since 1980 and standards are at an all time low (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1
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Table 2.1 Exchequer subsidies to local authority housing revenue
accounts (England & Wales)
Year £mcash £m at 1987-8 prices
1979-80 out-tum 1,274 2,237
1980-1 1,423 2,106
1981-2 906 1,224
1982-3 536 674
1983-4 280 336
1984-5 342 394
1985-6 409 444
1986-7 534 561
1987-8 est. out-tum 464 473
1988-9 plans 459 422
1989-90 490 432
1990-1 510 441
Source: Malpass, 1990, Table 7.3, p.141
Table 2.2 Sales and new building by local authorities
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
All sales
41,665
81,485
102,825
201,880
145,585
103,180
92,295
88,748
105,567
175,736
109,439
New building
69,734
70,824
49,407
30,176
29,823
29,185
23,478
18,532
16,089
13,705
12,201
Source: Housing and Construction Statistics various years;
andLocal Housing Statistics (1988-1989)
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Table 2.3: Localauthority capital investment
Year: HIPs: Capital Receipts: EAHIPs:
1978n9
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
£2432
£2545
£2199
£1786
£2192
£1801
£1853
£1600
£1465
£1366
£1290
£920
£413 (40%)
£393
£684
£666 ,"
£325 (20%)
£287
£316
£375
n.a.
£50
£75
£140
£190
Note: authoritieswere only allowed to reinvest a proportion
of theircapital receiptsas from 1981/82; and EA HIP only
came into existencein 1986/87 (all figures in £ millions)
Sources: Gay, 1985; HM Treasury, 1990; EA Annual Reports
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for an understanding of the tenure changes which are occurring). This is the direct
result of the fundamental changes to the housing finance system, council sales,
subsidy system and the capital controls introduced. The traditional housing finance
system had been established on the assumption that there was a housing shortage and
that local authorities had an important role to play in dealing with it. Since 1980, a
system of public housing finance has been set-up based on a rather different set of
assumptions.
There has been a switch in the balance of capital expenditure away from new
council building towards the rehabilitation of existing public and private stock.
Central government has encouraged local authorities to provide grants for the
renovation of private housing up to 90% of the costs (see Hughes, 1987). Also since
1982, authorities were no longer required to conform to detailed controls such as the
Parker-Morris space and heating standards and housing cost yardsticks (Merrett,
1979, p.l05); and finally, although authorities are awarded borrowing approval en
bloc for expenditure up to the level approved in their HIPs allocations, the project
control system requires the consent of the Secretary of State, for example in the
acquisition of land for new house-building programmes.
All these diverse elements are clearly part of the conservative housing strategy
which enables central government to maintain tight control over capital expenditure,
where the private sector is much more likely to be involved with the building work
and renovation, and where the strategy closely fits the dominant ideology of
promoting owner occupation. On the other hand, the effects of such policies have
been felt since the early 1980s implying that such trends have not necessarily
originated from the Conservative government's ideological stance - they have
undoubtedly been accelerated by recent developments, as an analysis of the HIPs
allocations illustrates.
The last decade has witnessed substantial changes to the HIPs system: cuts,
moratoriums, encouragements to spend, use of prescribed capital receipts - all of
which have undoubtedly resulted in substantial disruption of authorities' strategies
and investment programmes (see Gay, 1985). Not surprisingly, councils have
consistently over/underspent on the government's HIPs targets. Table 2.3 testifies to
the evolution of HIPs into a mechanism designed specifically to be used for short-
term financial control over public spending. If ever there were planning and control
elements to the initial system, these are now primarily control.
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The HIPs allocations have become progressively less important in housing
capital investment patterns and major distortions have become apparent. For
example, the capital receipts generated in the shires and the south (bar London) have
been very great, thus increasing their share of usable resources relative to the
authorities in the northern regions, the metropolitan districts and inner London (Murie
and Malpass, 1987, p.114). To the extent that capital receipts now prop-up the
public house investment programme (due primarily to the 'right to buy'), their
impending decline greatly threatens the housing programme since it seems likely that
as the demand for council house purchase by sitting tenants under the 'right to buy'
falloff, the main source of receipt will also decline in future. This has led the AMA
to argue that the 1988/89 allocation:
...•. will be funded solely by capital receipts, with no 'new money' being
contributed by the HM Treasury ... 1988/89 marks the 10th anniversary of the HIP
system and over that time thevalue of the annual allocation has been reduced by
78.5% in real terms." (AMA, mimeo b)
These effects will not be too severe in the short run because of the accumulated
backlog of receipts which authorities still hold, but in the long term substantial
additional new money will be needed (if receipts continue to fall off) or it will
represent a further cut to the capital programme. Consequently, the nature and role of
the HIPs system has become somewhat metamorphosed as a reflection of shifts in
central government policy and priority, not least because of major reductions in the
levels of actual expenditure.
Developments outside the HIPs system have eroded and further debased it - for
example, the selective treatment of improvement grants in 1983 and initiatives such as
the Urban Housing Renewal Unit (renamed Estate Action) which involve a totally
separate system of allocating HIPs, which is essentially a small scale version of
Block Grants (see Figure 3.2). By 1986/87, only 47% of borrowing permission
was allocated via HIPs. The remainder of borrowing approval was determined in
relation to capital receipts or held back and allocated through some other route such as
Estate Action HIPs or the Homeless Initiative among others.
The AMA calculated that by 1988/89 there was no new money in the capital
investment system - all investment came through capital receipts or the EA HIPs type
of route. In other words, while gross provision has risen over time, there has been a
redistribution of capital investment resources from the traditional HIPs system to
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capital receipts and targeted HIPs. However, despite the fairly consistent reductions,
one underlying principle behind the HIPs idea has been free from change - namely
that within the overall cash limits, authorities be free to invest in whatever they see as
the council's priorities. The procedure of withholding HIPs resources and
redistributing them through central organisations (of which Estate Action is just one)
is termed 'topslicing' and is viewed by many as yet another step towards greater
centralisation of control over housing provision:
.....within the overall borrowing limit councils have been free to invest in what they
see as the local priorities - this, of course, being one of the underlying principles of
the housing investment programme idea. Even this, however, is being changed. In
1986/87 the government held back £50 million ofloan sanction [for Estate Action]
in order to give extra cash to councils which were following its policy of selling
council housing estates to private developers. This procedure, called 'top-slicing'
is clearly another step towards overall central government control of the housing
programme." (Aughton, 1986, p.6)
This is an important issues and there has been much debate as to whether
topslicing has indeed taken place or whether the resources available to the Estate
Action programme have been 'additional'. This issue is important to EA and to wider
public finance and will be discussed more fully in the empirical part of the thesis.
Before 1977 the relative absence of controls on borrowing meant a pattern of
investment reflecting local political and professional predilections unaffected by
relative needs or any national framework. By 1987 the level of investment bore no
relation to local or national estimates of need and the pattern of investment depended
on political and professional judgements about the use of creative accounting and of
capital receipts. Allocations of permission to spend bore little relation to needs or
policies and were more strongly related to where capital receipts were greatest. The
mechanism did enable central government to effectively check the total level of
housing capital spending in the public sector (Malpass and Murie, 1987, p.l20).
Local authority investment is being channelled towards the renovation of their
own stock and improvement grants to private sector owners and, since 1983, these
have accounted for two thirds of local authority capital investment and related
primarily to purpose-built council stock. Demand for investment has mushroomed in
this area not only because of the awareness of the scale of maintenance problems in
43
the stock (section 2.3), but also because of government initiatives such as the
Housing Defects Act, the Priority Estates Project and UHRU/Estate Action.
iii) The latest housing finance legislation
It is obvious from the above that the housing finance system was in severe need
of reform, a point emphasised in the housing literature (see Hills, 1988; and Gross
and Lansley, 1981). The government eventually accepted these arguments and
submitted a proposal for reform under the Local Government and Housing Bill
1988/89. However, virtually all the ideas presented in the housing literature have
been rejected for, as Malpass argues, their authors ignored the fact that:
"In practice, over the last fifteen or twenty years, governments have shown
themselves to be much more interested in short-term feasibility than long-term
ideals, and they have been increasingly motivated by the desire to promote the
growth of home ownership and to hasten the decline of council housing. The
conclusion has to be that tenure neutrality is not the issue [of concern] and home
owners are not the stumbling block [to housing finance reform], The issue is
tenure restructuring and the stumbling block is local autonomy." (1990, p.163)
The result is that instead of fundamental reform of local authority finance,
considerations of feasibility have taken precedence and the new regime has come to
represent an extension of the 1980 system. This section briefly considers the new
developments in public housing finance.
1. The Capital side: SCAs and BCAs
From the government's viewpoint there were several quirks with the previous
system, not the least of which were: the difficulties in forecasting capital receipts and
in keeping total spending within government expenditure targets; the local authority
entitlement to carry forward a proportion of unused capital receipts which produced a
'cascade effect' with distorting consequences for local capital expenditure; and lastly,
capital receipts perversely tended to be highest in areas of least need, which did not
aid targeting (see Malpass, 1990, p.169-70). '
Under the new arrangements local authorities receive Basic Credit Approvals
(BCAs) plus Special Credit Approvals (SCAs) which set the maximum resources
which authorities can obtain through conventional methods (such as borrowing) but
the government will now be able to take account of capital receipts in deciding
individual allocations, thus aiding targeting of resources. Authorities are now
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required to use 75% of accumulated capital receipts plus 75% of the receipts for the
year in question to finance future investments or redeem outstanding debt, thus
mopping-up their reserves. It is expected that:
"In general, the impact of the new capital controls will vary from place to place, but
it is clear that the intention is to give central government much tighter control over
local authority expenditure. The application of capital receipts to the redemption of
debt will severely constrain capital programmes in many areas, but it will also have
the effect of reducing debt charges falling on the housing revenue account On the
other hand, the elimination of the cascade effect will place considerable pressure on
rents to support continued expenditure on maintaining and refurbishing existing
council stock." (Malpass, 1990, p.171)
2. The Revenue side: 'ring-fencing'
The objective is to make the whole system simpler, fairer and more effective
(DoE, 1988b, p.5-6), hence the attempt to establish a tightly defined or 'ring-fenced'
HRA so that authorities will no longer be able to make Rate Fund Contributions
(RFC's) from their surplus HRAs, representing a significant amount of general
assistance. There is thus a redefinition of subsidy which collapses housing subsidy,
rate support grant and rent rebate subsidy into one HRA subsidy to be paid to
authorities. However, this will still reflect DoE assumptions about changes in
management and maintenance and rent expenditure thus re-introducing a strong
element of central leverage on rent increases. The likely impact of this part has been
simply and bluntly stated:
"The evidence suggests that the 'new regime' for local authority housing finance
will deliver what the government wants in the short term: less freedom for local
authorities, more council house sales, lower public expenditure, and higher council
house rents. But only for a few years. Then they will think of something else."
(Malpass, 1990, p.190)
However, it must be stressed that this system has only been introduced in the
1990-91 financial year and is thus beyond the scope ofthis thesis, except to the extent
that it affects the future of the Estate Action initiative and is accordingly discussed in
that context, as the research was concluded before the details of the new legislation
had been finalised.
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2.6.3 The alternative to council housing: 'social' housing?
It has been discussed elsewhere that whereas many local authorities down-
played the importance of housing management. concentrating instead on finance and
construction. there has now been a marked change in attitude not least because of the
problems on many estates as well as because of authorities' seeming inability to adapt
their management structures rapidly enough to cope with the changing situation
confronting them. The Conservative party has for some time been stressing the value
of introducing a diversity of tenure and competition in the housing market in general
(and council housing in particular) in the belief that this would result in landlords
which actually act upon the views of tenants. while also aiding the exclusion of party
politics from the management of housing.
The original route chosen by central government was to promote the 'right to
buy' where sitting tenants were given the option to buy council properties at discount.
thereby obtaining a capital asset. In the intermediary phase the government tried to
stimulate the growth of alternative landlords to councils. such as Housing
Associations (HAs) and Housing Co-operatives. Recently, however. the government
has actually begun to question whether there is a future role for council housing at all,
with the result that large-scale, radical initiatives such as Tenants' Choice and
Housing Action Trusts have been placed on the statute book. These could potentially
spell an end to council housing of any son.
A government which when elected, had few policies towards housing other
than the need to reduce capitaVrevenue subsidies and increase owner occupation via
sale of council property, now appears to be aiming to actually replace council housing
with 'social housing' (see Roof. 1990). This would be financed, managed and
constructed by a variety of landlords (other than local authorities) including private
landlords, trusts of various sorts, housing associations, building societies and
housing co-operatives .. The final section thus analyses how these substantial changes
in attitude have come about and more importantly perhaps, what impacts they are
likely to have. This provides the context for the EA initiative which forms the thrust
of the empirical part of the thesis.
i) The initial phase: undermining council housing
1. Council House Sales
Though the sale of council housing was not by any means a new phenomenon
(see Holmans, 1987. pp.204-206), the policy proved tobe one of the most politically
controversial reforms of the 1980 Housing Act. Secure tenants of three years'
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standing acquired the right to buy the freehold of their house or the long lease of their
flat at extremely favourable terms. Although purchase price was based on the market
value, the tenant was entitled to a discount on such a value of 33 percent, plus 1
percent for each year by which the tenant's period as a secure tenant exceeds three
years, initially up to a maximum discount of 50 percent.
This package of incentives proved very attractive and in the years 1980 to 1983,
over 500,000 dwellings representing 10 percent of the public housing stock were
sold under the scheme. This led not only to a relative decline but also to an absolute
reduction in public sector dwelling numbers, accentuating the process of
residualisation and polarisation (see sections 2.4 and 2.5). Sales peaked in 1982 as
pent-up demand was exhausted (Loughlin, 1986, p.lOl) and in order to maintain the
impetus, additional incentives were provided in the Housing and Building Control
Act 1984 in the form of a relaxation of residential qualifications and the upping of the
maximum discount, whilst also extending the powers of intervention of the Secretary
of State. It has been estimated that the number of council properties sold under this
legislation has now exceeded 1m (see Table 2.2).
There seem to be several important reasons why the Conservative government
went to such lengths to ensure that the 'right to buy' became a success. It has already
been indicated that they were committed to increasing owner occupation. Council
house sales were thus important for several reasons:
The political element relates to the importance of this policy for the
Conservatives' electoral strategy, because it has proven to be popular and has
encouraged traditional Labour voters to vote Conservative. The economic element is
equally important, given that it links with the rationale of monetarist policy seeking to
reduce the size of the public sector and the burden of public expenditure. Housing
has received the brunt of public expenditure cuts as discussed elsewhere (see
Loughlin, 1986, pp.96-97). Additionally, the discounts have acted as a potent
inducement. People would not buy unless the terms were attractive, which,
combined with rising council rents enforced by the deficit finance system, did prove
to be a powerful incentive.
The ideological element focuses on tenure form and was particularly significant.
The argument is as follows: a house of your own is inherently good and encourages
independence and thrift while a large council housing sector with its large subsidies
are both a drain on the nation's resources and an unacceptable extension of state
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control (Short, 1982, p.64). While this view seriously ignores the extent of public
subsidy to owner occupation via mortgage tax relief (see Ginsburgh, 1989), it was
not surprising that the sale of council housing took on such a significance within the
Conservative party, not least because such house sales seemed to be the most
propitious way of maintaining and extending home ownership.
The main concern for the Conservatives was the balance of households in the
public and private sectors, with the result that the 'politics of construction rates' has
been replaced by the 'politics of tenure forms'. The view that the proportion of
households in the private sector is still too small persists (in 1990, 66% of the
housing stock was already owner occupied) and, therefore, housing policies have
concentrated on privatising council housing, providing assistance for increasing
levels of owner occupation and attempts to regenerate the private rented sector albeit
with minimal or no incentives.
There is little doubt that the 'right to buy' has been spectacularly successful. In
a decade, nearly one in six council tenants have bought their homes, the sales being
boosted by the:
"Government's moves to eliminate blanket subsidies in favour of targeting help on
those in need. The existing government and rate-funded subsidies to local authority
housing have been steadily reduced, whether intentionally or otherwise making
house purchase in the public or private sectors a steadily more attractive option."
(Mason, 1989, p.98)
Furthermore, the government seems to have no intention of slackening its pace
on the owner occupation front:
"Further policies seem certain to include yet more extensions to the tenants' right to
buy, more schemes to encourage existing tenants to move out of the public sector
through cash incentives in place of rebates, further shifts of the available public
sector investment from councils to non-local government agencies, and more
pressure on councils, where tenants do not want to buy, to transfer houses to co-
operatives." (Mason, 1989, p.99)
As the government tries to push home ownership as far down the line as
possible, it is inevitably those on lower incomes which are taking up the option. The
Building Societies have already indicated they do not expect (or desire) owner
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occupation to increase much more. Indeed the number of mortgage payment defaults
and repossessions have been increasing rapidly in the last few years creating hardship
and demonstrating that home ownership is not a housing panacea per se. It is
perhaps this that has prompted the government to recognise that there will continue to
be a need for some sort of 'safety net' to support those that cannot afford to buy (see
Glennerster, 1990). This recognition undoubtedly contributed to the next phase of
Conservative policy towards housing (see 2.6.3ii below).
2. Encouraging thePrivate RentedSector andRent (De-)ControZ
The amount of private rented housing in Britain has undergone a steep decline
starting in the early nineteen hundreds, when it accounted for 90% of the total
housing stock, to the present day where the relevant figure is closer to 9% (see
Doling and Davies, 1984, Table 2.2). But although this has become a residual tenure
and despite the stock's poor physical condition which tends to be older, more unfit
and lacking in amenities in comparison to both council and owner occupied housing
(DoE, 1982), the sector nevertheless occupies a crucial position in the housing
market. It is very diverse, catering for the very wealthy, pensioners, transients and
migrants. Although the great majority of private rented tenants are on low incomes,
its importance as a tenure lies in that it offers immediate access, which is particularly
important for certain households which are normally disadvantaged in the housing
market, such as single people and childless couples.
This demonstrates both the importance of a thriving private rented sector and
why successive governments have attempted to revive it albeit with little success.
The present government is no different and is urged onwards by right-wing 'Think
Tanks' such as the Institute of Economic Affairs which argue that the British housing
market has been in a tangle for generations due mainly to massive state intervention
policies which were introduced:
"... with the best intentions but have led to the worst of outcomes. We find
ourselves with too little housing accommodation of the right kind in the right
places. Moreover, there is a cost not only in terms of hardship, but in terms of a
less efficient economy, a less mobile labour force, and higher unemployment"
(Minford et al.; 1987, p.xi).
Minford et al. blame the Rent Acts, the subsidies to council rents, the subsidy to
owner occupiers through mortgage tax relief and the system of planning restrictions
on land for housing, for aggravating the situation (1987). Measures have been
49
undertaken in an attempt to de-regulate and revitalise the private rented sector via the
Housing Act, 1980 which introduced two new tenancies - 'short-hold' tenancy,
meaning a fair rent but limited security of tenure (1-3 years) and 'assured' tenancy,
meaning security of tenure but market rent The overall aim of the Act was to stop the
decline of the private rented sector by allowing higher rents, a shorter period between
rent increases and a reduction in the security of tenure afforded to the tenants (Short,
1982, p.66). In contrast to the 'right to buy', the various measures designed to
stimulate the private rented sector have had a negligible impact. Only about 5,000
short-hold tenancies had been created by 1982 (He Debate 4.4.84 c554W) and most
of these were probably the result of conversion of former regulated tenancies to short-
hold ones.
Attempts have so far been unsuccessful yet, there is clearly a need for a sector
which provides immediate access to accommodation without need for registration,
central allocation and without the necessity for a substantial deposit and intention to
remain in the district; as is the case with owner occupation and council housing. This
polarisation of tenure options has been criticised by the NFHA which makes a strong
case for two groups which are in particular need of this form of tenure, namely those
who cannotafford to buy (those unemployed, too old for mortgages, single parents,
those on low/irregular income) and which equally would not be able to afford to pay
highrents without assistance via income support or subsidy to reduce rents; and those
for whom owneroccupation is inappropriate including students, those new to an area
or temporarily there and current owner occupiers unable to cope with the full costs
and responsibilities of ownership due to age, incapacity or poverty. This category
includes a majority of the population at some stage of their lives (NFHA, 1985,
pp.24-26).
The government has indicated that it will continue to attempt to revive a
vigorous and respectable private rented sector, to relax rent controls for tenants and to
establish the 'right to rent'. However, there are considerable doubts as to how
significant rent regulation and security of tenure are, compared to the difference in
financial assistance to the owner occupied sector. Mortgage tax-relief costs
approximately £6bn and capital gains tax exemption on principal residences another
£2bn in 1988-89. It is no surprise that landlords with vacant possession prefer to sell
for owner occupation in order to maximise their income. At the same time, private
landlordism in Britain attracts no tax breaks such as depreciation allowances, tax
relief on rental income and on capital gains (Ginsburgh, 1989, p.59).
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The other method which has been used by central government to revive the
sector is the Business Expansion Scheme (BES) announced in the 1988 Budget and
enacted in the Finance Act, 1988. Its intention is to offer tax breaks to people with
spare resources and willing to put it on risky start-up ventures. However: "renting
out a block of flats hardly puts one at the cutting edge of entrepreneurial risk-taking.
Many people find the BES assured tenancy schemes distasteful - the equivalent of
Rachmanism with a tax break." (Ginsburgh, 1989, p.60, quoting from The
Guardian, 15.2.1989, p.16). It is far from clear whether all these measures will be
successful in reviving commercial landlordism on any scale let alone contain the
decline without a major reform of housing finance (The Guardian, 16.2.1989, p.5;
Whitehead and Kleinman, 1986).
ii) The intermediate phase: alternative agents
1. Housing Associations (HAs)
HAs have a long history in Britain but only began to expand rapidly following
the creation in 1964 of the Housing Corporation specifically to develop and promote
associations; and the Housing Act, 1974 which signified a degree of support from
both political parties for this form of tenure, also establishing a generous subsidy
(Housing Association Grant of 80-90%) for such schemes. The present government
has come to accept the need for an intermediate form of tenure and now sees HAs as
the main vehicle for the future construction and management of social housing - even
taking over former council property:
"Our new policies put housing associations on centre-stage. We see them as the
major providers of new subsidised housing for rent and as possible alternative
landlords for dissatisfied council tenants." (Speech by David Trippier, Minister at
the DoE, reported in Voluntary Housing, February 1989)
The government's commitment to the value of this tenure as a potential
alternative to council housing is so great that it has even taken the step of re-
classifying HAs as belonging to the 'independent' rented sector despite the degree of
public subsidy necessary to make them viable. In such a climate HAs have expand at
such a rate, that they are already building more homes (22,200 in 1987/8) than the
council sector (15,300) which has seen its capital allocations severely curtailed in the
last decade. However HAs remain a small tenure both in terms of number of
properties (630,000 versus 4.4m in the council sector) and the overwhelming
majority of the 2,OOO-odd HAs are very small (Housing Corp. Factsheet, 1989);
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Associations are non profit-making organisations. They have traditionally
housed those in need, but the government was clearly attracted by their specialist
nature and the absence of party politics. Additionally, they were lauded as models for
housing management, being small, locally based and apparently well-suited to the
climate of housing opinion. As 'problem' estates became more widespread, so
practitioners became more interested in models of intensive and localised management
structures as well as increased tenant participation, although a recent report by the
Centre for Housing Research questions this assumption:
"Good management performance and low costs were not the preserve of a single
organisational type, and similarly for poor performance and high costs."
(Maclennan et al., 1989, Para 9.4).
This begins to illustrate the problem faced by government. While it has clearly
come to rely upon this tenure to push forward with its 'intermediate' policies, HAs
are not necessarily the most appropriate vehicle for its housing objectives. This will
be tested following the introduction of the 1988 Housing Act which has restructured
association finance. They are now responsible for setting their own rent levels on
new tenancies of all sorts; all their new tenants are assured tenants; and since April
1989, the level of grant is fixed at the start of the scheme and will be funded by a
mixture of public and private finance. The ratio of public subsidy varies according to
region and type of development but averages at 75%.
It remains unclear whether HAs will be able to raise the necessary resources
from Building Societies, Banks and the City at favourable terms because these
financial institutions know little about them and they are not helped by their small and
fragmented nature. It is likely that HAs will look to merge or build consortia in order
to raise the necessary private capital. Additionally, rent levels are expected to rise (as
they are currently doing even though still subject to Fair Rents). While Housing
Benefit may insulate the unemployed, it does little for those on low income and will
begin to affect the others as the Housing Benefit is restructured and further eroded.
Consequently, it is likely that the HAs 'advantages' (of being small scale and in
receipt of generous finance) will change as the new legislation forces them to merge
and become more commercially minded. The likely expansion of the sector will, in
all probability, be modest and their main route for fast growth lies in the
government's encouragement for them to offer themselves as alternative landlords to
local authorities under the Tenants Choice (see 2.6.3iii below). However, HAs have
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not shown themselves to be overly keen on the idea and remain concerned that the
new financial regime may push up rents and undermine their traditional role of
housing those in need.
While relationships with local authorities have not always been smooth, the two
have worked together in providing new homes. The government's proposals for
Tenants Choice threatens such links. This has placed HAs in an invidious situation
between meeting tenants' needs, central government policies and long term
relationships with local authorities. The NFHA has responded by stating that it will
not support transfers unless there is a majority ballot vote, the authority is not
opposed to the proposal and adequate resources will be available to deal with the
necessary repairs (HA Weekly, 20.1.89, 'Tenants Choice and Housing
Associations'). Another side-effect of the Housing Act, 1988 has been to encourage
voluntary transfers by local authorities of their housing stock to HAs. 'There are good
reasons for doing so as this would protect their stock from predatory landlords,
ensure their ability to meet their homelessness requirements and enable such housing
to be freed from the capital and revenue constraints operating on the council housing
sector.
This cautious reaction has not gone unnoticed by the government or its
supporters who have made it clear that unless HAs become more pro-active, the
Government will seek other agents more willing to promote its policy of
diversification of tenure (David Trippier, Minister at the DoE, reported in Voluntary
Housing, February 1989; and Coleman, 1989). There are already those who argue
that HAs should not be the only choice and that: "In putting so much emphasis on
housing associations, the Government may be refloating Local Authority housing
under a new flag of convenience but on the old sea of public money" (Coleman,
1988, ppAO-41). Nevertheless it would be very optimistic to expect HAs to rapidly
obtain a much larger share of housing tenure than its current 3%. In the meantime,
local authorities will continue to be constrained from providing much new housing
for general needs while their waiting lists and homelessness continue to expand, as
well as from spending sufficient amounts' on repair and maintenance. The
government has instead sought to encourage authorities to tum their decimated capital
investment programmes into their existing stock via the PEP and EA programmes.
2. PriorityEstatesProject(PEP) and EstateAction (EA)
In an attempt to combat decline and having become convinced of the value of
localised management, the DoE established PEP in 1979 in an effort to develop a
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model for integrated estate based housing management. PEP brought about major
organisational changes (radically different from the centralised local authority housing
structure), in which all functions are organised within a locally based team and where
control and decision-making is vested in the local project manager. Political and
central management control is only exercised over broad areas of policy resources and
monitoring as opposed to day-to-day decision making (see DoE, 1987c).
Many local authorities have experimented with the initiative. Local offices must
be in control of four basic management functions: repairs and communal maintenance;
tenant liaison; rent control; and lettings as this would offer a more manageable scale
of operation, an integrated service, direct dealing between the residents and housing
workers, scope for initiative and decision making and power to deliver. Given that
many public housing estates were in a desperate situation: "there was a willingness to
relax normal procedures and bureaucratic ties with the centre." (Power, 1987a, p.29)
It has been argued that such an initiative could transform housing estates. A
survey was conducted in 1984 of 20 local estate management schemes, three of
which were PEP estates. It suggested that PEP did result in impressive
improvements in landlord/tenant relations; protected investment in such estates;
responded to tenants' priorities; local management of repairs, rents and lettings was
popular, efficient and cost effective; rent arrears were contained; local care-taking and
autonomy was important; the local housing office acting together with the police and
residents were essential in reducing crime and social abuse; that such projects were
'affordable' and: "brought> about substantial cash savings. No local authority
questioned the value of investing in local management." (Power, 1987b, p.239-240;
1984).
PEP is no panacea. There are severe limitations to the estate based approach. It
requires intensive input and outside support; it is an impermanent one-off intervention
(model) with DoE consultants for a limited period of time; it has no legal or financial
framework; it is hard to disentangle the local organisation from the centre (ie, the
council); and it is based on insecure finance (requiring cuts and reorganisation at the
centre). Estate budgets can be used creatively and innovatively but they are also
potentially a tool for increased inequality and disadvantage where they are used to
force poor estates to pay for the whole structure of costs (Bonnerjea, 1987, p.37). A
further limitation is that it is aimed almost exclusively at management. Its objective is
to make the worst estates more viable housing communities with better services by
changing the bureaucracy. However, this does not change wider housing policy,
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choice and opportunity; whereas the socio-economic problems are deep-set and
cannot be resolved simply by changing the style of' housing management.
Nevertheless, because of its achievements, PEP has served as a model for other
authorities and housing initiatives to build on.
The government's second major venture in trying to encourage changes in
management as well as ownership, is through the Estate Action initiative which can
be seen as an evolution of PEP. This is the subject of the thesis and is analysed
thoroughly. Suffice it to say at this stage that Estate Action was set-up to encourage
authorities to try to improve their most difficult estates through the use of alternative
management styles and forms of ownership, with an element of 'targeted' DoE
financial support.
iii) The more radical- phase: de-municipaIisation?
The latest phase was signalled by the 'Housing Bill, 1987 which proposed
markedly different changes to solve the problems facing council housing. As Mason
argues, the: "Conservative housing policy has developed through what appear to have
been a series of uncoordinated responses to unrelated events ... it is only recent
policy initiatives that appear deliberately intended to bring an end to municipal
housing." (1989, p.98)
Three reasons appear to have influenced this' changed attitude: first, "the
dramatic and unexpected success of council house sales, with its side-effect of
reducing the potentially damaging electoral impact of adopting radical policies;
secondly, central government's growing lack of confidence in local government; and
the increasing use [by councils] of their housing stock as a weapon in the party
political battlefield" (Mason, 1989, p.98).· Regardless of the reasons why central
government has chosen to press for an end to council housing, there can be no
denying the powerful nature of the instruments enabling the transfer of the housing
stock out of council control. Two significant proposals have been carried into law
with minor modifications, namely Tenants' Choice (TC) and Housing Action Trusts
(HATs). A third method of privatising large portions of council housing exists via
the Voluntary Transfer (VT) of blocks, estates or even the entire stock to other
landlords or private developers.
1. Voluntary Transfers (VI')
This power was first initiated under the 1986 Housing and Planning Act and
the 1988 Housing Act elaborated on how councils can dispose of some or all of their
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housing stock. Under VT, no requirement is made of local authorities to consult the
tenants affected (other than offering alternative accommodation), although the
Secretary of State must be satisfied that the tenants support the developments. Most
councils interested in pursuing this option have used the balloting arrangements for
TC as a means of presenting evidence of tenant support. This voting system is highly
controversial because at least 50% of all those balloted have to vote 'No' to stop a
transfer since abstention is effectively counted as a 'Yes' vote.
This technical problem has acted as a hindrance for many authorities who have
gone as far as to consider and implement this option. The crucial difficulty is that
when VT goes ahead, tenants who voted 'No' or abstained will also be obliged to
transfer to the new landlord (unlike the TC mechanism - see below). In spite of these
concerns, three authorities have so far transferred their entire stock to newly-created
Housing Associations because of two key advantages: firstly, the government's
financial restrictions have starved them of resources. Though VT authorities can
circumvent centrally determined capital borrowing restrictions for new construction or
refurbishment of the existing stock. Secondly, voluntary transfer to Housing
Associations is regarded in some quarters as a mechanism for both retaining and even
expanding the supply of rented social housing. These two issues may persuade many
other councils that limited scope presently exists for the expansion of social housing
under their own control and that VT may be a better option, especially if selective
transfers of stock can be achieved which also meet tenants' aspirations. VTs are
likely to be of small but growing importance in the future.
2. Tenants' Choice (TC)
Introduced in Part IV of the Housing Act 1988, this piece of legislation extends
the rights and choices given to council tenants (in 1980 through the the Tenants'
Charter and the 'right to buy'). Potentially the most powerful instrument available
under the Act, tenants individually (in houses) or collectively (in flats) can choose to
transfer their existing homes to another landlord. Independent landlords must be
approved by the Housing Corporation as 'appropriate' (viable and competent) social
landlords before they may take over council housing stock. The choice is determined
via a voting system whereby non-voters are assumed to be in favour of transfer,
possibly because the Government may have anticipated lack of interest from tenants.
The government's immediate aim via TC is to give more choice to council
tenants who either do not wish or cannot exercise their 'right to buy'; and to expose
councils to competition which might result in a better standard of services. For their
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part, local authorities are primarily opposed to the policy because of their desire to
retain their housing stock. They worry that 'ring-fencing' may have been designed to
force up rents and to encourage tenants to opt out of council control either exercise
their 'right to buy' or through 'I'C,
Nevertheless various factor may inhibit tenants from making widespread use of
TC. Unlike the 'right to buy', there are no potential cash benefits to the tenants - only
the likelihood of steeper rents imposed by relatively inexperienced landlords. It is not
surprising that tenants have not been keen to transfer, not least because as Glennerster
et al argue, this choice is largely non-existent. There are in fact few capable (or
willing) landlords to pick from. Additional problems arise from the fact that an
individual's choice can run against a neighbour's; most residents are likely to vote for
the status quo; and because ownership confers power that ensures landlords' rights
rather than tenant choice (1989, p.22). The measure seems to be more about taking
stock out of council control than about presenting choices to tenants, but public
housing will continue to be privatised as local authorities, central government, private
developers and housing associations seek a transfer of ownership, subject to the
tenants'veto. It seems unlikely, however, that TC will progress at the rate that the
government may have anticipated. Other inhibiting factors include the fact that:
"A number of surveys have found majorities of tenants expressing a desire to
remain with their councils. Evidence also suggests that many councils are making
efforts to meet the needs of their tenants, seeking their tenants' views and
improving services. If this is the case, the Act may be seen as having acted as a
successful catalyst." (Rao, 1990, p.9)
3. Housing Action Trusts (HATs)
Sections 65-92 of the 1988 Housing Act contain strong powers enabling Trusts
appointed by the Government to take over large patches of the 'worst' council
housing, renovate them (with £125m set aside for the programme over three years)
and transfer them to alternative private landlords. The objectives ofHATs are to: take
over council housing within the designated area; repair, modernise and improve the
stock; improve the living conditions and general environment of the area; and secure
diversity of tenure.
An analogy can be drawn with Urban Development Corporations (such as the
London Docklands Development Corporation) as the Trusts will take over estates for
five years without any obligations or accountability to the local populace. This is
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justified by the government by appealing to the fact that the size of the areas
concerned and the magnitude of the problems have been beyond the capacity of
authorities to handle. The government maintains that housing authorities will be
relieved of their most difficult housing stock which will enable them to concentrate
their efforts and resources on the remaining stock.
Because of the mounting public concern and lobbying about the lack of
provision for a tenant ballot on whether they want a HAT to be imposed in their estate
or not, following a late amendment by the House of Lords, the Act now includes the
right for tenants to vote against the HATs and for designation to be conditional upon a
'Yes' vote. An irony is that while HATs are in principle for the benefit of the
residents, the tenants themselves are vociferously campaigning for the de-designation
of their estates. The tenants' main concerns are that there will be fewer homes
following demolitions and refurbishment, that homes will be sold to developers who
will try to attract higher income households and that homes will be re-let at
unaffordable rents. They also remain worried about other factors such as changes to
the conditions of tenure, the 'right to buy' and other tenants' rights.
Indeed the reaction has been such that as the HATs campaign has progressed, it
has become clear that the Government not only badly misjudged the costs involved,
but also the climate of tenant opinion, their degree of activity, organisational abilities
and unwillingness to transfer out of council ownership. Plans for all six sites
originally earmarked for HATs (Lambeth, Leeds, Sandwell, Southwark, Sunderland
and Tower Hamlets) have either been dropped or rejected by the tenants.
That is not to say that the idea is now totally defeated. Tenants in Hull have
voted for the creation of the first HAT and Labour-run Liverpool City Council has
endorsed the concept by asking the DoE to examine the possibility of of setting up a
HAT in its area (The Independent, 3.4.1991, p.2). In addition, the Government may
simply choose to transfer the HATs resources to Conservative controlled councils
which may be more willing to entertain the transfer, resulting in further privatisation
of municipal housing. On the positive side, however, councils are now fully aware
that the survival of social housing rests on their support. It is to be hoped that this
will encourage local authorities to provide an even more responsive and effective
housing service to tenants.
To summarise this section, the government has been concerned over time to
move away from any reliance on local authorities to provide social housing. This ties
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in with their monetary. ideological and political policies but has taken time to evolve
to its natural conclusion. The government has come up with a plethora of initiatives
aimed at increasing tenant choice of tenure. however. all of them seem to be aimed at
actually reducing the size and power of council housing. In no circumstances do
councils have the opportunity to actually increase their housing stock, even if
community charge/rate payers were willing to accept it.
However, the dismantling ofcouncil housing is not necessarily going according
to plan. The 'right to buy' has been extremely successful but will increasingly
involve tenants in the poorer properties. locations and increasingly flats. The
Housing Associations will not be able to expand as quickly as the government might
have hoped and are unwilling either to increase their rents rapidly or take-over estates
from unco-operative councils. HATs have been a decided flop, TC has been limited
and tenants remain nervous about private landlordism. particularly where the prospect
of rising rents is extremely likely as a consequence. Lastly, VTs of stock have been
few, nevertheless. there are no grounds for complacency. Local authorities' best line
of defence must be in attempting to improve their housing service, to be responsive to
tenants and to actually involve them in the decision-making process (Pinto,
forthcoming b). However, even this may not be enough in the long term if they are
financially constrained from responding to tenant wishes. In the meantime, the
housing situation is set to deteriorate further.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter has been concerned to set the context and demonstrate the reasons
why the last decade has been so turbulent for housing authorities. The council
housing role has been redefined in the 1980s and for a variety of reasons, the concern
has shifted perceptibly from an emphasis on 'the numbers game' to a commitment to
the provision of a service to the client. Crucial within this is the realisation that, in
providing a good quality housing service, management must be at the forefront. This
has resulted in a variety of attempts to develop new, more effective ways of owning
and managing public housing.
This is a message which many authorities are already aware of and actively
pursuing. However, it is also something which government, through PEP and Estate
Action in particular, has sought to disseminate. With the emphasis on management
go other messages relating to efficient use of resources, tenant consultation and also
ownership by other organisations and landlords. It is for these reasons that EA has
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been chosen as a key example to analyse in order to determine the effects of this
commitment to a new style of council housing management. The next chapter
introduces Estate Action in greater detail and locates it within its policy context,
describes the main issues which the thesis seeks to examine and then concentrates on
describing the methodology to be employed in carrying out the empirical part of the
thesis.
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Chapter 3
Policy Context and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
,The previous chapter illustrated the difficulties arising as a result of a complex
set of factors: emphasis on owner occupation, the 'right to buy' and other powerful
anti-council housing devices, resource squeeze, rising rents, deterioration of housing
stock and a transformation in the socio-economic characteristics of the tenants. In
such a context, local authority housing has come under severe criticism from the
political as well as the academic front, much of which has concentrated on
authorities' traditionally centralised management structures and remote procedures
which seem unable to respond quickly and effectively to the needs of their clients.
This has prompted local authorities to become generally more open to initiatives
which place the tenant at the forefront while also introducing more effective housing
management structures (Clapham et al., 1987). Examples are co-operatives (LHU,
1987b), decentralised organisations such as neighbourhood offices (Hambleton and
Hoggett, 1984; Seabrook, 1984), and a variety of other initiatives (LHU, 1987a).
This state of affairs has also presented difficulties for central government
policy. On the one hand there is a belief that council housing is badly managed, that
scarce resources should be diverted towards resuscitating the private rented sector,
that a new 'social' housing sector should be generated which includes housing
associations and co-operatives and lastly that owner occupation remains the best
tenure form. On the other hand, there is an obvious and proven need for greater
public expenditure directed towards the housing sector. The symptoms are there for
all to see after decades of neglect (sections 2.3 and 2.4). However, the government
remains committed to its policy that public expenditure should be tightly controlled
and that home ownership should continue to be stimulated. In an attempt to
overcome this dilemma, its response has been to develop several new strategies:
i) Privatisation through three main agents: volume builders, building societies and
home owners. The housing problem is seen as being the inadequate resources and
the government's aim has been to supplement and/or substitute state spending with
private funds, thereby also generating further opportunities for owner occupation
through disposals, renovation and re-sale of former council property (Brindley and
Stoker, 1988).
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ii) A second government response has been to reinforce and commendthe work of
the Priority Estates Project (PEP) which, as we have seen, is based on a
decentralised management structure, but which has tended to emphasise the
management problems rather than the physical problems, and thus does not requirea
large injection of newfinancial resources (Cantle, 1986, p.80). The PEP approach is
selective and concentrates both staffand financial resources into smallareas together
with assistance from the police, social services and additional resources from the
UrbanDevelopment Grant (seePower, 1984; 1988).
iii) The last strategy, Estate Action, combines the previoustwo elements whilst also
makingan increasing proportion of housing capital investment resources (EAHIPs)
available to local authorities. Estate Action (EA) gives improvement allocations to
councils in return for a commitment to improve their management of estates and
decentralise. It alsoencourages local authority involvement with theprivate sectorin
order to renovate estates. EA's remit, as statedwhenit was launched by Sir George
Youngin June 1985,is as follows:
• To identify authorities andestates where newinitiatives can be pursued;
• To develop new or relativelyuntried solutions to the problems facing these [run-
down] estates, including transfers of ownership and/ormanagement to management
trusts, involving tenants, or to tenants' co-operatives;
• To encourage authorities to adopt, where appropriate, one or more of a range of
existing disposal solutions suchas:
i) salesof tenanted estates to private trusts or developers;
ii) salesof emptyproperty to developers for refurbishment for saleor rent;
• To encourage authorities to improve the management andmaintenance of theirown
estates by establishing local autonomous estate basedmanagement schemes on PEP
lines;
• To adviseministers of the needfor newmachinery, incentives or legislative change
to promote the full rangeof solutions; and
• To providea reporton progress bythe end of June 1986(DoE, 1985a).
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The EA Unit has been in existence since 1985. yet unlike the other two
strategies and in spite of its increasing importance to housing authorities (a number of
which now receive over half of their housing investment allocation viaEA HIPs).
there has been virtually no research conducted on the government's intentions or to
assess its contribution and its effectiveness - except for the DoE approved Coppers &
Lybrand Deloitte project which remains to be published. It is. therefore. upon EA
that the rest of the thesis focuses. The next sections will add detail to the initiative.
analyse relevant concepts which impinge upon an understanding of the initiative and
describe the methodology to be employed in evaluation. The evidence is presented in
subsequent chapters.
3.2 Policy context and nexus of research
Estate Action (originally called UHRU - the Urban Housing Renewal Unit),
attributes crucial importance to certain issues and was originally targeted only on
'problem' estates (see section 6.2i for EA's methodology in selecting estates). The
archetypal UHRU/EA solution 'package' would include the following:
"The key ingredients are a responsive, comprehensive and effective local
management ..• including the development of tenant management cooperatives to
encourage the fullest possible tenant involvement ... we encourage local authorities
to involve the private sector in the upgrading process, both to generate additional
resources and to widen the tenure mix." (DoE, 1986, p.6, Emphasis Added)
Whenever such opportunities existed, EA would also encourage the disposal of
empty dwellings and in the case of tenanted dwellings, the Unit would explore the
scope of disposal to trusts or co-ops (DoE, 1986). EA was thus intended to benefit
local authorities whilst also fulfilling central government policy. We have discussed
that since 1980, local authorities had seen their HIPs allocations reduced sharply
while capital receipts became increasingly the normal method of capital allocation
(section 2.6.2). A key element was thus that EA would appeal to authorities by
enabling more capital resources to be targeted (through EA HIPs) to run-down
council estates. The programme was also intended to encourage local authorities to
continue experimenting with various 'new' management options which, as discussed
above, many were already showing signs of being interested in. Authorities could
bid for EA HIPs (as opposed to the normal annual capital allocation or illPs), but
this had to be accompanied by DoE defined 'new or relatively untried' management
options such as employment initiatives and estate based management.
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The EA initiative had much appeal for central government Research at the DoE
had identified the scale and nature of problems in certain council estates (DoE, 1978;
Burbidge et al., 1981). Also, the government's policy of selling the most desirable
property through the 'right to buy' legislation, the difficulties of growing
unemployment up to the mid 1980s and the widening of the distribution of income,
all exacerbated the problems on run-down estates. The government was probably
very aware of these problems even if it could not acknowledge them (Glennerster,
1990). Through EA, the government could be portrayed as responding to the
management and maintenance situation in the most problematic sector of council
housing where local authorities were seen to have failed. At the same time it created
another avenue for privatisation and diversification of the council housing stock
through various disposal solutions.
In terms of government's monetarist policy towards public expenditure, while
the DoE gained control of which schemes proposed by authorities were acceptable,
central government did not actually provide any additional resources via grants. The
rapidly escalating EA HIPs (£50m; £75m; £140; £190m; and £280m), was merely
borrowing approval given to authorities (if their bids conformed to EA criteria) on
top of the HIPs annual capital allocation which authorities then had to borrow from
private sources in the usual way. The amount of EA HIPs was decided on an annual
basis according to a government decision of what extra resources the country could
afford and it had to be allocated and spent within the financial year. Controversy has
raged as to whether EA HIPs resources are 'additional' as implied by the Treasury or
merely 'top sliced' (or withdrawn) from the annual HIPs allocation and redistributed
to authorities through EA (this is discussed in Chapter 6). A further point to note is
the fact that EA HIPs is one of several financial 'targeting' mechanisms being
employed by the DoE (see Figure 3.2) but which are totally unresearched. It is
hoped that the issues and lessons leamed from an evaluation of the EA initiative may
beof use for the other ones.
From the discussion above it will be evident that the EA system involves
several different agents. The Treasury decides the EA HIPs allocation annually and
requires that such resources be spent within the financial year. EA Central (based in
Marsham Street) formulates policy, oversees and co-ordinates the whole process and
makes final decisions on bids submitted by authorities for schemes to be funded with
EA HIPs. Nine DoE Regional Offices and the Merseyside Task Force, prioritise
their authorities' bids for schemes seeking to utilise EA resource, liaise with local
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Figure 3.1: EA agents and the policy context
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Figure 3.2: DoE calculation of HIPs and targeted credit approvals
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authority officers and monitor schemes. The Local authorities (through various
departments including housing, finance and architects) consult tenants, generate
bids, erect and implement successful schemes. The council tenants themselves and
the Tenants' Associations are expected to be fully involved and consulted and finally,
the DWs or contractors actually undertake the work. Additionally the private sector
may be involved in partnerships to renovate properties or authorities may contact
their associations in an effort to influence the operation of the programme. These
interactions are fully illustrated in the Figure 3.1. There are two stages in the
application process (Forms A and B) requiring increasingly detailed information; a
Quarterly Financial (C) and an Annual Assessment Form (D). This gives an
indication of the degree of co-ordination, complexity and cost involved in generating
EA proposals. Even if bids conform to EA criteria and receive support, the allocation
must be spent before the end of the financial year or the allocation reverts back to the
Treasury.
The following section seeks to develop the discussion by analysing the various
concepts which seem valuable to such a system of interactions between central,
regional and local government.
3.3 The conceptual issues: central-local relations
Stripped to its core, the main issues of concern from a conceptual stance relate
to the nature of the relation and interaction of the various agencies and organisations
that form part of the EA initiative. It is the operation of these organisations which,
therefore, determine EA's success or otherwise in achieving its goals. In this case
the key actors are considered to be the EA Central team based at Marsham Street, the
Regional Offices of the Department of Environment (DoE), the local authorities (and
the various departments involved in generating and implementing EA schemes) and
the tenants and their representative Associations. This pre-determines the nature of
'relevant' conceptual frameworks which enables us to make sense of the complex
interactions and relationships between the various agencies which eventually give rise
to EA schemes.
Most perspectives on central-local relations start from the position that there has
been a steady process of centralisation of power away from the locality in most local
services. It is held that this has been occurring for the last 20-odd years but that it
has greatly accelerated in the last decade under the Conservative government and that
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this process of centralisation of local autonomy is well exemplified by an analysis of
the developments in council housing:
"Historically, in centre-local tensions over the proper role and functions of local
government, housing has always been particularly sensitive. It has been a focus of
conflict since 1979. In the last decade the development of housing legislation and
the use of legislative powers by central government to control local government
housing activities have reflected the crisis in the relationship between the two."
(Rao, 1990, pA)
It is argued that the government has employed three principal strategies:
• Housing finance has been centralised (developments in capital and revenue finance)
• Alternative housing agencies have been encouraged (such as Housing Associations
and Tenant Co-operatives, which are non-elected and can be more easily controlled
by the centre)
• Increased central compulsion (exemplified by the 'right to buy' and HATs). For a
fuller discussion on the centre-local issues and housing, readers are referred to Karn
(1985); Duncan and Goodwin (1988); and Pinto (1991b). There are several key
models which may be employed to conceptualise these developments. These are
analysed below.
3.3.1 The traditional view: agent or partner
Until the mid 1970s, the conventional wisdom limited discussion solely to the
relationship between central departments and local authorities whilst maintaining that
this relationship took two different forms. Under the 'agency' model, local
authorities implemented national policies under the supervision of central
departments. In the 'partnership' model, both were seen as co-equal in the
relationship. There was thus a tendency to view central government as both
homogeneous and monolithic and it was assumed that the relationship had shifted
from partnership to agency primarily due to the financial dependence of local
authorities upon central government. This process was much criticised as
undermining local autonomy.
This orthodoxy was challenged in the mid 1970s because of the accumulation
of a number of findings which could not be incorporated into the existing framework
(for a detailed critique see Rhodes, 1981, chapter 2). Research into policy areas
where central and local government were in conflict demonstrated the problems faced
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by the centre in obtaining compliance as well as the capacity of local authorities to
resist central control and maintain their own policy objectives. Growing evidence of
the key role played by professionals in policy-making, various linkages between
central and local government and the centre's limited ability to achieve detailed policy
control also contributed to the dissatisfaction with the limitations of the orthodox
framework culminating in the establishment of the Social Science Research Council's
research initiative on central-local relations in 1978. This research was also inspired
by an awareness of the changing pattern of service allocation responsibilities; the
increasing size of local authority expenditure on public services despite coinciding
with the onset of a period of recession; and the increasing politicisation of local
authorities, as reflected in the changing attitudes towards local policy-making held by
central government, political parties and the public (Houlihan, 1988, pp.9-1l).
3.3.2 The Dual State Thesis
This concept proceeds on the basis that the state in the modern society cannot
be analysed as a single cohesive entity. The scale and scope of state activity in all
developed nations has expanded dramatically in the Twentieth Century. It has
assumed an increasing range and degree of responsibilities and has become
organisationally more complex. The state apparatus has fragmented into different
branches, elected (eg. local government) and non-elected (eg. civil servants, boards
etc), all responsible for implementing many aspects of social policy. This is what
enables tensions and conflicts to arise, themselves exacerbated by internal differences
within each branch.
Conflicts within the state may thus occur both horizontally, between different
branches of state apparatus, and vertically, between different levels within each
branch (Saunders, 1984, p.23). This suggests that analyses which rest either on a
reduction of local government to central state or on a reduction of local political
struggles to class categories, should be rejected. Since these involve different
functions, modes of interest mediation and different ideological priorities, local
political processes must be analysed by means of theories and categories which are
distinct from those which are applicable to processes at the national level, hence the
rationale for developing a dualistic theory of British politics (Saunders, 1984).
Rather, the state has two main functions: social investment and social
consumption. State intervention at central level relates primarily to the politics of
production and proceeds through a policy process of corporatist mediation
functioning primarily in the interest of capital (e.g. via investment in physical
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infrastructure). At the local state level, however, activity is geared primarily towards
the social consumption aspects of state provision, which are consumed individually
by the population as a whole or by sections of it (eg. health care and housing
provision). Such policies are developed through competitive political activity at local
level and address themselves at issues of social rights and needs.
The interests at the centre are primarily those of production (such as industrial
and financial capital) whereas at the local level interests cut across class lines and are
formed on the basis of specific and locally based consumption classes (e.g. council
tenants). There exist tensions between the two functions because increases in social
consumption via, for example, increased taxation may have negative effects on
private profitability. This may give rise to a 'rationality problem', as well as a
'legitimation crisis', as state intervention and a belief in the needs and rights of
individuals conflict with private property and the market principle.
These two political processes can be distinguished along four main dimensions
(Table 3.1). The organisational dimension is the most fruitful of these bearing in
mind the particular issues to be addressed in the thesis, however, this is only briefly
discussed since this part of the theory borrows heavily from Rhodes' work
(discussed in section 3.3.3 below). Saunders basically accepts Rhodes' argument
that government organisations at the central and local levels relate to each other; that
these form part of a wider environment which includes other organisations; and that
dominant groups must mobilise their power resources (constitutional, financial etc) to
achieve their objectives. This means that local authorities are neither agents of the
centre nor partners with the centre, but are rather lociof power which is mobilised in
relation to power exerted by the central authority (Rhodes, 1981, p.24).
The Dual State Theory has stimulated a great deal of debate and criticism by
Marxist as well as non-Marxist writers (such as Duncan and Goodwin, 1982;
Rhodes, 1988; Dunleavy, 1984; Flynn, 1986). Saunders himself has acknowledged
the degree of criticism as being wide-ranging, identifying and responding to some
common critiques such as that: the elements cannot or should not be separated; the
thesis is ethnocentric and ahistorical; and problems of empirical application (1986).
The following quotation is indicative of the reaction and leads the discussion
neatly to an analysis of the structuralist contribution to the debate:
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"This work has been of vital importance in highlighting the specificity of the local
level, and in arguing for a conceptualisation of the local state that is based primarily
on its 'uniqueness' and on its separation from the centre ... but for us the approach
is still fraught with problems." (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988, p.35)
3.3.3 Uneven Social Development
Despite Saunders' criticism of class-based theories, a major contribution to the
debate has come from Marxist geographers (see Duncan and Goodwin, 1982;
Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray, 1985; and Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) who
have grappled with the inadequacy of the concept of the unitary state. The starting
point of this argument is that local service variation is a crucial determinant of central-
local tension. Turning to public housing, the consequence of this argument is that
there is also variability in housing production, distribution and consumption and that:
"In all this, variations over time and space are argued to be particularly important.
As such, 'states' and 'localities' (not 'state' and 'locality') are key themes •.• a
central objective is the search for an explanation of the causal processes at work
determining housing provision, accounting for state activity (or the lack of it) and
producing different outcomes in different localities." (Dickens et al.; 1985, p.xi)
The above illustrates that like the Dual State Theory, Dickens, Duncan and
others also start from a position that there is no such thing as the unitary state. It is
thus necessary to look at localities and local states as well as central government. To
understand the process of housing provision one must analyse not only state policy
regarding consumption but also production and participation or protest at the local
level. Duncan and Goodwin contend that policy autonomy is inherent in the very
idea of local government (for otherwise there would be no point in having it) but that
other studies have generally been too based on quantifiable variables, political factors
and have 'lacked any conceptional framework which could link government and
external social relations' (1988, p.xv).
Their argument is that national variations in the housing situation conceal huge
sub-national variations and since it is in the local authorities that decisions are taken
over housing provision, these have to be analysed. Given their theoretical
perspectives, the focus of attention is the balance between capital and labour - 'the
varying strength of labour might provide a key in explaining variations in housing
provision both nationally and locally.' (Dickens et al., 1988, p.8)
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According to this view civil society allows three sorts of practices: the social
relations of circulation, reproduction and social intervention. Examples of what these
comprise include housing tenure, housing as a vital element for the domestic
economy and voluntary organisations such as tenants' associations, community
groups and political parties which seek to intervene in housing production,
circulation and consumption. There are also other features of civil society which are
important: firstly, it is highly differentiated by generation, gender, ethnicity, religion
and spatially, and secondly, while it is essential to capitalism's existence, 'this
plethora of social practices is partly, and to a varying degree, independent of
capitalist production- it may even threaten the latter' (p.13).
The operation of civil society in conjunction with its interaction with state
institutions is of crucial importance. This is where the 'local state' fits in because
apart from providing local administration, state institutions must manage, respond to
and transcend local class relations and other local social relations since civil society is
unevenly developed and, therefore, spatially differentiated. Dickens et al. place
particular stress on one dimension of civil society, namely the spatial or locality:
"It is unrealistic to suppose that local variations have no local effects, and they
might be important in understanding local housing conflict for instance. But more
serious than this, national level analysis in isolation could miss specifically local
mechanisms, local social processes, which help produce social change in particular
places. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that even national policy changes [such
as housing policy] have been fundamentally affected by sub-national social
relations." (p.l?)
So the argument is that uneven social development and local states are linked
both because space can affect social processes and because social processes
themselves are uneven. A local social process refers to something active and specific
to localities (but not necessarily unique to them) rather than local deviations to
national level processes such as local action, local consciousness, local culture, local
history and such like. A national process is not merely the average of a mass of local
ones, but should apply to all areas in practice. A 'locality' demonstrates not only a
degree of variation> it refers to a socially defined unit distinguished by active and
specific local differences in causal process.
These arguments have been illustrated by analysing three housing actions
(homelessness and squatting in Brighton; private property rights and legal action in
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Crawley; and rent increases and collective action in Crawley - Dickens et al., 1985)
and this analysis is then extended by Duncan and Goodwin (1988) to cover a larger
spectrum of issues under the headings of centralisation of policy, centralisation of
finance and rate-capping and abolition. The conclusions are that local social relations
and the nature of local state institutions are of critical importance in influencing the
nature and focus of the housing action, mainly because of the inability of local state
institutions to adequate respond to, and meet, local demands. Secondly, they argue
that local social relations are significant in generating a collective form of action and
that each example must be understood as something with a complex pre-history and
with wider implications for housing consumers and the shape of housing
consumption.
Therefore, to sum up these subtle and complex arguments, it is worthwhile
quoting the proponents at length:
"... conceptually more important than state institutions, which are in themselves
empty and without power, are the social relations of a particular state. These social
relations are, in tum, an expression of the social forces in a society at a particular
time and in a specific economic, social, political and ideological context ... This
suggests that what the state does over the housing question hinges on the struggle
in and around a particular state ... The housing question itself will vary over time
and space according to changes in state power and activity, state social relations,
and ultimately the wider balance of social forces. Housing consumption is a central
component of the housing question and also a very problematic process.
Ultimately it dissolves into issues of power and access and control of scarce
resources. In tum, these are issues of social relations between people, social
groups and institutions. Such issues often, by their nature, involve tensions and
conflict." (Dickens et al., 1985, p.234)
At the end of the thesis we return to discuss the value of this concept, based on
the experience of the EA initiative. The next section deals with the notion of Sub-
Central Government which became the dominant paradigm in the central-local
government debate of the 1980s and early 1990s.
3.3.4 Sub-Central Government
Rhodes has been at the forefront of the resurgence of research into central-local
relations in Britain (1981) and in 'Beyond Westminster and Whitehall', he presents a
re-conceptualisation of the study of Sub-Central Government (1988). The meso-
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level of analysis is of particular relevance, the basic argument being that there are a
large number of governmental and political organisations at the sub-central level of
government with a range of relationships and that the concept of 'policy networks' is
useful in ordering the plethora of links and searching for regularities in the
relationships. This model of inter-governmental relations is presented and an attempt
is made to demonstrate the relevance of the concept to an analysis of the EA initiative.
i) Organisations and agencies (micro level)
The contention is that the behaviour of individuals or organisations is not
merely a product of their environment and that they can influence their environment
in varying degrees. The micro level of analysis involves exploring relationships
within and between these, and the 'power dependence' framework analyses relations
between central government and local authorities - it emphasises the game-like nature
of the links, the resources of participants and the rules of the game, strategies and
appreciative systems conditioning their exchange. Such a framework is argued to be
applicable to intra- and inter-network relations (see Rhodes, 1988, pp. 87-94).
Central-local relations resemble a 'game' with both participants jostling for
advantage, deploying the resources (financial, hierarchical, constitutional-legal,
political and informational) at their disposal to maximise influence over outcomes and
trying to avoid becoming dependent upon the other. An organisation's resources
must be deployed effectively in order to realise the potential for power based on the
rules of the game and the choice of strategies. The rules ofthegame are those which
set the limits within which discretionary behaviour can take place; and the strategies
(eg. bargaining, incorporation, confrontation, persuasion, and incentives) are:
..... the means for imposing upon other organizations an organization's preferences
concerning the time of, conditions for, and the extent of the exchange of resources.
An organisation which effectively deploys its resources will maximise its scope for
additional manoeuvre (or discretion) and be able to choose amongst the various
courses of action and inaction." (1988, p. 43)
Table 3.2 classifies the various individual actors and agencies operating at the
level of the Sub-Central Government while at the same time adapting it for the
purposes of EA, thus demonstrating that these meso/micro-level issues can be
'applied' to an analysis of the Estate Action initiative.
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Table 3.1: The four dimension of the duals state thesis
Dimension Class Politics Sector politics Tension
Organisational Central Local Centralised direction versus
local self-determination
Functional Production Consumption Economic versus social
Corporate
priorities
Political Competitive Rational planning versus
Ideological Profit Need
democratic accountability
Private property rights
versus citizenship rights
Source: Saunders, 1984
Table 3.2: Estate Action: organisations and actors
Organisations Actors
1) The 'centre' [Westminster and Whitehall]
Central departments [Treasury;DoE: Estate Action]
2) a) Territorial ministries [n.a. EA applies only to England)]
b) Intermediate instititutions [DoE Regional Offices]
c) Non-department bodies [n.a./peripheral ego NFHA and HC]
d) Local government [81 EA local authorities]
e) Sub-central political organisations
i) Political parties [Labour; Conservative; Alliance]
ii) Interest groups [private sector renovators; LAAs; DLOs; TAs etc]
iii) Professions [DoE=civil servants; LAs=housing, finance etc]
Source: After Rhodes, 1988, p.88, Table 2.4
Table 3.3: Authorities visited and interviewed at pre/survey stage
Brent Newham Birmingham Middlesbrou
Greenwich Southwark Bolton Gateshead
Hamsmith & Ful Tower Hamlets Dudley Salford
Kensington & Chel Wandsworth Knowsley Sandwell
Islington Westminster Langbourgh Sheffield
Lewisham Leicester Wirral
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ii) Policy Networks (meso level)
Policy networks are defined as a 'complex of organisations connected to each other
by resource dependencies and distinguished from other ... complexes by breaks in
the structure of resource dependencies' (Benson, 1982, p.148). Rhodes uses the
concept, noting that it is possible to distinguish a variety of policy network in Britain,
such as professionalised communities. The main policy network of relevance here
are the 'Policy Communities' which are characterised by stability of relationships,
restrictive memberships, high degrees of vertical interdependence based on shared
service delivery responsibilities and insulation from other networks (as well as from
the public and parliament to some extent). Such a description closely fits the Estate
Action initiative (see Figure 3.2), for if one analyses the various agencies involved in
Estate Action, these clearly form part of a policy network. Professions are important
(such as civil servants, housing and architects) as are inter-governmental networks in
the shape of LAAs. It is interaction within the policy network which is of crucial
explanatory value.
Since the centre controls resources and has many strategies available (such as
legislation and coercion), policy networks are not necessarily a constraint on central
government and can be manipulated in the government's interest. The relationship is
asymmetric. Additionally, the centre has a multiplicity of interests and policy
networks may be based on a department or a section of a department, each with a
distinctive style where the relationships are shaped by the 'departmental philosophy'
(Rhodes, 1988, p.82). This diversity is matched by the range of interests within
central government. The 'guardians' (Treasury) seek to restrain expenditure while
'advocates' comprise such service spending departments and policy networks which
have a direct involvement with the services of Sub-Central Government, as well as
those which have no such involvement. The DoE, being responsible for local
government acts both as 'guardian' in the negotiations about local government grant
and as 'advocate' for the services over which it has responsibility - this omits the
particular interests associated with a specific policy initiative. So to the range of
policy networks, it is necessary to add a parallel and profuse range of interests.
Central level interests relating to Estate Action may be described thus:
Treasury==>Ministers/Star Chamber==>DoE==>Housing==>Estate Action
The analysis of policy networks presupposes that they have a key impact on
policies but Rhodes recognises that policy is both a dependent and independent
variable and that the analysis of policy networks cannot be limited to an analysis of
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process - it must encompass policy content which is conditioned by the two-party
system. Ministers are both heads of bureaucracies at the heart of policy networks
and leaders of majority parties. Policy networks have not supplanted party political
channels of communication and influence whose effects are all pervasive. He
suggests that if policy networks are closed, the party is one of the means of prising
them open and the fluctuating relationship between the two is central to
understanding the sources of inertia and innovation in the policy process:
"SCG became the locus of conflicts rooted in multiple social cleavages, and the
politicization of local government began to pervade central-local relations. SCG
politics became the politics of Westminster and Whitehall." (Rhodes, 1988, p.84)
The consequences (of the politicisation of local government) includes the
revival of municipal socialism (the new urban left); rejection of local government's
'responsibility ethic' in favour of the politics of confrontation; and the militancy of
unions reacting to 'cuts' in public expenditure, privatisation and limitation of union
power among other things. Policy networks can, therefore, act to constrain the
government's ability to respond to the changes in Sub-Central Government:
"The very existence of policy networks caused certain policy-making processes and
outcomes. A product of the welfare state, they had a vested interest in, and helped
to fuel, its continued expansion. In an era of economic decline, they resisted
political pressure for cuts: a bulwark of inertia ... Total expenditure continued to
rise •.. [and] only housing of the major welfare services experienced a 'cut' in
expenditure in real terms." (Rhodes, 1988, p.8S)
The contention is, therefore, that the various policy networks are characteristic
of Sub-Central Government and exploring this variety involves examining the
relationships within networks, the process of exchange and the rules and strategies
governing resource transactions.
3.3.5 The Housing Policy Community
The discussion in section 3.3.3 has not been applied specifically to the housing
context. Houlihan explores the characteristics and complexity of the relationship
between central and local government as it has developed in housing policy, focusing
on the main linkages between the various levels of government such as the
professions, agencies and consultative bodies and their impact; and the relationship in
terms of the problems of policy implementation:
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"Only by combining analysis at these ... levels [of individual actors within
organisations, the organisations themselves, and the wider social structure] can an
adequate theory and understanding of the relationship between central and local
government be provided which takes sufficient account of the complexity and
ambiguity in the relationship." (Houlihan, 1988, p.56)
He highlights certain inadequacies in the Rhodes model, in particular the fact
that while a focus on resource dependencies is an important first step in the analysis
of the policy sector which aids understanding of the linkages that bind members
together (and thus explaining particular network configurations), the framework
seems unable to go beyond this. The way forward is to use an approach which
focuses on the linkages through which resource dependency relations are mediated
and articulated. This has the advantage of drawing attention to the processes which
characterise the pattern of exchange and the way in which relationships are structured
and managed.
Few communities have discrete boundaries so the aim is to understand the
community through an analysis of the background and roles of the main members.
Theformal roles are those publicly adhered to while the informal ones are those roles
acquired and developed primarily as a result of intra-organisational and inter-
organisational relations within the network. Such roles include integration (important
as complexity increases and involves the integration of organisations into a
community), leadership (setting of public goals, organising the community and
controlling entry), resource acquisition (a prime need which includes finance and
clients and legitimacy: both at individual organisations and at community level) and
bridging (linking the policy community to the wider social structure). Community
survival and effectiveness are dependent on the fulfilment of the four roles; and
behaviour of members will be influenced by a variety of factors such as
organisationaVsurvival interests, interest groups, resource dependency relations and
links to sources of power outside the community (Houlihan, 1988, p.88). Within
this policy community, certain sources of ideological influence (political parties,
professions, non-state voluntary and private organisations and other contiguous
"policy communities) are identified, as are seven linkages in the policy community
(see Figure 3.3). The network of EA-related organisations (Figure 3.2) can be
considered as a policy network which fits neatly into Houlihan's conception of the
housing policy community.
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Figure 3.3:The national housing policy community.
and the nature of the links
Professions
FC FC FC
Local Authority
Associations
DoE
B
Regional DoE
B
T
P
Contiguous PolicyNetworks
FC IP
Key: Form of Basis of Character ofRelationship Relationship Relationship
B Bureaucratic Convention, Relatively clearly defined;
legislation predictable; regular; frequent
T Technical Sharedexpertise Continuous, narrowlybased
and ideology
P Formal Requirements Periodic; cyclical; oftenstrong
Professional of plan financial element
IP Informal Sharedinterests Irregular; Frequent
Professional andproblems
IC Informal Information Irregular; infrequent; often
Consultative tansmission strongly political
FC Formal Information Regular; oftenovertly political
Consultative exchange
Party Broad consensus Infrequent; not alwaysconsensual
Political ideology
Source: Houlihan, 1988,Table 4.2 and Figure4.1
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1) Bureaucratic: for example the 1980Housing Act, specifying rules, regulations and
defining the rights and duties of the organisations. However: "Although
bureaucratic linkages are basic to central control over much of local authority housing
policy they are difficult and expensive to sustain ... As a result there is a strong
incentive to develop other linkages" (1988, p.78), such as the use of specialised
experts to make judgements based on technical grounds.
2) Technical Linkages: this refers to the increasing use of Policy Planning Systems
such as HIPs which operates at the centre-local interface. There was originally a
strong emphasis on comprehensiveness of problem analysis and search for solutions,
forward projection of costs and policies, priority setting and performance reviews but
these are now used as a weapon in local authorities' bids for resources (Houlihan,
1983; 1984). Policy Planning Systems involve an acceptance of the significance of
technocratic data, a reduced involvement of non-professionals and the centralisation
of problems as decision-making moves closer to a technocratic rather than political
process. They also impose an obligation to provide supporting information that
enables a greater degree of external monitoring of local policy.
3) Formal Professional: professional officers have acquired a central role in Policy
Planning Systems due to the high level of data and statistics required in, for example,
HIPs. The main professionals involved are planners and housing officers, but may
be led by a 'stronger' profession such as accountancy or law, the dialogue being
essentially a professional one. They are also important in linking central and local
government.
4) Informal Professional: this refers to personal contacts between the local authorities
and central departments, predominantly via the Regional Offices. It is important in
shaping perceptions of each other. It serves as a channel for the provision of
information and advice about policy implementation and to acquire information about
local problems and successes. It operates at two main levels of contact i) middle
management of the local authority and concerns interpretation of rules and regulations
and ii) at senior or chief officer level and concerns discussion of problems of mutual
interest. Regional Offices (ROs) are keen to maintain personal contact as it softens
their image and they get to meet the implementing officers of, for example, Estate
Action or the HIPs programmes.
5) Informal Consultative and 6) Formal Consultative: there are various degrees of
formality ranging from the six monthly or quarterly meetings of the Housing
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Consultative Council (HCC) and the Consultative Council on Local Government
Finance (CCLGF), to the periodic meetings between local authorities and regional
officials. The least formal are the common meetings organised by Regional Officers
to promote policies involving authorities in their region. More formal are the Local
Authority Associations (LAAs) which maintain regular contact with DoE ministers on
a wide range of issues. The most formal is the CCLGF, which like the HCC
meetings, has declined in importance but has managed to survive because both
parties see the meetings as a valuable forum for information exchange, where policy
priorities can beexpressed, local authority responses monitored and matters of policy
interpretation and implementation pursued.
7) Party Political: such links include those which operate through' the national
organisation of the parties and, secondly, those that involve Ministers and LAA
representatives. Both major parties have opportunities for the representation of the
interest of their councils and councilors, but these links have received little attention.
As for the LAAs, despite their privileged access based on party connections the
central problem remains whether they really do result in greater influence (Houlihan,
1988, pp.75-85), nevertheless, these constitute the final linkage in the range available
within the central-local network.
3.3.6 Summary of ideas
This section has been concerned with trying to provide a conceptual backcloth
to inform the thesis. It has involved analysing the various concepts which impinge
upon the initiative under discussion: the traditional conceptualisation of 'central-local
relations' swinging from a 'partner' role for local government to an 'agent' status; as
well as the view of the centre as homogeneous and monolithic has been criticised.
The Dual State Thesis points out crucial flaws in such literature in general, and the
state theory literature in particular, namely that it is incorrect to diagnose the local
state as a mere extension/agent of the central state. This line of argument has also
been pursued within the structuralist framework by Dickens et ale who also belive
that it is not sufficient to analyse housing' policy at the national level. Their
contention is that local social relations and the nature of local state institutions are of
crucial importance and that the human world of action is temporal, spatial and located
in unique circumstances which give a specific action its character.
The Dual State Thesis argues that the analysis must besplit into the production
processes (a function of the centre) and the consumption processes (a function of the
local state) and both of these are further differentiated according to the political,
81
structural, ideological and organisational dimensions. The latter is particularly useful
as a framework or background for the thesis but the relevant parts are mainly derived
from Rhodes' concept of the Sub-Central Government which, like Saunders, argues
that there is no such thing as an unitary state. It is made up of a multiplicity of
organisations where even central government is split into departments and sub-
departments, below which is the sub-central government. An argument is presented
as to why this framework is relevant" and why the concept of 'policy communities'
may be pertinent to research on the Estate Action programme, but that the links
between the various actors and agencies within policy communities are not
adequately articulated.
The work and perspectives of Houlihan adds to Rhodes' conceptualisation of
'policy communities' and transforms them back to the issue of public housing in
Britain. This approach is used as the main set of concepts relevant for the
interpretation of the empirical findings of the thesis. The intention is to return to
these conceptual issues in the final chapter of the thesis. The rest of this chapter
discusses the methodology employed in conducting the empirical work.
3.4 Methodological issues
Having introduced EA, its explicit objectives and its policy environment, it is
now possible to move on to define the aims and methods used in the thesis. There is
an extremely problematic and changing situation facing local housing authorities
(Chapter 2) and there have been a variety of initiatives to try to improve the
management and maintenance of these areas which have concentrated on 'difficult'
estates (such as Housing Associations, Tenant Management Co-operatives, Trusts,
HATs, neighbourhood offices, PEP etc). Each of these, however, either involve
local authorities solely (except PEP) or are aimed at a specific method, style or
organisation of management. EA is different. It intimately involves both authorities
and government, encourages a variety of innovative management styles and
ownership forms and places tenants at the forefront of proposals. EA also involves
central government resources and local authority investment whilst encouraging a
third dimension, namely private sector involvement and funding.
It is, therefore, an initiative which is a useful surrogate for evaluating much
central government housing policy, as well as how authorities are responding to the
new pressures and opportunities being presented to them. Naturally, the thesis does
not hope to provide enlightenment on all areas of government housing policy.
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Rather, it seeks to identify the interactions necessary in establishing EA-funded
schemes; how its objectives were established; how authorities have reacted; the
effects on local housing programmes, priorities and policies; what tensions and
difficulties arise in meeting the challenges facing council housing by using the
initiative; and lastly what lessons can be learnt and applied as a result of the research.
In line with the main objectives of the thesis discussed in section 1.1, the rest of the
work is translated into the following format:
• the origins and formation of the EA initiative, its appeal to central government and
the civil service (DoE); and the reaction of its policy community (Chapter 4);
• the operation and implementation process involved (Chapters 5, 6, 7)
• the advantages and disadvantages that result from such a policy (Chapters 5, 6, 7)
• the outcomes/effectiveness (Chapters 6 and 8)
• synthesis of the main conclusions and theoretical implications (Chapter 9)
To this end, and given the specific environment within which the EA initiative
operates, it is important at this stage to describe the methodology employed to enable
the rest of the thesis to concentrate purely on the evidence itself. It is clear from the
discussion above that EA is a relatively novel subject area which operates at three
main levels: central (EA/Treasury/Cabinet); regional (DoE Regional Offices); and
local (housing authorities in England). An approach was thus necessary which could
provide substantial first-hand information on the complex interactions at these levels.
In the end it was decided that it would be appropriate to use both intensive and
extensive explanatory tools.
Given the paucity of data, a national survey which could incorporate all the
authorities participating in EA was essential to elucidate general patterns and issues.
However, questionnaires lack the depth and explanatory power which is provided by
employing interview techniques and these are, therefore, used primarily to pursue the
more important issues brought out by the survey analysis. Semi-structured
interviews are employed within the case-studies and it also proved to be the most
appropriate technique to conduct the research at the regional and central levels. The
fact that there are relatively few DoE Regional Offices (to); EA Central officials; and
case-studies (four), made such a strategy feasible as well as allowing for depth and
complimentarity. There were several stages in the research and there is thus a
balance of extensive and intensive methodologies throughout the analysis which
'feed-off one another, thus generating a large body of original material which, it is
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hoped, yields high explanatory power. The sequence of the research is now
described briefly:
• unstructured interviews with local and central agencies, housing researchers,
academics and professional staff. These were intended to amplify the knowledge
obtained via the literature review or the published information, to the actual operation
of the EA initiative. This formed the basis of the next structured stages;
• a national questionnaire survey;
• semi-structured interviews with the ROs;
• semi-structured interviews with central agents including consultants; and finally
• case-studies comprising semi-structured interviews in four localities.
3.4.1 The preliminary stages
The first stage consisted of reading all the existing public information which
relates to EA (Annual Reports, DoE Circulars, press cuttings and PEP Guides - see
DoE, 1987c), however, the only method of obtaining an authoritative understanding
of the initiative was to interview informed individuals at all levels. Accordingly a
series of visits and interviews were conducted to discuss the initiative with the
Central team, DoE consultants, DoE Regional officers charged with liaising with
local authorities, local authority associations and representatives, housing
professionals and researchers, as well as the local authorities themselves by
approaching the housing officers co-ordinating the EA schemes (see Table 3.3).
This enabled a comprehensive picture to be built up of the situation since 1985 and
the main issues were identified for inclusion in the national questionnaire.
It was considered necessary to approach local authorities directly with an
original survey in order to investigate the extent to which local authorities were
interacting with EA, gauge the range of innovative management initiatives being
investigated and implemented and to examine the nature of the relationship between
EA and local authorities. Given the rapidly evolving nature of this initiative, it was
imperative to capture aggregate data for all the authorities so as to evaluate its success
and generalise on its evolution and achievements.
3.4.2 A national questionnaire survey
i) Piloting the survey
'Piloting' was considered to be essential to ensure that the survey draft was
logical and representative of the relationship with EA and the situation as it exists; to
assess whether all the objectives of the survey would be obtained; discuss
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presentational issues; and to eliminate any remaining ambiguities and superfluous
questions. Variousmethods were utilised. Two surveyswere mailed to respondents
who simply noted the queriesand relevantpoints; two were mailed and the reactions
noted via telephone; in one case the questionnaire was posted, completed and the
individual was later interviewed; and in threecases, the questionnaire was pre-mailed
and the respondents interviewed as they worked through the survey, discussing
points in an interactive manner.
Their opinion was that the survey would be sensible with some minor
modification of categories for conciseness and clarity. All authorities insisted that the
high degree of structuring in the survey was the best approach to adopt as it made the
survey quicker to complete, provided consistency of response and reduced
ambiguity, however, they insisted that authorities should have the opportunity to
express themselves if their experience deviated from the 'normal' situation. An
'other' category was thus added to all the appropriate questions, together with space
for comments. Pilotingalso revealed that the originalsurveywas too long and might
have compromised the response-rate becauseof the amount of detailed information
requested. Certain sections were condensed but the questions requesting detailed
information such as dates and finance were retained because they werejudged to be
worth running the risk of obtainingpartial/non-responses,
The type of information requested was primarily of a subjective nature
(requesting opinions rather than 'hard' data) for important reasons. Firstly, many of
the developments in the EA in~tiative seemed to be informal in nature, therefore,
authorities' perceptionswere valuable. There was also a trade-off betweenthe level
of detail, the type of information requested, the time necessary to respond and the
resulting response-rate. It was decided that a structured approach would work best
in this particular case with an opportunity for authorities to rank the importance of
their responses. Most importantly, the thrust of the survey as an EA evaluation
exercise was in any case, subjectivein nature. More detailed output measures were
also sought when appropriate. For example, 'hard' data was sought on capital and
revenue costs to authorities in implementing such schemes and the number of staff
involved. In the schemeevaluation section,objectivemeasureswere also sought but
this was constrained by the lengthand detailof thequestionnaire.
Based on this process, a set of issues were selected for inclusion in the
survey. Because of the lack of alternative data and researchon EA, the issues
selectedcame mainly from the preliminary unstructured interviews conductedwith 10
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local authorities participating in the EA initiative. It was, therefore, likely that the
issues addressed in the survey would reflect the concerns and priorities of those
interviewed at the time. -This means that in some sections of the survey (such as the
disadvantages of the EA initiative) may be 'loaded'. With hindsight, the advantages
listed in the survey could have been more extensive, however, because of the lack of
alternative information at the time, the survey reflected the knowledge and experience
that was available. In an attempt to 'balance' the survey, the 'pilot' was also sent to a
DoE Regional Office and the comments and suggestions were also incorporated.
ii) Circulation of survey
The final survey (see Appendix 1) was then mailed to all authorities concerned
(EA presently covers England), together with a cover letter outlining the independent
nature of the research, the reasons why it was being undertaken and promising a
report of the survey's main findings to all respondents as a quidpro quo. This was
sent to Housing Directors requesting for the survey to be passed on to the appropriate
officer co-ordinating their involvement with EA, as it proved difficult to identify
these individuals in advance. The relevant addresses were obtained from the
Municipal Year Book listings.
While there were 87 authorities which had been involved with EA and which
had been successful in receiving EA HIPs (between 1985 and 1989), the survey was
actually circulated to a total of 81 authorities because six authorities had only received
EA funding for Homeless Initiatives. This was an issue with which the thesis was
only peripherally concerned (as opposed to the management style and ownership
forms) and it was decided that these authorities could be excluded without unduly
damaging the thrust of the surveyor the analysis.
Initially only 20% of the authorities responded and subsequent investigation
revealed that a large proportion claimed that they had not had sufficient time to
complete the survey. An equally large number had not actually received the survey
or it had not reached the appropriate individual. This was in part because the surveys
had gone 'astray' and partly because several housing departments had changed
location, but the primary reason was that the postal strike of September 1988
intervened and many of the questionnaires were lost.
,
iii) Response-rates
The survey was re-circulated to all the non-respondents and a 50% response-
rate was achieved. This was not considered satisfactory given a population of 81
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authorities, so substantial effort was devoted in 'chasing-up' the large number of
authorities which had indicated the intention of completing the survey but which had
not done so by the dead-line. This proved to be the most frustrating stage of the
thesis involving a good deal of 'coaxing' over the telephoning before closing the
survey on the 20th of December 1988. Nevertheless, this was a period of critical
importance to the thesis, for it allowed time to continue the process of visiting and
interviewing authorities in order to gain an understanding of changing circumstances
to the EA set-up; different authorities' approaches; their experiences and schemes; as
well as augmenting the response rate and thus adding to its quality. Lastly, the visits
facilitated the identification of potential case-studies. This stage in the thesis
enhanced both the analysis and the interpretation of the data. A protracted time
period was the compromise made to obtain a 75% response-rate (61 authorities).
This level of response was regarded as essential in order to be able to generalise with
a high degree of confidence from a relatively small population.
iii) Statistical analysis
A careful and deliberate decision was made at the outset of the empirical
analysis that statistical significance testing could not be employed on the various
tables to be presented. This decision was based on a number of key criteria. Firstly,
the sample size is small (61 authorities) from a population which is also small (81
possible EA authorities). Secondly, the population itself is highly non-random in
selection, from the total authorities. Thirdly, as a further result of small sample size,
each sub-division or category has very small numbers of observations. Whilst not
completely ruling out some non-parametric testing, the non-random nature of the
sampling makes an application of such methods difficult to defend. Fourthly, the
key dimensions of comparison are expected to stand out clearly from inspection of
cross-tabulated results. If the distinction is not clear enough to be obvious by
inspection, it is believed that the form of sampling and the nature of responses are not
accurate enough to justify a conclusion to be drawn.
The use of inspection of descriptive tabulations derives, therefore, from the
chosen methodology of intensive study of the national sample, complimented by
case-studies and 'triangulation' using EA officers and council tenants. It is not
sought to defend the methodology as an extensive and statistically-based study.
Thus the approach adopted draws from the spirit of 'robust' methods suited to the
nature of the problem in hand.
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3.4.3 The semi-structured interviews
An attempt was made to obtain information on various EA, RO, and LA issues
which were added to and/or developed from the national survey. Such a method had
the advantage of facilitating the creation of a greater level ofdetail and explanation as
well as enabling 'triangulation' of information to take place. Interviews were thus
the appropriate tool and in particular, semi-structured interviews which introduced a
flexibility for additional information and explanatory factors to be discussed and
incorporated. In this manner data were introduced with which to compare and
enhance the survey information, thus creating the potential for greater explanatory
power for the analysis. An attempt was made to keep interviewees within 'relevant'
areas although they had free rein to discuss issues, their causality and to introduce
related factors which they considered to be relevant. This was an intense and time-
consuming technique but 'one which produced a great deal of material and revealed
many important and rewarding facets of the initiative.
i) Interviewing DoE Regional Officials
The Regional Offices (ROs) have a central role in facilitating the implementation
of the EA project. It was thus important to identify this role, the functions performed
and the nature of the interaction with authorities.' The author initially contacted all 10
ROs to ascertain which were willing to co-operate (see Map 1). This was done in
order to obtain first hand information of their involvement with the EA initiative and
its implementation, however, EA Central expressed misgivings about the idea,
stressing that these were busy government offices but accepting that it could not
prevent the research if the ROs were willing to be interviewed. In the end, five ROs
were selected partly with EA's objections in mind, but mainly because the Regional
Offices approached were the most influential on the basis of the number of authorities
bidding for EA resources. These five ROs contained 62 out of the 81 authorities. It
might have been interesting to have investigated the other ROs, however, two of the
ROs had no EA schemes and to have interviewed more ROs would have been
repetitive. Several key aspects arising from the survey were also raised using semi-
structured interviews in order to obtain an understanding of the difficulties faced by
the ROs themselves in implementing EA schemes. An attempt was made to gauge
the extent to which ROs and the LAs are dependent upon each other in realising EA's
remit.
Personnel from five ROs were interviewed (ROI-ROS). Two interviews were
conducted in ROt. R01a refers to an unstructured interview which corresponds to a
discussion at the early stages of the research when an attempt was made to obtain
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feedback on the issues being addressed in the survey, as well as to gain an
understanding of the operation of the Regional Offices prior to the preparation of the
more detailed and precise semi-structured interviews (ROtb - see Appendix 2).
ii) The 'Central' interviews
EA is a relatively recent initiative which is growing in importance. The only feasible
way to develop an understanding of the scheme, its origins and operation was to
interview the main actors charged with deciding its priorities, objectives and
generating its organisational, financial and administrative system. To this end the
author interviewed a variety of key EA-related (current and former) founding
members of the initiative so as to obtain a 'rounder' perspective (EAt - EA 5/6). A
variety of issues were discussed which broadly related to EA's origins, its present
state and future development. A schedule of topics for the semi-structured interviews
was the technique employed (see appendix 2), the advantage being that it was flexible
enough to provide scope for discussion and the pursuit of relevant topics, while also
enabling aggregation of issues as the basic questions were structured in a compatible
manner.
3.4.4 Case-studies: choice and background
The intention of the thesis is to use the most appropriate methods in order to
investigate the initiative thus case-studies were considered a valuable tool. The postal
survey identifies and presents a broad-brush picture of the issues encountered by
local authorities in generating EA schemes but excludes depth and detail regarding the
experience of local authorities with the workings of EA and its projects. Case-
studies on the other hand, allow the context to be sketched-in, including the exact
nature of the difficulties involved as well as enabling additional qualitative and
quantitative data to be incorporated. The main technique employed was, once again,
that of semi-structured interviews for the key decision makers vis avis EA (see
Appendix 3):
• The director (or assistant) of housing
• The EA co-ordinating officer
• The finance officer (programming HIPslEA HIPs)
• The Chair of housing.
By this stage a wealth of material would already have been gathered and
analysed. To have included many EA schemes would have been time-consuming,
prohibitively expensive and most importantly, would have been repetitive and
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contributed little. Thus it was decided that four case-studies would be adequate for
the purposes of 'triangulation' and depth.
The fact that EA tries to generate a variety of approaches for the revitalisation of
council estates had to be reflected in the case-studies. An example of estate based
management was included, both because EA has put this at the forefront of its
rationale and because a large proportion of EA-funded schemes have been of this
kind. The second example is a concierge scheme since security is a key principle
underlying EA and because it represents an even lower level of decentralisation than
localised management. The third is an example ofprivate sector involvement since
this formed the original basis for the creation of UHRU/EA and has remained a high
priority for EA. The last scheme is an example of relatively straight-forward, but no
less important and necessary refurbishment schemes. Other types of initiative could
have been included. Much interest has been generated about Tenant Management
Co-operatives but too few have been EA-fundep to justify such a case-study; there
have been no trusts and few disposals to Housing Associations; and the Homeless
Initiatives were not regarded as central to the thrust of EA.
Diversity was also an important consideration in the choice of authorities and
this manifests itself in terms of the political control, level of housing deprivation,
type of authority and the DoE region that the authority is located in. Nevertheless, it
is inevitable that there would be an element of duplication, in particular, the fact that
two of the authorities are from the same DoE region (see Table 3.4).
A fourth aspect which had to be taken account of was the schemes' stage of
development. In other words whether the scheme is a new, continuation or an 'old'
scheme which no longer receives EA funding. Although the original intention was to
examine a new scheme about to start in the 1989/90 financial year (before); then
again six months later (during); and once more twelve months later (after), this
proved to be impractical because there would not have been insufficient time for the
effects of the scheme to have worked themselves through sufficiently to enable
evaluation of impact. The schemes chosen were thus either subject to continuation
funding (so as to analyse how this translates itself in terms of the planning, spending
and efficiency and effectiveness of the schemes) or completed schemes, all dating
from 1986/87. The reason for this is quite important since it can justifiably be argued
that results take a long time to filter through and that any evaluation of the
effectiveness of EA schemes would be inadequate if it did not consider this.
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The choice of case-studies has been made with these factors in mind. It is
natural that the case-studies should be biased towards the most deprived authorities
(with a housing deprivation or 'Z-score' of 1) which also tend to be predominantly
Labour-controlled. Although information exists on the types of initiative funded by
EA, this is extremely rudimentary, offering little in the way of description upon
which to base a rational explanation for the choice ofcase-studies. Consequently the
author was forced to base choice upon personal knowledge and experience obtained
via first-hand visits to over twenty authorities (see Table 3.3). The case-studies were
chosen with the criteria described above in mind (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: The Case-studies: background information
Authority: Scheme Type Authority Type: DoE Region: Politics: Z.Score
LAI Concierge Distr. Council E. Midlands Labour 1 (Worst)
LA2 'Private Sector Metr. District North West Labour 1
LA3 Refurbishment Outer London London SDP/Lib 1
LA4 Est-Based Mmt Distr. Council North West Conserv 3
3.4.5 Investigating tenants' opuuons
The aim of this part was to obtain an indication of the schemes' effectiveness.
Unlike the national survey, there was no attempt to be scientifically rigourous in the
design and methodology (for example, there was no detailed 'piloting' work unlike
the postal survey) for canvassing tenant opinion. The primary concern was to obtain
information regarding the extent to which the block or estate had improved (in terms
of its image, environment, comfort and safety, and level of managerial support).
Consequently, the focus centred on a 'before/after' approach (see Appendices 4 and
7). Such a method has its drawbacks (eg. decaying memory, people's raised
expectation and separating the effects of EA from authority/country-wide factors),
nevertheless, the approach was regarded as being relevant in terms of the objectives
and the resources available for the study.
Various resource constraints mitigated against the possibility of conducting
sample surveys. Whenever possible the explicit aim was to obtain the views of at
least two tenants: one a 'leading' tenant, usually a member of the Tenant Association
representing the block/estate; this was balanced by a 'naive' tenant not normally
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involved formally with the operation of the council. It must be stressed that in the
private sector involvement scheme, all the previous tenants had been decanted and
replaced with new tenants so obviously, the 'before' situation did not apply; and in
the estate based management scheme only one tenant turned up to the pre-arranged
meeting. The tenants tended to confer with one another and generally conclude with
a common view. This can either be viewed negatively because it may reduce the
diversity of opinion or positively in aiding each other's memories of the events and to
come up with a common and, hopefully, more accurate account. It is readily
acknowledged that the opinions of so few tenants in estates with an average of about
1,000 dwellings is unlikely to be representative. For these reasons it was decided at
a later stage to appendicise the results rather than to include them in the body of the
thesis (Appendix 7). The findings of this approach are meant to be indicative of the
general effects of EA-funded schemes and to enhance and triangulate with the other
measures of EA's impact.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the stimulants giving rise to the EA initiative, namely
the government's moves towards privatisation and the creation of the Priority Estates
Project; EA's objectives which are quite variable in nature; and the complex policy
environment within which EA operates, highlighting the EA Central, DoE Regional
Office and local authority structure. This led to an introduction of the most relevant
concepts which relate to the operation of these central-local organisations. The
'Agent/Partnership' model, the 'Dual State Thesis', the 'Uneven Social
Development' and the 'Sub-Central Government' frameworks were all discussed.
All have elements which would seem to touch upon the operation of the EA initiative,
however, it is left to the last chapter to discuss their relevance in the light of the
intervening research findings.
This chapter also translated the aims of the thesis (stated in section 1.1) into an
appropriate methodology which involves the interplay of various research techniques
- a postal survey, semi-structured interviews and case-study work. Each method will
highlight and emphasise different aspects which will result, it is hoped, in a through
analysis of the EA initiative. It was also useful to discuss the methodology at this
stage so that the subsequent chapters could be freed to concentrate on the evidence
without frequent methodological interruptions.
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Chapter 4
The Policy Background:
Origins, formation and initial reactions
4.1 Introduction
The initiative that was launched in 1985 contained a mixed bag of criteria. On
the one hand, EA was to facilitate and help fund the creation of housing co-
operatives, trusts and private sector involvement - all designed, it could be said, to
encourage the continued contraction of the council housing sector. On the other
hand, it was also to encourage authorities to improve their management structures,
tenant consultation procedures and to help improve their estate security and
environment (see section 3.1iii). In other words, measures to counteract the
management difficulties faced by housing authorities (chapter 2) and thus improve
the circumstances for many council tenants.
This chapter seeks to analyse how and why the EA initiative took this shape.
Since there were neither debates in parliament nor any published information on the
process which led to the inauguration of the initiative, the methodology used in this
chapter has been to contact key individuals involved in the build-up and creation of
the EA scheme in order to obtain a first-hand understanding of its origins and
formulation. The last part of the chapter also analyses the local authorities', (local
Authority Associations (LAAs) and housing commentators' initial reactions to the EA
Unit when it was launched. The sources of information used in this chapter are
primarily derived from a set of semi-structured interviews conducted mainly with EA
Central staff (EA1; EA2; EA3; EA4; EA5/6), although some supporting evidence
comes from the DoE Regional Officials interviewed (ROla; ROlb; R02; R03; R04;
R05). The methodology was developed in section 3.4.3.
4.2 The civil servants' priorities: managerial issues
The government's conception of the future role of council housing has been
discussed together with the fact that it has now been relegated to a 'enabling' role and
that local authorities are generally regarded as bureaucratic, inefficient and uncaring
landlords. When the key civil servants behind the formation of the EA initiative were
interviewed about its origins, influences and which models fed into it, they all
stressed that it was the managerial issues (rather than political considerations) which
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were paramount - as management was then a key DoE interest. This was not a
spontaneous initiative. Rather it was the culmination of a series of DoE studies and
three main antecedentsmay be identified.
i) The DoE's investigation of 'difficult to let' housing
The origins of the EA initiative go back to the mid 1970s, to Mike Burbidge
and the Social Research Division at the DoE which: "... produced reports on what
was then called 'difficult to let' housing [Burbidge et al., 1981] ... With the ageing
of the public housing stock, a message was going out that whereas councils had
traditionally found it very easy to let their properties, a lot of it was becoming
difficult-to-let and manage. Suddenly, there were large chunks of property where
boarding-up was taking place and even demolitions in extreme cases" (EA2).
These three volumes (Burbidge et al., 1981) served to highlight the fact that the
management of estates was a key issue behind many of the problems in these areas:
"At the time, the emphasis and blame was placed on the planners, architects and
developers for building 'non-traditional' housing which nobody wanted to live in.
After the research, however, it became clear that this was also happening in the
traditional type of low density housing such as the cottage estates and that this was
because of the design of these estates, their locations, their lack of physical
infrastructure and, more importantly, the fact that management had not been taken on
board. For example, repairs were not being dealt with and there was a lack of
management presence on the ground" (EA2).
Clearly a variety of factors interacted to create 'difficult to let' estates and it was
at this point that the DoE's housing management advisory group: "... set-up seminars
around the country with local authorities, carefully discussing the findings of the
research on 'difficult-to-let' estates. We found that local authorities themselves had
begun to understand the issues and started to change their management emphasis.
Some authorities were actively experimenting with different methods of managing
their properties and the DoE's Housing Advisory Group began to publish 'good
practice' reports on these." (EA2)
The report 'An investigation of difficult to let housing' was thus important for
several reasons: it represented the first official recognition of the existence the
difficulties; it was thorough in its analysis of the causes of the problems; and it
recommended various alternatives which combined with the issues discussed below
(4.2 ii) to produce the PEP and the EA initiatives.
95
ii) Tenant and Town Hall
The research reports undertaken under Burbidge's supervision served to
highlight the weakness of the management presence on the ground. This was added
to by: "A further study by Lesley Andrews, who spent over a year examining the
situation in these difficult estates from the bottom-up [participant observation]. She
came-up with a list of policy recommendations which were to prove influential to the
formation of PEP" (EAt) and also, by implication to EA's development:
• Housing management functions: area housing management teams should control
lettings (the key to good management practice), repairs (carried out by a small team
of on-site tradesmen), be involved in the design brief of new projects, arrears
control, public relations with residents and the administration of transfer requests and
other administrative matters.
• Theorganisation ofhousing management: management functions should be carried
out by area teams, decentralised to convenient locations, with each manager
responsible for all the management and administrative functions listed above. In
Andrews' view: "There is no reason why this devolution of powers should not be
accompanied by the allocation of a budget for the area" (1979, p.273). The report
also maintained that 'the style of management should be participatory rather than
bureaucratic', personal initiatives ought to be encouraged and council policy goals
should be clearly stated to residents and staff alike.
• Housing management roles: all management officers' briefs should be extended.
Housing management assistants should be encouraged to develop a wider working
knowledge of their patch which would aid decisions on lettings and public relations
work. The role of resident caretakers should be re-evaluated.
• Staff training/staffing requirements: "If the service is to be effective it is essential
that officers with the appropriate educational background and personal resources for
the development of management skills are attracted and retained" (p.275). Basic
training should be given in communication skills such as interview techniques, public
speaking, letter writing and even a staff training officer. Attention should also be
given to attracting women to the service (with suitable training and working hours) as
female residents and the elderly of both sexes prefer to deal with women on sensitive
issues. These were all issues which had not been tackled to any great extent.
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• Housing management and estate residents: the area team officers should be
accessible to the residents. Convenient locations and flexible hours are desirable, as
are receptionists to handle all visitors, calls and arrange interviews with staff
members: "Perhaps more importantly, contact between officers and residents in all
types of situations need to be informed by altered attitudes. These must be based on
mutual respect •.• There should be more on-going contact with officers giving
unsolicited information using not only meetings but posters, local newspapers or area
office newsletters. At the same time expectations should not be raised unless the
prospects for meeting them are real, and shortcomings in the services offered should
be honestly admitted." (p. 276).
The recommendations were quite revolutionary and via three PEP consultants,
the DoE undertook to attempt to raise authorities' awareness of the value of
intensifying the management presence on certain estates. This was the next phase of
DoE involvement.
iii) The Priority Estates Project (PEP)
In (EA2)'s view the next crucial step which 'gave the whole thing impetus',
was the idea of PEP which became a key initiative pursued by the DoE, primarily to
encourage a greater and more local management presence on the estates: "At this
juncture the department decided that the way forward, was to set-up pilot projects to
'pump-prime' the process by demonstrating how to achieve better management."
(EA2), and it was at this point that Ann Power came in: "She was the engine that
took it over in astute ways" (EA2). (EAt) notes that: "She brought useful experience
from her work in setting-up co-operatives in Islington and from her research in the
USA where she was looking at far worse estates than in Britain. She is the one who
dressed-up the skeleton of the idea, such as generating more local employment such
as caretakers, localised budgets etc (EAl)".
(EA2) adds that: "A number of authorities were experimenting with a variety of
initiatives. These were studied and reports were produced periodically [by the DoE's
Housing Advisory Group] to encourage authorities to go on experimenting and
innovating. Having successfully engineered and planted the idea, PEP sold itself
with DoE funds and the number of such initiatives began to spread" (EA2). To sum
up, one of the key tenets behind the EA initiative is that of encouraging better, more
efficient and local management structures. This concern with the management aspect
has its origins in a number of DoE reports which had previously highlighted this as a
crucial, but missing element in the most problematic portions of council housing.
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EA's managerial emphasis was thus the culmination of this research, experience and
interest. According to those interviewed, the EA initiative was built upon the DoE
experience and it was natural that this should greatly influence the final form of the
initiative and that local management should end up with a high profile.
4.3 The government's objectives: housing policy
The civil servants acknowledge that: "Even by this date [1985], the
Conservative government had failed to establish a major policy for social housing.
In terms of its arguments for the diversification of tenure, the only issue was the
'right to buy' and improvement grants for the private sector" (EA2). The implication
is that in certain respects, the thinking behind the origins of EA and the EA initiative
itself served to focus and extend central government housing policy. This section
discusses in what ways the initiative may have contributed to the development of the
Conservative housing policy.
i) 'Badly managed, inefficient and bureaucratic'
By default EA's starting point was a critique of established management
practices since it was, after all, an initiative set up to encourage authorities to innovate
and experiment with new management and ownership structures, such as locally-
based management and repair offices, disposal and TMCs. EA can thus be seen as a
central government initiative to demonstrate to local authorities how they could
improve their management practices. According to a DoE Regional Officer involved
in implementing the EA initiative: "The overriding objective was to tackle the
problems of run-down and difficult-to-let estates by a variety of means. Management
was seen as the basis upon which success was either secured or not. It is true that
the 'hub of the wheel' is estate based management because if the estate is badly
managed, it is likely to go into decline once again. Therefore, the emphasis is on
effective management and decentralisation, ideally with repair depots and
decentralised budgets too." (R05). The initiative was designed to force local
authorities to look at their own management arrangements and to evaluate how
appropriate they were. The government's motive was either to further undermine
council housing by pointing to its problematic management or to genuinely force
authorities to consider their clients' needs more seriously... or both.
ii) Politically sensitive issues
In terms of the political origins of EA: "It was reported after the election, that
Mrs Thatcher wanted to 'do something' about the inner cities - to provide a more
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public face and to concentrate on those areas which existing programmes were not
reaching. This came back to the civil service which also recognised that there were
pockets of bad housing other than in inner cities" (EA3). A further factor mentioned
by both (EA2) and (EA3) relates to the succession of riots in August 1981. These
were of significance to EA insofar as: "It spurred the government to explore other
ways and means of dealing with the situation in estates [and inner cities], such as
setting up the Merseyside Task Force and a variety of other schemes, such as the
Brixton initiatives and the Inner City Projects" (EA2).
It would make sense for the government to attempt to concentrate resources into
those areas which could be considered as the potential 'flash-points'. These would
naturally be the run-down council estates with their high concentrations of
unemployed, ethnic mixes and poor and sterile environments. Indeed, it had been
widely reported that riots had originated in certain estates, such as Broadwater Farm
in October 1985 (see Lord Gifford, 1986; 1989). This situation would undoubtedly
have acted to make the government more willing to consider approving the EA
scheme. A DoE Regional Officer was blunt about EA's motives: "The origins of
UHRU were essentially political. There was a desire by politicians for something to
be done about the inner city ... or to be seen to be doing something" (ROlb).
This motive was to impact directly on the form that EA took: "Ideas were being
desperately searched within the department, which could bring work to people in
such estates, as well as to improve the estate itself and its management ... the idea
being that there was always going to be a number of people with skills and energies
in these areas - what was needed was to harness these. Community Refurbishment
Schemes (CRS) were thus born using Inner Cities and Urban Programme cash. The
Merseyside Task Force worked successfully with a number of authorities ... [this]
constituted another strand to the origins of EA" (EA2). The employment issue has
now expanded to become the key EA focus in 1990/91.
The same individual notes also that: "Ministers were constantly worried about
the media and the reports of 'no go' estates, arson, crime and so on; and the Home
Office was also greatly concerned about crime, vandalism and the design and layout
of estates" (EA2). All these concerns were to give rise to other EA criteria such as its
emphasis on security measures and the employment of Alice Coleman to look into
estate designs and layouts (DoE News Release No.612) with a budget of £50m.
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iii) Reforming the HIPs mechanism and targeting resources
According to a key member behind the formation of EA. a novel though not
unexpected aspect of the initiative was that: "There was within the DoE a keen
interest in the operation of the HIPs system. Originally. borrowing approval had
been issued on the basis of seven distinct categories. There had been several battles
with local authorities and their associations who had the attitude that the DoE should
give them the allocation and let them 'get on with it'. This led to a reduction of
categories to four. then three and eventually the DoE gave in altogether in 1981.
when there was a single HIPs block of allocation" (EA2).
However. an important issue for the DoE was: "... whether the cash was going
to the right places and whether councils were spending the HIPs allocation on a
variety of things. but too little on their own stock. There was a concern that the
block system was not getting the parts which it should reach. According to the HIPs
returns. the high incidence of voids and arrears all indicated that some of the worst
problems were not being tackled" (EA2). It would be reasonable to assume.
therefore. that it was the notion of 'targeting' public resources to where they were
most needed that was probably behind this concern. Indeed. one of EA's central
tenets was to be its ability to focus resources onto specific spatial areas which the
DoE considered to be the neglected and in most need. namely the public housing
estates (see section 3.2 and 6.2i for the method of selection).
As discussed above. central government was concerned that authorities were
not investing public resources where they thought these ought to be properly
directed. Given its emphasis on targeting resources to where they were most needed
and its concern with 'value for money' exercises. EA fitted perfectly the
Conservative government's penchant for demonstrating to councils how to achieve
economy. effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of local services.
The fact that this was and remains a crucial issue behind the EA initiative is
voiced by a leading EA Central member: "In a sense EA HIPs does go against the
trend for reduced public expenditure on council housing, but not in another. The
government is very keen on 'targeting' resources to specific things. so as to ensure
value for money ... EA is entirely consistent with those objectives and indeed. the
issue of targeting resources. is the basis of our arguments with the Treasury for
finance" (EA4). A former and founding EA staff-member leaves no doubt of the
importance placed on this aspect by the government: ilEA was all about targeting
authorities and resources. Initially it invited 69 authorities to submit bids. It then
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became open for all authorities, since it was argued that even resource-rich authorities
have their problem estates. With the employment initiative, EA is about to narrow
once again into funding fewer but larger schemes in the future" [see chapters 7 and 8
for more details] (EA5/6). The attempt to target resources was clearly a fundamental
component behind the formation of the project.
iv) Pressures for additional public finance
Certain pressures operated upon the Treasury to force it to allow local
authorities to borrow additional housing investment resources (as implied by EA
HIPs). It has been discussed elsewhere that several studies have evaluated the state
of disrepair of the housing stock in England and Wales and that they estimate that it
would cost £20bn to correct this in the case of council housing (see section 2.3 and
Balchin (1989) for recent estimates of £50bn-£70bn) and that this is actually
deteriorating at a rate of £lbn per annum (Audit Commission, 1986c).
The evidence of serious under-investment and disrepair has acted to compel the
Treasury to rescind its strong aversion to increasing public housing investment,
which has seen capital allocations to the council sector reduced by 75% in real terms
since the late 1970s. The last impetus for financial relaxation and change was
probably provided by the DoE study (published some time later in 1987) on the state
of the housing stock, which largely supported the other studies in its estimates of
investment needed. It was a significant factor in the origins of EA. This is
confirmed by a leading EA Central member: "The philosophy was that something had
to be done on the ground - some initiative was needed to alleviate the situation ... The
other factor that was important was the DoE stock condition survey, indicating the
degree of disrepair of council property" (EA3). This is backed-up by the Regional
Officers: "In 1985, there was a stock condition survey, the purpose of which was to
provide ammunition for the PESC. It tried to find out if there really was a housing
problem and its extent, in order to present it to the Treasury. It was a double-edged
sword because whilst it provided evidence for PESC, it also provided ammunition
for the critics, such as the AMA" (R05).
The above quotation would almost imply that the DoE undertook the study
specifically to use as leverage against a reticent Treasury. EA HIPs may thus also be
seen as a Treasury concession in recognition that the rising tide of council housing
disrepair had to be alleviated. This represented a significant shift in both
Conservative government and Treasury attitude to the public housing sector, even
though this additional resource was to be directed only to the most run-down public
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housing. The question must be asked as to the extent to which the EA initiative is
merely symbolic in seeking to tackle this particular problem given that the amount of
EA HIPs, although increasing, is insignificant compared to the figure generally
agreed as the minimum necessary. This paltry sum (relative to the level ofdisrepair)
may have reflected the degree to which the Treasury hoped that the private sector
would, in due course, become more involved in the renovation of these estates and
'lever-in' the additional resources necessary to upgrade them (see section 3.1).
These issues are explored subsequently.
v) Privatisation, diversification of tenure and transfers of stock
There can be little doubt that the government has sought to use the EA initiative
to maintain the council housing privatisation impetus. A key DoE civil servant states,
regarding the motives behind the creation of EA and the terms of EA's remit as far as
politicians were concerned, that the rough 'pecking order' of priority is as follows:
"1: Ministers were sold on the idea that if estates could not be let. there had to be
other alternatives - the most obvious one being disposals to willing private sector
enterprises; 2: Encourage the formation of co-operatives because of the
diversification of tenure element; 3: Development of estate based management; and
4: The continued development of the employment /CRS initiatives." (EA2)
The centrality of the privatisation issue in the origins of EA is not in question:
"As far as fulfilling central government policy towards housing. there are three
important emphases within EA: firstly, an attempt to involve the private sector in
order to break-up monolithic estates; secondly, to enhance the 'right to buy' policy
since people are clearly not going to buy unless the estates are improved; and thirdly,
in order to bring certain council properties back into use" (ROIb). Such a view is
backed by another Regional Official: "The government's housing policy, it is to
reduce the role of local authorities to mere 'enablers', hence all the legislation such as
'Pick a Landlord' and HATs so as to get rid of problem council housing altogether.
This aimis not undermined by EA." (ROS)
It is not surprising that when the initiative was launched, its objectives were
rather mixed and included attracting private investment; transfers of ownership I
management to trusts, tenants' co-operatives, Housing Associations etc; sale of
estates to private trusts or developers; sale of empty property to developers for
refurbishment for sale or rent (DoE, 1986). Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have sought to pull
out the reasons why this should be the case.
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4.4 Putting together the idea and the team
As a result of the various issues discussed: "Around 1983/4 ideas were put
together within the Department about how to tackle the worst 20% of council estates
or so. The period of policy formation for EA was, therefore, very long .•. It was
probably at this point that the two strands came together, namely what the DoE team
of civil servants were working on and what ministers were particularly concerned
about" (EA2). This is a direct reference to the union of the two key strands within
EA (management and sales/disposals), reflecting the preoccupations of the two actors
involved in designing EA (civil servants1government).
Two former EA members closely involved in the first few years of the initiative
add: "There is no doubt that EA first emphasised private sector involvement as the
key aspect of the initiative. The ministry then had to backtrack and to state that the
other options were equally valid for support and it was at this point that estate based
management came more into its own" (EA5/6). It seems that: "Even Sir George
Young appeared to have been somewhat frustrated by the slow progress of the
privatisation element and the Central team had to explain that the demand was simply
not there, wrong locations etc" (EA5/6). This is further indication that the politicians
very much saw the initiative as being about continuing with their policies for
diversification of tenure, as opposed to the civil servants who seem to have initiated it
largely for different reasons, primarily with a concern for the management of estates.
It is thus interesting to note that the emphasis on the private sector and sales
was created with strategic reasons in mind by the civil servants, principally for the
benefit of the politicians: "The private involvement and diversification of tenure
elements were added primarily in order to make the package attractive to the
politicians" (EAl). The key civil servants behind the formulation of the details ofEA
had other priorities: "They were particularly keen on the estate based management
element, having been persuaded of its value by the PEP experiments" (EAl).
It was almost inevitable that the final EA programme would ended up as a
compromise: "Because of the way the civil service operates, the practicalities are that
it is the people operating in the field which had to sell the idea and emphasis to the
under-secretary, who in turn had the task of translating this into a package which he
could sell to both the Minister and the Treasury. Above this, the permanent secretary
had to convince the cabinet and right at the very top, the Prime Minister herself had to
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beassured of its value." (EA2) In order to get through all these hurdles an attractive
package had to bedesigned, hence the assortment ofEA criteria.
4.5 Convincing the Cabinet and the Treasury
A discussion on the precise reasons why such a proposal was supported in the
end is valuable precisely because, as a Central officer reflects: "At the time, the
government line was very much in favour of cutting public expenditure whereas EA
was clearly a form of additional public housing expenditure" (EA2). In terms of
persuading both the Treasury and the Cabinet of the value of the initiative, it
transpires that the argument used by the DoE! Ministers! Consultants, was that
investment in public estates would be beneficial in several respects:
• These were areas of high unemployment and other socio-economic deprivation;
• If these estates were not dealt with, "they would have a cancerous effect on other
estates, including some private estates", and also that: "There were pockets of public
estates which had become owner occupied. If these estates were allowed to continue
to deteriorate, the government's emphasis on owner occupation would have a hollow
ring" (EA2);
• The conditions on the estates were often so bad that other government departments
reg the Home Office] were also involved in spending public money, such as in the
form of unemployment benefit and crime prevention measures;
• The EA initiative would have some effect in increasing privatisation of property as
well as encouraging developers to use land to build housing for sale or rent;
• Then there was: "The 'value for money' argument where the cost of replacing
housing demolished on shitty estates would cost X amount, whereas the cost of
keeping them going for another few decades would be Y" (EA2); and lastly
• The fact that: "A large number of bodies such as the Audit Commission had made
estimates of the vast sums required for public housing. All of this acted as pressure
on the Treasury to comply" (EA2), although at the end of the day, he himself
recognises that the resource available is marginal compared to what might be spent
estimating en passant, that it represents about 0.05% of the amount needed in 20
years. Nevertheless, the fact that: "... the PM was very taken with the EA initiative"
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(EA2) was helpful, not least because whereas most initiatives of this sort last little
more than two or three years. EA is receiving increasingly more EA HIPs and would
seem to still rank high in the minds of ministers and the Treasury.
4.6 Sir George Young's advisory group
It has become standard procedure for ministers to set these up: "•.. both for
comfort and as a 'sounding board' for new ideas, as opposed to being totally reliant
on civil servants. They are designed to operate between the ministers and the civil
servants" (EA2). Given the nature of the advisory group (consisting of Tom Baron,
Chairman of Christian Salveson, Tim Melville-Ross, general manager of Nationwide
Building Society, Harry Simpson former GLC housing director and Herbert Walden,
general manager of the Heart of England Building Society), one would have expected
it to have been highly influential in pushing for disposal and privatisation (if they
considered it to be feasible), however, this does not seem to have been the case and
the group's role was somewhat tenuous.
Despite the background and vested interests that many of these people may
have had: "There was nothing in concrete terms which the Advisory Group did.
They observed the progress of Estate Action, such as how many authorities and
which types of scheme [to target] but they were not around long enough to steer it in
any direction". These people (in particular Walden and Simpson) were: "..• all
interested and genuinely concerned about the social housing problem but their ability
to influence anything was limited by time and in the end they only met three times"
(EA2).
In actual fact the civil servants designing the EA framework received support
for the emphasis on estate based management: "The advisory group had little
influence on the initiative. They just discussed the agenda set by the civil servants
such as the criteria to be established. The one aspect where the advisory unit
contributed. was in that Tom Baron believed that if the initiative was to be
successful, it would have to be in some way innovative or novel and that this role
was fulfilled by the estate based management criterion" (EAt). This worked in
favour of the civil servants who were in any case keen to make this the primary focus
of the initiative.
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4.7 The launch and the initial reactions
In June 1985 Sir George Young launched the initiative, indicating the policy
thoughts, targeting 69 authorities and asking them to put together ideas for EA
support and organise visits to the estates (see section 3.1 for its remit). It is worth
stressing the point that: "There was no consultation with local authorities or their
associations in the setting up of the initiative. Neither was there consultation with the
Regional Offices" (EAl). This officer acknowledges the possibility that the initiative
and the procedures involved, might have been more refined if the authorities and
associations had been involved in developing them, although he adds that they did
travel to numerous authorities to inform them of the initiative and what they hoped to
achieve under it This does not comprise consultation in the true sense of the word.
This then is the history of the origins of the initiative, its formulation and its
launching. EA created a stir within the local authority housing policy community.
(EA2) agrees with (EA1) that there was a lack of consultation with other important
agents which EA would have to work with and that this may have been partly to
blame for the hostile reception to the initiative:
"I suspect that there was no discussion. It was thrust upon them [local authorities].
This would explain their initial reaction to the initiative because as a result they
greeted EA as: a privateer's party designed to lead to the selling of all blocks;
brought-up the issue about 'topslicing'; and saw it as further extension of central
controls over local authorities" (EA2).
Expanding on the issue: "As far as the authorities and their associations were
concerned, the reaction to the launch ofEA was ofprivatisation under another guise"
(EA2), and the interviewees estimate that this reaction was true of at least half of the
authorities initially targeted. The LAAs were also critical of the initiative's objectives
which were seen to be heavily skewed in favour of disposal of the council housing
stock: "We have been very suspicious of the privatisation element of Estate Action
ever since a gaffe by Ken[neth] Baker regarding its true motive, namely that of
priming estates for sales and privatisation" (AMA interview, 6.4.89). Other
criticisms refer to its financial system: "All authorities are opposed in principle to
'topslicing' resources since we believe in local authority discretion", and "Estate
Action is a gimmick for the DoE to get press coverage. We are very cynical about
such an initiative" (AMA interview, 6.4.89).
106
Reactions were so severe that certain authorities even vowed never to become
involved with the initiative because of the principles involved: "What non-compliant
authorities fear most and indeed Environment Secretary Patrick Jenkin has
confmned, is that the HIPs allocations will be adjusted to provide funds to councils
willing to take on joint publicI private sector ventures" (PSLG, 1985, p.8). The
notion of voluntary disposal of parts, or even whole estates, was novel and
uncontemplated, and the reaction was suitably vociferous. While the EA Unit was
welcomed for example by the National Consumer Council, Building Societies
Association and the House Builders' Federation, the Chairman of the AMA is
reported to have said that the Unit was merely: "designed to give a superficial
impression that the Government is doing something about Britain's inner city decay
when in fact it is doing nothing." (John Donnelly quoted in PSLG, July 1985, p.8)
This is a theme picked up by the newspapers under such headings as 'Cheap
answer to £19bn problem', stressing that:
"Until the financial resources are available to deal with the backlog of repairs, the
housing waiting lists, the homeless and the poorly housed, such initiatives have to
be set in a context of increasing housing distress and its accompanying social and
economic ills." (Guardian, 8.8.1986, p.6).
But the press has, in general, emphasised the fact that the initiative was created
primarily with privatisation in mind: 'Putting up the privatisation sign' (Guardian,
23.11.1985, p.29); 'For sale: run-down estate, in need of some modernisation, few
mod cons. No reasonable offer refused' (Guardian, 7.6.1986, p.29); and'MPs to
fuel council estate sales boom' (Guardian, 24 April 1986), all stressing that:
"Refurbishment for sale by means of a partnership with private developers has
become the official remedy for public sector ills" (Hardcastle, 1986, ppAO-41).
However, there remain difficulties, not least because:
"Government policy appears to be somewhat confused. It wants the private sector
to adopt the dominant role in inner city building and renewal as local authority
resources are reduced, but does not realise that such a policy means giving positive
help, as well as encouragement, to the private developers and builders. It ...
effectively asks them to do it with one hand tied behind their backs because of
planning, land and resource constraints" (rimes, 17.06.1986, p.68).
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Despite the importance of the initiative, the rather muted reaction of the
academic community to the launching of EA relates to two aspects. Firstly, it has
been critical of the nature of the financial system, namely 'topslicing' (Murie and
Malpass, 1987; and Aughton, 1986 - see quotation in section 2.6.2ii).
Secondly, it has also been critical of the inadequate nature of the resources
being provided:
"... due to ideological reasons, the belief of the Department of the Environment that
local authorities are incapable of efficiently undenaking repairs even if resources
were fully available, and the Treasury nostrum that £20 billion of extra public
expenditure would be inflationary, local authorities (Labour as well as Tory) have
been forced to sell-off their estates to property companies for refurbishment and re-
sale - 20 000 unit being lost to the public sector in this way, 1982-5 [representing
about 0.03% of the total stock]. To ensure that local authorities would not be slow
in disposing of their estates, the Department of the Environment set up the Urban
Housing Renewal Unit (UHRU) in 1985" (Balchin, 1989, p.224)
However, reference to the initiative has been restricted to this level of analysis.
There has been no thorough examination of the EA initiative and its effects five years
after its launch. It is this gap which the thesis aims to plug in the following chapters,
starting with a nationwide analysis of the operation of the initiative.
4.8 A description of the EA initiative
The EA initiative has now been in existence for five years. The following
discussion is an attempt to describe the local authorities that have participated in the
initiative, the number of schemes and levels of resources allocated by EA to the
various DoE regions and authorities, the composition of council stock housing and
the levels of housing deprivation confronting the panicipating authorities. The
following discussion will refer to Maps 2 - 9, Tables 4.1 - 4.3 and to Appendix 8
which contains, for each participating authority, further details on structure of
housing stock, housing deprivation, number of EA schemes and total expenditure per
local authority and EA scheme. The details of the operation and impact of the
initiative are the subject of the main empirical analyses in chapters 5 to 8.
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i) Authorities targeted by EA
Map 2 provide a picture of the spread of authorities which have been successful
in bidding for EA resources. At the start of its life the Urban Housing Renewal Unit
targeted 69 authorities which, based on HIPs return information, were considered to
have the greatest housing problems. It did not prove to be possible to obtain a list of
these authorities from EA Central. While the willingness existed to release the
information, they were unable to trace the original list of authorities. Map 2 shows
the 69 authorities that received EA support in the first year, a further 21 different
authorities in the second, 20 in the third and a further 20 in the fourth. Between
1986 and 1990, EA funded 130 local authorities with very different housing
characteristics (see Maps 3 and 4).
While a list of the authorities which were originally targeted by EA would have
enabled Map 2 to pick out the authorities which had refused to participate with EA'
one can still point out the authorities which experience great housing deprivation
(based on Housing Z-5cores) and yet did not participate in EA until the third or
fourth year. If this is taken as a crude surrogate for reluctance and/or unwillingness
to participate (for reasons discussed in the previous section), then a list can be
compiled of such authorities (see Table 4.1). Hackney, Liverpool and St Helens are
noteworthy for their hesitation given the high degree of deprivation in these
authorities - or they may simply have been unsuccessful in obtaining EA resources.
Map 2 enables a further important point to be drawn out. A number of
authorities (28) face high housing deprivation levels but have not obtained EA
support (see Table 4.2). The table lists only those authorities which have housing
deprivation levels greater than one, in other words, authorities which have been
deemed by the DoE to be in definite need of additional investment. The reasons why
they have not obtained EA HIPs resources are two fold: they may have decided not
to bid for EA support and/or the bids submitted for EA funding may have been
unsuccessful. Table 4.2 probably contains a mixture of both cases. Another
important factor to point out at this stage, is the fact that severe housing deprivation is
by no means confined to England and there is little doubt that South Wales would
also benefit from EA-type initiatives. However, the EA initiative is only concerned
with England at this point in time.
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Table 4.1: Reluctant partlclpants, year ofpanicipation and housing Z-score
4th year:
St Helens 4.23
Southampton 1.58
Barnet 0.86
The Wrekin 0.26
3rd year:
Hackney 8.23
Liverpool 4.23
Stoke on Trent 2.52
Brighton 2.49
Derwentside 1.82
Blackpool 1.47
Enfield 0.71
Easington 0.50
Sefton 0.01
Source: Estate Action Database
Table 4.2: Authorities with housing need (Z-Score) but no EA funding
England Lincoln (1.69)
Barking & Daghm (1.27) N. Bedfordshire (2.37)
Boumemouth (1.28) Oxford (2.47)
Corby (1.67) Penwith (1.72)
Ealing (4.28) Portsmouth (1.22)
Grt Grimsby (1.08) Reading (1.50)
Grt Yarmouth (1.03) Scunthorpe (2.08)
Hastings (2.20) Wales
Hove (2.20) Afan (1.93)
Kerner (1.57) Arfon (2.58)
Source: DoE Z-Scores and Estate Action Database.
Blaenan Gwent (3.27)
Cardiff (1.42)
Cynon Valley (2.90)
Dwyfor (1.30)
Islwyn (1.43)
Llanelli (1.55)
Merthyr Tydfil (3.34)
Rhymmen Valley (1.87)
Rhondda (4.67)
Swansea (1.19)
Table 4.3: Key Indicators relating to authorities involved with EA
Loc Auth/fotal EA HIPs LocAuthINo.Schemes Loc Auth/Z-Score Loc Auth/Z-Score
Rochdale 18,956,994 TowerHamts 26 Hackney 8.62 Eastleigh -4.25
TowerHamts 18,558,875 Newham 19 Newham 8.11 Est Herts -4.06
Sheffield 17,621,254 Knowsley 15 Lambeth 7.19 Tewkesbury -3.88
Greenwich 14,218,930 Hull 15 Hammersmth 7.04 Woking -3.29
Salford 13,626,799 Hanlepool 15 Tower Hamts 6.90 Waverley -3.25
Newham 13,566,345 Birmingham 14 Haringey 6.58 Lewes -3.10
Manchester 10,656,061 Bolton 13 Brent 6.28 Spelthome -2.82
Coventry 10,436,952 Sheffield 13 Islington 6.23 Woodspring -2.70
Wigan 10,312,333 Bradford 12 Wandsworth 6.15 Guildford -2.68
Walsall 10,216,953 Wirral 12 Camden 5.64 .Lichfield -2.59
Source: Estate Action Database and DoE Housing Z-Scores
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ii) Composition of council stock and housing deprivation
In an attempt to provide a better picture of the type of authority which is involved
with EA, Map 3 illustrates the composition of the participating authorities' housing
stock. Because so many authorities are involved, some of the pie charts overlap and
it is not always easy to determine the exact composition of the housing stock, even
after much cartographical experimentation. Therefore, Appendix 8 presents the
break-down of the public housing stock, together with the total stock.
Two points to note are that although special statistical information was obtained
from the DoE unfortunately, data do not exist for all the (EA) participating authorities
and secondly, little in the way of a pattern exists. The composition of the public
housing stock is highly variable, although the authorities with the greatest housing
management problems tend to be the ones with the highest amounts of housing stock
and the greatest proportions of high rise flats..It did not prove possible to distinguish
between high rise stock, peripheral cottage estates and the rest even though this
would have been informative in interpreting the pattern ofEA HIPs expenditure.
Map 4 extends the discussion by analysing the level of housing deprivation
experienced in the authorities which have received EA funding. The highest levels
and the greatest concentration of housing deprivation occurs in the London Region.
Other intense clusters of housing deprivation are to be found in the North West,
Merseyside, Northern and Yorkshire and Humberside regions. By contrast, the
remaining regions actually have a preponderance of authorities exhibiting below
average levels of housing deprivation ranging from -1 to -5. These local authorities
can be identified from Appendix 8.
iii) Number of EA schemes per authority
Map 5 presents a simple analysis of the authorities which have been successful
in setting up EA schemes. The circles increase in size proportionately with the
number of schemes funded by EA. The most successful authorities can be identified
from Table 4.3. Although the Table demonstrates that it is the London authorities
which have the greatest housing need (in terms of Z-Score), only Tower Hamlets,
Greenwich and Newham have had EA success commensurate with their housing
requirements. At the other extreme, many authorities which in principle do not have
much housing need have obtained EA support (see Table 4.3 for the level of funding
obtained). 19 authorities in all have obtained EA resources and yet have Z-Scores of
below -2.0. Later chapters will discuss why, after the first year, EA changed its
focus from being entirely targeted at the authorities with the greatest housing need.
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iv) Distribution of EA resource allocation and schemes
The next map (6) again uses the data provided by the Estate Action team in
order to illustrate the way in which EA HIPs resources have been distributed across
the 10 DoE Regions for each of the financial years from 1986 to 1990. Clearly the
North West, Northern and London regions have been exceptionally successful in
obtaining EA resources. This is also reflected in the symbol map (7) and the number
of schemes per region (Map 8). The data presented in Maps 7 and 8 are not
unexpected given the distribution of authorities which have obtained EA resources
(Map 2), the nature of the housing stock (Map 3) and their degree of housing
deprivation (Map 4).
A last point to note comes out of Map 9 which illustrates the level of EA HIPs
expenditure per participating authority. By comparing Maps 4 and 9, it is clear that
rarely do the authorities with the highest levels of housing deprivation receive the
highest levels of EA HIPs expenditure per local authority housing unit. Some
councils such as Hyndburn (£1,596p/u), Rossendale (£1,158p/u) and Lancaster
(£I,092p/u) have done exceedingly well out of the EA programme in comparison to
their levels of Z-Score or housing deprivation (2.27, 2.07 and -1.11 respectively).
This brief introductory description to the EA initiative, the participating authorities
and regions set the context for the empirical chapters to follow.
4.9 Conclusions
The EA initiative is interesting because it is widely seen as a measure designed
to 'fuel sales of council estates', to improve the state of (dis)repair of much public
housing and of centralising financial control and decision-making over council
housing. At the same time, it can also be regarded as a measure to improve the
provision of the housing service via the encouragement of various models of housing
management, the efficient targeting of scarce resources to where they are most
needed and pushing for the introduction of even greater levels of tenant consultation.
In looking at EA's origins, the previous sections have shown that EA
represents, in a real sense and for different reasons, an attempt to achieve all these
things. It has been demonstrated that EA has arisen out of a mixture of real concerns
for the way council housing was operating, as well as out of efforts to push forward
with central government housing objectives which had, until that point, been largely
confined to extending the 'right to buy' as far as possible. It can be argued,
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therefore, that the initiation of EA marks a watershed in Conservative thinking on
public housing, as it becomes much more imaginative and daring.
At the same time it can be argued that the EA programme marks a realisation on
the part of central government of the inadequacy of a housing policy which
concentrated solely on increasing home ownership and the reduction of public sector
investment. EA represents one of the first Thatcherite housing initiatives which
actually offered (from the Treasury's point of view) additional expenditure rather
than cut-backs in local authority housing investment. Ironically, the housing policy
community and the academic commentators concentrated their critique almost entirely
upon the privatisation element of the initiative and the fact that the EA resources were
'topsliced'. The other elements of the programme's remit were largely ignored.
This chapter has also presented an introductory description of the authorities
which have been supported by the EA initiative, their housing characteristics and the
levels of expenditure per participating authority. Indicators have been given as to the
identity of authorities which may have been reluctant to become involved with EA
and it has been stressed that the EA programme still has not reached all the most
deprived housing authorities (especially in Wales although the analysis did not
include Scotland). Finally, the analysis went up to the regional scale in order to
discuss the level of expenditure and the number of schemes per DoE region which
have been supported by the EA programme for the years 1986 through to 1990.
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Chapter 5
The Local Authority Perspective
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of an unique survey comprising
all the local authorities involved with Estate Action, conducted in order to provide
detailed information on its background and interaction with local authorities. The
survey analyses the reasons why authorities become concerned with EA and the type
of schemes which are implemented as a result. It also considers the administrative
procedures which govern this central/local government interaction, its advantages,
disadvantages, as well as the degree to which the resulting schemes are achieving
success in renovating the run-down estates that EA was formed to deal with.
The postal survey was designed, piloted and circulated in August 1988 and a
response-rate of 75%, or 61 authorities, was obtained (see section 3.3.2 for a full
methodological discussion; and Appendix 1 for a copy of the survey). The
descriptive analysis is divided into six parts:
• Analysis of the control variables
• General background information
• Estate Action administrative procedures
• Tenant participation and evaluation
• Counterfactual information - What ifEA did not exist?
• Evaluation ofEA schemes
Each part is analysed separately and closely follows the structure of the postal
survey. Since no research exists on the EA initiative, the emphasis of this chapter is
to contribute via an in-depth analysis of the operation of the initiative. Part of
Chapter 6 condenses and summarises the main fmdings of the survey.
5.2 Analysis of the 'strata' variables
Five main variables were chosen to provide additional context and background
to the analysis. These variables were used primarily for cross-tabulation purposes
and a chief motive for use was also to detect any biases in sample response.
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i) Department of Environment Regions
There may well be regional differences in the way EA operates, possibly reflecting
workloads which vary considerably between Regional Offices, different socio-
economic contexts as well as other factors. In order to analyse these possible effects,
DoE Regions / Regional Offices are used as an element to cross-tabulate other
variables with. There are nine official DoE Regions. The Merseyside Task Force
deals with the EA initiative in exactly the same way as the other Regional Offices and
is not treated separately here, making it ten (see Map 1 and Table 5.1). However,
two regions are excluded from subsequent analysis: the SE because there were no
responses and the SW because the one response made cross-tabulation meaningless.
ii) Housing Deprivation (Z-scores)
This strata variable (Table 5.2) was chosen because the level of deprivation
might conceivably influence certain issues dealt with in the body of the questionnaire,
such as the degree of authority involvement with EA and whether the Unit is seen by
authorities as being beneficial. In an attempt to draw out such relationships, the level
of housing deprivation is analysed using the DoE's established index of housing
deprivation (Z-scores), which has been used in numerous housing studies such as
the Audit Commission's (1986a).
iii) Political Control of authority
It is possible that the nature of local political control and the policies being
pursued may influence authorities' responses to EA; how fully they co-operated with
it; their perception of the way it operates and so on. As a result the authorities were
categorised into four different groups according to political control as set out in the
Municipal Year Book (Table 5.3), however, since there were only two responses in
the 'Other' category, this was omitted from the cross-tabulations.
iv) Authority Type
This variable is included because it is conceivable that attitude and response to
EA may vary according to the type of authority. The overall response-rate for Outer
London authorities was slightly lower (see Table 5.4). This is a reflection of the fact
that these particular housing officers felt that they were more hard-pressed than
elsewhere and consequently were unable to return the questionnaire. The definition
of the type of authority was obtained from the Municipal Year Book and the
authorities then split into four groups.
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Table5.1: Response-rate Cross-tabulated WithDoERegions/Regional Offices
Region Number of Authorities Response-rate
' .. . ..
Number Percent
London 15 10 66
Yorkshire & Humberside 9 6 66
Merseyside 5 4 80
Northern 9 8 88
NorthWestern 22 16 72
WestMidlands 11 8 72
East Midlands 6 5 83
Eastern 3 3 100
SouthWestern 1 1 100
Source: DoE, 1987a; LocalAuthontySurvey
Note: The SE is not represented because there were only homeless schemes at the
time. The SW is also omittedfrom subsequent analysis as its inclusion wouldhave
been meaningless. The total numberof responses for the DoE Regional Offices is
thus 60, rather than the usual 61.
Table 5.2: Response-rate Cross-tabulated WithHousing Deprivation (Z-Scores)
HousingDeprivation Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
High leveldeprivation 35 24 68
Medium level deprivation 19 17 89
Low leveldeprivation 27 20 74
.Source: Audit Commission, 1986b, LocalAuthontySurvey
Table 5.3: Response-rate Cross-tabulated WithPolitical Control
Political Control Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
Conservative Control 11 9 81
LabourControl 63 46 74
SDP/Liberal Control 4 4 100
Other ('hung') 3 2 66
Source: MUnICIpal Yearbook 1986/87; LocalAuthontySurvey
Note: The 'other' category was excludedfrom further analysis since only two
of the authorities responded (total = 59cases).
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Table5.4: Response-rate Cross-tabulated WithTypeof Authority
Authority Type Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
InnerLondon 5 4 80
OuterLondon 10 6 60
Metropolitan Districts 33 23 69
District Councils 33 28 84
..Source: Municipal Yearbook, 1986187; Local AuthontySurvey
[Note: because of their size,Tables5.5 and 5.6 are presented in separate pages]
Table 5.7:Experience Undue DelayCross-tabulated WithDoE Region
Region Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
London 10 7 70
Yorkshire & Humberside . 6 5 83
Merseyside 4 3 75
Northern 7 6 85
NorthWestern 15 11 73
WestMidlands 7 6 85
East Midlands 5 2 40
Eastern 3 2 66
MissingCases=4; Source: Local Authority Survey
Table 5.8:Experience Undue DelayCross-tabulated WithPolitical Control
Political Control Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
Conservative Control 8 5 62
LabourControl 46 35 76
SDP/Liberal Control 3 2 66
Missing Cases=4; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
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5.3 General background information
i) Authority appointed to liaise with and co-ordinate EA bids:
17.0% An EA team
18.9% An EA co-ordinating officer
45.3% An officer with ad /WC EA responsibilities
35.8% Other factors (eg PEP officers & estate working parties)
Missing Cases = 8 (13.1%)
Note: The authorities couldtickmore thanoneoption throughout mostof the questionnaire
as appropriate to theirparticular authority andcontext, hence figures do not total 100%.
EA has been in existence for several years but despite its rapidly increasing
resources, the majority of authorities did not consider it important enough to create
posts specifically (or even primarily) aimed at bringing in additional resources to the
authority. The results imply that in the majority of cases, EA tasks were allocated
and incorporated among the existing housing staff. This is surprising given that this
is one of the few options available to authorities to augment their HIPs allocations,
thus circumventing capital restrictions. However, the.. workload generated by EA
may not be sufficient to justify a position/team exclusively for EA bids which is
probably why its responsibility is often shared between the existing staff (in 45.3%
of the cases). The fact that the initiative operates on a year to year basis may also
discourage the creation of such posts.
ii) The authorities' main reasons for being concerned with EA between
1986/87 and 1988/89 (see Table 5.5):
1. EA HIPs isa rapidly increasing andmuch needed resource: By far the main
reason for authorities' interest in EA is because it is regarded as an extra source of
income. As discussed elsewhere (section 2.6.2ii), the main font for council capital
investment has traditionally been via the Housing Investment Programme, but since
the early 1980s this has been consistently and deliberately run down, and it was
predictable that authorities should soon come to appreciate the value of EA HIPs to
their housing programmes. The main point to note, therefore, is that this has also
been consistently registered as the factor that authorities ranked as being of the
highest importance (regularly obtaining the top overall ranking of 1 - Table 5.5).
2. The authority wanted to try out Decentralisation Iestate based management:
Authorities also expressed a good deal of interest in this aspect In recent years,
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Table5.5: Authorities' mainreasons for beinginvolved withEA: analysis over time
Very Important ~ ... Not Important
- ~
- - - -
~
~ ~ ~ ~ .......
....... ....... ....... ....... i ~..... C'I ('f') ~ -caThe authority wanted to try out: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ... ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0
1.EA HIP is rapidly increasing 1986n 44.9 4.1 8.2 22.4 20.4 1
and a muchneeded resource 1987/8 52.5 5.1 3.4 18.6 20.3 1
1988/9 47.4 10.5 3.5 17.5 21.1 1
2. Estatebasedmanagement / 1986n 4.0 16.0 6.0 18.0 56.0 2
Decentralisation 1987/8 25.0 15.0 10.3 21.7 48.0
1988/9 10.3 10.3 10.3 19.1 50.0 3
3. Innovative management 1986n 4.0 4.0 20.0 10.0 62.0 3
styles 1987/8 5.0 . 13.3 16.7 15.0 50.0 3
, '
1988/9 3.4 15.5 13.8 20.7 46.6 2
4. Other things (eg, sec & env) ,1986n 8.0 6.0 4.0 12.0 70.0 4
1987/8 1.7 8.3 1.7 10.0 78.3 4
1988/9 0.0 5.2 1.7 . 13.8 79.3 5
5. Employment initiatives 1986n 0.0 ' 8.0 0.0 6.0 86.0 5
1987/8 0.0 0.0 8.3 11.7 80.0 5
1988/9 1.7 0.0 8.6 13.8 75.9 4
6. Diversification of tenure 1986n 4.0 2.0 0.0 8.0 86.0 5
1987/8 5.0 1.7 0.0 10.0 83.3 6
1988/9 3.4 0.0 3.4 13.8 79.4 6
7. Homeless initiatives 1986n 2.0 6.4 2.0 0.0 89.6 7
1987/8 1.7 6.8 1.7 3.4 86.4 9
1988/9 1.8 5.3 3.5 1.8 87.6 9
8. Concierge schemes 1986n 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 92.0 8
1987/8 1.7 5.0 1.7 8.3 83.4 6
1988/9 5.2
·5.2 6.9 3.4 79.4 6
9. Privatesectordisposals 1986n 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 94.0 9
1987/8 3.4 3.4 1.7 6.8 84.7 8
1988/9 1.8 1.8 1.8 8.8 85.8 8
Note: Overall Rankis determined on thebasisof the 'Not Important' answers. In 1986n, only20.4% of
the authorities considered the fact that 'EA HIPsis rapidly increasing' to be 'Not Important'. This
thereforereceives the topRank. Source: LocalAuthority Survey; Missing Cases=11; 1;3
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many authorities have been searching for ways of improving the management and
maintenance of their housing stock (discussed in Chapter 2). This frequently means
some sort of decentralisation since EA stresses that its central theme is that schemes
should, as a matter of course, consist of plans to improve estate based management.
Additionally, if councils are themselves committed to this form of housing
management organisation, it is natural that they should seek to use EA resources
rather than their own IllPs allocations.
44% of the authorities were interested in this option offered by EA (1986/87),
and this' increased to 52% at the height of the decentralisation debate before
registering a slight decrease in interest to 50% in 1988/89. Therefore, attempts at
using EA to promote decentralisation in authorities has remained at consistently high
levels throughout the period covered by the survey. This reflects the discussion in
chapter 2 regarding many authorities' willingness to promote new housing
management initiatives.
3.Innovative management structures: Authorities also seem to have been fairly
receptive to promotion of different management structures and 38% of the
respondents indicate that this was one of the main reasons for their involvement with
EA. This is increasingly becoming a priority - it was registered primarily in Ranks 3
and 4 (see Table 5.5). The concern and willingness of many authorities to break the
previous mould of management style and organisation is expressed in these figures
which show a 12% increase in interest in this aspect from 1986/87 to 1987/88 and a
further 3.4% increase in 1988/89. There has been a consistent desire to use EA in
order to promote innovative management structures.
4. Other things: Promotion of 'other' initiatives has declined rapidly in the three
years but includes: 'security measures'; 'to supplement the HIPs borrowing
approval' / 'play ball with the government'; and 'to undertake environmental works,
refurbishment, remodelling, upgrading of estates'.
5. Employment initiatives: The creation of employment opportunities by using
under-utilised resources within council estates has only recently began to be
articulated and promoted (see McArthur and McGregor, 1989; Pinto, forthcoming c).
It is debatable whether local authorities are undertaking these primarily because of EA
promotion, nevertheless, even in 1986/87 this issue was of greater concern to
authorities than was promotion of private sector involvement. Employment
initiatives have been given increasing consideration and priority by local authorities
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(from 14% to 24.1% over three years), nevertheless, authorities do not place this as
their top priority - it is their fifth overall priority. This is showing signs of changing
because EA has now thrown all its weight into all-out promotion of the 'enterprise
initiative' for reasons discussed in later chapters.
6. Diversification of tenure: While authorities were greatly concerned with and
interested in, decentralisation and innovative management structures, diversification
of tenure was not such a great priority for them. The scores registered started from a
low level (14%) and peaked at 20.6% by 1988/89. This increase may indicate that
continuing EA promotion of diversification of tenure has begun to bear fruit and that
sooner or later, central government will have an impact upon local authority policy
and practice even if the councils may be opposed to it in principle.
7. Homeless initiatives: This is not a key local authority concern, nevertheless,
a number of such initiatives were accepted and funded by EA, whose remit did not in
fact mention this option. Chapter 6 analyses this issue in greater detail where it is
argued that this type of initiative is used as a 'safety-valve' by EA when it is in
danger ofunderallocating its resources.
8. Concierge initiatives, namely staffed receptions at the entrance of tower-
blocks: It was only in 1987/88 that EA formally took concierges into their criteria and
began promoting them, although certain authorities (such as Brent) were already
pursuing these. The fact that local authority interest in concierges increases
demonstrably thereafter, must reflect the combination of increasing authority
awareness of this initiative as well as EA promotion. By 1988/89, 20.6% of the
authorities were actively looking to implement concierges. The overall ranks are
indicative of these developments (8th and 6th).
9. Private sector involvement anddisposals: During the exploratory interviews
(see Table 3.3), authorities indicated that they were not at all concerned to either
dispose their stock to the private sector or involve it in any way so as to renovate run-
down estates in partnership. Despite ENs initial emphasis on this issue, in actual
fact very few of the schemes turned out to be of this type. There is a feeling among
housing officers that EA quickly realised that it was pushing the private sector aspect
too hard and too quickly for authorities' liking in 1986/87.
Interest in using EA resources in this way started from very low levels (6%),
probably because partnership with the private sector was a relatively novel concept
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for most authorities at the time and/or because it was something which certain
authorities fundamentally opposed. However, by 1987/88, some authorities do seem
to have become convinced of the virtue of this EA policy (15.3%) but the proportion'
remained quite low and interest decayed to 14.2% in 1988/89.' While EA may have
had some success in changing authorities' interests in certain aspects, the results also
imply that if authorities are determined (and their housing problems are not acute),
they may be able to refrain from pursuing paths not in accord with their own policies.
iii) What authorities perceive EA to be primarily stressing I concerned
with (see Table 5.6):
This section examines what local authority officers perceive EA to have been
stressing in the three years concerned. The official EA view is that its criteria have
not changed since EA was inaugurated, however, in the preliminary interviews
authorities suggested otherwise, expressing uncertainty, lack of confidence and
confusion about the changes in EA practice. This question was posed to examine
these issues.
1.Decentralisation I estate based management: The overwhelming majority of
authorities felt that this is what EA placed greatest emphasis on over the three years.
This is reflected partly in the authorities' own priorities (Rank 1) and is mirrored in
the bids made by authorities, as well as by the actual schemes that got under way. It
is worth noting the sharp increase in statistics for Rank lover the three years (from
11.1% to 42.1%), indicating a substantial elevation of this criteria as far as EA
promotion is concerned. This ties in well with the previous discussion (in chapter
4), that private sector involvement and disposal was initially seen as being the focus
of EA. Since authorities reacted half-heartedly to this idea, the emphasis began to
shift to estate based management thereafter.
2. Security and environmental works: EA has emphasised the fact that
comprehensive renovation involves as much the security and environmental aspect as
the capital investment and actual management of the initiatives. However, the
authorities experience is that that EA blows 'hot and cold' for this initiative because
although support remains at fairly high levels, it does fluctuate. Nevertheless,
judging from the overall ranks received, it remains one of EA's central tenets.
3. Private sector involvement I disposals: This issue has been contentious from
the beginning. Several prominent authorities (such as Liverpool City Council)
initially refused to participate in the scheme and despite the fact that the original
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Table5.6: WhatAuthorities perceive EA to be emphasising: analysis over time
VeryImportant ... ~ Not Important
- ~
- - - -
~
~ ~ ~ ~
-
- - - - l l:X:- N M ~ -, taThe authority wanted to try out: a -g -g ~ ~ ... b~ l:X: ~ l:X: l:X: ~ 0
1.Estatebasedmanagement / 1986n 11.1 46.7 15.6 20.0 6.3 1
Decentralisation 1987/8 43.6 16.4 12.7 20.0 7.3 1
1988/9 42.1 17.5 10.5 25.8 4.2 1
2. Security & Environmental 1986n 6.7 31.1 17.8 13.3 31.1 2
Works 1987/8 23.6 18.2 23.6 27.3 27.3
1988/9 3.5 10.5 15.8 31.6 38.6 3
3. PrivateSectorDisposals 1986n 15.6 11.1 4.4 20.0 48.9 3
1987/8 18.2 18.2 16.4 10.9 36.3 3
1988/9 15.8 23.6 14.0 14.0 29.9 2
4. Innovative management 1986n 0.0 4.4 13.3 24.4 57.9 4
styles 1987/8 1.8 7.3 12.7 23.6 54.6 4
1988/9 3.5 7.0 12.3 26.3 50.9 5
5. Diversification of tenure 1986n 6.5 8.7 13.0 13.0 58.8 5
1987/8 7.3 12.7 7.3 18.2 54.5 5
1988/9 10.5 17.5 19.3 8.8 43.9 4
6. Concierge schemes 1986n 2.2 0.0 4.4 5.1 86.7 6
1987/8 0.0 1.8 7.3 10.9 80.0 7
1988/9 15.8 1.8 1.8 15.8 64.8 6
7. Employment initiatives 1986/7 0.0 2.2 6.7 4.4 86.7 6
1987/8 0.0 1.8 5.5 10.9 81.8 8
1988/9 1.8 3.5 1.8 15.8 66.6 7
8. Homeless initiatives 1986n 0.0 2.2 4.4 5.1 88.3 8
1987/8 0.0 0.0 3.6 18.2 78.2 6
1988/9 1.8 0.0 1.8 28.1 68.4 8
9. Other things 1986n 0.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 93.3 9
1987/8 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.8 96.4 9
1988/9 3.5 0.0 0.0 1.8 94.7 9
Note: OverallRankis determined on thebasisof the 'Not Important' answers. In 1986n. only 6.3% of
the authorities considered the fact that 'EA is keen to promote decentralisation' to be 'Not Important'.
This therefore receives the topRank. Source: LocalAuthority Survey; Missing Cases =13;4; 2
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name of the initiative was changed (from the Urban Housing Renewal Unit to Estate
Action), the stigma has not been dislodged for many councils. Few local authorities
were greatly interested in private sector disposal (Table 5.5), which may explain
EA's shift in focus to estate management but the results also demonstrate that, far
from the issue of private sector involvement dying away, not only has it been
retained, but the amount of emphasis placed on this initiative has actually increased
(3rd to 2nd). It may not have had much success but that is not to say that this option
has been abandoned and it remains to be seen how much and for how long
authorities can resist this option, especially as the alternative sources of council
housing investment continue to dry up.
4. Innovative management structures: These statistics were unexpected insofar
as EA was formed to encourage local authorities to develop new ways of managing
their property. Quite clearly, the majority of officers did not perceive this to be
particularly stressed by EA. The highest scores registered were Rank 4, indicating
that while authorities note an enthusiasm for this aspect of EA's remit, it was
nevertheless of middling priority. A consistent pattern of increasing importance
being placed on this type of initiative by EA (42.1%,45.5% and 49.1%) is emerging
but in terms of overall rank, it declines to fifth place.
5. Diversification of tenure: The change of emphasis over time is also true of
diversification of tenure. In 1986/87 it was perceived by housing officers as being
only fairly important (as far as EA is concerned) but was stressed more heavily in
subsequent years. This may have occurred because of a plethora of reasons, but the
fact that EA has met little success in promoting this element may signify an attempt to
redress the balance in the third year. EA may also have felt that authorities had two
years to get used to these ideas and that they ought to begin reacting a bit more
positively to the option of mixing their tenure patterns, hence the reason why it
becomes more 'forceful'.
6. Concierge schemes: Little was known about these prior to 1987/88 and EA
must be given the credit for publicising them more fully via a report circulated to all
authorities (Skilton, 1988). The majority of authorities do not feel that this is being
stressed very much by EA (see Table 5.6), and concierges were ranked 6th, 7th and
6th. EA's main priorities in allocating its resources clearly lie elsewhere.
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7. Employment initiatives: These findings show that EA seems to have placed
increasingly more importance on the generation of employment opportunities. CRSs
were promoted from the start, nevertheless, employment initiatives only became
more visible during the 1988/89 round of bids, when there was quite a large increase
in the proportion of authorities who felt that this was being particularly emphasised.
This aspect remained fairly peripheral and EA has not paid much more than lip-
service to this. However, things are set to change markedly in the 1990/91 round,
with 'employment' initiatives becoming the key element behind the EA initiative.
Questions must be asked about why this has now become the number one priority for
EA and chapter 4 provided some answers as do chapters 7 and 8.
8. Homeless initiatives: Not only did authorities themselves not register a great
deal of support for promoting homeless initiatives (Table 5.5), but they did not
perceive EA to be stressing this initiative very much either (Table 5.6).
Nevertheless, the perceived emphasis placed on this type of initiative by EA has
continued to increase rather rapidly (in terms of the total score rather than overall
rank), despite the lack of matching local authority enthusiasm. In fact, one would
have expected this to have abandoned in 1988/89 when a new DoE initiative was
announced specially to generate initiatives for the homeless. An explanation for this
discrepancy is attempted in chapter 6.
9. 'Other'factors: Few of these are mentioned but include 'tenant consultation',
'comprehensive improvement', 'arrest of sink effect on estates'; and 're-
establishment of the social balance'. This implies that EA tends to stick closely to its
agenda (in terms of what it agrees to fund) and is not prepared to deviate very much.
Alternatively, it may reflect that authorities do not feel confident enough to risk
submitting 'non-conforming' bids. If the latter is the case, it must be questioned
whether EA can really help authorities to innovate.
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5.4 Administrative procedures
i) Referring to the time period between submission and approval dates,
do you consider that there was an undue delay in general?
No· 25.9%
Yes 74.1%
Missing cases = 3 (4.9%)
Note: The phrase 'undue delay' may be interpreted as being 'loaded'. The preliminary interviews
indicated that virtually everysingleauthority approached felt that theEA teamseemed to takea long
time to processthe bids. The question might havebeenphrasedas 'took too long' or 'unnecessarily
long' and so on. Either way, it wouldstill have been somehow 'leading'. With hindsight, it might
havebeenmoreappropriate to haveleftout theword'undue'.
A high degree of consensus existed among local authorities that an
unacceptably high proportion of bids for EA support were delayed by the EA Unit's
administrative procedures. Authorities have a tight schedule of one financial year
within which to prepare initial bids (Form A); send these to the Regional Officials for
processing; prepare tenders and Form B for final approval; before having to actually
spend the allocation in the time available (see Figure 3.1). Given that so many
authorities (74.1%) contend that they experience delays on the part of EA, the present
situation is clearly unsatisfactory. The consequence of such a problem is discussed
more fully below and in Chapter 6.
Cross-tabulating the authorities experiencing 'undue delays' with DoE Regions
indicates which of the regions were particularly bad in processing applications (Table
5.7). This procedure illustrates that the West Midlands, Northern and Yorkshire and
Humberside regions are particularly slow at processing forms, while the East
Midlands is much better than average at dealing with these procedures and keeping
delays to a minimum. No firm reasons for this can be postulated, but it would
appear that the perceived delays do not simply reflect the number of authorities which
the Regional Offices interact with.
Cross-tabulating the same variable with political control indicates that the delays
occur irrespective of the political composition of the authorities, although Labour-
controlled authorities indicate that they experienced the most delay (Table 5.8).
Lastly, cross-tabulation with type of authority identifies that the most acute problems
lie especially in the Inner London and Metropolitan authorities (Table 5.9). EA
would be well advised to look particularly into the operation of these Regional
Offices in order to identify exactly what is wrong since together, these authorities
make up a high proportion of the total number of authorities involved with EA.
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Table 5.9: Experience Undue DelayCross-tabulated WithAuthority Type
Authority Type Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
InnerLondon 4 4 100
OuterLondon 6 3 50
Metropolitan Districts 21 19 90
District Councils 27 17 63
Missing Cases=3; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
Table 5.10:Underspend Cross-tabulated WithDoE Region
Region Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
London 9 5 55
Yorkshire & Humberside 6 3 50
Merseyside 4 1 25
Northern 7 2 28
NorthWestern 16 5 31
WestMidlands 8 3 37
EastMidlands ·5 3 60
Eastern 3 . 1 33
MissingCases=3; Source: Local AuthontySurvey
Table 5.11:Underspend Cross-tabulated WithAuthority Type
Authority Type Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
InnerLondon 4 3 75
"
OuterLondon 5 2 40
Metropolitan Districts 23 10 45
District Councils 28 8 28
MissingCases=2; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
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ii) What were the main reasons why this delay occurred in so many of
the schemes/authorities?
70.7% Administrativedelays on the part ofEA
53.7% The time required by local authorities in working up the bids
51.2% The lack of an adequate timetable for EA bids
. 51.2% Bids being invited too late and with unreasonable deadlines
36.6% Lack of clarity about EA criteria
24.4% Changing EA criteria and the need for authorities to resubmit
2.4% Other reasons
Missing Cases =20 (32.8%)
The responses indicate that local authorities feel that EA's administrative
arrangements are primarily to blame for the current situation (70.7%).· The present
system with its two bidding stages (A & B bib forms) requiring detailed information
may be part of the problem. Further cross-tabulation analyses reveal that the
authorities which complained most about EA administrative delays were in the
Merseyside (66.7%) and London (50%) regions. If EA wishes to review its
administrative structure, it would do well to start with these.
It is not a surprise that local authorities would try to accuse others for the delays
to schemes, however. they were also self-critical. 53.7% of the respondents
acknowledged that the delays were partly because of the time needed by themselves
in forming EA bids. It remains unclear whether this is in fact, because of local
authority delays, incompetence and general inefficiency or whether this resulted
because of the level of detail and type of information required in EA forms, the
inadequate timetable, or both. The present administrative, timetabling and
organisational arrangements begin to appear flawed.
51.2% contended that an inadequate timetable has been formulated for bidding
for EA resources, consultation and spend to be achieved and that bids were invited
too late by EA and with unreasonable deadlines. These issues also surfaced in the
preliminary interviews conducted. Many authorities apparently made representations
to the DoE that the timetabling did not correlate or complement very well with their
HIPs rolling capital programme, thus causing difficulties. These issues are
discussed in greater detail in chapter 6 but when cross-tabulated, authorities of all
types and in all regions indicated that they considered this to be a problem. The
timetabling arrangements are seen as a general problem across virtually all
authorities.
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The last two reasons cited for the 'undue delay' relate to EA criteria. 36.6%
indicate that EA criteria lack clarity. This is perhaps both a cause and/or effect of the
fact that 24.4% of authorities also felt that EA criteria kept changing (resulting in a
need for authorities to resubmit their Forms A and B) thus contributing to delays.
Several other reasons have been put forward to explain why this occurs - these are
detailed in chapter 6. It seems realistic to assume at this stage that most of these can
be improved upon, starting with a need for EA to rethink its timetabling and
administrative organisation.
iii) The survey tried to probe deeper into the consequences of the fact that so many
authorities experienced delays by asking them to: 'Pin-point the precise aspects
which were adversely affected by EA administrative procedures and
inadequate timetable.'
50.9% The authority's rolling capital programme
87.0% Whether all the EA allocation was spent in the financial year
87.0% The timetabling of schemes [when started/finished]
13.0% Other factors
Missing Cases = 7 (11.5%)
The survey results suggest that the situation is far from satisfactory.
Authorities are directed to plan their housing strategy three years in advance under the
HIPs system, however, if they are successful in their EA bids, it may necessitate
substantial rearrangement and reorganisation of the authorities' housing investment
programme in order to cater for and accommodate the additional approved spending.
This disjunction is what results in programming difficulties with the rolling capital
programmes in 50.9% of the cases. Given the uncertainties and delays already
discussed, it is not surprising that 87% of the authorities also indicate that the system
affects whether all the EA allocation is spent in the financial year. Adverse
consequences (such as tenant complaints and increased costs) resulting from late
starts and/or completion of schemes (87%) is analysed in later chapters.
According to the 'other' category, the administration and timetable adversely
affect 'the tenant consultation process and meeting tenants' wishes which are not in
accord with EA policies'; 'delay and undermined tenant confidence'iwere mentioned;
and lastly, 'DoE year by year basis of controlling capital programmes is a hindrance
.•. it is rather an artificial distortion in our three year programme.'
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iv) Did your authority manage to spend the allocation within the
financial year or not, and why this was the case?
No 39.0%
Yes 61.0%
Missing Cases = 2 (3.3%)
Not surprisingly, a high proportion of authorities (39%) did not manage to
spend all their EA allocations in the specified time. It might be argued that this is as
high as most local authorities' success with mainstream HIPs, however, all the
comments and arguments presented by the EA co-ordinating officers suggest
otherwise. Therefore, it is worthwhile probing deeper into the situation in order to
try to gain a better understanding by cross-tabulating the yes/no answers with
relevant strata variables (Table 5.10). Most authorities (61%) achieved spend but in
three regions (East Midlands, London and Yorkshire and Humberside), over half of
their authorities did not manage it. This level of underspend does not merit
complacency. This situation is at best inefficient. At worst. it is unforgivable when
council housing is so desperately under-funded. Of course in a wider context, the
same could be said of the existing levels of arrears, voids, disrepair etc.
The major problem in spending the EA allocation arises primarily in Inner
London, though Metropolitan districts and Outer London also suffer from this
problem to a considerable extent (Table 5.11). Another point to note is that the
higher the level of deprivation, the higher the percentage of authorities not achieving
spend (Table 5.12). Increasing local authority reliance upon capital receipts favours
the authorities in south England (except for London) with the greatest sales, and
those authorities with the least housing deprivation (see Malpass and Murie, 1987).
It appears that this imperfect situation is compounded for those who benefit least
from the current HIPs system because they are also the ones who are primarily
underutilising their EA resources. The attention now turns to those authorities that
did achieve spend.
Yes 61.0% Did manage to spend all their EA allocation because:
Missing Cases = 2 (3.3%)
51.5% The EA set-up was well timed and effectively co-ordinated
54.3% Other reasons
Missing Cases = 26 (42.6%)
130
Table5.12:Underspend Cross-tabulated WithHousing Deprivation'
Housing Deprivation Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
High leveldeprivation 24 11 45
Medium level deprivation 16 6 37
Low leveldeprivation 19 6 31
MissingCases=2; Source: Local Authority Survey
Table 5.13:Annual Variation in Funding Cross-tabulated WithDoE Region
Region Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
London 8 8 100
Yorkshire & Humberside 4 2 50
Merseyside 3 3 100
Northern 8 5 62
NorthWestern 14 9 64
WestMidlands 5 4 80
East Midlands 3 2 66
Eastern 3 1 33
MissingCases=13; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
Table 5.14:Releases Resources Cross-tabulated WithAuthority Type
Authority Type Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
InnerLondon 4 4 100
OuterLondon 6 6 100
Metropolitan Districts 23 22 95
DistrictCouncils 27 21 77
MissingCases=l; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
131
While 87% of all authorities feel that the present system causes them problems
in terms of whether all the allocation is spent within the financial year (see section 5.4
iii), nevertheless, 61% did manage to overcome this difficulty. What this has meant
in terms of corner-cutting and shoddy workmanship in order to achieve spend can
only be guessed at.
Authorities in the West Midland, East Midlands and Eastern regions in particular, did
concur that the EA set-up was well timed and effectively co-ordinated, however, only
51.1% of them stated that they achieved spend because EA involvement was 'well
timed and effectively co-ordinated'. 54.3% of the responding authorities indicated
that they actually managed to achieve spend because of reasons other than EA. The
following quotations give a good indication of the reasons why authorities have
managed to achieve spend: 'because of an effective response from all council sections
involved, mobilising resources quickly and anticipating approval'; design work
undertaken 'at risk' until the allocation is confirmed; 'flexibility by the DoE and
creativity by the LA'; and 'making realistic bids that are well developed and capable
of being implemented'. None mention that this was because ofEA and its flexibility,
but to some extend this is to be expected given the level of centre-local tension which
exists between EA Central and the local authorities. We turn next to analyse those
that did not achieve spend.
No 39.0% Did not manage to spend all their EA allocation because:
Missing Cases =2 (3.3%)
62.5% Inefficiencies and delays by EA in getting out approval
45.8% Inefficiencies and delays on the part of local authorities
41.7% Inefficiencies and delays on the part of contractors
20.8% Other reasons
Missing Cases = 37 (60.7%)
39% of the authorities underspent but unfortunately there is no way of
estimating how much resource is lost this way. All the responding authorities in the
East Midlands and the Northern Region indicated that the blame was theirs while all
the others accepted little blame themselves for underspend. Underspend was cross-
tabulated with regions resulting in the following areas which experience this problem
acutely: Yorkshire and Humberside (100%), Northern (100%), East Midlands
(100%) and the North West (80%). No single party control or politics is particularly
significant. Local authorities again accept much of the blame themselves and
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inefficiency on their part (45.8%), however, the greater portion ofthe blame is nailed
firmly to EA's mast, as can be seen above (62.5%).
Problems with contractors failing to deliver on their contract/tender promises is
the other main reason for underspend. Unfortunately there is no indication of
whether this was mainly the DirectLabour Offices' (DLO's) fault or the outside
contractors' as this information was not requested. The reason for underspend
seems to be spread evenly among the main agents involved but 20.8% of the
authorities also named 'other' reasons, which is a large enough figure to merit further
analysis. Such reasons include: 'Late notification [by the DoE] of allocation';
'normal delays in going out to tender and contractor starting'; 'unrealistic timetable';
and the 'lack of flexibility in the allocation system'.
v) 'What normally happens if your authority cannot spend the
allocation in the year?'
5.3% Penalised with no EA funds the following year
44.7% Renegotiated the allocation with EA the following year
52.6% Allowed to spend the allocation on other schemes
13.2% Other factors
Missing Cases = 23 (37.7%)
A small percentage of respondents (5.3%) perceived that if they underspend,
they lose out on EA HIPs the following year. This seems to somewhat extreme and
if this is not the case, a letter to authorities clarifying the situation would not be amiss
(one of the responding authorities is based in London and another in the West
Midlands). This illustrates the mixed signals which authorities complain they are
receiving from different Regional Offices (ROs) about the EA aims and criteria.
The impression from the survey and the initial interviews with local authorities
is that in the great majority of cases, the Regional Officials do their best to facilitate
smooth implementation of schemes. When final approval is actually given, the
responsibility for schemes is passed on to the ROs and 44.7% of the authorities
indicated that they were able to come to some sort of arrangement with the ROs
although the exact repercussions of the arrangements remain unclear at this stage.
When in danger of underspending, authorities have (in the main) received some
sort of unofficial EA/DoE 'approval' to spend the resources on any other project on
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the understanding that the EA schemes would be completed the following year from
mainstream HIPs or capital receipts (52.6%), perhaps because scheme readiness was
the main hold up. This is an eminently reasonable policy in that it matters not which
resources are used to complete the schemes, as long as they are undertaken. This is
especially the case if it there is a risk that those schemes may be lost, in part because
of the DoE itself. This informal sanction occurred in all types of authority as well as
in all DoE regions. This does show a degree of flexibility and responsiveness on the
part of EA Central.
'Other' consequences mentioned include: 'We have to make up the difference
the following year'; 'unspent HIPs is lost'; 'reallocation of funds across EA projects
in the same year'; and 'negotiate the best arrangements in the circumstances'.
vi) If approval arri ves late, which fa ctors we re affec te d?
7 Other factors • vcry Important
6 Need to renegociate tenders m Important
5 Increased cap ital costs 0 Not Important
4 Disruption of normal procedures
3 Increased staff work load
2 Slippage in comp letion dates
1 Increased tenant frustration
a 10 2 0 30 4 0 5 0 60 7 0 80 90 100
Per cent ag
Missing Cases =11 (18%)
1. Increased tenant f rustration: 78% noted that this occ urs. This is partly the
effec t of the next category (2), namely the slippage in completion dates of schemes.
Th ere is normally a time gap between bid submission and receipt of final approval
whi ch is prolonged by admin istrative delays over and above the normal ones . It
must be remembered, however, that some tenant frustration probably pre-existed the
EA bids. The next chapter links tenant frustra tion and delays to argue that the flawed
EA timetable is at the base of these problems.
2. Slippage in completion dates of schemes: That 78 % of authorit ies also
expe rience some degree of slippage mus t be cause for concern. T he EA
administr ation would perhaps benefi t from looking through the res ults of these
survey analys is chapters for clues about why and where this is occurri ng, how it
manifests itself, as well as what could and should be improved.
1 3 4
3. Increased staffworkload and duplicationofwork: This arises partly from the
fact that for most officers (52%), EA work is only an ad hoc part of their job
description, which means that EA work is thus seen by staff as 'additional'
workload. Undoubtedly the consultation, planning and co-ordination required to pull
an EA scheme together; as well as to find the information necessary for Form A and
Form B is an intricate and complex job. This is not at all aided by the lack of
computerisation in authorities and delays the which as seen earlier, beset EA
procedures leading, for example, to the renegotiation of tender documents.
Interviewees at the preliminary research stage stress that duplication of work arises
primarily when criteria and weight placed on certain EA criteria change (but see
sections viii and xi below).
4. Disruption to normal planning procedures: The fact that 46% of the
respondents were of this opinion is yet another reference to the fact that the one year
timetable for scheme completion is inadequate. This makes planning and co-
ordination that much more complex. Chapter 7 probes into why this is the case.
5. Increased capital costs to schemes (30%): If tenders lapse (see below), for
example, as a result of EA approval arriving late, its likely that the prices of materials
and other capital costs will have increased. Authorities normally (though not always)
only go into Form B stage once the tender costs have been established. If this is the
case, barring gross delays and inefficiencies by authorities whose interest is to go to
tender as quickly as possible, these problems must be the result of EA delays. A
factor which cannot be controlled for, of course, is the weather.
6. The need to renegotiate tenders: Preparation of tenders is a long process
involving costs for authorities in terms of staff time spent in preparation of such
complex and detailed documents. These are then submitted to EA for final approval
yet 32% of responding authorities indicated that they had to renegotiate their tenders
when final DoE approval arrives late. This is an extraordinarily high figure and
blame is seen to rest upon EA. Potential consequences include increased costs and
tenant complaints. Waste is clearly endemic if EA final approval arrives late.
7. Other factors: There were few of these (11%) but includei 'Loss of
credibility [in] Estate Action'; and 'inadequate time for tenant consultation', which is
an issue discussed in section 5.5.
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vii) Continuation funding is the only way that authorities can get medium term
support for schemes. It is of crucial importance to the larger and/or phased schemes
and a substantial proportion of the total annual EA HIPs is committed this way:
75.5% Always secured continuation funding from EA
35.8% Obtained more than two years' funding for their authority/schemes
13.2% Were given some form of guarantee from EA
51.9% Stated that this system of capital allocation caused problems
Missing Cases =9 (14.8%)
Since the Treasury allocates the finite amount of EA HIPs on an annual basis,
authorities rarely gain the total allocation necessary to upgrade whole estates in one
go. They are, therefore, forced to phase the renovation of large projects and to
juggle with substantial sums in stages, in the hope of maximising their EA HIPs
allocations in subsequent years. The point to note is that EA is hampered by the fact
that by law, it cannot guarantee funding for anything with a timescale longer than one
year. Continuation funding thus becomes essential in circumventing this clause. To
its credit EA has realised that authorities require a longer period to complete large
projects. Via the notion of agreeing inprinciple to continuation funding, 'EA
acknowledges that schemes may take longer than one year and that (should it still be
around the following year), a certain amount of resources will be committed for that
particular scheme. Thus it is an informal system where no guarantees are actually
given, yet halfofEA's total annual resources are committed in this manner.
, For obvious reasons, it is important to get an indication of whether EA always
meets these informal obligations, This has occurred in 75.5% of the cases. In other
words, a quarter of the respondents at some stage did not get the 'promised' funding,
which must have implications for both tenants and authorities. Cross-tabulation of
this variable with DoE regions shows that revocation of EA 'promises' to fund future
phases occurred in all DoE regions except the East Midlands, where the continuation
funding commitments were always met. This does not promote the confidence and
trust which is essential to the initiative and by no means aids forward planning or
value for money.
EA initially stated that it would fund schemes for a maximum of two years.
However, 35.8% of the respondents stated that this had been exceeded in their case,
adding impetus to the local authority suspicion that EA bends its rules at will,
however, this is perhaps a recognition that for many local authority proposals, even
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two years is inadequate. Cross-tabulation of this variable indicates that all DoE
regions allocate funds in excess of two years so perhaps it is almost inevitable that
this rule would be changed sooner or later, as happened in the 1990/91 round.
13.2% of the authorities were also under the impression that EA did guarantee
their continuation funding. This is surprising (though useful in avoiding problems of
uncertainty in capital programming) in that this is illegal from the point of view of
EA's constitution. Few authorities received such 'guarantees' and these were in the
Yorkshire and Humberside and the West Midlands regions.
51.9% of the responding authorities indicated that the continuation funding
system caused problems. With no guarantees of further funding, authorities must
find resources from their own HIPs or capital receipts to 'cover' the scheme in the
eventuality that EA support does not materialise. This seems to be a wise precaution
since as discussed earlier, about a quarter of the authorities in this survey have been
denied such allocations. The point, however, is that resources are finite and should
be fully invested instead of being held back just in case EA decides to renounce its
commitments - formal or otherwise. A considerable amount of financial covering
and juggling occurs before such schemes are allowed through the Committee stage
by councillors who want to be satisfied that all schemes will be sustainable.
Authorities of all types, regions and political backgrounds experience problems
although the Labour controlled authorities were more critical of this aspect.
The last part of this question prompts authorities to express what types of
problems were caused by the system of continuation funding. The scale of response
underlines the seriousness of the issue. Some problems arose primarily out of the
delays and inefficiency of the EA administration in processing bids and typical
comments include: 'Delay in accepting tenders, programming work and involving the
tenants'; 'Level of allocation is not known until very late - finance from authorities'
own HIPs has to be secured as a back-up'; and the 'requirement for local authority
resources to be reserved at an unknown rate to support EA', since EA now expects
authorities to contribute a proportion of the capital costs from their own HIPs.
Others point to the incompatibility between EA's timetabling and those of
optimal contractual work: 'one year funding and contractual commitments were in
conflict'; and there were related criticisms regarding the financial timetable itself:
'Difficulty in having to work up schemes with sufficient tenant consultation, prepare
detailed designs, go out to tender and complete the works to spend the allocation in
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one financial year'; and 'Need for advanced tenant involvement and increasing
information prior to approval and allocation and no commitment by EA'.
Many other comments concerned specifically the uncertainty surrounding the
issue of continuation funding: 'lack of certainty that resources will be available to
complete the scheme'; 'Uncertainty and the need to phase projects in order to
maximise EA support'; and 'Not known if continuation funding will allow further
phases to be undertaken'. Programming EA continuation funding is extremely
frustrating to work with and to accommodate within the local capital programme.
viii) 'What exactly will or will not be approved'. EA will not necessarily
meet all the elements that together make up a bid if it is believed that parts of schemes
should be funded out of authorities' mainstream HIPs allocation. In order to avoid
unsuccessful bids it is crucial for authorities to know what will not beapproved:
69.4% What was funded did vary within and/or between years
36.0% Know exactly what EA will not approve
Missing Cases = 11 (18.0%)
The fact that 69.4% felt that there were changes in what is funded by EA from
year to year (as well as within years), is confirmation of the pervasive feeling among
officers that criteria change according to whether EA is going to underallocate its
resources or not, a point developed in Chapter 6. For example, sometimes (and in
some regions) roofs, windows and kitchens are included and sometimes not. This
undermines confidence in EA and adds to the feeling of shifting 'goal posts'. The
perception that the elements approved varied is strongest in London (100%) and
Merseyside (100%), where all the responding authorities in those regions felt this to
be the case; and in the West Midlands (80%) to a lesser degree (Table 5.13).
As a consequence of this uncertainty, only 36% of all respondents knew
exactly what EA will approve. These are damaging figures but in theory, relatively
simple to remedy by simply issuing a letter to authorities setting out precisely what
will be approved under EA. This is standard DoE practice and there is no reason
why it cannot be used in the case of EA unless this uncertainty does act as an useful
tool for EA. It does nothing for DoEllocal authority relations or for value for money.
The survey also prompted authorities to 'indicate, based on their experience,
which elements EA will not approve'. Views are generally critical: 'There seems to
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be a continual change in emphasis which causes some confusion', but one view was
almost supportive of EA: 'It funds different types of work - depends on the package
of works'. Given the level of uncertainty, it is still worthwhile compiling a list of
elements which EA is unlikely to support, based on past experience across the
country. It seems clear that EA is not willing to do much for the inside of dwellings
(which is often the tenants' chief priority) such as internal improvements,
modernisation and repairs. It will no longer fund refurbishment of kitchens and
bathrooms. The only internal aspects it seems to be willing to support are insulation,
heating and windows, however, there is contention over these as certain authorities
list them as items that EA will not fund in their schemes. Other aspects not funded
include scaffolding, structural repairs, re-roofing, vandalism, revenue costs and
community facilities. This list serves only as a rough guide because as illustrated
elsewhere, there are frequently differences between and even within regions.
ix) How closely do local authorities and EA monitor their schemes:
93.3% Authorities monitor their EA-funded schemes
Missing Cases = 2 (3.3%)
The fact that virtually all authorities monitor these schemes reflects a growing
trend amongst both local authorities and central government. This is now regarded
as essential in order for decision-makers to get some idea of problems and difficulties
as they arise. Through EA, many authorities are also experimenting with different
management organisations or ownership forms, which means that they need to have
facts and figures so as to evaluate the success of schemes and the extent to which
they can be generalised across the authority. Such a high degree of monitoring also
reflects the need for authorities to scrutinise spending in order to be able to fill in the
EA assessment forms (C and D).
The main forms of scrutiny were via project control and capital spending
monitoring but also includes working groups, programme targets and even housing
management targets such as void and arrears levels, though this was rare. As for EA
monitoring, this took the following forms:
71.4% Asked for all the annual scheme assessment forms
89.3% Asked for all the quarterly scheme assessment forms
50.0% Sent officers to inspect the scheme during/after work
3.6% Sent officers to audit spending on schemes
12.5% Other [Missing Cases = 5 (8.2%)]
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EA obviously keeps close watch on developments in authorities via the
qu arterly (89.4%) and annual assessment (71.4%) forms. These are primarily
concerned with the financial aspects but which also includes environmental and
socio-economic issues, in order to find if there has been any sort of improvements on
the es tates. With this degree of monitoring, there is little need to inspect schemes
(50%) and even less point in auditing records (3.6%). What matters is that the
schemes are erected and operational within a reasonable time period. The other
forms of EA monitoring included occasional and/or yearly aut hority visits, regular
meetings with DoE staff and EA observers. EA is keen on photographic surveys
(12.5% - 'before' and 'after' the works/schemes are completed), the best of which
invariably end up in its colourful and up-beat Annual Reports.
x) The chi ef advanta ges of working to improve 'problem' es tates
through EA :
6 Other Factors
Time-scale encourages accelerated consultation.
5 plannin g and completion of shemes
Enables comprehensive problem investigation
4
and comprehensive solutions to be found
Allows innovative management structures
3 to develop
EA releases resources for necessary
2 capital works La take place
EA enables more schemes La take place
than would otherwise have been the case
• Vcry Important
1m Important
0 Not Important
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentag
Missing Cases =1 (1.6%) Source: Loca l Authority Survey
1. EA enables more schemes to take place than would otherwise have been the
case : This fits with the results presented in Table 5.5 which indicate unambiguously
that the primary reason for authori ties being involved with EA is the iss ue of
funding. Housing legislation has squeezed both cap ital and revenue subsi dies and
there is a feelin g that any source of 'extra' funds must be seized. Consequen tly EA
can be see n as havin g enabled more schemes to be se t up by 91. 7% of the
respondents. Thi s is an important finding for obvious reasons.
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2. EA releases resources which enable necessary capital works to takeplace
(88.3%): Authorities again stress that their prime intention via EA has been to obtain
additional funds. This leads one to question whether EA is just doing what councils .>
would have been doing themselves if these additional (EA) resources were available
to them via an enhanced HIPs system or through some other method. Enabling more
schemes to take place and releasing resources for capital works are by far, the main
advantages of working through EA. This is particularly important to SDP/Liberal
(75.0%) and Labour (73.9%) controlled authorities. The order of its importance
declines in relation to the type of authority. This illustrates in broad terms which
authorities are most likely to be dependent upon EA resources (Table 5.14).
3. EAallows innovative management structures andschemes to develop which
wouldotherwise nothave occurred: To EA's credit, 47.5% of the authorities do feel
that there are real advantages to be gained from the existence of such an organisation
- what is left unclear is what percentage of authorities would have engaged in these
anyway, if they had the resources to undertake such schemes themselves. There is
much evidence to suggest that authorities are primarily using EA for their own benefit
and to fulfil their own priorities, nevertheless, this is deemed to be one of the
advantages of working to improve 'problem' estates through EA mediation.
4. EA enables comprehensive problem investigation to occur and thus
comprehensive solutions to develop: Only 33.9% of the authorities were greatly
impressed with this potential advantage, among other things because the one year
financial timescale forces the pace a bit too much to be very effective. Rushed
developments may mean lower quality schemes.
5. Its timescale encourages accelerated consultation, planning andcompletion
of schemes: Few authorities saw great virtue in this aspect (25.4%), possibly
because accelerated consultation, planning and completion of schemes does not
necessarily result in better planned and higher quality projects. In fact, most
authorities may feel this to be a disadvantage or as not working very well in practice,
especially in relation to tenant consultation.
6.Authorities mentioned few 'other' advantages (3.4%) but comments include:
'Many EA objectives coincide with council policy'; 'No advantages - no more
applications'; and on the positive side, 'Estate based repair teams are being
recommended. t
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xi) The chi ef disadvantages to workin g with EA and its procedures:
15 Other factors
14 Lack of feedback on rejected schemes
13 EA criteria lack priority or rank
12 EA criteria not clear ly defined
11 EA procedu res resulting in confusion
10 Loss of co ntrol, autonomy & democ racy
9 Author ities must make revenue contribs
8 EA crite ria which keep changing
7 Authorities must make capital contribs
6 EA admin . procedures lead to delays
5 Inability to plan for medium/long term
4 EA cr iteria which are not authority's
3 Inadequate timetable for bidding etc.
2 Difficult & time co nsumin g nature of inf
1 EA adm inistra tion results in more work
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Note: There is clearly a mis ma tch betwee n the number of EA adva ntages and disadvanta ges.
Readers are referred to the methodological discussion (sec tion 3.4.2) for the reasons why this is the
case.
1. EA administration resulting in more work fo r staff: It is no t surprising that
thi s is seen to be one of the greates t di sadv ant ages (83.4%) . Staff have to be aware
of developments in EA and literally 'kee p their ears to the ground' in order to keep
abreast of EA 's more subtle twi sts and turn s, such as what it is part icul arl y keen to
embrace at different points in time. Offi cers indicate that it takes much effort to keep
tabs on these formal and informal developments and that there is a co nsiderable
amount of paperwork involved with this initiati ve. Cross-tabulating thi s variable
with DoE Regions indicates that authorities in all regions and all pol itical persuasion s
note this as a problem and, as in most issues regarding the initiative, a large degree of
consensus pervades. The fact that many of these offi cers onl y spe nd a proportion of
their time on EA add s to the perception that such involvement constitutes ex tra work.
2. Difficult and time consuming nature of information required by EA (81 .6%):
In their view not only are there numerous EA forms, but these are also subs tantial,
complex and time-consuming to compile. Addition ally, the information and figures
required are rarely easily avail able to authori ties, ass um ing that they ex ist at all.
Form A comprises of 34 sec tions (4 pages); Form B over 100 ques tions (8 pages);
Quarterly assessment Forms (4 pages); and an Annual scheme evaluation report (2
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pages). Housing officers are evidently concerned with this part of EA and the fact
that the data are not easily available.
Cross-tabulation against the strata variables reveals unanimity amongst all types
of authority. This is a very real problem, but one which cannot easily be solved,
especially if EA is keen to maintain the degree of control over schemes which it
currently exerts through all the paper work. Whether these are necessary is another
issue (see chapter 7), but the above two factors were by far the most important
disadvantages to officers.
3. Inadequate timetable/orbidding, acceptance and allocation 0/EAHIPs: As
previously discussed, over three quarters of authorities feel that there was an 'undue'
delay between submission and final acceptance of bids by EA, resulting in side-
effects such as the under-using of the potential allocation available to council housing
and that many of these difficulties could be traced to ENs timetable. This aspect is
again stressed by authorities, where 70% of them felt this to be one of the primary
disadvantages to EA. There is a good case for starting the whole EA bidding
procedure long before the start of the financial year concerned so that authorities have
a full year in which to spend that allocation as effectively as possible, without having
to worry about submitting bids within EA deadlines. Bids should be approved early
enough so that authorities can still spend their allocations in a financial year which is
rapidly coming to a close. Criticism of the timetable is not specific to certain regions
or authorities. It is all-pervasive and is one of the aspects analysed in greater detail in
subsequent chapters.
4. EA criteria which are not the authority's: A substantial proportion (65%)
recorded strong reactions to the fact the relationship meant working with criteria
which are not always the councils', with the implication that their autonomywould
thus be undermined. This is true to the extent that what one can bid for and what EA
expects is pre-determined and, therefore, authorities must conform to these if they
hope to get any funding at all. However, EA does not in any way force authorities to
become involved and there is the valid argument that within the umbrella initiative
that is EA, authorities have a great deal of flexibility to bid for elements which do not
infringe their own policies and priorities. If there is a willingness to exploit this, the
opportunities to do so exist. Quotations to this effect from preliminary interviews
include the following: "All EA schemes are what we would have done anyway, but
we are lucky that we've decentralised as this is highly regarded by EA" and: "The
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authority tries to use EA funding by targeting the bids and proposals to EA priorities
and wishes as well as our own".
Table 5.15 shows that the more socialist the nature of council control, the
greater the perception that EA did undermine local authority autonomy and/or that this
was a disadvantage to working with EA. It is important to note that 44.4% of the
responding conservative-controlled authorities also perceived this to be the cases.
5. Inability to plan/or the medium or long term in EA schemes: This pervasive
(61.7%) criticism refers yet again to the fact that EA can legally fund schemes for
only one financial year, though special arrangements are available for schemes
spanning two or more years. Approximately a third of authorities have received EA
funding over a longer period, probably because EA has come to appreciate that a
limitation of two years' funding is inadequate for major capital projects but a major
criticism of the set-up remains that it impairs forward planning to the degree that is
considered appropriate by authorities. Bids may be phased but there is never
certainty that these will be honoured since EA itself survives on an annual basis.
6: EA administration procedures resulting in delays to schemes: 55%
responded that this was a major disadvantage for reasons which have been discussed
elsewhere in the chapter, but it should be added that a major problem internal to the
EA bureaucracy, seems to be the fact that the division of responsibility between EA
Central based in Marsham Street and the DoE Regional Offices is unmistakably
blurred. The bid forms are sent by authorities to the Regional Offices and these are
then shuttled between Marsham St. and the Regional Offices until the decision is
finally made (see Figure 3.1). If the ROs do indeed have a degree of autonomy why
can they not reach a decision themselves, thereby reducing or eliminating the
extensive administrative delays?· This is an area which needs to be more
scrupulously analysed by EA and there are indications in subsequent chapters that
this is beginning to occur. Cross-tabulation of these responses with authority type
(Table 5.16) reveals that this is a problem for all excepting District Councils, which
perhaps reflects the fact that they tend to have fewer housing problems and submit
fewer EA bids.
7. Need/or authorities to make capital contributions to schemes: For the first
years of EA's existence all allocations were met from the EA HIPs (see table 5.29).
One ofthe more significant changes, however, has been the insistence by EA that
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Table 5.15: Criteria notAuthority's Cross-tabulated With Political Control
Political Control Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
Conservative Control 9 4 44
LabourControl 46 33 71
SDP/Liberal Control 4 2 50
MissingCases=2; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
Table 5.16: Administrative DelaysCross-tabulated WithAuthority Type
Authority Type Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
InnerLondon 4 3 75
OuterLondon 6 4 66
Metropolitan Districts 23 15 65
District Councils 27 11 40
MissingCases=l; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
Table 5.17:Revenue Contribution Cross-tabulated WithAuthority Type
Authority Type Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
InnerLondon 4 3 75
OuterLondon 6 1 16
Metropolitan Districts 23 6 26
DistrictCouncils 27 13 48
MissingCases=!; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
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authorities should contribute a proportion of the capital costs (currently 50%) from
their own HIPs. 45% of the responding authorities are very critical of this
development. Others refuse to contribute, arguing that EA does not actually pay for
anything - it merely enables authorities to borrow an additional amount for their
housing investment. They have been prepared to string along and use EA to their
advantage, but if the amount received from EA does not cover the full costs of the
schemes, their keenness to participate begins to ebb, particularly if it is seen as yet
another mechanism of reducing local authority autonomy over housing. Cross-
tabulation with 'political control' reveals that opinion is unanimous that this is a
major disadvantage. In terms of authority type, district councils were the least
concerned about this issue, possibly because of the amount of capital receipts which
they have accumulated in recent years.
8.. EA criteria whichkeep changing: The notion of changing criteria (36.7%)
has already been touched upon and there is little doubt that it does cause numerous
dilemmas for authorities: confusion, extra costs and delays remain a problem but
there is no reason why this should remain the case indefinitely with EA. Further
cross-tabulation shows that the authorities which suffer most from 'fluctuating
criteria' are the ones within the Northern and the London regions.
9. Needfor authorities to makerevenue contributions to schemes (38.4%): EA
has consistently declined to meet any of the increased revenue costs associated with
the initiatives which it helps to create, despite the fact that it is supposed to encourage
authorities to innovate and to demonstrate the benefits of new ways of organising
their stock and management. Similar government initiatives such as PEP, do make
provision for revenue costs to be met at least temporarily. Thus, for example, via the
Urban Programme, the DoE meets 75% of the costs and can, therefore, reasonably
expect to approve such schemes. Authorities are highly critical of the fact that
through EA, not only does the DoE not meet any of the costs involved in the schemes
(other than issuing authorisations for additional borrowing approvals), at the same
time it also gets to approve all the schemes. Nevertheless, surprisingly few
authorities have seen this as a disadvantage to working with EA and its procedures.
This must reflect the stringent financial climate that local authorities operate in.
Cross-tabulation with the strata variables (Table 5.17) suggests a confused and
contradictory response which· indicates that authorities do not seem to be certain
about whether the additional revenue cost involved is good or bad. Perhaps this is
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because not all schemes incur additional revenue costs, although it is the Inner
London boroughs which are particularly concerned about this.
10.Loss ofcontrol, autonomy and democracy over housing: Despite the initial
local authority rhetoric regarding this initiative and the early speculation and criticism
(refer to chapter 4), only 33.3% of respondents see this aspect as being a primary
disadvantage to working with EA. It is not surprising that their attitudes have
metamorphosed. As mentioned previously, EA has become such a umbrella
organisation that it can be argued that authorities wishing to gain supplementary
resources should be able to find elements within EA without greatly compromising
their own policies. The charge of reduced autonomy is thus somewhat defused.
Secondly, as authorities are keen to point out, EA has had difficulties in allocating all
of the resources potentially available to it. This situation presents an advantage to
authorities which will disappear (and even reverse) as more and more authorities bid
for EA resources in future. It must be said that nobody forces authorities to liaise
with EA and even if they feel that it entails compromises, they enter into the
partnership fully aware of the possibility.
11. EA administrative procedures resulting in confusion for staff: This is
another disadvantage cited by 33.4% of the respondents. The issue of changing
criteria and 'moving goal posts' has been discussed. That officers dealing with EA
should be confused to some degree is regrettable but almost inevitable for reasons
already discussed. This point will be elaborated on in the next chapter.
12. EA criteria which are not clearly defined: This was considered to be a
disadvantage for 33.4%, an extremely large proportion for something which ought to
be taken for granted. But should it? Every Annual Report lists the familiar aims
(plus what has been added) under such headings as 'Private Sector Involvement',
Estate Based Management' and 'Employment Initiatives' but clearly, if there is
uncertainty and confusion, these standard slogans cannot mean the same thing to
each officer in every authority. Most importantly, does it mean the same thing in the
same way to EA Central (and for the various Regional Offices, for that matter) as it
does to those who are bidding under those headings?
Perhaps EA ought to place greater emphasis on compiling brief guide-lines and
reports on what exactly it means by these phrases and slogans, together with
examples of models and variations. This could help to clear up the criticism. After
all, if officers do not have a clear idea of what they should be aiming for, they are
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unlikely to be successful in their bids, resulting in both delays and costs due to
abortive work, not to mention further mistrust Neither is the problem confined to a
single Regional Office. The degree of confusion is evenly spread, peaking in the
London and Northern Regions (Table 5.18).
13. EA criteria lacking prioritisation orranking: 23.3% consider it problematic
that EA has made no attempt to attach any sort of prioritisation to its lengthening
criteria. Canand does EA treat all these initiatives/bids with impartiality and with the
same degree of importance? If so, and more importantly if not, then authorities must
be supplied with this information to use as a basis for more rational decision-making
vis a vis EA and their bids. We have seen (Tables 5.5 and 5.6) that what local
authorities perceive EA to be emphasising varies so much (both annually and by
region) that as things stand, the initiative means different things to different
individuals/authorities. This needs to be clarified.
14. Lack offeedback on why schemes are rejected: A small but important
16.7% of respondents felt this to be a disadvantage. There can be no good reasons
for not informing authorities of the exact reasons why their bids have been rejected.
This should be a simple aspect to rectify and would certainly clear confusion and
improve authorities' confidence in the initiative, while also helping with future
applications. Cross-tabulation indicates that the lack of feedback from the DoE is
principally a problem in the Northern, London and West Midlands regions.
15. Other comments (3.3%): Both are worth inclusion: 'Allocations are 'top-
sliced' and therefore [there is now] even less scope for successful traditional HIPs
bids'; and '[EA] causes a great deal of extra work for staff since exactly the same
schemes would be prepared if we were given the resources in HIPs'.
5.5. Tenant participation and evaluation
i) Has the involvement with EA resulted in greater tenant consultation,
participation and input into schemes than would otherwise have been
the case in the authority?
Yes 31.1%
No 68.9%
. Missing Cases =0
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Table5.18:Changing Criteria Cross-tabulated WithDoE Regions
Region Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
London 10 5 50
Yorkshire & Humberside 6 3 50
Merseyside 4 0 0
Northern 8 5 62
NorthWestern 15 5 33
WestMidlands 8 2 25
EastMidlands 5 2 40
Eastern 3 1 33
MissingCases=2; Source: Local Authority Survey
Table 5.19:Satisfactory Tenant Consultation Cross-tabulated WithPolitical Control
yyg
Political Control Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
Conservative Control 4 2 50
LabourControl 34 22 64
SDP/Liberal Control 2 2 100
Missin Cases-=21; Source: Local Authont SUlVe
Table 5.20: Change to Schemes Cross-tabulated WithHousing Deprivation
Housing Deprivation Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
Ffighleveldeprivation 23 11 78
Meiliurnleveldeprivation 15 11 86
Low leveldeprivation 18 16 88
MissingCases=5; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
149
This is a vital EA element which explicitly recognises the fact that in the past, many
schemeshave beenimplemented withouttenant involvement and have turnedout to
be unworkable. 31.1% of the respondents did feel that EA involvement had led to
increased tenant consultation in theirauthorities. This is undoubtedly an indication of
success, however, two points are worth noting. Firstly, givenEA's commitment to
and heavy emphasis on this objective, perhaps a larger degree of success might be
expected. Moreimportantly, whenaskedto specify in what ways this greaterdegree
of consultation had been achieved, the majorityindicated that this had not occurred
primarily through theirinvolvement in generating EA schemes perse. This being the
case, EA's influence in thisrespectbegins to appearquestionable.
The survey probed intohowexactly therelationship withEA may haveresulted
in greaterconsultation. The responses relatedprincipally to PEP involvement, tenant
forums and to someextentEA itself. Mostof the other factors related to the tenants
in some way: 'Tenants forums established as part of the decentralisation package';
and 'Strong Residents Association formed. Regular consultation meetings'. Only
one authority praisedEA directly: '[Ourauthority] has not had a significant recordof
tenant involvement. EA guidance has made the Department more consciousof the
need to consult'. Thus, strictly speaking, even in these 31.1%, the main reasons
why greatertenant consultation has occurred, relate to reasons beyond EA itself.
When this variableis cross-tabulated with DoE regions, it is the authorities in
the EasternandEast Midlands regions which havebenefited mostby improving their
tenant consultation, while authorities in the London region benefited least. It was
generally the district councils and the ones with the least deprivation which indicated
improvements in their tenant consultation as a resultof EA involvement.
In fact, 68.9% of authorities felt that involvement with EA had not necessarily
led to a greaterdegree of consultation. This is because:
63.4% Authority/officers are satisfied withexisting levelsof consultation
35.0% Fearof raising tenants' expectations yet be unable to guarantee delivery
of schemes
30.0% Authorities are expected to plan,consult, cost and submitschemes too
quickly andtoo late to allow for full andeffective consultation under
.EA's timetabling arrangements
5.0% Costsincurred by the authority in preparing bids while thereis no
guarantee that theywillbe approved by theEA administration
20.0% Otherfactors [Missing Cases= 21 (34.4%)]
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Most (63.4%) stated that this was because authorities/officers are satisfied with
existing levels of consultation. This response would suggest that authorities seem to
have reacted positively to the general criticism about bureaucracy, paternalism and
not involving their tenants sufficiently, and many councils have responded by taking
consultation more seriously by laying down consultation procedures. The survey
results suggest that by the mid 1980s, this objective would appear to have been
fulfilled independently of any government initiative. This mayor may not be true.
Certainly it could be argued that greater consultation is occurring precisely because of
the EA initiative's insistence that this is a pre-requisite for financial support (see
chapter 9). Nevertheless it was the SDP/Liberal and Labour-controlled councils
which have maintained the same levels of consultation, mainly because they argue,
they were satisfied with the pre-existing arrangements. It is primarily Conservative
authorities which have benefited in terms of introducing this element into their
authorities as a result ofEA (Table 5.19).
Of great concern is the possibility that less consultation may actually result from
EA involvement. Suspicion of such a perverse side-effect arises from the fact that
35% of authorities noted their fear that they may raise tenants' expectations yet be
unable to guarantee delivery of the schemes. Under EA's procedural arrangements
authorities must go through all the motions of designing, planning and costing a
scheme, as well as involving the public at all stages of the process. However, there
is always the danger that schemes will not be approved and so no additional
resources will be forthcoming. A tenant backlash is the likely consequence
mentioned by some councils and the danger is that even those committed to full and
meaningful consultation may only involve tenants once EA approval to spend has
been obtained and the details of the scheme set.
Further points arise from the fear of Regional Office underallocation or local
authority underspend, both of which are analysed more fully in chapter 6. We have
discussed the problems experienced with the EA administration leading to delays in
approval and that speed is of the essence if all councils are to spend their EA
allocations within the financial year. A side-effect of this is that councils may be
tempted to scale-down or even sacrifice tenant consultation; if they are to both get the
resource and spend it (30%). The justification may be that resources and schemes
are better than full consultation but no scheme to show for it.
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Several 'other' reasons (20%) were identified in the survey as to why greater
tenant consultation did not occur in these authorities. These include the following
reasons, none of which are unexpected: 'Our local authority already committed to
increasing tenant consultation before EA [was formed]'; 'Tenant consultation
happens anyway, and is being improved'; and lastly, the 'Cramped timetable and
scheme length makes effective consultation harder'.
ii) Which forms of con sultation actually took place in your a uthor ity
and at what stage of the process did thi s occur?
6 Other factors
• Yes
5 Adverts, posters, presentations II Form A
4 Surveys & door-to-door visits ~ Form B
Bl Later
3 Steering groups incl. tenants
• Ongoing2 Public meetings & presentations 0 None
1 Feedback mechanisms
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Per cent ag
Missing Cases =4 (6.6%); Source: Local Authority Survey
N ole: T he 'Yes' ca tegory includes only tho se authorities tha t ind icated that this form of
consultation had occurred. though not when it had occurred (see also Table 6.2).
1. Feedback mechanisms in order to incorporate tenant input and (3) Steering
groups composed of tenants, officers and architects: 59.6% of respond ing
authorities stated that they had some form of mechanism for incorporating tenant
input and feedback. An equal proportion had formed steering groups for their
schemes. These are advanced forms of consultation and if it is true that 60% of the
authorities undertake these, then it is encouraging to note that such a high proportio n
of authorities consider these to be important.
2. Public meetings and presentations: These are particu larly useful for
discussing scheme proposals and ironing out details and are very common forms of
tenant involvement (80.7%). This, as most methods of consultation, is especially
useful if it is on-goi ng but the evidence is that this is the case only with a small
percentage of EA schemes.
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4. Questionnaire surveys and/or door-to-door visits: The evidence indicates that
the main form of consultation for EA schemes is questionnaire surveys and/or door-
to-door visits (82.5%). These are presumably used to identify the issues and areas
of concern which form the basis of the actual schemes submitted to the DoE. In
actual fact, things do not quite work that way as discussed below.
5. Adverts, posters andpresentations (43.9%): These are designed primarily to
draw tenants' attention to the fact that changes are planned for their estate. This is a
smaller figure than expected and is probably a manifestation of the fact that if
authorities are to consult, plan, design, bid and spend their allocation within a year,
they may well have to skip the 'frills' which constitute the build-up and concentrate
instead on 'true' consultation such as meetings and steering groups.
6. Otherforms of consultation (12.3%): These include: 'Tenant Management
Board and Tenants' Associations'; 'Small group meetings and Tenants' Association
meetings'; and 'Weekly tenant surgeries' but overall, it would appear that authorities
are concerned and committed to tenant consultation and that the EA schemes do
achieve high levels of consultation but that, as described earlier, in the majority of
cases (68.9%), such levels are no different to those of schemes normally funded by
the authorities. EA is thus failing in' the strict sense since part of its purpose is to
promote greater and more meaningful tenant consultation. At the same time, the very
fact that this is known to be a major objective may compel authorities to ensure high
consultation levels in EA schemes.
The issue is more complicated. A closer analysis of the 'quality' of
consultation reveals a somewhat disappointing scenario. If we accept that
consultation should occur before the schemes are decided (for otherwise they would
be mere rubber-stamping exercises) and that they should preferably be on-going, it is
no overstatement to argue that EA is failing badly and that this is a feature inherent to
the way that it operates as currently organised. The argument here is that only a
small proportion of authorities actually consult with their tenants at Form A stage.
Rather this occurred mainly at Form B, namely when the costings and other details of
the schemes are already known in broad terms and presented to EA for final approval
and funding. The suspicion must be that this proportion would be even larger if the
'Yes' category could be unravelled. This surely, is a contradiction to a key EA
principle, but this is a consistent pattern for all the various forms of consultation.
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Most of the consultation actually takes place between the time that EA approves
the initial bid (and invites authorities to work up the scheme in greater detail) and the
time that this (Form B) is submitted for final approval. This makes sense for
authorities. They obtain an indication of whether their applications are likely to
succeed, tenants' expectations are not raised until authorities are fairly certain of
receiving the allocation and staff time is not wasted on organising consultation,
designing the project, drawing up the tenders and other fine details. But in a very
real sense, this process works against optimum tenant consultation and involvement.
This important issue is also analysed in great detail in subsequent chapters.
iii) To what extent has tenant consultation resulted in change to EA
schemes?
Little Change
Substantial Change
Sub-Total
66.1%
17.9%
84.0%
No change 3.5%
Not Known 12.5%
Missing Cases =5 (8.2%)
Ifchange resulting from consultation is desirable (since tenants are presumed to
be in the best position to decide what is needed and how that should be provided),
then the statistics show a healthy element of change (84%) which clashes slightly the
housing officers' responses to the previous question. However, only a relatively
small part of this total change was substantial (17.9%). Perhaps the reason for this is
that the housing officers have guessed rightly what tenants wanted done on their
estates (and so the bids required little change), but if this is the case, why then all the
fuss about placing greater emphasis on tenant consultation?
The more likely explanation for the small amount of substantial change is a
direct consequence of the fact that authorities are put in a position where the bulk of
the consultation process must be conducted and incorporated within the period when
EA asks the authority to work up the schemes in greater detail and the point when
Form B is tendered to the DoE. This would suggest that the reason why most
authorities make little change may be firstly, because of a combination of insufficient
time for adequate consultation and for collecting and incorporating those suggestions,
and secondly, because those recommendations do not square with the original
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conception of the scheme as set out at Form A stage. A third factor is perhaps,
because the scheme was exactly what was needed or wanted by the tenants with few
exceptions; or lastly, because tenants did not have many ideas or suggestions, in
which case it is quite natural that there should be limited change in the majority of
schemes. The first two options seem more probable.
The degree of change to schemes cross-tabulated with the level of housing
deprivation (Table 5.20) demonstrates that it is not the most deprived authorities
which experience the greatest degree of tenant feedback which is subsequently
incorporated into schemes. Nevertheless, the levels of tenant involvement seem to be
fairly high.
iv) How were the approved schemes primarily chosen?
10.0% They were suggested by the EA team
61.7% Consultation between the authority and the EA team
50.0% Consultationbetween the authority and the tenants
6.7% Formation of a project group for each EA scheme
13.3% Other factors
Missing Cases =1 (1.6%)
These results confirm that EA can have a direct impact upon authorities. For
10% of the authorities, the main reason why their schemes were chosen was because
they were suggested or recommended by the EA team. One assumes that local
authorities went through with them because the suggestions were relevant and
beneflcial to the area or estate. Cross-tabulation with DoE regions reveals that it is
only in Merseyside that any number of authorities (66.7%) are influenced by EA, but
the small number of authorities in this category (3) makes the statistic deceptive.
The majority of schemes were primarily chosen as a result of consultation
between the authorities and EA (61.7%), which seems to imply that tenant
consultation and involvement was not the primary consideration of a great many
cases, but is not altogether surprising that this occurs with the present organisational
arrangements. Authorities must bid for schemes which conform to EA criteria
(thereby possibly clashing with another intention, namely to help authorities to
innovate) and everything must be done within the financial year. Additionally, a
crucial reason for success in bidding for EA HIPs quoted by many of the officers
interviewed, was a very informal one - the authority's relationship with their DoE
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Regional Office and the understanding and quality of the officers thereof. That
schemes should come to primarily reflect ENLA considerations is almost inevitable.
50% of the respondents did reveal that the approved schemes were chosen
primarily as a result of consultation between themselves and their tenants. The
discrepancy in numbers arises as usual because authorities were free to tick more
than one category. However, in this case the categories are mutually exclusive, in
the sense that the primary reason for choosing a scheme cannot be because of EA
suggestions as well as being primarily because or EA/authority consultation and/or
primarily because of authority/tenant consultation. Officers seem to have been
collectively ambiguous in their answers. What is clear is that few authorities formed
steering project groups (6.7%). The reasons may be many and varied but uncertainty
about funding and the short timescale probably figured. In fact, the 'other' category
was more important (13.3%) and the primary reasons why schemes were chosen
included: 'Schemes which met EA criteria but main HIPs resources were insufficient
to fund'; and 'Developed by local managerlhousing officers and chosen due to
known problems'. One even indicated that a scheme was chosen 'Following
appointment of consultants'.
v) Indicate whether the authority will be bidding for additional EA
allocation in the future:
No 5.0%
Missing Cases = 1 (1.6%) They would not participate in future because:
33.3% Negative experience with ENthe failure of previous schemes
33.3% The resulting increased revenue costs to the authority
33.3% Authorities are expected to make capital contributions to schemes
66.7% Other reasons
Missing Cases =58 (95.1%)
Only a small number of authorities (3) stated that they would not participate in
the EA programme in future so the discussion must of necessity, be highly tentative.
Negative experiences with EA and the lack of scheme success were mentioned, as
was the increase in revenue cost incurred as a result of EA schemes not being
subsidised or supported. Authorities are left to cope with increased cost themselves
unlike other government initiatives such as the Urban Programme schemes. Another
factor in this decision relates to EA's decree that as from 1988/89, authorities would
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be expected to make a contribution to the capital costs from their own HIPs
allocation. This appears to be an offence to certain authorities given that they already
have to 'jump through so many DoE hoops already'. The 'other' reasons for cutting
the links with EA include the 'Proposed changes in spending capital receipts' and the
'Lack of DoE appreciation of the housing needs of the area'.
The overwhelming majority (95%) of councilors are committed to continuing
their relationship and involvement with EA. The reasons for this for this are set out
below:
Yes 95.0%
Missing Cases = 1 (1.6%)
40.4% Positive experience with EA and the success of previous schemes
80.7% EA represents vital and increasing resources
52.6% Lack of choice since EA's resources are essential to the authority
7.0% Other factors
Missing Cases = 4 (6.6%)
Initially the situation reflects well upon EA. 40.4% concurred that they have
had positive experiences with EA and/or the fact that their EA schemes were
succeeding (though we will see in Section 5.7ii that they attribute this success
primarily to themselves and their tenants, not to EA). However, the 'other' reasons
mentioned would indicate that the majority of authorities will continue to bid not so
much because ofEA, but rather in spiteof it.
80.7% will continue their involvement but only because EA represents vital and
increasing resources. Such an attitude has remained consistent throughout the period
covered by the survey and there can be little doubt that authorities aim to use EA for
their own ends as far as possible. Equally, over half of all authorities (52.6%)
admitted that they were involved with EA through lack of choice, since the resources
available to EA were considered to be essential to their authorities. What clearly
emerges here is that authorities will continue to be involved but not always for the
'right' reasons. Local authorities are still using EA to their advantage as amply
demonstrated throughout the survey but at the same time, EA's power is probably
increasing in relation to the authorities. As more authorities become involved and the
number of bids submitted to EA increase, EA may well be in a position of being able
to 'pick and choose' schemes in the future (see Table 5.26).
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A few authorities quoted 'other' factors but financial aspects remained
uppermost: 'HIPs is rapidly falling; EA is increasing'; 'Due to decreasing HIPs
allocations'; and the 'Need to fund local management projects'. In other words all
were in it for the resource and one even implied that their authority had become
dependent on EA: 'Need to complete future phases of existing schemes'.
5.6 If EA HIPs had not been available
This part of the survey poses certain counterfactual questions in order to gain
an understanding of what authorities would have done if they did not have to rely on
EA HIPs as much as the majority currently do (as we have seen in previous
sections).
i) With regard to the EA schemes which have been implemented in the
authority, how high a priority would they have been given if EA HIPs
had not been available?
40.7% In the process of being implemented anyway from main HIPs
72.9% Under discussion for future implementation
10.2% Low priority
6.8% Not previously considered
3.4% Other reason
Missing Cases = 2 (3.3%)
This question serves as a surrogate for the degree to which authorities have had
to compromise in order to obtain additional resource and whether EA is indeed
working as force for innovation (if these types of schemes had not been given high
priority previously). The first factor suggests that EA has not been a great force for
change. 40.7% planned to construct such schemes from their own resources.
Presumably, having found out about the EA programme and realising that their plans
fell within its wide criteria, they did what any responsible organisation would have -
they used EA funding instead.
Normally though, not only did authorities know about the initiatives sponsored
by EA but they were actually under discussing for future implementation (72.9%).
These were probably being left to the future because they were unable to come up
with the necessary finance. By virtue of its resources (and 'fitting' bids), EA has
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enabled more schemes to proceed beyond the drawing board - schemes which would
otherwise not taken place for years. This may explain why. despite the low levels of
tenant consultation and little change to proposals. the great majority of schemes are
still evaluated as being substantially improved; as well as why authorities (largely)
have not seen EA as greatly undermining their autonomy. The majority are clearly
bidding only for those initiatives which they had planned to undertake in the future
and which are. therefore. likely to be in accord with council priorities and policies.
This lends further support to the argument that if authorities are prepared to engage in
EA. they can find the opportunities without too much compromise. but see (ii)
below.
Many authorities planned to implement these EA schemes at some stage and
cross-tabulation with the Regional Offices reveals that the great majority have not
deviated much from what they had intended to implement. with the exception of the
authorities in the West Midlands (see Table 5.21).
10.2% of responding authorities indicated that the schemes which had been
implemented had only been given low priority previously and that 6.8% had not been
considered at all. These may be interpreted either as evidence that EA is not
achieving its objectives (since so few authorities are actually undertaking things
which they did not consider before and that EA has had very little effect on the
authorities' deliberations) or conversely. that with its financial clout. EA is slowly
beginning to become more influential and even forceful in attempting to fulfil its aims
and that authorities are beginning to toe the line. On a less sinister note. this may
simply reflect the greater number of options being placed in front of local authorities.
A few indicated 'other' positive elements to EA: 'Varies - some would have
gone ahead anyway. others would not'; 'Work would have begun. however it may
not have been as comprehensive as EA funding has allowed'; and 'Decentralisation to
local management offices would have been difficult'. These reinforce the view that
more schemes have taken place than would otherwise have been the case and
illustrates that EA is achieving one of its aims: EA has allowed resources to be
directed towards difficult-to-Iet estates.
159
Table 5.21:FutureImplementation Cross-tabulated WithDoE Regions'
Region Number of Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
London 10 7 70
Yorkshire & Humberside 6 4 66
Merseyside 4 4 100
Northern 7 7 100
NorthWestern 15 10 66
WestMidlands 8 3 37
East Midlands 5 5 100
Eastern 3
• <
3 100
MissingCases=3; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
Table 5.22:Different Areaor Estate Cross-tabulated WithHousing Deprivation
HousingDeprivation Numberof Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
High leveldeprivation 17 3 17
Medium leveldeprivation 14 2 14
Low leveldeprivation 13 2 15
MissingCases=17; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
Table 5.23: MoreEffectively in General Cross-tabulated WithHousing Deprivation
HousingDeprivation Numberof Authorities Response-rate
Number Percent
flighleveldeprivation 17 9 52
Medium leveldeprivation 14 6 42
Low leveldeprivation 13 6 46
MissingCases=17; Source: LocalAuthority Survey
160
ii) Would you have used the EA HIPs any differently, if it had been
available to use as your authority saw fit?
15.9% In a different area or estate
22.7% In a different scheme or way
47.7% More effectivelyin general
22.7% More effectively in each of the EA schemes
11.4% Other factors
Missing Cases = 17 (27.9%)
The first two factors are good indicators that certain authorities are having to
compromise to a certain extent in order to secure EA allocations. That is surely what
must be deduced if 15.9% of the authorities argue that they would actually have used
the resources in different areas/estates and a further 22.7% would have used those
resources in different schemes/ways if they were not 'tied'. The conclusion must be
that it is not always the localities which officers perceive as having the greatest need
that end up with the schemes and resources. To the extent that the housing officers
are the ones best able to decide what is needed and where, this must be seen as a
serious concern. Worse still, when the first factor is cross-tabulated with housing
deprivation, Table 5.22 illustrates that it is the most deprived authorities which
indicate that they would have invested in different areas or estates if they had the
choice (all of which were Labour-controlled). This is a serious issue which should
be further investigated.
The following two factors indicate further reasons to confirm the suspicion that
inefficiencies arise from the EA structure. 47.7% of the authorities felt that they
could and would have used those resources more effectively in general if they did not
have to cope with the EA administration and if these resources were available for
them to use as they wished (see Table 5.23). A further 27.7% also argued that they
could have used it more effectively in each of the particular schemes. These are
serious findings given the government's stated drive for 'value for money'.
'Other' factors indicated (11.4%) were that the EA HIPs allocation would have
been used: 'In exactly the same way, just cutting out all the new bureaucracy', and
that if left to its own devices, these: 'Resources would have been spread more widely
(political reasons) and therefore effectiveness may have been reduced'. This
represents more peripheral support for EA. But for a government obsessed with
economy, effectiveness and efficiency in everything public, this evidence justifies
further consideration and research. A strong case may be made from the evidence
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presented via this questionnaire for the need for reform in certain crucial aspects of
EA, summarised and discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. As mentioned
elsewhere, there is evidence of changes for the better here and there but the situation
is still inadequate and moving slowly.
iii) Do you consider that your authority's needs, priorities (and thus
autonomy) have, therefore, been compromised in order to obtain EA
HIPs?
Little compromise
Substantial compromise
No compromise
Not known
Missing Cases = 13 (21.3%)
56.3%
25.0%
12.5%
6.3%
There can be no more clear-cut evidence of the fact that EA can and does exert
considerable influence upon authorities. 81.3% of authorities felt that their
authorities' needs and priorities had been compromised at least to some extent. Only
12.5% gave a clear signal that they had not been compromised in any way due to
their involvement with EA. The rest (6.3%) abstained from registering any view.
When cross-tabulated with politics, it was mainly Labour-controlled authorities
which indicated that they had been compromised and only Labour councils indicated
that they had been substantially compromised.
iv) Do you expect that as time progresses and as capital expenditure
constraints tighten up in future, that your bids and schemes will come
to reflect EA's objectives and priorities more and more?
No 0%
Yes 67.2%
Not Known 32.8%
Missing Cases = 3 (4.9%)
The results are conclusive. Not a single authority indicated that it did not
expect this to be the case. 32.8% avoided the issue by saying that they didnot know
but every other responding authority indicated that they did expect EA's influence to
increase in the future. Cross-tabulation shows that authorities in all regions agreed
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and there was also little variation with political control. A quotation from the survey
is particularly barbed: 'EA is a process of centralisation without any doubt. Not only
that. but is also bureaucracy gone mad ... [Nevertheless. the authority] spends a lot
of effort on EA - local authorities just cannot afford not to go in for it ...• therefore. it
is worthwhile chasing after despite the confusion. delays and frustrations'. For
many authorities EA allocations can top 50% of their annual HIPs allocation in a
successful year. In other words. EA HIPs has become absolutely crucial for many
authorities. Their dependence on EA is beyond doubt (except where they also have
large capital receipts) and the scope for greater assertiveness on the part of the EA
initiative must grow annually.
5.7 Evaluation of EA schemes: preliminary findings
The last section of the questionnaire addresses the degree to which the estates
have improved following the completion of these EA schemes. All the evidence
presented comes from the national survey.
i) Would you say that the situation in your estate(s) has improved?
No 2.0%
Little 30.6%
Substantially 67.3%
Missing Cases = 12 (19.7%)
Little need be said here. except to note that according to officer evaluations. the
EA-funded schemes appear to be working remarkably well. If the great majority of
the estates (67.3%) have indeed shown substantial improvements. as indicated. or
general improvement (98%). then it would seem to imply that EA is doing its job and
that this DoE initiative does justify its increasing annual budgets despite many of the
critical issues discussed earlier. The results suggest that targeting resources along
DoE-prescribed lines does work. Effectiveness of policy is an issue which is
developed in chapter 8.
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ii) What were the primary reasons for this perceived or actual
improvement? .
98.0% The authority and the efforts of its officers
57.1 % The [efforts of the] tenants themselves
38.8% [The efforts and] intervention by EA and its team
10.2% Other reasons
Missing Cases = 12 (19.7%)
Authorities naturally consider themselves and their efforts to be the key to these
developments (98%). It would have been surprising if it were otherwise, since it is
the officers that decide which estates need changes, the form of these changes, bid
via EA, build the scheme and staff it. EA's contribution in this sense, is not much
more than as an 'enabler' since it holds the purse strings. This notion of authorities
using EA as a facilitator has been consistent throughout the analysis, as has been the
conclusion that even in this role, there are clearly problems and efficiencies which
operate in its procedures and administration, and there are certainly grounds for
recommending improvements.
The second main reason for the success achieved by these schemes was
accorded to the tenants themselves and their input and efforts (57.1%). The main
means by which tenants would have contributed to the success of the schemes would
be, firstly, through the consultation process, and the previous section has analysed
this issue fully, and secondly, by their reaction to the changes and efforts to work
with local councils in order to make their homes and environments better places to
live in.
Last comes EA itself. While it has been described as an enabler, its role in
theory is much larger than that. It seeks to promote a number of initiatives yet, it
would appear from the data that authorities bid overwhelmingly for those elements
which suit them and their priorities. EA is also supposed to advise authorities on
what they consider as the best ways of improving and managing their stock, based
on the experience of other authorities across the nation. This is a demanding role,
nevertheless, EA does seem to have met with a degree of success. 38.3% of
respondents felt this to be the case. This should be neither ignored or under-rated.
10.2% ticked the 'other' reasons option: 'Substantial improvement - appears to
be because of capital expenditure', 'Physical improvement of environment and
164
property', and 'Decentralisation policy and consultation mechanisms set up to
discuss issues with representatives on the estates'. There is a glaring omission in the
possible categories, namely joint tenant/council/EA co-operation. The fact only two
authorities indicated that this was the primary reason for the improvements is
indicative of the fact that despite the rhetoric, the true relationship in this initiative is
principally between EA Central, the Regional Offices and the local authorities.
iii) A preliminary indication of the improvement on the estates
It must be stressed that there are problems with these data as few authorities
completed the questionnaire adequately enough to be included in the analysis. While
61 authorities responded to the survey, the data from 40 authorities (constituting 53
EA schemes in all) have been incorporated into this section, representing a 65.5%
overall response-rate. The objective of the exercise is to obtain an useful indication
of the degree of success met by the EA-funded schemes which have already been
implemented.
Table 5.24 summarises the main findings of an evaluation of impact. Based on
the housing management indices chosen, the statistics imply a very pronounced
improvement in the management situation of the great majority of the schemes funded
by EA. Transfer requests have decreased in 44% of the estates, the average time
taken to re-Iet property has also declined (in 57% of the cases), as has the number of
dwellings still classified as 'difficult-to-Iet' (57%). Similarly positive results are
. evident as concerns the level of vacant dwellings (57%) the incidence ofcrime(62%)
and vandalism and graffiti (63%).
While it is recognised that these improvements cannot be separated from wider
developments in the authorities concerned, nevertheless, these findings suggest that
'targeting' EA HIP is having a measurably beneficial effect (see Pinto, forthcoming
a), which is the objective as far as the EA schemes and the tenants are concerned. It
is important to bear this fact in mind when reading the rest of the thesis, although this
must be counterbalanced by the fact that these figures are not very robust and are
based in part on the subjective assessments of EA co-ordinating officers.
Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that there would appear to be very positive
results accruing from EA schemes and chapter 8 builds upon this analysis by
evaluating the effectiveness in four case-studies located in different settings.
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It is relevant to note at this juncture that further analysis has been carried out
from the postal survey but that for reasons of space and simplicity, this information
and the accompanying statistical tables have been annexed to Appendix 6.
Table 5.24: Evaluation of EA Schemes: management statistics
~ c:I:l~ ~ 0~ t:: c:I:l] 0 ~ a13 bJ)a 0 ~ bJ)c:I:l j t:: .SManagement Indicators: (oj ..c ~~ C) "5 c:I:l... c:I:l~ ~ e£ ....~ ~
Outstanding transfer requests 17.7 44.4 22.4 15.5 100 8
Average time to re-let the dwellings 4.7 57.3 28.5 9.5 100 11
No. dwellings (still) difficult-to-Iet 0 57.9 26.3 15.8 100 15
Current tenants with rent arrears 19.3 57.4 17.0 6.3 100 6
Management costs per dwelling 55.5 0 7.3 37.2 100 26
Vacant dwellings 14.8 57.4 21.4 6.4 100 6
Incidence of crime 1.9 61.5 30.8 5.8 100 1
Incidence ofvandalism & graffitti 1.9 63.4 28.8 5.9 100 1
Source: Local Authority Survey
5.8 Conclusions
This chapter has presented an overview of the survey's findings, faithfully
following the structure of the questionnaire. This was considered to be necessary
primarily because by nature, this son of approach was essential if the analysis was
not to lose coherence and flow. The general drift of the findings indicate that local
authorities feel that EA's operation is far from optimal although EA does appear to
have achieved positive impacts on the locality.
There is some divergence in what local authorities wish to use EA HIPs
resources for. Local authorities are above all attracted by the fact that EA is an
increasing source of housing finance and by the opponunity to further decentralise
their management structures. While they have come to perceive EA to be about
encouraging new management styles, they are wary of the fact that EA's second
highest priority seems to be that of further privatisation of council housing.
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The administrative procedures are generally felt to be cumbersome which,
combined with the problematic timetable, creates pressures towards the end of the
financial year, possibly resulting in wasted resources and a host of other difficulties
such as in coordination, renegotiation of tender agreements and confusion. The
merits and disadvantages of the EA initiative were analysed before turning to the
issue of tenant consultation. Only 31% felt that involvement with EA resulted in a
greater level of tenant consultation and many felt that the quality of consultation was
actually jeopardised. Local authorities also argue that most of the schemes which
have been funded would have been implemented from mainstream HIPs anyway or
were under discussion for future implementation, which suggests that EA results in a
lot of 'dead-weight' schemes as far as the DoE is concerned. The overwhelming
majority of authorities also expected ENs influence to increase with time.
Lastly the preliminary evaluation of the impact of the EA initiative using
aggregate data suggests substantial (positive) impacts on the estates in 67% of the
responding authorities on the basis of a number of management criteria such as the
reduction in the number of requests for transfer, the remaining number of dwellings
classed as 'difficult-to-let' or void and the incidence of crime and vandalism.
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Chapter 6
The Local Authorities' View:
A summary and evaluation of Estate Action
6.1 Introduction
This chapter has several objectives. At one level it seeks to build upon the
previous chapters by bringing together the main points from the analysis of the
survey results. The chapter summarises a wealth of material from which further
details have been published in Pinto (1990 and 1991a). Another aim is to discuss
additional factors which are important to the initiative but which have not been
touched upon, for example, the 'topslicing' of resources and the extent to which EA
is fulfilling its remit. The final purpose is to assess why the problems discussed in
the previous chapter arise and begin to analyse the role of the other key agencies
involved in the implementation of EA schemes, namely the Department of
Environment's Regional Offices (ROs) and the EA Central team. This chapter is thus
an important precursor to the next two (chapters 7 and 8) which respectively deal
with implementation and effectiveness.
6.2 Local authority interaction with EA: a summary
In terms of the detailed operation of the EA initiative, it is obvious from the
survey (Chapter 5) that the overwhelming local authority opinion is that EA is not
operating effectively and that it is primarily EA's administrative and operational
procedures which work to inhibit smooth and effective co-operation and co-
ordination with authorities. This results in underused EA HIPs resources and
possibly also compromises the quality of the schemes themselves. There are several
inter-related issues which arise from a detailed analysis of the interaction between EA
Central, the ROs and local authorities in attempting to renovate and better manage
run-down council estates using the EA approach. This section goes further than
chapter 5 by both summarising the main problems and postulating possible solutions.
i) Deficient timetabling arrangements
According to the survey results one of the primary factors which undermine
smooth interaction in implementing EA, is that its timetable is not well geared to the
one which local authorities must operate to, particularly with respect to capital
programming. The importance of this issue was underlined in the survey by the fact
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that 69.5% of the respondents noted that one of the chief disadvantages of working
with EA was the 'inadequate nature of the timetable for bidding, acceptance and
allocation of EA HIPs', which they argue to be more problematic than the normal
HIPs system. 51% of the authorities stated that the main reason why they
experienced unreasonable delays between the time they submitted Forms A and B,
and the time they finally received official approval, was because of the lack of an
adequate timetable for bids. A further 51.2% also stressed the difficulty by
contending that EA invited authorities to bid too late in the financial year and imposed
unreasonable deadlines. An example illustrates the difficulty. In the 1987/88 round,
London authorities were invited to submit bids on the 16th February 1987. Final
approval arrived between July and November and the resources had to be spent by
April of the following calender year. Such a timetable inevitably creates very tight
deadlines particularly on large, complex and costly schemes.
It may be suggested that the bids should be processed much earlier so that the
total approved allocation is known to authorities at the startof the financial year in
question, thus enabling the resources and schemes to be more optimally planned and
programmed. This is an issue which was taken up by the AMA in a letter to William
Waldegrave (the then Minister for Housing and Planning), whose response
confirmed the findings of the survey:
"I note what you say about the timetable •.. and I agree that we should do what we
can to improve it •.. we have brought forward the bidding round for next year and
our aim is to accelerate it even further for the following round so that bids are
received in the preceding summer" (Waldegrave, mimeo).
Although a few authorities have indicated that the timetable has improved for
the 1988/89 round, the situation is still far from adequate. Even if the financial round
is started earlier EA still has to allocate substantially more resources each year (see
Table 6.1). In other words, any marginal improvements may be erased by the
increased demands placed upon the EA machinery. This results in the danger that
either EA will underallocate or local authorities will underspend what few resources
are being made available to attempt to solve the situation, in what is frequently the
worst of the council stock. These issues are considered in detail below (6.2v).
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Table 6.1: EA visits, schemes anddistribution of resources
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90
Number of authorities visited byEA 145 175 n.a. n.a.
Numberof schemes approved byEA 138 195 190 320 est.
Numberof dwellings beingtreated* 60.000 87.000 160.000 150.000 est.
Total amountof EA HIP resources £sOm £75m £140m £19Om
Distribution of EA resources:
Security measures . 30% 19% 23% 20%
Environmental improvement/remodeling 25% 19% 30% 22%
Heating/Insulation/Anti-condensation 25% 24% 18% 23%
Management related facilities 10% 10% 6% 4%
Homeless initiatives 10% 7% n.a. n.a.
Refurbishmentsfunprovements n.a. 19% 23% 31%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Various EA Annual Reports; *HM Treasury, 1990, Table 8.8
Table 6.2: Nature of consultation and stageat which thisoccurred
Stage A B C D E F
Yes 20% 30% 22% 28% 14% 2%
Form A 5% 12% 12% 18% 9% 2%
Form B 27% 18% 19% 21% 11% 5%
Later 4% 18% 4% 12% 5% 4%
On-going 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 0%
Total 60% 82% 61% 83% 44% 13%
No 40% 18% 39% 17% 56% 87%
MissingCases= 4 (6.6%); Source: LocalAuthority Survey .
Note: The 'Yes'category includes only those authorities that indicated that this form
of consultation had occurred though NOT when it had occurred. a) Feedback
mechanisms in order to incorporate tenant input; b) Public meetings and
presentations; c) Steering groups composed of tenants, officers, architects etc; d)
Questionnaire surveys and/or door-to-door visits; e) Adverts, posters and
presentations; f) Otherforms of consultation.
Table 6.3: Eligibility Criteria forEA Funding
Criteria National Averages (England 1986)
Higher thanaverage vacancies 2.5%
High rent arrears £46 per tenancy
High tenantturnover 9.8%
Other evidence of tenantdissatisfaction (eg. low take-up of 'right to buy')
Other measures of social malaise [eg. highlevels of litter,vandalism and graffiti]
Source: FormA Applications Guidance Notes, 1988/9
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ii) Problematic administrative procedures
The survey results indicate that the administrative arrangements involving several
different agents described earlier (section 3.2), create major difficulties for local
authorities. 74% of responding authorities felt that they experienced an
'unreasonable delay between the period they submitted EA bids and received final
approval'. Cross-tabulation of those which experienced delays by individual DoE
regions indicate that this was a widespread perception throughout all the regions,
though it was particularly acute in the West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside,
and Northern Regions (see Table 5.7).
In 71% of the cases the main reason for the delays experienced was argued by
the local authorities to be the time it took the EA administration to process bids. This
problem was exacerbated by the fact there are never guarantees that bids which are
time-consuming and expensive to generate will actually be approved by the DoE until
final notification is given, yet considerable staff time and other costs are involved in
the preparation of both forms (A and B); all of which is abortive if EA rejects these at
any stage. Given the scarce nature of such capital resources, the EA budget is heavily
overbid (Table 5.26), therefore. there will always be a number of authorities with
good bids which will be rejected. In consequence, the investment in generating bids
will be squandered unless authorities undertake the scheme from their own HIPs
allocations or capital receipts and very few believe themselves to be in a position to
do so. This is especially true of large-scale schemes where the authorities' own
HIPs allocations will be insufficient.
There have been suggestions, therefore, that this process should be replaced
by a one stage mechanism with officers being called upon on an ad hoc basis to
provide further information. thereby greatly reducing the delays which exist. These
problems have been acknowledged by EA which has indicated that the two-stage
process should be eliminated (LHU, mimeo). This has not yet occurred but there are
good reasons for believing that it could ease the administrative delays which currently
have important negative consequences, such as delaying the opening date of EA-
funded schemes (for 77.9% of authorities); and resulting in increased tenant
frustration for a further 77.9%. For 87%, this delay was important in determining
whether they managed to spend all their allocations as well as adversely affecting the
housing rolling capital programme in 50.9% of the cases. The analysis of the local
authority survey responses suggest that the negative consequences and repercussions
of the EA administrative problems can be substantial for they do not seem to be very
compatible with authorities' own procedures.
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iii) Changing EA criteria or emphasis
With regard to the initial interviews carried out by the author with housing
officers, a source of frequent complaint relates to EA criteria of what is permissible
for authorities to bid for through EA. In other words, there is measurable uncertainty
about criteria whose emphasis is argued to be continually changing (as indicated in
their responses in Figure 6.1) so that authorities ended up feeling uncertain about
which initiatives are being emphasised by EA from year to year. This is reflected in
two phrases which were repeated frequently during interviews, namely that EA is all
about the 'flavour of the month' and that 'the goal posts keep being moved.'
In consequence, 36.7% of authorities in the national survey blamed the
processing delays upon the fact that EA criteria keep changing and on the need to re-
submit bids (also resulting in increased cost to authorities). 31% considered that the
criteria were ill-defined and a further 23.8% that the criteria were problematic because
they lacked any ranking or prioritisation. The uncertainty was even greater with
regard to elements which EA will not fund as part of an estate's package of solutions.
69% of authorities replied that EA's policy of not funding certain elements which did
not meet their criteria, actually varied over time; and a mere 36% actually knew
exactly what EA would not fund.
When prompted as to why this uncertainty existed, officers argued that this was
partly related to whether EA was about to underallocate its resources to authorities
and, therefore, needed to off-load any remaining EA HIPs quickly (before the end of
the year) to avoid embarrassment. Whatever the real explanation, the simple fact
remains that there can be no basis to bid for EA resources and schemes if there is any
doubt regarding what is (or is not) acceptable to EA and such a situation can only
encourage waste and inefficiency. Ministerial Guide-lines have now been issued so
perhaps EA itself is aware of the confusion which certain authorities operate in. It is
too soon to evaluate whether the guide-lines have achieved their purpose in spelling
out in detail what will and will not be considered under EA and in what
circumstances.
iv) Adequacy of tenant consultation
From the outset EA put tenant consultation at the forefront of its agenda as a
crucial element underlying the 'themes' it tries to encourage. The evidence is that in
this respect, EA has not been too successful and that the very nature of its operation
compromises its ability to fulfil this objective.
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69% of all authorities indicated that involvement with EA had not resulted in
'greater tenant consultation, participation and input into schemes than would
otherwise have been the case in their authorities'. This is argued to be primarily
because most authorities (63.4%) were satisfied with the existing consultation levels
although 30% argued that greater consultation with tenants had not come about
because they were expected to 'plan, consult and submit bids too quickly and too late
for full and effective tenant consultation to occur'. The argument in chapter 5
suggested that authorities may actually be underplaying the extent of EA's influence
with respect to tenant consultation, however, this is again a reference to the
timetabling arrangements and the fact that it makes it difficult for authorities to
consult effectively, design and plan the scheme, programme the capital allocation and
spend it all within one year. Procedural delays did not help the situation:
A further 35% indicated that involvement with EA had not necessarily resulted
in greater consultation because they feared raising tenants' expectations, while not
being in a position to guarantee delivery of proposals. Success depends entirely
upon whether the bids fit EA criteria for that particular year and whether they 'make
the cut' and thus form part of the group of approved bids in that particular DoE
region. These factors all seem to jeopardise effective tenant consultation. This view
is confirmed in Table 6.2.
Consultation took place mainly through questionnaire surveys (82%) and
public meetings (83%). The main point to note, however, is the extremely small
proportion of authorities that consult tenants at Form A stage when the overall bid
and its costings are outlined. It is only at Form B stage that tenants are normally
consulted. This seems contradictory vis avis the aim of effective tenant consultation
since by this stage, the broad outline of the EA scheme has been decided and the
flexibility for tenant input significantly reduced.
From the authorities' view-point, this makes sense since tenants' expectations
are not raised until after the authority has obtained confirmation that the scheme has a
good chance of being successful. However, by this time (Form B), as previously
indicated, authorities are having to move rapidly if they are to spend their allocations.
It is also worth noting the very low level of on-going consultation. Given that EA
took it upon itself to make consultation of primary importance in its schemes,
according to the evidence supplied by local authorities, it appears that this is not
being fully achieved, partly because of authorities' uncertainty about committing staff
173
time and technical resources as well as raising tenants' expectations when there is a
real possibility that bids may be rejected by EA (but see the concluding chapter).
There is thus a case for EA underwriting both the technical cost of scheme
preparation and the tenant consultation exercises, especially if the bids are rejected.
This would be costly but at the very least it would create a great deal of goodwill in
authorities which are already financially pressed. This is important as it leads to
other desirable developments which are essential for smooth and effective
implementation of an initiative which depends upon four crucial levels: EA Central,
the ROs, and the authorities and tenants.
v) Underusing Housing Resources
Apart from the issue of topslicing (see 6.3 below) and those relating to the
adequacy of a system of capital allocations based on a single year timetable, the
survey illustrates another significant problem. EA is found to be a problematic and
inefficient method of allocating authorisations for capital work yet this is a system
which is not only increasingly used by central government (for example in the Private
Sector Renewal and the Homeless Initiatives - see Figure 3.2), but also one which is
undermining and replacing the HIPs system (Malpass and Murie, 1987). Apart from
all the difficulties already highlighted, the EA HIPs capital allocation system is
problematic in two other respects. It can either be underallocated or it can be
underspent. Both result in a further loss of housing investment at a time when it is
important to improve the management and maintenance situation in certain sectors of
council housing and to use whatever is available as efficiently as possible.
1.Underallocation
The annual EA HIPs is divided amongst the 10 Regional Offices to be allocated
to their authorities but as has been demonstrated, the timetabling arrangement is
somewhat problematic and authorities and their representatives have argued that this
has resulted in the EA ffiPs not being entirely allocated to the authorities. The AMA
estimates that in 1986/87,'EA may have underallocated by as much as £lOm (out of
£50m) and that this also occurred the following year (AMA, rnimeo a). If this is the
case, then the EA system may result in serious losses of potential capital resources
which are already contracting rapidly. The DoE denies this. In reply, Waldegrave
states: 'The whole of the £75 million [for 1987/88] is committed. And last year
approvals totaling some £52 million were given.' (Waldegrave, mimeo) The EA
Annual Reports also indicate that the allocations have been fully committed.
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Local authorities have countered this argument by stating that the delays
experienced indicate that bids cannot be processed quickly enough. Even if EA is
becoming more efficient. the rapid increase of its total allocation may nullify such
progress that occurs. Additionally the confusion over EA criteria concerning what
will (and will not) be funded also reflects the fact that at certain times of the year. EA
is desperate to allocate quickly and almost irrespective of the type of package or
scheme. This could also help explain why. despite an almost total lack of interest by
local authorities in using EA HIPs to generate Homeless Initiatives (see Table 5.5).
10% and 7% respectively of the total EA HIPs allocation went on these initiatives for
1986/87 and 1987/88; while the proportion was only 10% and 10% for the key
element underpining EA. namely estate based management (see Table 6.1).
The problem of underallocation and the need to find simple schemes that can
both be processed and enable resources to be spent quickly (eg. Homeless Initiatives
_see Table 5.28). may explain these figures. Certain authorities have been extremely
successful at obtaining EA funding because they have learned to hold such bids 'on
the shelf for later in the financial year. when the ROs requests schemes which can be
processed and spent quickly. This may occur either because the region has had
difficulty in allocating its share or because it has been able to secure additional EA
HIPs from other regions. Thus the DoE ROs can lose their allocation to one another
if they are in danger of underallocating their proportion and there is. therefore,
competition between authorities as well as between regions for EA funding.
2. Underspend
"The normal sequence of events is a) visit by EA Unit b) letter inviting submissions
of Form A c) Approval in principle to schemes d) Local authority working up
schemes. tenant consultation. detailed designs. costings, committee approvals. out
for tender. submission of Form B e) Further allocation ofEA funding. By this time
its usually well towards Nov\Dec\Jan of the financial year with spend having to be
achieved by the following March." (Quotation from Local Authority Survey)
In such a context it is authorities themselves which end up either underspending
or not using resources in the most effective manner possible. While 87% of the
authorities stated that EA administration and timetabling adversely affect whether all
the allocation is spent in the financial year nevertheless, 61% of them did manage to
spend it all. The point to note, however, is that only 51.5% stated that this was
because 'the EA set-up was well timed and effectively coordinated'. 54% made it
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clear that they only managed to do so by undertaking work 'at risk' until the
allocation was confirmed or by making bids which are capable of being implemented.
A substantial proportion (39%) did underspend although the actual extent was
not quantified partly so as not to adversely affect the survey response rate. This
financial mechanism thus appears to be an inefficient method of distributing capital
allocations. Authorities argue that there is a great deal of waste when bids are
aborted or rejected. Even on successful bids, underspend may result and other
repercussions for the quality and cost of schemes can be envisaged (but see chapter
8). The next two sections deal with related issues. A brief examination is made of
the notion of topslicing but the bulk of the chapter is devoted to an exposition of the
extent to which EA is fulfilling its official objectives.
6.3 EA funding: additional or topsIiced?
This is an issue which reared itself throughout the preliminary interview and
survey stages of the research. From the outset local authorities were wary of EA,
primarily because many initially saw EA as yet another method resulting in the
centralisation of decision-making and financial control of council housing (Chapter
3). It is accordingly worth briefly commenting on the issue in order to draw together
the evidence for the contention that 'topslicing' takes place, not least because it is a
mechanism which is increasingly employed by the DoE for its special schemes.
Only one officer interviewed during the survey preparation stage
(preliminary/trawling interviews) believed that EA HIPs represented truly extra
capital resources (additional to the annual HIPs allocations), as implied in the
Chancellor's Autumn Statement: "Extra resources are being provided for the
renovation of the local authority housing stock through the Urban Housing Renewal
Unit" (Hansard, 1986, Emphasis Added). Rather the majority of authorities believed
that it was topsliced from the rapidly dwindling annual HIPs allocations, centralised
and then re-allocated to authorities. The point to note is that the resources are then re-
allocated on DoE terms and conditions rather then being 'unspecified' allocations for
authorities to use as they see fit (as under the HIPs system). In unstructured terms,
some support exists for the widespread belief among authorities and their
representatives such as the AMA and the LHU (Interviews), that EA IDPs resources
are topsliced.
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Table 2.3 indicates that HIPs capital allocations have contracted so much in
recent years that EA's allocation could easily have been transferred from HIPs to EA
HIPs without anyone knowing for certain. This is naturally rather a simplistic
argument, but corroborating evidence comes from an EA Annual Report:
"Depending on local needs and circumstances, UHRU is able to orchestrate a range
of public sector inputs to its package solutions. Most significantly, the Unit has
access to Housing Investment Programme (HIP) resources of £50m in 1986/87 to
help." (DoE, 1986, p.7)
This quotation undoubtedly implies an element of topslicing. The government
White Paper on Public Expenditure for the same year was more explicit: "Out of the
total HIP allocations to local authorities for 1986-87, a special allocation will be
reserved for projects identified by UHRU" (H.M. Treasury, 1986). Some
authorities interviewed indicate that even the Regional Officers responsible for
helping implement the initiative no longer insist that EA HIPs is totally separate from
HIPs. Some ROs even refer to the resources as being topsliced. Despite the
references to this financial aspect, however, little 'hard' information exists upon
which to conclude on this issue with any degree of certainty, which is precisely why
the debate continues.
6.4· The objectives and the achievements
We have discussed elsewhere EA's remit (section 3.1). EA has employed three
principal strategies. Firstly, it has re-routed capital resources for improvement and it
has 'targeted' these upon the most problem-prone sections of the housing stock of
authorities willing to become involved. Its resources have increased rapidly (from
£5Omto £27Om in 1990/91 - see Table 6.2) and have come to figure prominently in a
substantial number of authorities' capital programmes. EA has also attempted to
introduce new methods of managing and disposing of this type of council stock and
its aims have not remained static since its inception - it has diversified and now
includes the use of concierges (see Skilton, 1988) and employment
generating/enterprise initiatives (DoE, 1988a). The balance of schemes and
resources is illustrated in Table 6.1.
Having discussed the administrative and implementation characteristics, it is
important to attempt an evaluation of the initiative in broad terms, not least because
EA was launched back in July 1985. Therefore, this section seeks not to to comment
177
on the quality and success of the EA initiatives themselves (see chapter 8) but rather
to evaluate EA's success (in broad terms) in achieving its stated remit by making use
the limited official data that exist. Each element of the remit is discussed in tum.
i) Identify authorities and estates where new initiatives can be pursued
In 1985/86 EA identified 69 such authorities using the relatively simple
criterion of local authority Housing Investment Programme (HIPs) bid returns which
'appeared to have the most severe problems' (DoE, 1986, p.3). Over time the
selection criteria become more refined. In theory, only estates with poor layouts and
designs, lacking defensible space (DoE, 1987a, p.2) and demonstrating management
problems would be eligible to apply for EA resources (see Table 6.3).
Authorities have indicated in preliminary interviews and the survey results, that
as far as they were concerned, the most worthwhile EA feature was that resources
were set aside specifically for authorities with the most difficult stock and
management problems. There was some candid agreement that run-down estates had
been ignored to some extent (demonstrating the failure of the generallllPs allocation
to meet priority needs) and that there was, therefore, a rationale for 'targeting'
resources on this particular element of council stock and management, if not
necessarily through the particular financial mechanism that now exists.
Over time though the spatial focus seems to have changed and become diffused
as more and more authorities have been invited by EA to participate and submit bids
for its resources (see Table 6.1). The reasons why this has occurred has not been set
out officially but all authorities are now eligible to apply for EA resources. This
would imply that the issue of targeting resources upon the most needy authorities and
estates has to some extent been toned down, prompting some authorities to argue in
preliminary interviews that EA has now lost its most legitimate raison d'etre. Strictly
speaking, however, EA has fulfilled this element of its remit and indeed, there are
indications that with its new emphasis on fewer and larger 'enterprise' or
employment initiatives, the focus may be narrowing once more - perhaps to the
opposite extreme.
ii) Provide a progress report by the end of June 1986 and iii) To
advise ministers of the need for new machinery, incentives or
legislative change to promote the full range of solutions
There is now an established tradition of publishing Annual Reports on EA
activities so that the public has some understanding of how the resources are being
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used in broad terms but there is little or no basis to evaluate whether EA has been
successful in achieving the third part of its remit. The only connection that EA may
have had with legislative changes is possibly with the newly designated Housing
Action Trusts (HATs), where some commentators have highlighted the fact that all
the estates which were originally proposed for HATs designation had either received
EA funding or had been the subject of a bid (LHU, Interview 8. Feb. 1989). This
means that the DoE had a substantial amount of detailed information on these estates -
more than enough to select prime candidates for HATs designation.
Although the HATs concept originates from different sources (Henney, 1985),
nevertheless, council housing officers have maintained that EA has required too
much information in the application procedure, not all of which is relevant to the bids
being made. There is, therefore, an issue as to whether the information gathered by
EA has been used for another purpose. Secondly, of course, there is also the view
that these estates have been primed for sale by extensive investment through the EA
programme (Grant, 1988). A key former member of the EA team has indicated to the
author that this information has been used in determining HATs (see section 7.4.3v)
even though, as it has turned out, six out of seven HATs estates have so far been
either de-selected or voted down by tenants (The Guardian 6.10.90). There seems to
be little else that EA has directly contributed to although they have collaborated with
the Priority Estates Project team in setting up Estate Management Boards (see Zipfel,
1989).
iv) Encourage authorities to dispose of their stock
As discussed in chapter 4 this was originally a prime political motive behind the
creation of EA. Greater detail of what is meant by 'disposal' is set out in a letter to
Chief Executives elaborating upon the reasons why EA encourages authorities to
look to the private sector to help them tackle the problems of their run-down estates.
The benefits include resources in addition to local authority HIPs and EA HIPs; the
fact that diversity and new forms of tenure help create a new atmosphere and ease
management difficulties; and empty properties could be brought quickly back into
profitability. Consequently EA would encourage three types of scheme: disposal of
empty blocks/parts of estates for refurbishment and onward sale; for refurbishment
and onward renting; and disposal of tenanted properties to new landlord bodies, such
as trusts or ownership co-operatives (EA letter, 30.9.1987). EA has tried hard to
promote diversification of tenure via this method:
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"Last year [the] Council made three EA bids: two were successful. Both included
the disposal of properties to either a private developer or Housing Association. The
one that was not successful did not!" (Authority in the Northern Region)
According to the Annual Reports available through the DoE, a number of
authorities seem to have become convinced of the value to them and their tenants of
off-loading some of their stock to the private sector. In 1986/87 20 schemes (14% of
the total) were for onward sale or to develop unused land. This increased to 24 and
34 schemes in the following two years (forming respectively 12% and 18% of all the
schemes funded with EA HIPs).
This must be a reflection of the fact that authorities are placing increasingly
more emphasis on involving the private sector, this being one of the key EA tenets.
The national survey tried to obtain information about various aspects of EA's remit
with special emphasis on the variety of management initiatives which it tries to
promote. The results were aggregated and ranked in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 (Rank 1 =
highest priority and Rank 9 = lowest). This procedure illustrates some interesting
trends derived from responses to the questions: 'Indicate your authority's main
reasons for being concerned with EN; and secondly, 'Indicate what you think has
been stressed by EN. As discussed in section 5.3, it proved necessary to ask
housing officers the latter question because EA has not acknowledged that its
criteria/emphases have changed, whereas local officers interviewed were suggesting
a different situation. The overall ranks were used and incorporated into Figure 6.1,
thus providing information which is pertinent to the discussion to follow.
It is interesting to compare side by side what authorities are mainly concerned
with as opposed to what they perceive EA to be interested in, in order to see if there
are great similarities or differences - in other words, we attempt to compare the
responses in Table 5.5 with those of Table 5.6. The result is that in every single case
there is a disparity in intention between the two, which is crucial in understanding the
findings discussed in the rest of the chapter. The immediate point which arises from
Figure 6.1 below, is the fact that authorities' interests hardly ever coincide with those
ofEA, particularly in the case of private sector disposals; but more importantly, the
priorities attached (even to compatible interests) is always different. This is not
surprising but it does illustrate very well the reason why the two camps frequently
seem to be at 'loggerheads' with each other, particularly in the first few years of
EA's operation. The discussion to follow draws upon these results to develop the
analysis on ENs remit.
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Figure 6.1 illustrates that a growing percentage of authorities perceive that EA
places major and increasing importance on private sector disposals in the renovation
of estates, since this has been elevated to EA's second most important element (Rank
2). There is a sharp clash of interest here as it is ranked very low in terms of local '
authority priority (9th, 8th and 8th respectively). Nevertheless 18% of the total
number of schemes funded by EA were of this sort. This suggests that over time,
EA has been able to persuade authorities of the value of such schemes and/or that
many authorities are so desperate to obtain additional capital resources to supplement
their dwindling basic HIPs, that they are prepared to even contemplate this option
which was decried with such contempt back in June 1985.
v) To encourage authorities to improve the management and
maintenance of their own estates by establishing local autonomous
estate based management schemes on Priority Estates Project lines
More or less from the start EA put management at the forefront by stating its
determination to follow the PEP model of local management:
"Estate Action will only support schemes where the existing assets, the existing
investments and tenants interests will besafeguarded by adequate arrangements for
housing management and repairs. Some form of on-site management presence is
virtually always desirable; and on many estates •.. this would be on the lines
developed by the priority estates project •.. Where estates have become run down,
it is unlikely that a continuation of the present management and repair arrangement
will prove acceptable in a bid for Estate Action resources"
(DoE News Release, 17 Feb. 1988, p.2).
Figure 6.1 shows that authorities believe that EA was genuinely seeking to
promote decentralised management but unlike private sector disposals, this is an
aspect of the EA remit that was very much in accord with authorities' own intentions.
It is not surprising that many EA schemes turned out to be of this type according to
Annual Report figures (Table 6.1). In the the three years concerned, respectively
40%; 57% and 57% of the new EA schemes either introduced or strengthened estate
management (DoE, 1986; 1987a; 1988a).
Plainly, this is one aspect where EA has been very successful in terms of the
number of schemes funded although it is recognised that this is a very crude measure
of success. It is argued by most authorities that this occurred primarily because this
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Figure 6.1: Overall/aggregate ranks of survey scores
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part of the remit mirrors closely what they as authorities. were looking to develop in
their estates anyway; as well as reflecting a general trend for authorities to
decentralise and experiment with localised management. Support for this contention
comes from the fact that this has consistently ranked highly (the 2nd and 3rd most
important factor) in authorities' motives for being involved with EA - after increasing
EA HIPs.
vi) The last element of the remit is. 'To develop new or relatively untried
solutions to the problems facing these estates, including transfers of
ownership and/or management to management trusts, involving
tenants, or to tenants' co-operatives'. which' also include concierges.
homeless initiatives. security and environmental measures. affordable heat.
employment initiatives and refurbishment:
Using official as well as survey data it is possible to assess whether EA has
been fulfilling this element of its remit. The wording places the main emphasis upon
developing newor relatively untried solutions so the crucial issues are whether it is
new/relatively untried and how many have been implemented. Success. degree of
replication in the rest of the stock and effectiveness can only be evaluated via the
detailed case studies undertaken at a later stage (chapter 8).
1. Transfer of ownership/management to Trusts orHousing Associations
These are another facet of the disposal solution which EA is keen to promote
but authorities have been unwilling to pursue this option in improving their more
problematic estates. Although the Thamesmead and the Stockbridge Village Trusts
have been featured as models of what EA is prepared to fund. no Trusts have actually
been generated with EA support. advice or funding. While some disposal of council
land and housing has occurred. the numbers involved by no means correlate with the
degree of priority attached to this by the DoE. The available data indicate that no
Housing Associations were formed under EA auspices in the three years covered by
the survey and very few since. as far as the author is aware.
2. Transfer ofownership/management toTenant Management Co-operatives (TMCs)
EA is keen to promote these even though they are by no means new. TMCs
has been in vogue for some time without their full potential being exploited. The
new legislation (Housing Act. 1988) has created a climate more conducive to change
and authorities themselves are now paying much closer attention to this particular
initiative. Islington and Glasgow for example. were actively investigating these and
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illustrating their potential benefits long before EA was established. While these co-
operatives are used nationally as models for other authorities, the same cannot be said
ofEA-funded TMCs. As with other 'themes' it seeks to encourage, there is a feeling
among authorities that EA has not introduced anything new. To quote local authority
housing officers interviewed, the prevailing attitude is that it merely 'jumps on the
band-wagon' and takes-up the latest 'flavour of the month' where the original ideas
and developments originate from authorities themselves. Nevertheless, this
represents another laudable attempt by the EA Unit to spread 'good practice'.
TMCs are not new and neither has EA been the catalyst for experimentation
with them. While EA may claim credit for funding five co-ops in the first two years
(no data is available for these in the third), Cloverhall (Rochdale) for example, had
already been created and had received help from PEP with EA merely providing
resources in support of re-roofing, insulation, internal modernisation and anti-
condensation measures. In the case of Langridge Crescent (Middlesbrough), the
authority had decided to create a TMC independently and only became involved with
EA when it realised that it could get EA to fund the necessary refurbishment
(Interview by Author). Despite some common interest in generating this type
initiative (Figure 6.1 - diversification of tenure), disappointingly few TMCs have
actually been implemented under EA. The most likely reason must be because TMCs
are a long-term prospect which requires careful planning, tenant training and
meticulousness over organisational, lettings and financial aspects. EA's operational
timescale must conflict with that required in forming viable TMCs.
3. Security works/Concierge schemes
A large proportion of EA's budget has gone on schemes involving security
works on estates or setting-up concierges (30%, 19% and 23% respectively - see
Table 6.1). This is rightly seen as an important element in revitalising estates and EA
has consequently promoted entry-phone schemes and improved security measures
such as doors, fencing and better lighting. However, only those schemes under the
heading of 'defensible space' and the concierge schemes could be considered as
being relatively untried.
It is worth noting that the South Kilburn concierge scheme in Brent featured in
the 1986/87 Annual Report, was not an EA scheme. Given the benefits that can
potentially accrue to such tower blocks, a number of authorities were anxious to
experiment with this initiative. EA became impressed with concierges and has
attempted to promote them via for example, sponsoring a report on the creation and
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benefits of concierges (Skilton, 1988). In 1986/87 seven concierge schemes were
formed, increasing rapidly to twenty the following year (no data are available for the
last). In the context of EA's remit this was a relatively untried solution and one
which EA must be given credit for stimulating and encouraging. In terms of the
other initiatives taking place under the heading of security, these are on the whole,
rather mundane initiatives which authorities maintain they would anyway have
undertaken in the course of maintenance if they had the resources to so do. Whether
this is true remains an open question.
Figure 6.1 illustrates yet again the discrepancy between what authorities seek to
generate through the initiative, and what EA itself seems keen on promoting (as far as
housing officers can tell). There is an increase in the priority accorded to concierges
over time (as reflected also in the numbers). There is a corresponding increase in the
perceived EA ranking, indicating that the EA Unit has become more interested in
approving and funding such schemes. If the data are anything to go by, the
implication is that the number of concierges supported will remain static in future.
4. Homeless initiatives
The EA homeless initiative was launched in August 1986 for 14 London
boroughs with the worst problems but then extended to all EA authorities in October.
Its aim was to bring vacant council properties back into use for the benefit of the
homeless and involved works which could be substantially completed in that
financial year (DoE, 1987a, p.9). Twenty nine schemes were supported in 1986/87,
using 10% of all EA resources (and 7% the following year; no data for 1988/89). It
is interesting to speculate on why this initiative was introduced by EA. While the
numbers of homeless people have been rising in recent years, such initiatives were
neither new nor relatively untried. Neither were they primarily management-
oriented, as is the case in most EA themes.
Authorities themselves have apparently not been particularly interested in using
EA HIPs to promote this type of initiative either (ranked 9th and lowest in terms of
local authorities' relative priorities in Figure 6.1). At the same time, EA's perceived
interest in promoting homeless schemes has remained fairly strong (ranking 8th, 6th
and 8th) even though a special Homeless Initiative, separate from EA but using the
same system of targeted capital allocation (see Figure 3.3) was created by the
Minister for Housing in 1987. Surprisingly, authorities still feel that this element
was still being stressed by EA when they expected it to have died away. An
explanation for this has arisen (through the initial interview process) which is not
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altogether related to EA's remit or the 'themes' it tries to develop, but rather to the
perception that EA has in the past, had trouble allocating its resources within the
timetable available. Homeless Initiatives may, therefore, offer a 'safety valve' by
which any unallocated EA resources which are in danger of being unused can be
processed very quickly through the machinery and spent as a last resort to avoid DoE
embarrassment, both in front of local authorities (for not being able to allocate
everything) and the Treasury (for its inefficiency).
Supporting evidence for this contention comes from housing officers who
argue that they have learned to hold schemes 'on the shelf towards the end of the
financial year when EA begins to look for schemes which do not require much
scrutiny and which allow resources to be spent quickly so as to beat the end of year
deadline. Additional evidence for this comes from the 1986/87 Annual Report itself,
where it is made clear that this initiative was only launched late in the financial year
(perhaps implying the existence of an unallocated sum) and then extended to all
authorities in October. One of the stated criteria for the selection of such initiatives
was that it should involve: "... works which could be substantially completed in the
1986/87 financial year" (DoE, 1987a, p.9).
5. Environmental works (and building/ace-lifts)
59 schemes involving layout, landscaping, clearing rubbish and tidying up
were funded by EA in 1986/87. In the following two years, environmental schemes
were of two sorts: 68 and 106 of the schemes respectively included environmental
improvements, whereas 49 and 119 of the schemes involved improvements to the
exterior of dwellings. Given the nature and costs of such schemes, they take a large
proportion ofEA resources (Table 6.1).
There is no doubt that these are important elements in renovating 'difficult
estates' but once again, the general impression obtained from housing officers is that
their authorities were either doing these themselves or capable of doing so if they had
resources. In other words, action is occurring through EA both because it releases
resources and provides targets for authorities to follow. Although this may have little
to do with EA showing authorities what is more effective or things which they had
not considered before, it is still a positive outcome. In terms of estate layout, much
discussion was generated by Alice Coleman's work (1985) and it appears that this is
to be given a higher profile in the EA 'themes'. Professor Coleman has been
commissioned to develop (in partnership with local authorities) experimental
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solutions for poorly designed estates. Additional resources to the tune of £SOm have
been promised by the DoE for these models.
6. Adequate andaffordable heating
This is another element that only became clear in 1987 after the second Annual
Report was published. It states that: "Efficient and affordable heating was quickly
identified in year one as another Estate Action priority" (DoE, 1987a, p.B).
However, when authorities were prompted in the survey to identify the main reasons
for their involvement with EA, this aspect hardly figured at all as one of their
priorities for using EA HIPs resources. Nevertheless a substantial number of these
initiatives, including insulating and condensation works, have received support from
EA (25,49 and 93 schemes) to provide affordable heating.
7. Community Refurbishment Schemes (CRS)/Employment initiatives
CRS combines Urban Programme and Employment Training resources to
enable local unemployed people to work to improve the environment of run-down
estates. Such work often includes enclosing gardens, general landscaping, clean-ups
and minor works lasting a maximum of two years. These were originally pioneered
in Merseyside but EA has helped to extend them elsewhere. Thirty CRS/employment
initiatives have been set up thus far and although this does not involve EA HIPs per
set these schemes normally complement other EA measures (such as the introduction
of estate based management), as part of the overall strategy to revitalise the estate.
This issue was not widely advocated and promoted in the past and EA has played a
part in extending awareness and debate through regional conferences on the topic.
This type of initiative has recently taken a much greater emphasis under the heading
of 'enterprise initiatives' and as ENs new focus, it will inevitably receive a higher
profile in future. Subsequent chapters also explore why this important new-found
focus has come about and the success such schemes are likely to meet.
6.5 Conclusions
The discussion illustrates that there are difficulties with the EA HIPs method of
targeting and allocating capital resources for schemes in accord with its priorities.
The authorities question whether these are indeed additional resources and mistrust
ENs privatisation objectives. Many councils use EA HIPs primarily as it is one of
the few legitimate ways of supplementing their own IDPs allocations, provided it
does not compromise their policies. Consequently ENs main advantages are seen by
local authorities as being that it has enabled more schemes to occur than would
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otherwise have been the case and that it has released resources which enable
necessary capital works to take place. Authorities argue that this would have
occurred more efficiently and at less cost (given also the size of the EA bureaucracy)
if the topslicing mechanism did not exist (see chapter 5).
EA's main role to date has been to provide funds which local authorities have
used to set-up schemes which they wanted to but lacked resources for. EA has been
most successful where its objectives have coincided with local authorities' own
housing priorities (in promoting estate based management, concierges and
employment initiatives in particular). It has had some success in enabling authorities
to dispose of surplus land and stock in conjunction with the private sector.
In terms of the actual procedure, operation, timetabling and other details which
relate to the nature and quality of the necessary interaction between EA and local
authorities, several issues have emerged which undermine the success of the
government's initiative. Not the least of these is the inadequate timetabling
arrangements. From this arise most of the other difficulties discussed, such as
flawed tenant consultation and the degree of underutilised housing investment
resource. Nevertheless, the EA programme is fairly new and it remains to be seen
what the long term repercussions of the problems identified by the survey will be.
One of the few things which seems certain is that as capital resources continue to dry-
up and the recent changes in housing legislation bite deeper, EA's ability to be more
forceful in achieving its more controversial policies is likely to increase.
The next two chapters analyse the key elements of a scheme of this nature.
Chapter 7 deals respectively with the EA Central and Regional Officer views of the
initiative; and chapter 8 brings to a close the empirical part of the thesis with some
detailed case-studies of EA schemes in different settings and localities, in order to
assess effectiveness.
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Chapter 7
Implementation:
DoE Regional Office and Central team interviews
7.1 Introduction
As discussed in earlier chapters, this thesis represents a first attempt to unravel
the operation and impact of the EA initiative. Chapter four analysed the political and
managerial origins of the scheme; in chapter five it was necessary to obtain a broader
understanding of the characteristics of the initiative, hence the postal survey; and
chapter six summarised the key issues to come out of the survey and the local
authorities' general view of the EA initiative.
The discussion in section 3.2 revealed that EA operates within a complex policy
environment which involves at the DoE level, both the EA Central team and also the
9 DoE Regional Offices (10 when one includes the Merseyside Task Force) charged
with implementing EA. The operation of these two organisations is clearly central to
the aims of the thesis, not least those of analysing the implementation, financial
effectiveness and central-local relations within EA. Consequently it would have been
inadequate to have left the discussion at the local authority level (through the survey)
and then progressed straight into a micro analysis via the case-studies (chapter 8).
Therefore the aim of this chapter is progressively to build upon previous work
by presenting the views of the other two key agencies involved in the implementation
of this central government initiative. Firstly, some context is provided based on a
brief resume of what is generally accepted to be the regional role of the DoE. The
discussion then moves on to present the opinions, based on semi-structured
interviews, of members offive Regional Offices (ROs) regarding the EA initiative. It
is important to remember that EA represents only one element of a larger DoE
housing role. The methodological discussion in section 3.4.3 has explained why it
was considered to be sufficient to interview five of the Regional Offices, not least
because the ones chosen contain the great majority of participating authorities, EA
schemes and EA HIPs resources allocated (see Maps 5-7).
The discussion concludes with an analysis of the role and evolution of EA
Central. The crucial relationships between EA Central and the Regional Offices and
the corresponding relationship with local authorities are also analysed so as to enable
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the analysis to handle all the key organisations within EA'spolicy community and to
fulfil the aimsof the thesis.
7.2 Between the centre and the locality: the literature
It is useful to begin the discussion by setting in context the EA, RO and local
authority relationship prior to progressing to an actual discussion of the issuesraised
via the semi-structured interviews. The DoE has a large regional presence in a
complex administrative mosaic which is heterogeneous in naturewithin and between
departments, and serves the managerial and service implementation interests of
Whitehall. Theyare, therefore, a:
"resource of the centre, embedded in multiple linkages, but with limitedresources
of their own whichenable them to mediate between the centre and locality. The
degreeof discretion varies within and between departments over time•.. [They] are
neitherbureaucratic agents nor decentralised bodies." (Rhodes, 1988, p.163-164)
There is broad agreement regarding what constitutes the DoE ROs' role in
England. Young (1982) sees themas comprising the following:
• Formal executive responsibilities: including much administrative work to implement
national policyand following annual procedures suchas the Hll's allocation round;
• Whitehall's co-ordinator in the region: giving the collective reaction of all
government departments at regional level to othergovernment agencies;
• Activepromotion ofgovernment policies: vitally important to centralgovernment,
since it is local authorities which are responsible for implementing many nationally
determined policies. The ROs also have a promotional role, such as explaining the
details of policies on the innercity;
• 'Mothership': ROs aim to fill gaps by encouraging authorities to develop particular
policies ego to take-up/ apply for certain grants; anddirectexpertadvice is provided;
• Arbitrator: For example, the ROs sometimes find themselves having to act as
arbitrator between twoauthorities withconflicting ideas;
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• Directly influencing local authority policy-making: this has increased over time,
such as in regard to structure plans and the development plan process where the
DoE's influence is normally felt from the beginning of the process of preparation and
continues through subsequent negotiations until the plan is given fmal approval;
• Assisting localauthorities in the lobbying process: local authority lobbying takes
three main forms i) contact between officers and the chairmen of service committees,
and civil servants and ministers of central departments (with local MPs also getting
involved) ii) lobbying by a third party where appeals are made to Chambers of
Commerce, Economic Planning Councils, LAAs and so on, to intercede on behalf of
local authorities and lastly, iii) they use the ROs to press central government since
ROs play 'a classic middleman role having loyalties to the centre while developing
loyalties to the region' (1982, p.89). This is a useful 'ear at court' and ROs appear
to present an impartial view in convincing the centre; and
• The 'eyes andears'ofWhitehall: departments need detailed information about how
policies are being implemented at the sharp end since they themselves are far
removed. Their function is to: "provide confidential, accurate feedback to the centre
so that policy can, if necessary, be amended to make it more effective." (1982, p.90)
The discussion is further developed within the inter-organisational framework
with the argument that: "it cannot be simply assumed that regional offices and their
parent departments can be treated as a single entity" (Houlihan, 1984, pA02).
Houlihan too stresses the 'middle' role of ROs, pointing to Hambleton's study
illustrating the crucial interpretative function of ROs in relation to inner city and
housing policy (Hambleton, 1983) and notes the domination of the regional state by
professional and bureaucratic interests. He identifies seven major 'linkages between
central and local government' (see section 3.304 and Figure 3.3 for a discussion of
these links and their mode of operation).
Houlihan's argument is that: "•.. the region is not simply a passive recipient of
information, a task which the headquarters could easily fulfil, rather it is involved in
checking the veracity of information, identifying new information requirements and
evaluating the information supplied." (1984, pAlO). To conclude the pattern of
linkages that operate through the ROs is extensive and evolutionary, with the centre
in a position to choose from a range of opportunities for intervention in the local
housing policy area. Thus the ROs have an important mediating role in central-local
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relations generally andacrucial role in facilitating and improving the implementation
of government policy, suchas the EA initiative (seealso conclusions in section 9.4).
7.3 DoE Regional Office interviews
This section identifies the role of the Regional Offices (ROs) and the functions
they perform, before going on to discuss its interaction with local authorities in
implementing theEA initiative and the resultant schemes. Officials froma spreadof
five of the most influential Regional Officeswere interviewed in order to obtainfirst
hand information of theirinvolvement with the EA initiative and their importance to
its implementation. Several key aspects arising from the survey were raised via
semi-structured interviews so as to gain a detailed understanding of the difficulties
facedby the ROsin implementing EA. The methodological elements arediscussed in
Chapter 3 and each regional office(r) is referred to in the following convention:
ROla; ROlb (sameoffice,different interviews and officers); R02; R03; R04; and
R05. The results reveal that the ROs and the local authorities are greatlydependent
uponeachotherin fulfilling theirEA aims.
7.3.1 Central-local relations: the administrative relationship
It is important to understand that the EA elementis only one of a large number
of functions performed by the housing section of the ROs. These functions are to:
"Execute policies coming from Head Quarters [Marsham Street]; allocate a large
amount of resources to the authorities in that particular region; and perform all the
housingcase-work namely, to deal with any matter arising from government policy
vis avis authorities" (ROta). It is within this context that the ROs operate even
though: "These functions and thedegreeof control and autonomy havechanged over
time." (ROta). Thesedevelopments and the reasons for themare discussed below.
i) The past
In the first year of EA's operation RO involvement was minimal with the
Central teamdistributing all the information, receiving the bids,processing theseand
monitoring schemes: "1985/86 was the campaigning year for EA and so only certain
authorities - in particular urban authorities - were invited to submit bids for EA
funding" (R03). However, it was speedilyappreciated that the Central team could
not cope with the volume of work, not least because it is a smalldirectorate and, as a
result, the pressure mounted in subsequent years to upgrade the ROsrole.
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The ROs see their role as one of liaison with local authorities in order to
implement government policy, in this case the EA initiative and they now deal
directly with authorities, giving them advice and interpreting policy for them: "We are
EA's mouth-piece on the ground. Local authorities 'sound us out' on their proposals
and we give them advice based on our interpretation of what is likely to find favour"
(R02). In effect, therefore, the RO involvement begins during or even before the
time authorities are preparing their initial bids (or Form As).
When Form A is received by the ROs: "These are prioritised in terms of the
'quality' or 'innovativeness' of the schemes proposed. In principle, priority is
determined by the number of EA criteria which are fulfilled in the bid and these are
then ranked into a list which is sent to EA Central" (ROta). Each region's EA HIPs
allocation is then dependent on the quality of the list of bids submitted, not on the
basis of other traditional criteria such as HIPs patterns or the General Needs Index.
The result is that certain regions can receive twice as much (as a proportion) under
EA HIPs as under the ordinary HIPs system, the reason being: "•.. because of the
quality of our schemes and the fact that our authorities are now prepared to embrace
EA and are geared-up for it" (R03).
The prioritised list is sent to EA Central which then determines which schemes
to accept for the second stage (see Figure 3.t). The ROs were not certain of the
exact nature of the selection procedures but an informed guess was that this was done
on the 'Star Chamber' principle, whereby the Central team is convened to discuss the
merits of each scheme proposal. The members of this team includes each region's
EA contact; professional staff (eg. architects and quantity surveyors); and the leading
EA staff. Based on these decisions, the ROs then receive a list of the schemes to
'work-up', and thus obtain: "A rough idea of how much will be available to us. This
regional slice is then split into two amounts: resources which are ear-marked for
continuation funding and resources to be allocated to new schemes" (R02, Emphasis
Added). Authorities are notified about which schemes to proceed with and: "ROs
and LAs must then work in tandem although in practice, most LAs finalise schemes
and issue tenders independently" (ROla), and then submit the more detailed Form
Bs. There is apparently no deadline by which this Form has to be completed but:
"local authorities are perfectly aware that it is in their own interests to fill it in and
send it back A.S.A.P." (R02), since they will have more time to complete schemes.
In the previous system, the Central team would then make the final decision as
to whether or not to fund these schemes and ROs would send out an official letter of
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notification to the successful authorities. Thereafter local authorities were free to let
the contract and perform the work in the time available. The ROs subsequently
monitored the progress of the schemes, primarily via the Quarterly Assessment
Forms (C) and Annual Assessment forms (D). At the time RO discretion and control
was admittedly minimal. Since then and as a result of criticism by individual local
authorities, the Housing Consultative Council (HCC, mimeo), the ROs themselves
and the fact that EA Central was feeling the pressure of the administrative workload,
the ROs' autonomy has been increased appreciably.
ii) The present
Progress has been made. Within approximately the same procedure, ROs can
now argue against verdicts made by EA Central: "We can counter EA decisions.
There may be argument over the merits of certain schemes or they may need more
information because for example, authorities have submitted over-optimistic bids"
(R02). As a result a 'central reserve fund was devised for bids which are delayed
but which are of good quality. Additionally ROs are now allowed to over-
programme their regional slice of EA HIPs by 15%. This is possible because no
firm commitments are made to authorities until final approval is notified (after the
Form B). A further development is that: "In the course of the year, some schemes
drop out and we can choose the new ones without necessarily going through the
whole procedure again" (R03), which is clearly important in minimising the delays
identified in the postal survey.
The situation has clearly become more flexible: "In the past we had no real
control. Every scheme had to be sent back to EA. Since then, they have devolved a
great deal of financial authority to the ROs. We have total control over on-going
[continuation] schemes. In terms of new schemes it is now the Regional Controller
who makes the final decisions, although we also submit copies [ofFonn Bs] to EA.
They have 10 days to suggest changes and recommendations. If they don't, we can
go ahead and issue final approval ourselves" (R03). The EA/RO relationship has
recently undergone further changes which in theory, should result in improvements
to the operation and the processing of bids, thus helping to allay local authority fears.
iii) The future
EA is currently undergoing a marked change in emphasis (1990/91). It has
announced that:
194
"Estate Action's effort and resources would be focused in future ..• the Department
would seek in particular to promote proposals which encapsulated the widest range
of features of the sort that Estate Action has been developing in schemes to date"
(DoE, 1989, p.14).
. This has been taken to mean (among ROs), that there will be fewer and larger
schemes and there are fears that this will mean that the financial powers and
administration devolved as a result of poor co-ordination in the past, will be re-
centralised. Such a perception was echoed in all ROs, although there is measurable
vagueness and uncertainty about the future (even as late as January 1990). There is
also unease about the fact that there will be fewer but larger schemes, with two
officers commenting that EA: "... seems to have 'peaked' and its allocation is going
to be reduced in future" (R03). It is equally conceivable that the opposite may
happen with greater powers being devolved to ROs for the bulk of EA work.
7.3.2 Nature of the EA I ROs I LAs relationship
i) ROs and EA
All the officers interviewed stress that they know each other and get on well,
'we are all civil servants working together' and sometimes have conferences to
discuss EA but that problems remain. First, although EA HIP has increased, staffing
levels are 'not great' and have not kept pace. Second: "Inevitably, people on the rim
believe that the centre imposes ridiculous timetables - we have a wide number of
responsibilities other than BA" (R04), and last: "There were tensions two years ago
.•• There were many appeals by ROs which resulted in delays. They rEA] are still
the paymasters and issue the regional allocations but their role is now largely quality
control, co-ordination and dissemination of good practice ... We still have problems
but we have good relations and we are all committed to the initiative." (R05). One
officer indicated that there are 'rumours' of even greater devolvement and
decentralisation in the 1990/91 financial round, when all regions will have their own
pool or resources to deal with as they see fit, but also pointed out that what is being
rumoured rarely turns out to be the case in reality (ROlb).
ii) ROs and ROs
All five ROs indicated that there was little contact with each other: "The only
formal contact is at Regional Controller level. This takes place every two months and
deals with such issues as new policy initiatives, further devolvement of EA activity
and changes in procedure" (ROlb). This seems a pity because they could well learn
from each others' methods for example, of dealing with EA projects so as to
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streamline current procedures. Two regions intimated that they had learned much
from one another's experiences and that co-ordination had improved as a result.
iii) ROs and LAs
The general feeling is that the quality of their interaction with the local
authorities is mixed but that it 'has improved'. Tensions arise because: 'The regional
allocation is never large enough' and 'They do not always want to do what the ROs
advise them', but all the ROs agree that: "There has been a substantial change in
attitude in the last couple of years. Local authorities now understand how to play the
game and also there are substantial sums at stake whereas mainstream HIPs have
shrunk" (R04). Another officer put it more prosaically: "Even the most 'dyed in the
wool' Labour local authorities realise the way local government fmance is going and
that they have to 'bite the bullet' and 'play the game'." (R03)
A perspective which links well with the literature discussed in section 7.2, was
that: "I hope that ROs are seen as a buffer between them and the central department,
that we act as their 'friend in court' and that whatever their grievances, we can listen
to them and take it back [to EA]" (ROlb). All insisted that they had begun to work
more constructively with authorities, with fewer tensions and more frequent contact.
iv) The importance of the ROs
The ROs were unanimous about the value of their contribution to the efficient
implementation of the EA initiative: "EA would not have been so successful
[otherwise] ... We clarify EA criteria, give advice and so on. Civil servants are
needed to twist arms and badger local authorities to make sure they do these
schemes. It would not have been possible without the ROs (R02)". In a similar
vein: "It wouldn't have been so successful because local authorities look upon us as
their representatives and expect us to work for them." (ROlb), the inference being
that the interaction would have been different if the authorities were dealing directly
with EA Central.
They also believe that: "It is vital to have lots of contact with local authorities,
build relationships, get to know the people, the area;its problems and housing stock"
(R02), and on an even more positive note: "We have taken to EA with gusto - it is
something which we have to offer to local authorities •.• We derive much job
satisfaction from knowing that we are pan of the developments. We make sure that
their proposals are presented in the right way and that we emphasise any novel
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features in the proposal that might otherwise be overlooked" (R04). The ROs clearly
see themselves as being rather essential to the implementation process.
v) The importance of the Central team
The Central team's role is also judged by the ROs to have been vital: "EA has
been important. For example, they have advanced the timetabling cycle, produced
manuals to help local authorities and taken steps to devolve power to the ROs"
(R02). Another argues that the devolution which has occurred: ".•• has been the
result of pressure from ROs for EA to do so ... and there have been slight
improvements in the timetable. They are also a useful source of advice and
information. Their visits are invaluable and we get to see the problem on a national
scale, instead of the narrow regional focus" (R04).
They acknowledge that although the timetable has helpfully been 'brought
forward', so-doing also means that: "Estate Action work now comes in at our busiest
period" (ROlb), namely when the HIPs forms are being assessed. A number of
ROs added that the EA part of their role takes: "... a disproportionate amount of our
time [roughly estimated at 20%] given the amount of borrowing approval involved
and the immense input required in terms of staff time" (RO1b). To this can be added
the fact that no extra staff have been employed by the DoE although admittedly, this
has been alleviated by the fact that there is now less work for the ROs because some
of their responsibilities have been transferred to the Housing Corporation. Naturally
enough some feel that perhaps: "The ROs could have more autonomy to make
decisions without EA. EA could maintain a smaller team at the centre to formulate
and decide on policy and good practice, but would not be needed otherwise •.. this
would work much better" (R02). This leads the discussion to an analysis of the
main issues arising from the survey (discussed in chapter 5; summarised in section
6.2). Feedback was sought from the ROs so as to incorporate their perspectives.
7.3.3 Implementation: issues arising from the survey
i) TimetabIing arrangements
All regions bar one (ROlb), acknowledged that the timetable is a problem:
"Delays and lateness were the main difficulties •.• implementation would improve if
there was a little more flexibility with tenders but the real issue is about having
enough time" (R04), hence the proposal that: "We need a continuing rolling
programme over three years instead of the one year timetable" (R02). Officers were
adamant that the situation is being rectified by bringing the timetable forward: "The
problem is becoming better although we accept that it will never go away" (R03),
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mainly: "...' because of the one year rule" (RO1a). Typical comments were that: "EA
Central itself must bid for their resources on an annual basis. This is the reality of
government finance now and EA was a relatively new scheme which needed time.
Local authorities have now managed to gear themselves to it" (R02); and that: "...
the problem arose partly because EA grew very quickly and it formulated procedures
as it went along. In part, we did not understand the administrative issues such as
how long it takes to devise a scheme and the long lead times" (R04). As has been
discussed, EA did not see fit to consult with either ROs or the authorities when it was
designing its operational procedures (see section 4.7).
'The one dissenting opinion was that the perceived problems with the
timetabling were 'hard to believe' because: "EA HIPs has become part of the capital
programming mentality and our authorities are already thinking about the next round
of bids without waiting for us to send them a letter of invitation to participate"
(ROlb). It is ironic that such a statement comes from the region which by general
agreement amongst those interviewed, is one of the worst performing ROs.
ii) Bureaucratic procedures
There was an awareness that: "•.. perhaps we are slightly over-bureaucratic"
(R02), and that "Form A is a problem. There is insufficient information and context
with which to judge schemes and Form B requires too much too late" (ROS).
Continuing with the procedural vein: "We have wondered ourselves why it is
necessary to have all the information in Form B. Not all of it is used in the
evaluation of schemes. A lot of the EA procedures have evolved over the years
There is an argument for starting from scratch again and to question what is really
relevant" (R04). On the other hand there was also the opinion that: "Local
authorities gripe too much about the procedures. The forms are not that difficult to
complete ... the main problem for them really is the fact that they must commit staff
resources when there is no guarantee of anything. Perhaps EA should underwrite
these costs." (R02)
iii) Changing criteria
All ROs reject local authority claims that criteria have changed in any way,
pointing to the fact that these have been spelled out in the Annual Reports and that
Ministerial Guide-lines had recently been issued. The author suggested that
confusion may have arisen because of perceived changes in emphasis. Reasons why
this should occur include: "It is not a perception ... Each year there is a new theme.
They [EA] retain certain aspects such as innovation, disposals and so on, but they
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have refined what they expect. Next year it is the 'enterprise' issue and even further
tenant involvement in estate management. EA retains the basic objectives but the
emphasis definitely changes ... after all, what was innovative four years ago is no
longer so now" (R02). In contrast: "At first the money was there and EA was not as
discerning but with more authorities submitting bids which fulfil more EA criteria,
we are no longer approving those bids that used to be accepted in the past. This
could be part of the explanation" (ROtb) for the reason why authorities complain of
shifting EA criteria. Expectations of what constitutes good quality bids change. It
was also suggested that: "While a lot of local authority criticism of EA and the ROs
may be justified, part of that is the resentment felt because they have to go through
these hoops •.. We talk to our authorities a lot. If they are not getting things right
and wasting valuable time and resources, its because they decide to take 'flyers' ...
Bids often represent what councillors want rather than conforming to EA criteria"
(R02). This is likely when there are local politicians with local mandates.
The following quotation highlights the difference of opinion between the ROs
and the local authorities: "There are misunderstandings. We feel that we have said
everything about EA. They have obviously not heard us, perhaps because they are
more in tune with the physical improvements than the management issues. EA has
deliberately not been 'hard and fast' about what it will not fund. I would have
thought that this worked in local authorities' favour in the long term - perhaps it
doesn't" (R04). In general, the opinion is that the emphasis does change although
there remains contention over whether this is justified or not.
iv) Tenant consultation
All the ROs showed awareness of the dilemma confronting authorities in this
respect (previously discussed in sections 5.5 and 6.2iv): "It is fair to suggest that
most authorities only actually involve tenants at Form B stage, when they get an
indication of whether their bids are likely to succeed ... Tenant consultation is the
greatest problem for local authorities. They are reluctant to consult until they have a
good idea of what is to be done and the amount they are likely to get. Its a 'chicken
and egg' situation. Additionally, tenant consultation can also be protracted and result
in failure to deliver schemes" (R02).
Another officer was defensive about the issue: "It is not our fault. The reason
why tenant consultation is not full, is because local authorities themselves are afraid
that they will not get EA funding. It is they that get bashed about by their tenants;
not us" (R03). A further comment was that: "It [the timetable] is undoubtedly too
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tight ... but it is not an insurmountable problem. Local authorities ought to know
which schemes and estates they want and start low-key consultations for the next
round" (ROlb) in advance. A suggestion was that the EA Unit should underwrite
the costs of tenant consultation, thus enabling this to be more effective: "It might be
costly but it would undoubtedly create a great deal of goodwill in local authorities
instead of the rhetoric [about generating full and effective tenant consultation]"
(R02), an argument similar to the one presented in chapter 6. None of the ROs
queried the survey results that tenant consultation does not occur as expected.
Discussion revolved only around why this occurred and how to improve it
7.3.4 Financial aspects
i) (Under)Allocation of funds
Four of the ROs insist that: "There are no great difficulties in allocating the
resources available" (R03) to their authorities. This was primarily because of the
numerous bids received (see Table 5.26) and the fact that ROs can now over-
programme (namely, approve more schemes in principle than they have resources
for) and thus have additional schemes to replace the ones that 'slip'. One even
comments that: "In fact, we've scored our allocation and even more. We were able
to overprogramme our regional allocation by 50%" (R04), which clearly means that
one or more of the ROs must have under-performed and lost resources. Clues about
their identity can be gained from the survey results, where London must be a
candidate (see cross-tabulations in Tables 5.10 and 5.13). This RO stresses that:
"All bureaucratic procedures take time", and that: "There are unique problems ... and
we have taken care of this [underallocation] by massively over-programming in
London" (ROlb). Over-programming in this region was 25% compared to 10%-
15% in other regions but despite the optimism, the region still appears to perform
less well.
ROs were perfectly aware of the potential side-effects of procedural delays for
authorities, commenting that: "I'm sure it does cause authorities difficulties if ROs
allocate late in the financial year" (R05), in part because: "We do ask for a a lot of
information ... there is always a great deal of work involved regardless of the size of
the scheme. This imposes quite a lot of burden upon local authorities which are thus
over-stretched" (R04). Other reasons for the fact that delays are persistent were
commented upon: "The same applies to the ROs fie. being over-stretched]. The EA
work has mushroomed and there have undoubtedly been delays. Some of the delays
are justified for example, when we need more information while others are less easy
to justify, such as loss of staff and retraining resulting in delays" (R04).
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That underallocation can and does occur and that EA HIPs is transferred to
other ROs is beyond doubt The ROs monitor the financial situation via the Quarterly
Assessment Forms (C) and in principle. are able to step-in when authorities: "•.. are
about to hit problems. Around November/ December we have to decide whether we
[as a region] can utilise all the EA HIPs or not and around January/February we
make a decision about whether to send it back" (R03). All the underallocation is
pooled into the Central Reserve Fund: "This is then reallocated to those ROs which
can make use of it and can spend it in time but this is a very rushed affair' (R03 -
Original Emphasis).
. One regional official candidly revealed that: "Our RO took that step last year fie.
return some of their EA HIPs allocation]. We have to pass it around from time to
time but it was because of unusual problems and we generally use what we get.
Everyone guards their pot jealously" (R03). This leads to an analysis of the degree
of pressure bearing upon ROs to allocate quickly to their own authorities. They are
unanimous in their responses. The typical view is: "No doubt about it. We fight for
what we get and see that it is used. This may well affect whether the best schemes
are picked. but we play the game according to the rules" (R03). One explicitly
indicated that there was a bit of 'horse-trading' at the margins. namely that: "..• a
scheme may not necessarily take place according to the original bid" (ROIb).
They were quick to point out that there is no attempt to deliberately obtain
resources from other regions but that they did try to process their bids as quickly as
possible: "We aim to do so by September/October and we've been able to do very
well from other regions. particularly London which has problems" (ROS).
According to Regional Officers' common knowledge. this has become a regular
occurrence in the London region. The London civil servants note with annoyance
that they were not authorised to invite their authorities to submit late bids to take
advantage of pooled/underallocated resources at the end of the financial year, unlike
the other regions. This is not surprising given the reputation it has acquired with EA
Central and the other ROs.
The conclusion is that underallocation occurs in most regions (some being
much worse than others) and that authorities located in these may lose out, but
equally, underallocation may reflect inexperience or inefficiency on the part of local
authorities in submitting correct bids to their ROs.
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ii) Underspending resources
. All ROs acknowledge that underspending may have occurred in their authorities
but did not accept blame themselves: "There are reasons which are not necessarily
because of us. These include the fact that they [authorities] tell us that they can cope
with spending 'X' amount, they submit bids late and they may simply be looking for
a scapegoat" (ROlb). Continuing with this vein, another indicated that they could
process bids in 4-6 weeks and that if it took longer, it was because authorities did not
provide the necessary information. Additional delaying factors include discrepancies
in data, tenant consultation and negotiation which is expensive and time-consuming
and the fact that authorities expect an immediate response and can't: "accept that ROs
can not just tick forms and send them back" (R02). There was also a feeling that
there was degree of 'ritual noise' by local authorities (R04).
The experience regarding underspending differed: "... Our Regional Office has
had problems and delays are common. Our procedures did not tie-in very well with
local authorities' own programming and we were allocating EA HIPs very late in the
financial year. But we have changed our procedures ... We would like to think that
we are improving all the time but local authorities are even more bureaucratic than we
arel" (R03). Another was even more forthcoming: "I have sympathy with local
authorities. We have argued [to EA] that a system dependent upon an initial bid
[Form A] just to give the green light and then upon a fuller form [Form B] with all
the details just creates too much pressure and delay in the system .•. Much better to
have a more detailed form at the start, thus providing a context to the scheme which
has been subject to discussion and consultation. Form B could then be a lot less
detailed and critical, resulting in fewer problems and delays" (R05).
The other issue was the fact that there are two timetables at work. The DoEIEA
finds out what resources will be available in October. However, HIPs are only
known in December, on the basis of which, local authorities reconstruct their capital
programme. They must guess both what amount to put aside to meet the 50%
contribution from mainstream HIPs which EA expects, andhow much staff resource
to set aside for the preparation of EA bids. However, by the time the final decision
arrives, capital programmes have been determined and may well require re-
programming: "This is in addition to all the procedural problems from the way EA
has organised its approval systems. It is not possible to bring the timetable any
further forward." (RG3)
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On the positive side the interviews confirmed the survey's findings that
informal arrangements did exist for authorities in danger of underspending their EA
allocations (see section SAv). These would be renegotiated the following year (in
the case of Urban Programme-funded schemes). although it was more common for
authorities to be allowed to spend the EA borrowing approval on other schemes
across the authority. since EA HIPs is non scheme-specific: "If they hit snags. we
allow them to use EA HIPs as they see fit but when it comes to re-negotiating
continuation funding. we calculate that they have spent as set out in advance ••• so
local authorities must meet the shortfall in resources for EA schemes from their
mainstream HIPs or capital receipts the following year. This still happens. There is
no way of preventing it" (R03).
The ROs argue that even EA Central accepts this as inevitable: "... the building
trade fluctuates wildly and even the best planned programmes hit snags. such as lack
of supply of [construction] material" (R03). EA and the ROs are not too concerned
because: "Local authorities know that we do not have any legal sanction over their
allocations and they have the genuine power of virement anyway ... Sometimes they
consult us. but we are not worried about when the scheme is completed - as long as it
gets done" (R04). Problems arise only if there is successive underspend since there
is only 10% virement on capital programmes (R02).
As to what happens to underspending authorities. four ROs insisted that they
did not penalise authorities with fewer resources - except in terms of a 'credibility
factor': "If authorities underspend continually. we may not be convinced that they
can spend large amounts in a short period" (R02 - Emphasis Added). In other
words. bids may be prioritised in terms of their quality but decisions are also made
on the basis of other professional considerations. A fifth officer was more assertive,
indicating that there were no penalties "... unless the local authority was performing
appallingly, in which case this would affect it in the future" (ROlb). which is in itself
a form of apriori discrimination which goes beyond the 'quality' of the bids.
iii) Targeting and the new financial regime
In terms of opinions regarding whether EA funds are 'topsliced' or 'additional'
(see debate in section 6.3). the balance of personal opinion among the ROs was for
the former. A civil servant simply stated that: "Our ministers do not take that view
[of topslicing] " (ROlb). Others were willing to discuss the issue: "The resources
would not be there if EA wasn't around to attract additional finance ... [and] it is
simplistic to conclude that merely because mainstream HIPs are being reduced and
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EA HIPs is increasing, that it is topsliced" (R02). Alternatively three ROs confided
unofficially that they believed that it was indeed topsliced: "I agree entirely that EA
HIPs is topsliced. EA HIPs constitutes the biggest slice although there are other
such initiatives such as the Homeless Initiative" (R03), which is a direct reference to
the other forms of DoE targeted resources (see Figure 3.3). Nevertheless such a
financial system was felt to be justified: "EA IDPs has altered the distribution of
resources; More has probably gone to difficult-to-let estates, as intended by the
targeting exercise ... If you trying to get local management, employment initiatives
and diversification of tenure, you need a specific system for it to work." (R04)
The ROs strongly rejected the notion that local authority autonomy may have
been undermined as a result of their involvement with EA: "The department sees it as
targeting resources more effectively onto specific things. Targeting is still more
effective than not targeting and local authorities still have all the discretion in the
world to decide whether to participate or not" (R02). Another quotation was: "That
is what authorities not getting it [EA HIPs] would say! It is unfair to them, but we
are addressing a particular need" (R03); and that: "In the medium term, EA probably
enhances local authorities. Better-managed estates produce more contented tenants
who will not exercise their 'right to buy' or opt out [of council housing]" (R04). It
remains difficult to decide what are the long term consequences of involvement in the
EA project, but an interesting comment was recorded: "I don't think EA does that
[reduce local autonomy and increase control over public housing], but it is part of
wider moves towards local authorities. EA is just one tool to allow resources to go
to certain areas but the end result is still the same - it still leads to interference with
council housing" (ROta).
There is agreement among all ROs that the much-vented local authority
contention that a much better system of capital allocations would be an enhanced
HIPs system with 'strings' attached (namely, forcing authorities to spend a certain
amount of resources on their 'problem estates' and on certain types of scheme as in
EA); is redundant given the changes in housing finance introduced in April 1990:
"Part of the difficulty has been to make such resources go where they are needed.
This had not happened before and EA HIPs is more equitable because of this •.• We
still do not know how the EA part of things will work [in future]. Things are being
left very late and we could face an embarrassment. At this time last year [June], we
would have sent out the HIPs forms" (R05).
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This uncertainty about the impending changes to EA was shared by all ROs.
The only thing which is certain is that EA will focus on 'flagship' schemes in future
and that: "Ministers like to be associated with good schemes. They have got
accustomed to doing visits and receiving some kudos out of it. Therefore EA will
continue to be some sort of supplementary pot but I can not see the system making
much difference in terms of the effectiveness of the capital allocation system" (R03).
This was a view shared by another region: "The new financial regime will not affect
the problem [of underallocation/spend]. Nothing much will change under the new
system because it is being altered other reasons - certain parts of it will be untouched"
(ROlb), such as the ones directly impinging upon EA. The general opinion is that
the prospects are not good as regards improvements in EA's financial deficiencies as
a result of the new financial proposals introduced in April 1990.
7.3.5 Centre-local issues and degree of EA scheme success
Opinion is diverse regarding central government's true motives in creating the
EA initiative and its reasons for awarding EA more resources. At one extreme it can
be seen as: "... either a way of central government imposing control over local
authorities or as attacking a problem. We can see tremendous improvements in the
estates. I do not think that its emphasis is the former" (R03). But there are also
rather different views of what EA is about: "It is very much a means of extending
central government control over local authorities ... they want tenants to be more
involved and to give power to the tenants in relation to local authorities. EA is a
means to an end" (ROta). A supporting comment along similar lines is that: "EA
does not legitimate council housing. By making tenants more aware of what they can
do and by helping them extend their control over housing, the next logical step is for
tenants to want to take-over their housing themselves [and to opt out]. EAis totally
compatible with the thrust of government housing policy" (R02).
However most ROs tread the middle line: "It [EA] has gained resources
because it has proved its merit and shown results; there is clearly a demand for the
initiative; and local authorities have come forward with proposals which have been
imaginative and workable. EA has thus been able to petitioning for more funds and
done a good job" (R02). What they are certain about is that: "Everything depends
upon the enthusiasm with which local authorities have taken up EA" (R04). Most
ROs also agree with local authority suspicions that EA does result in increased central
control or alternatively, that the motive is to place the tenant at the forefront while
also helping authorities.
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· Regarding the future of EA, three ROs were convinced of two likelihoods:
Firstly, that EA will be around for 'at least one more year' and secondly, that it will
probably become less of a major programme: "We can see it lasting another 3 to 4
years but its expansion is slowing down and government policy is to shift local
authorities from housing provision to an 'enabling' role. Therefore EA will not last
long. It all depends on the success of the enterprise issue and how the new financial
regime performs" (R02), and that: "A few years ago, housing was a hot debate but
this seems to have been replaced by concern with the environment" (ROtb). The
implication of such a development does not have to be spelled out.
To the extent that there has not been any evaluative study of the impact of the
initiative and of its success, it is interesting to note that there is an all-pervasive
feeling amongst ROs that the initiative is having a very positive impact on the ground:
"EA will be[come] less of a major programme and more of a flagship type of scheme
which is a terrible pity because the message of EA has spread out and some of the
estates have been outstanding successes. They have changed the atmosphere on the
estates and local authorities are thinking differently about estate management, upkeep
and other solutions." (ROS). Similarly: "EA has been successful. It has confronted
a problem which authorities did not have the resources to address; it has been a slap
on the back instead of the usual kick in the crutch for the DoE; and it has highlighted
what can be done by targeting resources into certain areas" (R03).
Another analogous quotation is that: "Whatever government policy and priority
may be, it has certain responsibilities. EA took over an embryonic DoE policy and
built it up. Cynics would say that this is just a 'tarting-up' exercise to encourage
tenants to exercise their Tenants' Choice in landlords or HATs" (R02), which
alludes to a possible 'danger' of too much success but a final comment is that: "EA
does try to push forward with government policy, such as privatisation and disposals
but local politicians just want to get on with things with the minimum of interference.
This will never change and consequently they will always be critical of this type of
initiative. But most politicians have been pragmatic and have made the initiative a
substantial success" (R02). There is little doubt among the ROs that EA has been
very successful, however, despite their conviction, it remains to be seen what the
exact consequences of EA schemes have been in terms of effectiveness. This is
attempted in chapter 8.
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7.4 Central team, former staff and consultant interviews'
This section outlines the views of various individuals who either played or play
a key role in the formation and running of the EA Unit. The objective is to obtain
feedback on issues which were raised through the local authority survey.so as to
understand whether the people most able to effect change are aware of the existence
of the problems brought out by the survey, and to analyse their responses and plans
to cope with the circumstances. Other issues of importance are also addressed not
least the effectiveness and the future of the scheme. The research is based on semi-
structured interviews with EA Central team members; consultants; and former staff
members involved in the key original decisions about the initiative. The responses
are coded in the following manner (EA1; EA2; EA3; EA4; and EA5/6) and the
method is discussed fully in section 3.4.3.
7.4.1 Economic issues
i) Redirecting and concentrating resources
In terms of targeting the Central team has been: "... at pains to dispel the idea of
EA HIPs as 'topping-up' HIPs, although inevitably many authorities have come to
depend greatly on the EA HIPs. But by targeting it on estates, we do feel that it is
getting into the worst estates in contrast to the general HIPs system" (EA2), adding
that housing directors have confided to him in private that without EA HIPs,
marginal investment would have gone into their worst estates. The Central team
rejects the notion that the increase in number of authorities eligible for EA support
(from 69 to all authorities), implies a 'watering down' of the concept of targeting
resources. This had occurred because: "We found pockets of housing in need of
change and investment such as in Bath; secondly, ifEA was going to extend its other
ideas, such as tenant consultation and participation, it would have to reach beyond
the initial sixty nine authorities; and lastly, at the end of the day, the resources are still
trained upon estates" (EA2). 'Their opinion is that spatial targeting remains, but when
the author suggested that based on survey results, it may not always be the worst
estates which end-up being funded, the response was merely that: "Any scheme
which authorities bid for should be their top priority" (EA2). This ignores the fact
that the very manner in which EA is set up may actually encourage authorities to
submit bids only for certain estates which they feel have a chance of fulfilling EA
stipulations, as suggested by the survey results (section 5.6). Estates with severe
structural defects may constitute the very 'worst' but would not be eligible for EA
support.
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Topslicing is a much-maligned issue brought-up by authorities convinced that
the government is taking resources with one hand and offering it with strings
attached on the other. This conviction has plagued EA since its inception (see section
6.3). Unlike the ROs which came out strongly in support of the view that topslicing
occurred, the Central civil servants are somewhat reticent about this issue: "The
question is hypothetical. IfEA had not been around in 1986, would there have been
£50m extra? Ministers would say no. It would not have been available because the
HIPs figure had already been established." (EA2) As for the correlation of declining
HIPs and increasing EA HIPs: "The HIPs allocations were in decline and its original
objectives to provide investment where it was needed had disappeared. The
government is moving towards targeting increasingly more public money and
refining the 'free element' available to councils" (EA2), implying that the mechanism
restricts choice, to the extent that investment is 'tied'.
But there does seem to be a degree of Central confusion about the importance
of targeted resources to EA. On the one hand there is the belief that: "When the
initiative was first announced, there was no mention made of cash. The idea was
simply to bring together a team and various sources of funding [such as UP, MSC,
private sector resources] and to find a way of co-ordinating it all .•. It was only in
late August, at the PESC round that ministers made a special plea for money to be set
aside to help spread the scheme. As a result, a special fund of £45m borrowing
approval and £5m from the Urban Programme monies was set aside" (EA2). In
other words, additional resources for EA were almost a side issue. On the other
hand, another individual asserts that additional resources were being offered as the
key to the whole initiative and that its availability was never in question - rather, it
was a pre-requisite (EAl). In the circumstances, probably the best conclusion that
can be reached for the issue of topslicing is that: "It is impossible to say one way or
the other. Would the ministers have made any extra resources available if EA was
not around? It is a question of speculation" (EAI). Nevertheless controversy
remains and is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
ii) Extra resources, privatisation and 'additionality'
The interviews suggest that the Central team has had to work hard to win its
expanding share of resources (see Table 6.1), which is not surprising given the
climate of political opinion that exists towards council housing: "It has been a hard
battle each time" (EA2). In support of its requests EA has been able to bring to bear
upon the Treasury the fact that it has been very successful in attracting bids: ''There
are usually three to four times as many Form A bids as there are resources, which
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indicates that a large number of estates remain to be dealt with" (EA2), and this is
backed-up in the survey results (Table 5.26), where many bids were unsuccessful.
Additional reasons for the no doubt reluctant Treasury accession come from
two former members of EA: "We 'muddled' the figures we sent them regarding
private sector involvement. For example, that 'X' amount of units had been
privatised but also that every scheme involved an element of privatisation, in the
sense that the various works were carried out by contractors. The fact that a lot of
this was carried out by Direct Labour Organisations was ignored. Further arguments
used include the fact that the existence of difficult to manage estates would affect
adjacent properties and estates, which would not encourage others to continue to buy
and lastly, that basically it was useful to continue to 'do-up' such estates" (EA5/6).
These arguments are very similar to those originally made to justify any EA resources
at all (see section 4.5).
Clearly some base their explanation of EA's success in securing additional
resources on the initiative's ability to pursue the privatisation element. This appears
to bebecause it is the most relevant factor for the Treasury officials yet paradoxically,
this was one of the less successful aspects of EA - numerically at any rate (see
chapter 6). They also note that: "The Treasury paid particular attention to the issue of
'additionality' for government initiatives in general ... the concern was to ensure that
what was undertaken under EA could not be done from mainstream HIPs. [But]
There is no doubt that many authorities were using EA HIPs to 'top-up' their
housing programmes" (EA5/6).
One of EA's leading members argues that they have obtained additional
resources because: "We have been able to use those resources. There is nothing
which annoys the Treasury more than to distribute resources only to find that they
have not been fully utilised. There is also plenty of evidence to suggest that the
money is producing good results on the ground" (EA4). This 'evidence' is rather
elusive to obtain, however, as no research has as yet been conducted to evaluate this.
The next chapter will attempt to provide some idea of the degree to which EA is
succeeding (see also Pinto, forthcoming a).
iii) Capital allocations
When the author mentioned that according to the survey results 39% of
authorities had underspent their EA resources, this was not questioned by EA
Central. One of the responses was that: "The first year was always going to be
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difficult •.. the situation [EA's inability to allocate all the HIPs] was explained to the
Treasury and it was partly in order to compensate for the underspend that the
Treasury allocated £75m in EA HIPs the following year. As a result of the informal
arrangements we can now assure the Treasury that all the allocation will be used up.
[But] The exact procedure has been kept from the Treasury so far." (EA2). This
contradicts Waldegrave's letter to the AMA, assuring the chair of housing that the EA
HIPs had been fully allocated in the early years (discussed in section 6.4 v).
When it was suggested that the survey results suggest that the EA HIPs system
of targeting resources may be an inefficient method of allocation, the reaction
confirms the suspicion that things did not proceed too well: "EA's budget in the first
year was £50m. We allocated £45m. Since then we have fully allocated the
resources. We underallocated because EA was still a new programme and it was a
hard slog to get authorities to accept it ... Local authorities were all hopelessly
optimistic about their abilities to spend and this was reflected in the amount of
underspend ... As a result the two stage procedure was designed [Forms A and B].
Now we will not allocate resources until they [local authorities] come up with their
prices. The result is that we do not underallocate" (EA4). The Central team appears
to be much more positive about the situation now.
They accept that programming difficulties may occur, partly because there are
always risks involved for example, with contractors and the vagaries of the weather:
"There are always uncertainties with major capital programmes and we cannot allow
for the unknown" (EA4). They confirm that EA now over-programmes to cater for
slippage and monitors schemes closely for signs of emerging difficulties. They
verify that: "Regional shifting of resources does occur ..• mainly because of
'slippage'. Authorities are often over-optimistic about their abilities to spend on
certain schemes and [as a result] these may even have to drop out altogether from that
years' programme. This releases formerly committed resources and we have a
choice of either writing them off or trying to allocate them to authorities that canmake
use of them and whose schemes match EA criteria [although there is a query over the
'and' part of the clause - see homeless discussion in section 6.4]. Some authorities
even design schemes and hold them on 'the shelf. We do not see anything wrong
with that" (EA4), not least because it can offer an escape route for EA. Not only is it
an embarrassment when their resources are 'wasted', but full utilisation of resource
is also an important factor in DoE negotiations with the Treasury for additional or
even continuing EA HIPs.
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There is a feeling that things have improved greatly since 'regionalisation' (the
process of devolving EA power and control to the Ras) began. The interviews
reveal that there has been an internal struggle between the Ras and the EA team about
who should control the administration of the procedures. Both agents now agree that
things would not have worked if it had all remained centralised: "There is a small
team and they have to deal with over 300 EA schemes per annum, as well as all the
bidding forms which they receive" (EAl). In other words, EA would have been
unable to cope if they had not begun the process of devolution and there is
confidence that even greater decentralisation to the Ras will take place in the future,
although EA Central will still be 'pivotal' to the initiative's operation.
In future co-ordination of policy and objective is to be achieved through
conferences and similar methods so as to encourage some degree of uniformity for
what is after all, a national initiative. EA Central will probably retain a budget for the
larger, enterprise initiatives (see section 7.4.6). while the regions will be allocated a
slice of EA HIPs to do as they see fit under broad EA Central guide-lines. -Both
(EAt) and (EA2) believe that there will only be a couple of these 'enterprise'
initiatives per region, which means that in the medium term, the Ras will have to
cope with and process the more traditional type of EA scheme as well as the
continuation ones.
iv) Regional 'slices' and continuation funding
The slice of EA HIPs allocated to each DoE region normally reflects the
previous years' allocations: "This is essentially because the continuation schemes
(which) are awarded first call on the year's resources. The provision for
continuation funding was organised because it was clear that EA was not going to be
able to tum around estates in a mere one or two years" (EA2). In consequence: "EA
began to encourage authorities to phase major works and to bid annually for those
phases ... ifEA folded then at least the phase completed could stand on its own. We
had enough confidence to assume that it would be inconceivable for the Treasury to
cut resources so drastically as to stop commitments to continuation funding. This is
the only certainty!" (EA2). If this is the case it is a pity that this confidence is not
imparted to the local authorities. many of which are critical of the uncertainty.
As a rough 'rule of thumb', half of the total borrowing approval allocated by
EA goes on continuation schemes and the remainder on new initiatives. The
following quotation is particularly enlightening: "... the success of certain regions
and authorities in bidding and securing substantial sums is related firstly, to the
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politics and secondly, to the performance of certain areas. Dealing with politics, the
sheer antagonism to the idea of targeting and any sort of central interference was all-
pervasive. Many [authorities] were reluctant EA partners and others were never
going to be partners at all. Approximately half of the authorities originally invited to
participate were very enthusiastic in the first year. More and more quickly warmed-
up to it and the late-comers began to realise that they were looking very silly. They
were crying that there was not enough cash around, yet other local authorities were
seeing their estates brightened-up under EA. Pressure from tenants noticing changes
across authority borders must also have been a factor in persuading certain authorities
to get involved" (EA2). This refutes again the EA claim that their decisions are based
solely on the quality of the bids they receive (see Map 2 for those local authorities
which were slow(er) in getting involved with the EA initiative).
It also appears that certain authorities acquire reputations: "The London
authorities with one or two exceptions, were very slow in grasping EA and
performed poorly. In allocating the money EA had to be certain that they would
spend, otherwise EA itself would end up look silly to the Treasury. The
performance of local authorities is a consideration in allocating EA funds, therefore, a
number of the better-performing authorities have lots of schemes" (EA2 - Emphasis
Added); Even if authorities create thoughtful and well researched schemes which
involve their tenants meaningfully, approval may still partly depend on their past
performance, especially where large projects are concerned.
7.4.2 Administration and implementation
i) Administrative proceedings
Local authorities are greatly concerned about the EA procedures (Chapters 5
and 6). When this issue was raised during the interviews, the Central team's overall
reaction was to attempt to rationalise them: "... someone has to ensure that authorities
are speriding on what they said they would [otherwise targeting would lose its
value]. The second issue is that of public accountability ... There is a need for clear
information and scrutiny via the various forms so as to verify the extent of
underspend, overrun, variations in expenditure and so on" (EA2). Another argument
for retaining these procedures was advanced: "We have to have an understanding of
the way the schemes are going and there is the issue of accountability since we are
using public money" (EAt).
EA Central does go as far as agreeing that: "This is an extra burden on local
authority managers but at least this way they maintain a degree of accountability as
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well as allowingEA advance warningof likely underspend", and continues that the
purposeof: "FormA is to provide us with a macroviewof what is thereon the estate
and an understanding of what and how much is needed. Form B legitimates the bid
into reality and EA ensures that there is no mismatch in the forms ... we get our
quantitysurveyors to scrutinise themfor overpricing" (EA2).
The next point raised by the interviewer regarding the application procedure
was that it may actually force authorities to wasteresources due to abortedschemes
since, as EA Central themselves note, authorities heavily overbid EA resources.
Their response is that: "Quite a lot of the information necessary for the bidsshould be
available anyway" (EA2). So while there is a degree of sympathy with local
authorities' complaints over the time-consuming and costly natureof EA procedural
forms, there is also a perception that they are not as onerous as authorities suggest.
The following quotation demonstrates an awareness of the potential difficulties
as well as someattempt at amelioration: "Wehave tried not to make these[forms] too
onerous but thereare timing difficulties with theinitiative ... to be reallyefficient, EA
needs to know what its total resources are in September and to allocate it all by
January so that by the first of April, authorities will have a full year to spend the
allocation. This has beena clear problem. In the first year, we were not too sureof
what was going to happen and we sometimes left local authorities with a handfulof
workingdays. The following year, the whole programme was delayedby six weeks
as a result of the GeneralElection. The way to resolve this has been to accept that
one may get a smallspendin the first year, the bulkof the spend in the second and a
smaller, 'wrapping-up' spend in the third. Generally, the regions ought to know
how local authorities are performing by September30th. If the red light comes up
we have a device whereby ... authorities are allowed to use [the] EA allocation to
performother works. Notmanyknow aboutthisdevice [namely the Central Reserve
Fund]. It is kept quiet because of the Treasury." (EA2). Even so resources are not
always fully utilised but the Central team supports the existing arrangements and
argues that improvements are occurring all the time. The next section analyses these
developments in detail.
1. Evolution ofEA administration
Official recognition of the difficulties which exist is forthcoming from EA
Central: "The procedures were 'cobbled together' with a fair amountof haste which
is partly the reason why they have beenevolvingover time" (EAl), and efforts have
been made to streamline them, as illustratedvia a brief description of the changes:
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"Procedures have changed from the first ... There was not so much bureaucracy in
the first year. ' We just wrote to authorities inviting them to arrange visits. We took
the intelligence gathered from the annual HIPs submissions, together with other
information supplied by authorities and visited the estates in order to get a flavour of
things" (EA2). The EA Central procedure was then to: "Summarise verbally what
we had seen, describe EA and its intentions and emphasise that the proposals had to
be 'dressed in sexy clothes'. Every scheme proposed then went back to the centre
together with supporting information. The minister would then examine each
initiative and announce in the press releases how many and how much had been
approved. Everything was centralised." (EA2)
However, it seems that: "As the regions became more adept at understanding
both the local authorities' and EA's objectives, pressure arose for them to have more
say in the process. It also became increasingly clear that having to trawl everything
to the centre would be impossible and it was decided to have an annual bidding round
and allow the ROs to collect and prioritise the bids. The centre then took a macro
view, looking across regional boundaries and ensuring that allocations were going to
the estates that would benefit most and that they conformed to EA criteria. Things
got more complex as procedures were added to ensure 'value for money' and
architects and quantity surveyors were called-in to scrutinise bids." (EA2) The ROs
were then allocated tranches of the EA HIPs (see Map 6). The following section
analyses how EA Central evaluates the Forms and is based upon interviews with a
leading member of the EA Central team.
2. FormA
In defence of the procedures which authorities perceive to be slow and even
unnecessary, the contention is that: "It would be somewhat artificial if we were to
judge the schemes simply on the basis of whether they conform to EA criteria or not.
There is no fixed format or procedure for selecting schemes for Form B stage"
(EA4). This officer is keen to stress that: "This is not a paper exercise. There should
be a continuous process of general discussion about local authority proposals,
months or years before they are submitted. As for the 'virgin' bids, the criteria for
selection are not rigid, box-ticking exercises. We try to make things as flexible as
possible but the paradox is that on one hand, authorities argue that government
departments are mechanistic, yet at the same time, they believe that things ought to be
well defined from the start •.. Problems exist but these result from the employment
ofvalue judgements and flexibility" (EA4), rather than EA procedures perse.
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Nevertheless, there arecertain important boxes/criteria in Form A such as: "The
condition of the estate; the need for additional investment; the originality of the
scheme etc. These are all factors but if for example, we came across a resource-rich
authority, we might still take the decision to support it because of the possible
consequences which this might have on their future management style or on the
neighbouring authorities (EA4). Therefore there are a series of considerations at the
Form A period: "Up to this year, we have considered the recommendations made by
the ROs and our aim has been to achieve consistency of approach since this is a
national scheme. There are plans afoot to change the system so as to leave discretion
entirely in the hands of the ROs at Form A so that they decide themselves which
schemes should be funded" (EA4). This points to welcome changes in EA, given the
previous discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. It would certainly help speed-up the
processing and approval of bids, resulting in a longer timescale for authorities to
spend their total allocations. This can only be constructive.
3. FormB
The Central team argues that previously Form B: "•.. too was assessed by us
although in more recent years this form has not, strictly speaking, been dealt with by
the Central team. We only request that the ROs forward us a copy of the Form Bs
and these are scanned to ensure cost consistency and that the schemes submitted are
actually those that resources were originally applied for. Other issues we scrutinise
include the degree to which tenants were consulted, the type of management
arrangements provided and the value for money" (EA4). A range of criteria must be
met before final approval is obtained.
The author asked whether, in line with the survey results, EA really can be seen
as being over-bureaucratic and leading to delays in the processing of forms. The
reply is that: "Yes, there can be delays - these are likely if you have procedures. The
real question is whether those delays are justified or unreasonable ... If you believe
that EA is trying to do something desirable and that some form of value for money
assessment is proper, than this will inevitably build-in delay. I think it is a proper
delay" (EA4). And regarding the delays experienced by authorities in obtaining final
approval: "This is largely down to the ROs. I cannot say whether all the ROs are
processing the forms as quickly and as efficiently as they ought to. If local
authorities are unhappy they should inform us. What I do know is that authorities
often fail to provide even basic information in their bids ... or do not know what the
effects of the scheme are likely to be. This is unsatisfactory" (EA4). In other words,
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there is a belief that blame for delays cannot be attached to anyone agent and not
necessarily to the current procedures either.
4.A and B into AlB
Chapter 6 discussed some advantages of amalgamating Forms A and B. There
was agreement that: "Anything that reduces bureaucracy is good and the earlier this is
done, the better" (EA2). According to the LHU, the Central team has accepted that
the two-stage procedure may not be the most satisfactory situation [LOO, mimeo],
although nothing has been done so far. The reason for this appears to be because
"•.. we came to the conclusion that it would not work. Form A requires relatively
little information and time whereas if there was a single, more detailed procedure,
authorities would once again complain about the costs involved for them if the bids
were rejected" (EA1). It seems that EA is unwilling to run the risk of altering the
procedure and that things are unlikely to change in future.
ii) Timetabling arrangements'
Acknowledgements were also obtained that problems exist with the current
timetable: "EA does have problems with the timespan, particularly with regard to
tenant consultation." (EA2). Nevertheless EA Central maintains that this has
improved as the timetable has been advanced: "It is envisaged that in this year's
round [1990/91], most authorities will be given the green light [final approval] on
allocation by the first of April", and that some of the blame must rest with the
authorities: "Some are very good, others are more pedantic ... [they] regard their
procedures as inviolable and inevitably put themselves in a tight box which can't be
escaped" (EA2).
The argument runs deeper in that the Central team also realises that:
"Everything is tied in to a one year timescale in government" (EA2). They do agree
that in principle, there ought to be a longer timescale of operation but are resolute
that: "Unfortunately, there is no way of changing it ... The timetable that we operate
under is totally determined by the fact that Treasury itself operates under an annual
budget. We have pushed back the timetable since the first year, when we realised
that we were leaving authorities with far too little time to spend their allocations.
Things have improved yet authorities still criticise the timetable" (EA1). These
comments clearly support the views obtained in the survey.
Also in defence, two former members of EA comment that: "No government
department gets resources on more than an annual basis and we've always said that
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we will fund schemes for a maximum of three years [sic. originally two], which
ought to provide ample time for authorities to gear themselves up. We have
encouraged authorities to split their proposals into three phases for larger schemes
and while it is true that we do not give guarantees of continuation funding, those
schemes will have first call on resources. One must remember that there are no
guarantees for HIPs funding either" (EA5/6), which is certainly true, however, in
that particular case, local authorities can decide for themselves exactly where, when
and how much to set aside for priority schemes.
The head of EA, responding to whether authorities are justified in feeling that
the timetable is both inadequate and makes programming problematic, argues that:
"We invited authorities to bid in June for the next financial year. The dead-line was
mid-September ... This was extended by a month to allow for late-comers ••. We
have tried to be flexible because tenants should not be penalised because of delays.
Bids are selected for Form B stage but the decision cannot be made until the
announcement of the results of the PESC negotiations. This normally happens in
September, however, this year it was delayed until October/November. The Central
role is to assess the hundreds of bids, prioritise and budget them. We responded to
authorities in December/January, announcing whether they had been successful and
inviting submission ofForm Bs. It is then entirely up to the authorities to design the
schemes in finer detail. This year, only a quarter of the new schemes have come in.
We are nine months away from the date when Form B approvals were issued and
they still have not come through! The fact that we have brought the timetable
forward in response to their difficulties does not seem to make a jot of difference to
their performance. Therefore, I do not accept that the timetable can make things that
much more difficult" (EA4). Equally both the ROs and EA Central cannot be
emphatic that the procedures are improving and that the resources are being used as
effectively as possible.
There is an appreciation of the potential difficulties experienced by authorities
but there is equally a degree of cynicism towards this local authority criticism. On
the bright side, (EA2), (EAI) and (EA4) all insist that things will improve once again
this year: "I suspect that this is the best timetabling arrangement possible [given the
constraints]. Authorities should get a full year to spend their allocations unless they
themselves 'bodge it up' for example, through their [slow] committee procedures.
ByJanuary, most authorities will receive a friendly nod from the ROs. There is a
good deal of informality. This is one of the good things about the ROs. Their local
presence is invaluable. They know their [authorities'] performance, those that need
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help and those that need cajoling" (EA2). The Central team recognises the crucial
importance of the ROs in enabling the effective implementation of the initiative.
On the negative side: "There was a lot of misunderstanding and misinformation
put out by the ROs, especially the London RO. The EA scheme has been let-down
by the London Office passing on incorrect information to authorities for example,
that they need to present bills of quantity whereas we just wanted estimates of total
cost. There was also a good deal of 'in-fighting' over the regional share of EA HIPs
..• The London RO has always moaned about the lack of resources for its authorities
but it can't allocate them!" (EA5/6). This confirms the survey indications that some
ROs perform better than others. Moreover, just as certain authorities acquire
reputations which make ROs unwilling to trust their abilities to spend EA HIPs, so
EA nationally behaves in a similar manner towards ROs which do not perform
adequately. The bottom line is that the tenants in those authorities and regions will
lose out because of considerations other than levels of deprivation or need.
iii) Constantly changing criteria?
All those interviewed at EA Central felt that this was not a valid criticism. In
response to the accusation that local authorities feel that criteria and emphasis changes
over time, there is the argument that: "We've said that we will fund all sorts of
schemes as long as that is what the tenants want ... there are no 'hard and fast'
rules." (EA5/6). There is also the contention that some change has occurred but that
this is justified: "Any good initiative requires time and government policy also
changes. When EA became aware that the privatisation element was not going to
have an immediate impact, it reduced its profile and increased management's instead.
TMCs also became important because of the tenant consultation issues. Some of
these changes are bound to be influenced by central government but EA is always
looking for innovation. IfEA comes up with exactly the same things, it will not be
supported [by the Treasury] hence for example, the idea of Tenant Management
Boards" (EA2), as well as enterprise initiatives.
The last view maintains that nothing has changed: "The criteria are not shifting.
They have been set out in the Ministerial Guide-lines and the basic principle still
applies namely, that those bids which go the furthest towards achieving EA
objectives will be the ones most likely to receive EA funding. In the early days EA
had to be satisfied with attempts to bring in greater tenant involvement and establish
estate based management. It was a struggle to even do this and I suspect that some
authorities did not consult as fully as they might have. EA was a new programme
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and I believe it was an achievement just to get authorities to introduce those
measures" (EA4). Over time, the balance of power has tipped in EA's favour:
"Nowadays we do look to local authorities to 'go further down the line' •.. As the
programme has developed, despite the haziness, some authorities have been very
acute in their perception of the way we operate. They have said to themselves,
'We've received funding for management, let's try concierges or co-operatives
[instead]', and it wins them more resources. However, the criteria remain the same
•.• The authorities which win resources one year and are rejected the following year
for submitting the same bids, will see it as shifting ground but those who realise
what the initiative is about, will understand why this occurs." (EA4).
Taking up the issue of schemes being approved one year but not the following,
the author asked whether it was feasible that this, together with the fact that various
elements (such as the interior of dwellings) were sometimes funded, resulted in
confusion and uncertainty over EA criteria. In reply: "The general rule is that we
would fund works 'from the doorstep outwards' because the rest is a matter for local
authorities to take care of from their own capital and revenue accounts" (EA2). At
the same time, however, it is freely admitted that: "We have breached that 'line' from
time to time. We have supported works such as roofs and windows so we are
flexible. We ask authorities to work on the basis of three columns: things which they
can and ought to meet from their own resources; things which we can and will fund;
and things which we can have a debate on •.. It is useful to retain flexibility and we
have avoided listing things item by item" (EA2). It is not surprising, therefore, that
confusions arise from this situation but the onus seems to be upon local authorities to
prove that what they propose 'fits' the EA ethos. Flexibility exists for authorities to
exploit this aspect.
iv) Generating consultation
1.Asrelates toschemes andtenants
The aim of attempting to generate greater tenant consultation is one of the many
laudable motives behind the EA initiative: "Greater tenant consultation and
participation ••. stems from an assumption that it is no good thrusting things upon
local authorities and tenants. There is a need for consultation and an understanding
that what we bureaucrats think as solutions are not always the best" (EA2). At the
same time, the survey findings that things have not worked exactly as anticipated
(section 5.5) are supported fully and acknowledgement is obtained that this issue: "Is
a very difficult 'chicken and egg' situation. Either consultation exercises raise
tenants' expectations and do more damage than necessary or the architect goes out
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and destroys the estate. This is a great worry for the EA team. I don't think we can
do anything about it." (EA2). A further Central officer concurs with this view: ''The
issues which you draw-up are very proper [ie. about lack of consultation;' the
timetable; and little on-going consultation] and it is something which I have raised in
meetings. However, my colleagues are of the opinion that these are supposed to be
the authorities' worst estates and that there should be some consultation and other
forms of survey going on independently of the EA round" (EAt). The assumption is
that authorities are already well aware of what tenants want, however, this seems to
run somewhat counter to the logic of trying to generate greater tenant consultation
exercises in the first place.
The response, when the author mentioned that 68.9% of authorities surveyed
indicated that EA had not resulted in greater consultation, was that: "•.. a lot of local
authorities were [independently] moving towards greater tenant consultation and
involvement" (EA2); and when the author added that the evidence indicates that it
may actually have resulted in less tenant consultation (see section 5.5), this too was
not disputed. The response was: "That is a worry for us. We are ploughing through
and there is a concern that we are pushing authorities to do things which they can't
logistically achieve. It is also a valid expectation for EA to underwrite the costs of
tenant consultation if schemes are not accepted for funding" (EA2). There is
obviously much concern over this issue within EA itself.
This disquietude is by no means unanimous. The head of EA is one of those
colleagues who plainly disagree: "We have said that authorities ought to be
consulting tenants. They argue that this tends to raise tenants' expectations. We say
that this only happens if they do not explain fully to tenants the basis on which they
are talking to the DoE ... What I suspect and know is happening, is that the
department is being used as a weapon, with certain authorities informing their tenants
that 'Unless you agree to the scheme, its impossible to meet the DoE's deadlines' •.•
A lot of authorities pay lip-service to the issue of tenant consultation •.. We do not
accept at all their argument about raising tenants' expectation" (EA4).
When the author pointed out the evidence for less than effective consultation
and that local authorities believe that it is EA's modus operandi that forces such a
process to occur, the reply was: "They know that EA exists and that the initiative is
likely to survive in the near future. We are talking about their priority estates so
surely, they ought to have been talking to their tenants in advance about what are
their needs and priorities. Are they really implying that if EA did not exist, they
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would not have been doing anything to find out about what is necessary on those
estates? ... They do not have to wait until EA invites them to bid before they begin
their consultation exercises" (EA4 Original Emphasis). This is a point but many
authorities would counter it by maintaining that they are not in a position to do so.
2. Otherforms ofConsultation (with IAAs and HCC)
This section confirms that when the EA initiative was formed, there was
precious little consultation between EA and the other agents which it would have had
to interact with - both in the very early days and subsequently. A personal view on
the main forum for housing-related discussion between the DoE and the authorities,
is that: "The HCC used to be a valid forum in the late 1960s and early 1970s but as
councils became more politically active, the HCC became less of a valid forum and
less used as a useful sounding board for new ideas. It has ceased to be a two-way
forum and become a way for ministers to make announcements ... [As for the Local
Authority Associations,] The AMA and LBA were their own worst enemies - they
staged confrontations, not consultations" (EA2). This may be a reason for cautious
dialogue but not for an utter lack of consultation with what would be their key
partners. This clearly represents a major error on the part of those charged with the
formation of the EA initiative.
With regard to the local authorities in particular, the principle of consultation
did not extend to EA itself consulting with the ROs and the local authorities over
operational and other issues: "I suspect that there was no discussion. It was thrust
upon them. This would explain their initial reaction to the initiative" (EA2). Another
Central team member was more pointed in commenting that: "There was no
consultation with local authorities or their associations in instigating the initiative.
Neither was there consultation with the Regional Offices" (EAl), and accepts that
the initiative and the procedures involved might have been more refined if the
authorities, their associations and the ROs had been involved. The team did visit
numerous authorities but this does not constitute a true form of consultation. It was
more a process of informing authorities what EA's aims were rather than a
discussion on how best to operationalise it. Hope was expressed that this situation
of minimal consultation with authorities on housing issues might change but the
Environment Minister's priorities seem to be the environment and the replacement of
the Community Charge with a more acceptable form of local taxation.
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7.4.3 EA and its remit
An opportunity was also provided for the Central team to evaluate the
initiative's achievements as relate to its remit. This section should be read in
conjunction with the discussion in section 6.3, which dealt with the extent to which
EA is perceived to be meeting its objectives, form a local viewpoint.
i) Trusts and TMCs
As far as Trusts are concerned there is acknowledgement that: "These have
been overshadowed and overtaken by HATs ... and there has been no interest shown
in these by local authorities" (EA2). HATs have all but been discontinued and it is
unlikely that EA's scope and level of funding is commensurate with implementing
Trusts. Turning to TMCs again: "There have been very, very few of these and we
will have to rely heavily on the PEP and Estate Management Boards side of things to
generate more interest and management by tenants" (EA2). This is perhaps, a
recognition that full tenant control is some way off and is confirmed by another
member of EA: "Co-operatives proved quite hard to get going and partly as a result,
Estate Management Boards are being promoted as an intermediary phase" (EA3).
Estate Management Boards seek to generate a formal procedure for generating tenant
consultation and involvement in the running and operation of council estates (Zipfel,
1989). Few of these have thus far been organised, although they are an important
development in terms of seeking to formalise tenant co-operation, involvement and
decision-making over the management of their homes and environment.
ii) Private sector involvement
The general opinion is that while positive, this has not been as successful as
was originally hoped for: "Where these have taken place, they have proved very
successful but it has been found that there is a distinct difference between theory and
what was found on the ground" (EAl). It appears that: "Initially it seemed that there
were lots of estates which could be taken over by the private sector and brought back
for sale to first time buyers. However, actual examples of such schemes are few and
only account for some 3,000 properties, which constitutes less than 0.05% of the
total council stock." (EA2) It seems that: "It was only when we got on the ground
that the difficulties became fully apparent. There was already a good supply of
housing in most regions; a lack of developer interest, even with Urban Development
Grant support; the location of many estates made them unattractive; and few local
authorities, Housing Associations and Building Societies linked together" (EA2).
There seems to have been little 'networking' in this respect and the conclusion must
be that: "The potential for these has been undermined by actual practice •.• lots of
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authorities stillhave not swallowed the 'bitterpill', but some authorities havebecome
verypragmatic andthere hasbeen some change in attitude" (EA2).
Similarly there are those who argue that: "There is no doubt that EA first
emphasised private sector initiatives as thekey [original] aspect of the initiative. The
ministry then had to backtrack and to state that the other options listed under the
initiative were equally valid for EA support. It was at this point that estate based
management came more into its own ... even Sir George Young appeared to have
been somewhat frustrated by the slow progress of theprivatisation element" (EA5/6).
The majority of theEAofficials interviewed accept thatprivatisation hasnot been an
enormous success in numerical terms, This is in line with the opinions of the ROs
andthe local authorities;
iii) Homelessness
When the author suggested that the homelessness initiatives seemed to be
incongruous and was introduced very late in the year, this was confirmed by the
following statement: "Wewere facing an underspend of resources and it wasdecided
to targetthemon the homeless" (EA3). This represents an admission that therewere
allocation difficulties faced by EA and that homeless initiatives havebeenusedas a
method of 'mopping-up' anyEA resources that might otherwise have beenunused.
iv) Advise Ministers
The onlycomment made in this respect is that: "Weare looking to do so but so
far thishas beeninsignificant" (EA2), but seebelow.
v) New or relatively untried solutions
Oneviewcorresponded with thatof thelocalauthorities: "We have notcomeup
with anything new. We are dependent upon authorities generating a brightspark. If
someone was to come with something worth trying, we would support it" (EA2).
Another view aboutEA's contribution to any innovative issues is that: "It could be
said that there were two spin-offs: Tenants' Choiceand HATs. Both originated in
the Tory's last election manifesto [the thirdmajor housing proposal being the 'ring-
fencing' housing finance], although the EA directorate has contributed to their
formulation. In the caseof Tenants' Choice, it probably originated fromEA'sdesire
to encourage the formation of co-operatives and Tenant Management Boards.
Therefore, there was some involvement from the EA directorate ... HATs were
primarilya central government initiative devolved to EA to deal with. There is no
doubt whatsoever that the data provided in the variousapplication forms have been
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used in the selection of suitable HATs candidates. The EA directorate is part of the
DoE and information travels around, as is right and proper" (EA5/6). Many
authorities were greatly concerned about the possibility that the DoE would use the
detailed information about their estates contained in Forms A to D, in order to select
estates for designation as HATs. The above quotation suggests that this is likely to
have been the case. The information was very pertinent to that purpose.
7.4.4 'Flagship' schemes and employment initiatives
Attitudes were also investigated with regard to the radical changes EA is
currently undergoing: "If you can get into the social and economic issues and are able
to generate some employment, than it can only be good for such estates. There is
enough material in terms of human resources and the key must be to get the main
governmental departments involved in order to 'pump-prime' the process" (EA2).
EA Central recognises that co-ordination of the various local authorities, voluntary
organisations and central departments will be the most difficult aspect and feel that:
"There is a need for a [special] team in order to overcome departmental arguments ...
It can happen ... [But] It will take an awful lot to get these schemes together and to
get them going by lots of people and organisations. It would require a corporate
approach which is not around. Ministers are keen to get this going next year but we
will only see the beginnings of the new emphasis in the 1991/92 round. Lots of
effort is being invested in this but the danger is that the initiative may be scrapped as
if it fails ... I think it is a brave idea" (EA2).
A relevant comment on the reasons why EA has swung heavily in favour of
generating these employment or enterprise initiatives is revealed in the context of the
discussion on the reasons why the initiative has been able to secure additional
resources: "It has been a hard battle each time. This year [the 1990/91 financial
round], the Treasury was arguing that EA has now reached the worst estates and that
they now want employment to be increased. This is why the new job opportunities
angle has been added to EA so as to encapsulate the macro issues and not just
management. Despite the existence of Urban Development Corporations and City
Action Teams, there is still a public and media outcry about the many estates which
have very high levels of unemployment and the idea is to try to bring in additional
opportunities" (EA2).
With respect to the future of the EA Unit, when it was posed that rumour had it
that it would not survive much longer, the reaction was: "EA is still operating on a
year to year basis. The directorate is reorganising itself but this is because the 1988
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Housing Act will dictate different workloads to civil servants ... [however;] As far as
the financial changes and how they impact on EA, we have still to see the final
papers, therefore, I can't say what will happen" (EA2). EA does seem to be leaving
the details to the last minute. To some extent this is inevitable, given that the
legislation has not been finalised (by December 1990), however, some believe that
radical upheavals are unlikely in the near future: "I don't see any new developments
in the next twelve months. The enterprise initiative will take a great deal of energy"
(EA2).
An interesting comment on the value of EA is put forward by (EA1) who
argues that many local authorities may be secretly glad of the initiative, quoting the
case of a housing director using EA as the scapegoat for introducing changes in his
authority - changes which would not otherwise have been possible but which were
needed. Nevertheless it seems that the EA Central team believe that the initiative
remains far from popular with authorities: "I recognise that EA, like many
government initiatives, is not perfect but it is important to try to separate out the
reasons for authorities grumbling about EA and criticising it: A lot will depend on the
kind of relationship which exists between the RO and the local authorities. It can
come down to a matter of individuals and Authorities just do not like EA perse - the
fact that we control the funds which they believe they should have" (EA4).
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter started by arguing that it is important to analyse EA Central and the
DoE Regional Offices, both of which constitute important elements within the EA
policy community. It then summarised the existing literature on the role of Regional
Offices which suggests that they have an ambiguous role to play. Depending on the
context, they can either be instruments of the centre or champions of local authority
causes. Both roles are reflected in this chapter with respect to EA.
An advantage of semi-structured interviews over surveys is that they enable
change and dynamism to enter the discussion. Despite the criticism of the operation
of EA inherent in the survey results presented in chapter 5, the Regional Offices'
administrative role (as regards EA) has evolved substantially. They have been given
greater responsibility and flexibility. Examples include the creation of a Central
Reserve Fund and the fact that they now have the option of over-programming the
regional EA HIPs allocation, however, problems remain. Over time, the ROs'
relationship with local authorities has also improved, a point recognised by local
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authorities. ROshave championed theirauthorities' EA bidsand havebecome allies
against bureaucracy and administrative delays. This is partof the reason whyfurther
responsibilities have been devolved from EA Central. The ROs maintain that they
operate well with both the Central team and their colleagues in other ROs but that
contact is minimal. This seems to be unfortunate because greaterinteraction might
result in more efficient procedures and generally improved practice. The ROs
consider theirrole to be critical to theimplementation of EA schemes but thatoverall,
EA Central alsodoesa good job andhasbeen quiteflexible.
Turning next to the issue of implementation, theROsacknowledge that theEA
timetable has beenproblematic but that it has improved. They also affirm that the
existing procedures maybe slightly over-bureaucratic and that there maybe a casefor
starting again and creating a new set of application forms. They also accept that
tenant consultation has been one of the toughest problems of all to solve, however,
theydenythevalidity of thelocal authority claimthatEAcriteria keep changing.
Dealingwith financial issues next, most ROs agree with local authorities that
EA HIPs represents topsliced resource. An important finding is that regional under-
and overallocation doesoccurand that one of the mostaffected of all is the London
region. This can be seen from Map 6 where its share of EA HIPs and numberof
schemes is not commensurate with the high levels of housing deprivation that its
authorities experience (Map 4). Another conclusion reached by those interviewed at
the regional level is thatfinancial targeting along EA HIPslinesworks.
In terms of central-local issues, there are mixed views regarding what were
centralgovernment's trueintentions in creating special initiatives/allocations suchas
EA. Someaccept that thisresults in centralisation of control butotherROsstress that
it is focused on proven need and thus that it is beneficial. They argue that EA has
been successful in securing additional finance because of the high and continuing
demand for schemes, because EA has lobbied effectively and because most
authorities have responded positively and imaginatively to the initiative after a
reluctantstart. The ROsexpectthe operation of the initiative to improve with time,
especially if further decentralisation of functions to theROs is forthcoming.
Someconclusions can also bedrawn as regards the Central team. Starting with
the financial side,EA Central refuses to accept thatEA HIPsare topsliced or that the
resources maynot necessarily end up in the worstestates of all. Targeting is seen as
an effective mechanism in directing resources to proven need and EA has worked
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hard to secure additional resources from the Treasury. Ironically, the issue of the
degree of privatisation achieved by EA has been the most important factor in
persuading the Treasury to release further resources for the EA programme even
though in fact, this is one of the initiative's least successful achievements. The
Central team does not contradict either the local authority surveyor the RO finding
that underspending occurs - it agues that this only happened in its first year of
existence and has not recurred subsequently. This is contradicted in the evidence put
forward by the ROs.
Continuation funding constitutes half of the annual EA HIPs allocation and is
normally based on the previous year's pattern of allocations. Interestingly just like
authorities, ROs which do not perform adequately acquire reputations with EA
Central of being unreliable. This has implications for the financial 'cut' (of EA
HIPs) received by each region and the re-allocation of resources that are in danger of
being underspent at the end of the financial year. The 'unreliable' regions are
unlikely to be asked whether they can make use of them.
EA Central stresses that administrative procedures have been decentralised to
the ROs and that they have become more streamlined as a result. There is an
awareness of the remaining problems for authorities but there is also a feeling that
part of the difficulty (of slow administration and processing of bids) rests with local
authorities themselves and that if they feel that the ROs are too slow, then those
authorities should approach EA Central with their complaints. Great stress is laid on
the fact that EA Central has to ensure public accountability, hence the reason for
maintaining the existing procedural arrangements. Nevertheless, further
decentralisation or, in the DoE's terminology, 'regionalisation' may occur, thus
reducing some of the remaining delays.
Regarding the timetabling arrangements, EA emphasise that they have greatly
adjusted it by 'bringing it forward' in the financial year in response to local authority
criticism. They argue that if local authorities still have problems, it is their own fault:
they should have been geared up to the fact that EA exists and it is the authorities'
own procedures which create delays and other problems, not EA's timetable. Like
the ROs, changing criteria was also not felt by EA Central to be a valid local authority
criticism. EA Central argue that EA is about innovation, that there are no 'hard and
fast' rules and that Ministerial Guide-lines have been issued. Another conclusion is
that despite the speculation, EA Central is adamant that the two stage application
procedure (forms A and B) will not be amalgamated in the future.
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Turning to tenant consultation, this remains a key theme for EA Central but it is
recognised that this has been a problem. Some team members argue that for this to
work more effectively, local authorities should be subsidised, however, others feel
that it should be left to authorities to sort out their own housing priorities and to
consult their tenants adequately. The latter view seems to run counter to the logic of
creating an initiative (in part) to encourage authorities to develop their tenant
consultation procedures. The chapter confirms that EA Central sought no
consultation with other bodies such as the Housing Consultative Council and the
Local Authority Associations prior to the creation of the EA mechanisms and that no
great effort is being expended in remedying this situation. The principle of
consultation only operates in some directions as far as the EA initiative is concerned.
Lastly, EAts policy bias has changed towards employment/enterprise
generation in public housing estates. Recent research demonstrates the necessity of
such initiatives, especially as far as the long-term unemployed are concerned (see
Pinto, 1991c; 1991d; and forthcoming c). There is unanimous agreement among all
those interviewed that this is an useful and important departure since it is no longer
adequate to see the problems in many of the estate supported by EA in purely
housing terms. Unemployment is a key issue which must also be addressed,
however, it has also been mooted that the move may have been influenced by the
desire to maintain and/or increase Treasury support for the EA initiative. There are
also those that suggest that the success of this emphasis may determine the future of
the EA initiative.
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Chapter 8
The Impact .of Estate Action at the Local Level:
Four case-studies
8.1 Introduction
This chapter develops from Chapters 4 to 7 in order to present an analysis of
the operation and impact of the EA initiative at the micro or individual local authority
level. In an attempt to present a thorough analysis of EA. the previous discussion
has traced the initiative from its political and managerial origins. through to a national
survey of its approach from a local authority perspective and finally to a discussion
of the initiative at the regional (DoE Regional Offices) and central (EA Central)
levels. It remains to conclude the empirical contribution by analysing EA's impact in
specific local situations.
As discussed in section 3.4.4, case-studies are considered to be vital in adding
context, depth and dynamism to the analysis of EA • all important elements which do
not come through with the survey methodology. In addition, public housing has
traditionally not been very diligent in defining and maintaining management or output
data so case-studies are useful in enabling both quantitative and qualitative
information to be marshalled in support of the examination of the EA programme.
Therefore four case-studies were selected comprising different management styles
(estate based management, a concierge, an example of public/private sector
partnership and a physical refurbishment scheme) in diverse contexts such as political
control (Labour Conservative and SDP/Labour), level of housing deprivation. type
of authority and DoE region (see Table 3.4).
The aim of the chapter is to unravel the notion of EA's impact or effectiveness
at the case-study level. The term 'effectiveness' must obviously be defined in terms
of both EA's and local authorities' aims. In addition effectiveness cannot be defined
purely in terms of statistical output measures. Even if this had been the intention of
the thesis, the data and 'bench-marks' for statistical evaluation simply do not exist.
Therefore effectiveness must make use of essentially qualitative data supplemented
with quantitative data where possible. Furthermore. assessment of effectiveness
must relate to various aspects which are central to the thesis, namely the way EA:
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• impacts upon the estates and people's lives
• is administered, organised and implemented
• uses the resources available as well as possible and;
• impacts upon local authority housing management and housing policy.
In order to analyse the above dimensions of effectiveness, in-depth semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key informed local authority personnel.
The interviewees included the EA co-ordinating officer (two interviews), the
assistant/director of housing departments, local councillors and the officers in charge
of the financial programming of EA HIPs (see Appendix 3 for the semi-structured
interview schedules used). For reasons of comparability, the structure of these
interviews reflects and builds upon that of previous chapters.
The chapter provides an introductory description of the case-study authorities
and what the four EA-funded schemes entail in financial and concrete terms. Section
8.3 begins to deal with the notion of effectiveness at the micro level. The first factors
to be analysed are the financial and procedural details of the four schemes in order to
determine whether EAprocedures were indeed slow and resulted in underspend as
suggested by previous research. The discussion moves on to a brief discussion of
the impact of EA schemes in terms of management statistics and supporting reference
is also made to the results of the national survey. Thirdly, indications of whether EA
has been a success in the actual estates is obtained from housing officers intimately
involved with the changes occurring in the estates in question. Brief reference is also
made to Appendix 7 which contains the details of an attempt to canvass council
tenants' opinions as to the developments occurring on their estates. Due to
methodological weaknesses relating to the small sample size, this information does
not appear in the main body of the thesis. Finally the analysis continues with the aim
of assessing EA's effectiveness in terms of the other criteria discussed above namely,
procedural, financial and policy effectiveness.
8.2 The four case-studies
This section entails a summary of the background to the estates and the EA
schemes selected for detailed analysis. The aim is to provide an understanding of the
types of problems faced by the residents of such estates and the types of initiatives
which have been encouraged by EA in order to counter the poor environment,
physical condition of buildings and management style in such areas.
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1. Goscote House (St. Peter's Estate): a concierge scheme
History: It seems that originally, "The area was the 'red-light' district for Leicester
and had a close-knit community. The estate itself is very recent but because of the
large number of high-rise units, it quickly came to acquire a bad reputation" (NS1).
The estate was built in four phases:
.84 units built 1968-70 (2-3 bedrooms), all demolished in 1989
.872 units in 4 tower blocks built 1971-73 (I, 2 and 3 bedrooms)
• 197 units in Goscote House, built in 1973 as a one-off scheme
.49 conventionally built properties were the final development in 1980
However, over time: "The estate acquired such a bad reputation that even
members of staff were reluctant to come to the estate, unless they had seen the work
being done to renovate it" (NS1). While the current estate manager (AB1) maintains
that the deterioration of the estate has little to do with the allocations policy, the
previous manager has a different account for the reason why the estate came to
become stigmatised: "The estate was originally quite stable because the whole
community had been rehoused in the same estate. However, in the space of 18
months, the community became fragmented due to the influx of a mix of people from
allover the authority. As a result the previous social cohesion was lost" (NS1).
It is suggested that the main driving force for change have been the Tenants'
Association in conjunction with the council (AB1) and that: "There was originally
some concern about the newness of the block and, therefore, of its eligibility for EA
funding. Nevertheless the place was undoubtedly 'difficult-to-let' with a very high
turnover of tenants [20% p.a.], which meant that it fitted EA's bill. The block had
been built exactly to DoE guide-lines with a resident caretaker. This was then
increased to two and eventually to twenty four hours cover to little avail. The
problem was that the council used the block to house people coming out of hostels
and the like, so that Goscote began to acquire a certain type of tenant. The politicians
were unwilling to change that policy and the [housing] department came to feel that
the only alternative was radical change the security arrangement" (NS1), which is
why it began to consider concierge schemes.
The EA element: The Goscote House concierge scheme represents an initiative which
EA has embraced and encouraged as being potentially very beneficial and cost-
effective (Skilton, 1988). Concierges represent one of the lowest levels of
decentralisation possible, down to individual blocks. This particular block was one
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of the most problematic in the authority and is an added reason why it is worthwhile
analysing the degree to which the concierge has affected the situation.
St Peter's estate as a whole has benefited substantially from EA support for
various schemes. Goscote House received an allocation of £210,000 in the 1986/88
financial round. 100% of the capital allocation came from EA and the particular
works undertaken at Goscote House were the following: the creation of a bullet-
proof glass door-entry system operated all day by a two-man shift. Two doors were
installed (in case unauthorised persons managed to push past the first) which are
opened by residents' magnetic keys whose code can be altered. Visitors must obtain
permission from residents to enter the building.
Goscote House is subject to additional security measures. Three external
cameras pan up and down the building; there is a camera in each lift; five cameras on
the ground floor; and one in each of the 21 floors. All this is recorded and print-outs
of anti-social and criminal behaviour can be obtained. Additional facilities provided
by the council include a lounge with easy chairs which is mainly for parties and
visitors' use; a TA room; a public telephone; and free a launderette service for
residents' use.
2. Canterbury Gardens (formerly Ladywell): a privatesectorscheme
History: The estate was built in 1950-51: "... but was going downhill due to the
malaise which affected a lot of our property. A major part of our housing work until
1980-81 comprised of slum clearance but being geographically a small authority
[until the reorganisation in 1974], it meant that an awful lot of high-rise construction
took place [circa 86 tower blocks]. People were at the time very willing to move into
them, partly because they were of a much higher standard than the housing they'd
left behind, but also because of a lack of choice. This major rehousing programme
came to an end in the early 1980s with a dramatically reduced demand for housing.
People now wanted houses instead of flats" (PW2).
It appears that consequently: "Family flats [as in Ladywell] of which there was
a surplus, became less and less in demand and people began to look to transfer out of
the estate. Only those desperate to be housed moved in. The community began to
break-up, not because of what the council was doing, but because peoples'
aspirations began to change and a more transient type of tenant began to move in.
We did attempt to improve things such as installing a new heating system and entry
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phones but these were soon smashed" (PW2). It was at this point that the council
began to think seriously about a more fundamental change to the estate.
The EA element: Disposals to the private sector and partnership schemes were a key
principle behind EA's creation, this being very much in line with government
housingpolicy. This choiceof case-studywas made all the more interestingbecause
it is a labour-controlled council with a reputation for being 'pragmatic' and at the
forefront of this type of scheme. The authorityhas obtained substantial resourcesvia
EA and it is, therefore, worthwhile analysing the extent to which the EA-funded
initiative has been successful. Canterbury Gardens received an allocation of £2.8m
in the 1986-89 roundwith 100% of the capital allocation coming fromEA.
The LadywellEstate comprised279 walk-up flats in seven three storey blocks.
The estate was classifiedas 'difficult-to-let' with a run-down appearance, boardedup
properties and a degree of vandalism. The council felt that 'the estate was no longer
acceptable' (Form A, Part B, 25.2.1986), that the whole of the estate should be
refurbished and proposed that approximately 50% of the estate be sold to a
developer. The remainderof the stock wouldcontinue to be councilproperty for rent
and the developer would act as a contractor to the council. All the properties would
be vacatedand re-letting wouldcommence once the estate had acquired a new image.
The council proposed comprehensive works on the estate firstly, to the flats
and communal areas: renewing windows, doors, frames and skirtings; installing
central heating and rewiring; new fittings for the kitchen and bathrooms' including
tumble driers; and an 'entry-phone' system leading to a carpeted lobby, stairs and
landings. Secondly, the external shells/areas: demolishing unsafe balconies, cleaning
and pointing all brickwork; new/rendered and painted stair shafts; replacementof bin
shafts with free-standing bin stores; French windows to patios on all ground floor
flats; subdivided gardens together with landscaping; and resurfacing the roadway,
courtyards, and community centre playground (Form A, Part B, 25.2.1986).
3. Bengal House (Ocean Estate): a refurbishment scheme
History: The Ocean estate is one of the authority's largest with over 2,000 properties
but: "Because of its size it eventually acquired a reputation as being unmanageable.
There was a district housing office to try to better manage the properties, however,
there was constant change in the officers assigned to manage the estate ... Within the
estate itself, symptoms of this 'unmanageability' included a high turnover of voids,
arrears, squatting and such like. At the same time, there was a centralised repairs
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service over which the Housing Department had little control ..• Everything else was
out of our hands" (MU3).
The officer adds that: "The estate has quite a varied ethnic mix. [Although]
There was a phase of racial harassment towards the Bengali community on the
estate", and as regards the management side of things: "The decisive change came
with the creation of a PEP management office in March 1987 together with a local
repairs depot, over which the Housing Department has much greater control,
allowing them to monitor the works or award them to private contractors" (MU3).
TheEA element: This scheme is interesting in that it represents an initiative outside of
EA criteria as it involves little more than pure and simple refurbishment of the block.
In other words, it is something which EA insists should be undertaken from
mainstream HIPs. It is worthwhile asking why this was approved. Additional
points of interest include the fact that the scheme is on a PEP estate to ponder on
whether the particular blend of the borough's politics (SDP/Liberal) may affect its
perception of EA and its willingness to participate.
Ocean estate too benefited substantially from EA support. In the 1986-87
round it received £200,000 worth of allocation for the installation of central heating
systems. In 1987·88 Channel House received an allocation of £1,335,000 for
refurbishment works (including structural works, lift refurbishment, provision of
central heating, roof recovering, new plumbing works, new kitchens and bathrooms
and asbestos removal). Bengal House itselfreceived an allocation of £2,771,000 in
the 1987·88 round. All this capital allocation came from EA itself and the works
undertaken included a new roof, new rendered facade, window replacement,
enlarged refuse facilities and refurbishment of kitchens and bathrooms.
4. Digmore Neighbourhood Office (Digmore): anestate management scheme
History: When the authority took over the Digmore Estate from the New Town
Corporation in 1985: "It found severe problems on the estate - so much so, that it
was even considered seriously the demolition of a selection/whole of the estate •••
Basically, no one went to Digmore unless they had no choice. Vandalism, voids and
turnovers were very, very high and had been exacerbated by the Development
Corporation's policies of the 'Sale of the Century' which had created lots of voids.
Property was bought by individuals and private landlords who then left them void
and derelict, and which the council has now had to buy back" (S04).
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The situation forced the council to think seriously about: "..• the idea of
eventually forming a PEP. The council carried out various forms of consultation
including a professional survey of the estate. The results highlighted very serious
problems but many officers were surprised to find that a large percentage of tenants
wanted to remain on the estate but wanted improvements. A project co-ordinator was
employed by the council and having become aware of the existence of EA and the
resources available through it, decided to bid for EA support." (504).
The EA element: While awaiting PEP designation the authority decided to apply for
EA resources and was successful. It has to be stressed that this is not the purest of
examples of EA's influence, since the estate also has PEP status. Another difficulty
which arose is that the bulk of the original work had been undertaken by the previous
co-ordinator and the exact details of the EA procedures were, therefore, not entirely
clear. This is an unavoidable problem which results from staff turnover.
Nevertheless a key 'EA principle has been its determination to encourage
decentralisation via localised management and initiatives of this nature comprise
approximately half of the EA-funded schemes. It is thus worthwhile analysing the
degree to which this has been an useful initiative. To this end, a scheme was chosen
in an authority that previously had no plans to decentralise and where a localised
management office is a novelty, in order to gauge the extent to which this has been a
success. Digmore represents the most problematic council estate in the authority's
stock which adds to its value as an indicative case-study for the effect of estate
management.
Other important reasons for the selection of this area include the need to have a
variety of regions and authorities for the case-studies. This area was also a
Conservative-controlled district council which enabled a different slant on EA to be
obtained. The Digmore estate has benefited from a substantial injection of EA
support. In a period from 1987 to 1990 it has experienced three phases of
continuous investment adding up to over £Sm (including the creation of the local
management office). It has also received PEP status (and the additional non-financial
support that entails) and has been designated as an Estate Management Board site.
8.3 Effectiveness: making use of the available data
This section analyses the scant statistical data available with which to address
the issue of EA's effectiveness at the local level. It starts by collating all the available
financial and procedural data and links the main findings to the discussions in
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previous chapters so as to use the case-studies to update the arguments. The
subsequent section presents the data gathered as the result of an effort to obtain
housing management statistics for the case-studies, however, information was
available for only two authorities and even this had been compiled using incompatible
definitions. This meant that the data had to be transformed into symbols indicating
improvement or deterioration in the estates rather than exact quantification. This
analysis is supplemented by reference to the results of the postal survey (Table 5.24)
and the tenant opinions described in Appendix 7. Lastly some indication was
obtained as to the impact of EA schemes from the point of view of housing officers
closely involved with the developments occurring in the estates in question.
i) Financial and programming details
By way of building the context and background to the schemes outlined above,
Table 8.1 collates the basic information necessary for an understanding of the
procedural, implementation and financial issues in dealing with EA. The first point
to note is the degree to which information is missing. This seems to be primarily a
reflection the fact that EA schemes are often hastily assembled by an ad hoc group of
officers. The task is often delegated to individuals to organise and submit the
information to EA and, therefore, the various EA forms are more likely to be
misfiled. This says much about local authority organisation and record-keeping but
also reflects on the variable amount of information which is demanded of authorities
by the various ROs - for example, one authority did not have to fill in Form B
whereas the other, in the same region, did have to. ENs insistence that authorities :
submit the Quarterly Assessment forms (C) was not always heeded, regardless of the
size of the allocation, although this may also have been a reflection of poor record-
keeping and/or staff tum-over. The variability in information requested by the EA
administration is the most striking aspect, backing the survey results (section 5.4ix).
It also reflects the fact that the EA initiative has evolved as it has gone along.
Table 8.1 also provides support for arguments presented earlier (Chapter 5),
relating to the processing of the various EA procedures. It is clear that by the time
final approval was issued, there normally remained very little time for the authorities
to actually spend their allocations, thus resulting in the underspending problems
identified in other parts of the thesis. A third issue which is immediately noticeable is
that at least two of the cases, the final costs of the schemes exceeded the original
estimates. To some extent this is inevitable (due such factors as the weather,
contractors, technical difficulties etc), but the point to note is that the authorities must
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Table 8.1: Case-studies: procedural and financial issues
Basic Information on Schemes Concierge Priv Sect Refurbish EstMmt
Whenbuilt: 1973 1948 1961 1967-71
Design/Construction method WimpyNF Traditional Steelframe Radburn
Numberof unitson estate 1009 279 1975 1219
Numberof units involved 197 141/160 95 981
Form A
Dateof EA invitation to submit 29.01.87 29.01.87 29.01.87 ' 29.01.87
date of submission to RO/EA N.A. 04.03.87 10.03.87 19.02.87
closingdate None None None None
Form B
date wheninvitedto go to FormB None None 26.08.87 30.06.87
date of submission to RO/EA 19.10.87 None 08.12.87 06.08.87
closingdate Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible
whenfinal approval received 22.02.88 10.8.87 26.01.88 N.A.
Weeks to spendtheallocation 5 15 8 N.A.
WeeksfromA to Finalapproval N.A. 21 52 N.A.
Form C
Numberof forms sent to EA 5 3 5 2
Spending going to plan? No Yes No Yes
Amount bid for (Ooo's): 186 2,863 2,711 5,566
Amount approved(OOO's): 210 2,863 2,584 5,566
Final cost (ooo's): 258 2,763 2,631 5,566
EA's contribution 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Interviews and EstateActionFormsA and B
Table 8.2:Housing Management Indicators: before/after the EA scheme
Concierge: Arrears: Re-lets: Voids: Transfers: RTBs: Vandalism Crime
Beforehand 0
1 yearlater + ++ + + 0 ++ ++
Since then + + + + 0 + +
Estate Mmt: Arrears: Re-lets: Voids: Transfers: RTBs: Vandalism Crime
Beforehand +
1 yearlater 0 0 + + 0 0 +
Since then ++ ++ ++ + + + ++
Beforescheme:
Very High (--);High (-); Medium (0); Low (+); VeryLow (++)
One year afterscheme & In the timeSince:
Much Improved (++); Improved (+); No Change (0); Worse (-); MuchWorse (-)
Note: No data returnedfor refurbishment and privatesector involvement schemes
Source: Local Authority Response to Requests for Information
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meet all the additional costs from their own budgets. This also calls into attention
EA's method of allocating funds. The information in Table 8.1 confirms many
procedural and implementation issues discussed in preceding chapters. These will
not be repeated here.
ii) Housing statistics: a basic assessment of impact
This section deals with the officers' views regarding the end result of all the
procedures and the effect of the EA schemes. It attempts to give an indication of the
general achievements of the schemes employing the housing management indicators
which are normally used to demonstrate improvements in housing conditions and
should be analysed in conjunction with the results of the survey (Table 5.24).
Although subjective in nature and prone to the problems of trying to separate
out the 'EA effect' from 'other factors',Table 8.2 does illustrate that the situation
appears to be improving on the estates as a result of the EA schemes. Every single
management indicator (such as the reduction in rent arrears and the crime rate)
records improvements occurring either one year later or in the time since. This is
probably happening in conjunction with 'other' factors not taken into consideration.
Nevertheless and despite the fact that only two case-studies returned the information,
these results support the local authority survey findings presented in Table 5.24.
iii) Impact on estates: quotations from informed housing officers
A worthwhile exercise is also to ask the housing officers who are intimately
aware of and involved with, the developments taking place in the estates for their
opinions regarding the extent to which they perceive improvement taking place in the
EA estates. Their impressions about the achievements in the various case-studies are
recorded below.
• Concierge: "A tenant satisfaction survey was carried out in February 1989 but only
27 tenants responded. All were favourably impressed with the scheme, although
some still complained about the allocation policy. Even the existing staff members
have built a lot of bridges with the tenants. There have only been three break-ins
since the start of the concierge; two of which were done by the police and one by the
resident himself when he lost the key. There have been no burglaries and no more
missiles thrown out of the windows" (NS 1).
• Private Sector: "There have been no studies but is is self-evident that it has been a
success. Void levels have fallen dramatically and it is now 100% occupied. It has
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also enabled us to free under-occupied properties and meet housing need as a result.
There are only two transfer requests at the moment" (PW2).
• Refurbishment: "Yes, certainly the estate has improved. There was no central
heating and the windows were draughty before. Now external cladding has also
been added and this has made a difference. It has not solved the management
problems for example, the homeless and there are still families housed on the seventh
floor of the building, but there have been improvements. Before all the four blocks
were regarded as difficult-to-Iet. This is no longer the case. There is now a high
demand for these dwellings which is reflected in the fact that there are now 12 'right
to buy' applications where there were none before." (MU/SR3)
• Estate Management: "We belive that it has been a success. Certainly the next [EA]
bid is going to be on very similar intensive management lines" (S04).
These comments imply substantial improvements in the estates. However, an
important opinion must be that of the residents themselves - the people who live in
the estate and experience the changes. Consequently part of the case-study research
involved an attempt to obtain an indication of the tenant opinion as this was felt to be
of relevance. Although an attempt was made to encompass this issue (see Appendix
7 for a discussion of each element of the tenant survey analysis; the methodological
notes are presented in section 3.4.5; and a copy of the survey can be found in
Appendix 4), it was not considered to be sufficiently robust to be included in the
main body of the thesis. Nevertheless, the findings of Appendix 7 represent useful,
albeit rudimentary, indicators of tenant satisfaction with their living environment. The
tenants' responses both support and enhance the housing management statistics
provided by the housing officers for the four case-studies (Table 8.2); the positive
EA Central, RO, and local authority comments; and the survey results (Table 5.24).
Taken together this constitutes an incomplete but substantive body of evidence
that suggests that, not only is the situation improving in all the four case-studies (and
beyond according to the survey results) but more importantly, that these schemes are
actually meeting tenants' individual wants and needs. It is extremely difficult (if not
impossible) to try to extricate the pure 'EA' impact from other factors occurring
independently of the initiative. For example, to what extent does the improvement
simply reflect the fact that these estates were in need of additional investment? Most
of them were severely run-down and any focused and substantial investment in
environmental, dwelling or managerial terms would probably have resulted in
substantial improvements. Effectiveness cannot stop at this stage.
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· Having concluded in the previous section that EA schemes seem to have
beneficial effects for theestates and the residents, nevertheless, any discussion on the
effectiveness of EA mustlookat otherdimensions. Threeothercritical determinants
of the effectiveness of EA, based on both their aims and those of local authorities,
must relate to the following issues: firstly, the procedures, administration and
implementation - in other words, whether these are as well designed as possible;
secondly, financial effectiveness - in other words, whether the targeted resources
available to EA are used thoroughly; and thirdly, policy effectiveness - or what
impacts there havebeen upon local authority housing management andwiderhousing
policy. Theseare nowdiscussion in turn.
8.4 Procedural Effectiveness
Procedural effectiveness refers to theextent to which authorities believe thatEA
Central has organised the administrative procedures, the timetabling arrangements,
tenantconsultation andotherimplementation or procedural issues as wellas possible.
This section also seeks to link up with and refine earlier arguments (based on the
nationalsurvey and the analysis of Regional Offices and EA Central) by addingthe
dimension of specific authorities, estates and schemes, thereby verifying the
preceding research or obtaining perspectives not previously discussed. Therefore the
following discussions of effectiveness not only report on the findings at the local
levelbutalsoseekto integrate them withthose of previous chapters where relevant.
As described in section 3.3.4, this part of the case-studies involved detailed
semi-structured interviews with key decision-makers in the local authority
administrations (seedetails in Appendix 3). The interviewees which are quoted have
theirown letterandnumber code. The letters referto the individuals interviewed and
the numbers 1 to 4 identify the different case-studies (see Table 3.4). This section
will analyse the localprocedures involved in selecting estateswhich are eligiblefor
EA support; the operation of the timetable; the quality of tenantconsultation; EA's
growing influence in housing circles; and theotherrelevant procedural factors.
i) Selecting EA candidates
In all four cases it was the Housing Department that assumed the lead role in
co-ordinating bids, selecting the candidates and collecting the necessary statistical
infonnation. This requires the full co-operation of other local authority departments
(eg. the architect's regarding costings). The general agreement is that: "If authorities
are to operate within EA deadlines, a good deal of co-operation and willingness to
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succeed must be available from other departments" (MU/SR3). This was soon
appreciated and the departments have, in the main, acted in unison and authorities are
now finding that: "It is getting easier to liaise with the others. This is both because of
the experience gained of dealing with EA and because there has been limited staff
turnover" (NS I), which facilitates matters. Similarly it was felt in another authority
that: "It has not been too much of a problem ... They [other departments] have been
very reasonable and realise that this is the only way to succeed" (S04).
Authorities stress that they were aware of which estates needed attention and
what was needed before EA was inaugurated and it thus was inevitable that some
candidates for EA bids would be chosen almost irrespective of the EA criteria. In
one case a bid was made in the full knowledge that it did not conform to EA criteria:
tI ••• the estate had already been prioritised by a comprehensive OLC report and the
authority undertook to push this forward under the EA programme ... the scheme
was, therefore, a top priority for the neighbourhood and for the authority as a whole"
(MU/SR3). but not for EA, although it was stilI supported.
Normally it was only once authorities became aware of the EA initiative that an
attempt was made to ensure that schemes submitted would be eligible under its
criteria: "By 1985 ... a number of estates 'at risk' had been identified by the housing
strategy ... It was at this point the EA/UHRU came along and we realised that the
estate would fit" (PW2). In another case: "The original impetus for a high security
system came from the tenants themselves following a sit-in and a petition" (NS1). In
all four cases, the officers maintain that EA contributed little other than providing
allocations which enabled the schemes to occur. This is in line with the survey
results presented in section 5.7ii, regarding the primary reasons for the
improvements in the estates.
ii) TimetabIing
Regarding the adequacy of the timetable, views are mixed at the local level. An
officer states that: "It is actually getting worse. It is now ludicrous because EA
expects us to drop everything else and to devote our time exclusively to developing
EA bids" (NS1), but authorities largely agree with the ROs and EA Central that
things are changing (see also section 7.3): "It has improved. IfEA allocates things
as last year, when we received Form A in December 1988, then we have a reasonable
amount of time to plan things - to be fair to them we do not have to wait for them to
invite us to prepare bids" (PW2). a point stressed by the EA Central team.
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Nevertheless there remains a feeling that: "There is still room for improvement
... and the proposed decentralisation to ROs should help. I appreciate ENs
argument that authorities ought to have 'cottoned on' to EA and to have the schemes
ready for submission, rather than waiting for an invitation •.. Unfortunately, the
situation is not as simple as that" (SR3). This view is supported by the following:
"We submitted Form A some while ago. Its already December and we have not been
informed whether to develop the scheme or not. By the time this is done it will be
into the financial year once again ... in the majority of cases, schemes are only fully
approved in September or thereabout. So although the timetable seems to have
improved, it is not that much better" (S04). Clearly this still causes difficulties and
the Central team is adamant that the timetable cannot be brought forward any more
than it already has. This issue remains to be handled effectively (see section 9.3.1).
iii) . Administrative burdens and criteria
The case-studies also confirm the survey results apropos the administrative
load. All agree that: "This is still large and onerous. The whole two stage process is
cumbersome because even at Form B, it [the bid] is speculative. The authority must
make a decision whether or not to work on the scheme prior to receiving official
approval. The vetting of application forms does not need to be so detailed... that is
what the tenders are supposed to be for - to ensure that the prices and costings are
competitive" (TII3). This call for more relaxed vetting arrangements could help
matters: "I suspect that they just look in detail at those bits that really matter to them
but an awful lot of information looks suspect in terms of relevance to the bid" (S04).
There also remains a need to streamline the application forms. There is common
agreement between the ROs and the local authorities about this point.
An authority even insists that contrary to RO/EA claims, these administrative
aspects have become progressively worse: "This too is becoming a heavier burden.
They get longer every year. The last form I received was 20 pages longl" (NS4). At
least there is a realisation that: "... all their administrative procedures are necessary,
however, they still get on our nerves, for example, when they change Form A and
we have to complete it again. There is also the 'pedantics of the statistics' where they
often request very exact measurements which are time-consuming" (DP/MW1).
Then again others believe that: "This is no more difficult for us than forming HIPs
submissions. We do not see this as being an EA problem - its very much at the local
authorities' door" (PW2), since authorities should collate management statistics to
analyse performance.
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A whole spectrum of opinion is obtained on the nature of EA criteria: "The
criteria are still a bit blurred. They [EA/ROs] are trying to be more hard-line, but
even during our meetings they are only prepared to say that anything would be
considered. They do not tell us what we should not bid for and the schemes are
rejected. I guess this is because they never know if they will get sufficient schemes
and need the uncertainty to mop-up the rest of their allocation" (SR3). This
vagueness naturally raises difficulties: "This causes a problem, especially if they
spring it upon you without warning ... The biggest change has been the question of
EA funding from 100% funding in the first year; to 75%; to the current 50%
threshold ..• perhaps some warning [of changes] would have been valid" (PW2).
On the positive side and in support of the ROs views regarding changes to EA
criteria (see section 7.3): "... this element has improved. Their publicity has got
better" (NS1). There is also the view that: "This has not been too problematic. I
submitted a Form A this year but by then the Ministerial Guide-lines had already been
published so I can't quibble. We knew about the emphasis on employment and we
are in partnership with PEP who emphasise local management. The fact that PEP
advises us ... has been additionally helpful in focusing our bids" (PW4). More
could still be done to reduce this uncertainty, perhaps along the lines proposed in
section 6.2, namely a DoE letter specifying exactly what will be approved, although
this too has its disadvantages in terms of affecting flexibility.
iv) Tenant consultation
In contradiction to the survey results, all four maintain that rigourous tenant
consultation exercises had been carried out before submission of Form A bids,
however, upon close examination, the evidence is that these have all been carried out
independently and irrespective of EA. It was clearly not because EA was forcing
authorities to be more rigourous in their attitude to consultation that this took place.
Moreover, there is as previously discussed, some argument as to whether EA's
present structure actually hinders efficiency in consultation (see sections 5.5; 6.4; and
7.3.3). Some relevant quotations illustrate these points: "The consultation process
involved a survey which identified the key priorities for the residents, then a series of
public meetings which the Director and other departments attended and finally, the
project co-ordinator undertook consultative exercises block by block. However, all
this occurred before EA came along and the authority decided to bid for their
resources" (SJ4, Emphasis Added). A second comment likewise highlights the
difficulties arising from the current EA structure: "We are aware that EA tries to
promote this, however, there was no tenant consultation involved in submitting the
243
bid at Form A stage. This was partly because the OLC had itself conducted a large
campaign of tenant consultation ... the bid was also fairly speculative so there was no
point in doing it; and lastly, EA left us little time in which to perform this. We
received the invitation to submit bids in February and it had to be in by March"
(MU/SR3). This confirms the survey findings (section 5.5) where few (31%)
indicated that involvement with EA had resulted in greater tenant consultation.
Very little change was made to the schemes at Form B, except where a 'design
day' was held for the various proposals' (LA1); and where the costs were revised but
not the scheme itself (LA4). The reason why so little change actually occurred at this
stage can be understood from another quotation which also sheds light on the limited
on-going consultation: "Once we are informed that we have got through to the next
stage [Form B], we must then 'go to tender'. This is a problem because the
timescale involved is very short. Tenants could not make any changes to the scheme
... otherwise tenant consultation exercises would have been mounted" (MU/SR3).
These point to a contradiction within the research. On the one hand, the survey
results indicate that most of the consultation actually occurs at Form B stage (sections
5.5ii and 6.2iv), yet the case-study results indicate that little consultation actually
occurs at this stage. This probably reflects the choice of case-study authorities and
schemes - all of which date back to EA's first year. All the case-studies formed part
of the original batch of EA bids and were all top priorities for the councils involved.
As such they were likely to have been well research, planned and their tenants well
consulted, but this would have occurred prior to the formation of EA. Such well
researched schemes would be exhausted in later years and consultation would have to
occur within the EA-defined timespan, thus leading to the situation revealed in the
survey results - the problems and solutions may have been less well researched.
Despite some RO and Central opinions to the contrary, the local authorities
perceive that this issue has notimproved significantly: "This is a major problem. We
have tried to avoid raising expectations too highly, while at the same time keeping the
tenants informed about the state of the bid" (S04). The result is that: "We still
manage to consult at an early stage but it is becoming more difficult ... so we agree
on the broad details but on smaller issues, we simply have to go ahead without
necessarily consulting the tenants. This is happening increasingly ... Things would
improve if the authority had the ability to work-up the schemes in advance of EA
invitation and hold them on the 'shelf. This is not possible for us" (NSl), primarily
because of the pressure of the current work-load and the lack of spare capacity.
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Even if tenant consultation occurs at Fonn B, this will not necessarily be
adequate: "... Tenant consultation is extremely tentative and needs to be qualified to
the tenants. There is undoubtedly an element of raising the tenants' expectations -
perhaps falsely. This also happens on our own capital programmes but the
difference is that EA gives a very high profile to tenant consultation ... [which] is
neither better nor more effective under EA" (SR3). Another view corroborating the
survey results was aired: "We have definitely had greater tenant consultation in these
schemes although this is partly because all of them have been so major ... I would
not say that it is because of Estate Action" (PW2).
v) EA's influence in 'shaping' schemes
There was variable EA/RO involvement in the case-studies. In one case the RO
was fairly instrumental: "... there was a great deal of discussion with the DoE and the
former estate co-ordinator built a close relation with the Manchester RO as well as the
national office. There were about 20 visits by various DoE officials which must have
influenced the final form of the scheme" (S03). This was important but more limited
in another case-study: "We have a very good working relationship with the RO •..
[But] It is important to point out that the council was quite advanced in its plans
before EA/UHRU came along and our schemes fell into its remit. This is why we've
done very well out of the initiative. In actual fact it was EA that approached us and
the Regional Office played its part in steering them towards us, and us towards EA.
However, our ideas were not stimulated by EA" (PW4, Original Emphasis).
By contrast, DoE influence was less significant in the other authorities, merely
involving visits at a late stage. The nature of the relationship has evolved and many
authorities now maintain a more or less continuous dialogue with the ROs in order to
'sift out' many of the unworkable schemes unofficially before too much work and
effort is expended. This is a welcome development which will grow in importance
with further moves towards decentralisation and larger EA schemes.
The authorities generally discern that the ROs have been forceful in securing
successful bids for them at Form B stage: "The RO was quite influential in enabling
us to obtain the funding. They gave us helpful suggestions about how to complete
the bid and make it look good to Estate Action" (TS I). A similar view is held in the
Conservative-controlled authority as discussed above. However, a different sort of
argument also comes through: "The RO is in a strong position at this stage and we
went to various meetings ... the DoE [then] sent us a 'special' form asking all sorts
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of questions. Therefore, we felt that we were constantly having to go through a
series of hoops - the case for investment stood for itself without the need for further
elaboration." (MU/SR3) Inevitably there is no simple 'poor' or 'good' relationship-
it varies between regions, authorities, schemes and officers.
vi) Other procedural factors
1. TheCommittee Stage andtender documentation
Proposals involving major capital works must first be approved by the
appropriate councillors but according to the interviews, nothing unusual occurs at the
Committee approval stage: "The tender process is no different from other schemes"
(S04), and it seems that: "It simply goes through the normal committee cycle"
(NS1). Special problems still can present themselves: "In large, multimillion pound
schemes, a bill of quantity is necessary; as are tender documents and negotiations
with contractors. Within the space of about a month we have to make a judgement
about the likely costs. There could be problems involved if the DoE pushes us to get
the work done in a short period of time. This may for example, contribute to an
increase in costs" (MU/SR3).
More typically: "The process is very much council-led ... We invited ten
developers to listen to our proposals for the concept of the joint venture and to submit
tenders ... [regarding] how much it would cost to refurbish our half and what they
would offer us for selling them the other half. When the tenders came back ... the
design was finalised, [and] the rehousing of tenants began." (PW2). Two officers
note that there was a 'strong correlation' between the location of EA schemes and the
ward of their Chair of Housing. No comment can be made on this point here.
2. Staff/Employment issues
Complications arising from new employment and/or changed job descriptions
were minor. No one was made redundant because the EA schemes either involved
transfers of staff or new appointments which the unions were satisfied with. The
main changes occurred in the estate based management scheme where: "I don't recall
there being any difficulties in negotiating with the unions as most of the posts were
created anew. Some clerical staff were 'volunteered' for the local office. The whole
staff issue was eased by an understanding that people could go back [to the central
office] after 12 months if they did not like it." (S04) In general terms there was the
feeling that: "The most difficult aspect is the CRS because it has to link with
Employment Training. It is very hard to work with and involves a number of
different agents: the ROs, EA and the Training Commission [now the Training and
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Enterprise Councils] and they do not always talk to each other" (SL4). This
quotation refers to a difficulty in co-ordinating various agencies and bodes ill for
EA's .new emphasis on 'flagship' initiatives. Success depends on strong links
developing between all these agencies.
3. Problems specific tomanagement structures
Only the decentralised authority noted potential implementation difficulties
arising from its present management arrangements: "Perhaps additional difficulties
are created by the fact that we have a neighbourhood structure. We do not have a
corporate housing strategy and each Neighbourhood Office is free to decide its
programme. Only the Housing Committee has control over the types of bids made to
EA and it is unlikely to reject the proposals submitted by the Neighbourhood Offices.
The disadvantages of this situation outweigh the advantages. They can't afford to
underspend; ... their capital allocations are relatively small, [and] it could discourage
the Neighbourhoods from undertaking large-scale schemes; and there is also the
temptation to over-programme capital commitments. This means that many Form As
are sent out which we know will not get EA approval. However, in fairness, we
have managed to get a lot of schemes approved which do not fit EA criteria" (SR3).
On the other hand, decentralising authorities may benefit by bidding for estate based
management schemes, thus using EA to 'subsidise' their housing strategies.
4. The EA co-ordinators' influence and capitalising upon EA
An attempt was made to elucidate the degree of influence wielded by housing
officers closely involved with the EA initiative regarding for example, the selection of
estates, types of initiatives and sway over councillors. In actual fact the officers felt
that their influence by virtue of their familiarity with the initiative, was marginal. The
types of scheme and estate are pre-defined: "In selecting estates, we looked at the
Ministerial Guide-lines and at ways of putting schemes into EA's rubric and
objectives" (S04), besides which, their authorities' priorities are normally self-
evident: "The schemes we submit are those that demonstrate the greatest need.
Neither have we had to look for schemes to 'fit' the EA bill because there isn't a
shortage of these. I have only been influential in deciding the best way to present
bids to EA and eliminating those elements I know will not be funded" (PW2).
The survey results suggest that authorities have used EA to establish
predominantly such schemes as were acceptable to themselves and which conformed
to their policies. Such a view is fully supported in the case-studies: "The authority
has only done what was palatable to itself. This has been easy because we were
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decentralising and largely pursuing the same changes as EA was trying to promote.
It was also the fact that the DoE was offering us some cash to do the things that a
shrinking HIPs wouldn't allow us to" (NS1). Another typical quotation is that:
"Some of our schemes have been little more than straight-forward refurbishments
[namely,] just putting things together to fit the bill. We just wanted the cash, so we
do use EA to some extent by twisting things slightly ... We have simply told them
what they wanted to hear" (PW2). Other authorities were defensive: "We have not
'manipulated' EA! We have merely submitted our bids - they always had the option
of rejecting them" (SR3). Another preferred to put it slightly differently, "Yes, there
is an element of what I would call 'capitalising' upon what EA is trying to do"
(S04). All this forms part of the council housing 'game'.
The benefits can cut both ways. An officer implied that his authority had
become more receptive to certain types of initiative as a result of its involvement with
EA: "We have pursued some ideas with ENs criteria in mind. For example, we
were prepared to go ahead with a housing co-operative because we knew that it was
likely that we'd receive an allocation. Perhaps we would not have been so open-
minded if EA was not around" (PW2). These quotations suggest that although in the
majority of cases, authorities are using EA resources to fund projects which they
suggest they would have themselves carried out, there have been instances where EA
has been influential in changing the agenda or increasing the options available to
councils. This issue is analysed in detail in section 8.5.
8.5 Financial effectiveness at the micro/authority level
As discussed earlier, the notion of financial effectiveness is used here simply to
examine the extent to which EA is perceived to be using the EA HIPs targeted
resources competently. EA HIPs represent specific allocations of resources which
are directed by central government at perceived problems in this case, the most
problem prone public housing estates. This involves the creation and operation of a
different financial mechanism from the 'traditional' HIPs. Previous work has
demonstrated that EA resources are achieving positive outcomes, however, that is not
the same as suggesting that those resources are being utilised effectively.
Chapter 5 illustrated the argument that problems seem to exist with the
'targeted' mechanism of allocating resources. The Regional Offices confirm this but
the EA Central team argues that the problems have been overcome. This section
analyses the extent to which this is truly the case by discussing whether targeting
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works against local discretion; the effects of continuation funding upon local capital
programming; the difficulties that may arise as a result of delayed notification by EA
of scheme approval; whether authorities should have to contribute to the schemes;
and concludes with some speculations on the likely effects of the latest Housing Act
on the financial operation of the initiative.
i) Targeting: central control and local discretion
All four authorities insisted that: "The resources are definitely topsliced and it
definitely increases central control" (TPI). This was rather taken for granted and the
individuals interviewed were more concerned to discuss what they considered to be
the real issue: "It does not matter whether EA HIPs [funds] are topsliced. What is
certain is that EA does not compensate for the cash that has been whittled away in the
last decade or so. Where they have got the resources from is an irrelevance" (PW2).
There is in fact, a degree of self-interest in maintaining the status quo for the
fortunate few: "We've managed to get £lOm from EA HIPs ... we don't want to be
too critical. We would never have got nearly as much from the HIPs mechanism."
(SR3). For another authority that normally receives very little under HIPs, EA has
been a godsend: "... the authorities' particular needs are their worst estates,
nevertheless, they are miffed about the fact that the resources get topsliced. For us it
is the only way to put together a housing package and programme" (SJ4, Emphasis
Added). Clearly there are advantages to this instrument of spatial targeting over and
above those discussed in section 8.2, where positive developments are occurring.
Despite the fact that the clock cannot be turned back, some authorities prefer the
HIPs system of capital allocation to targeted EA HIPs because: "There is no doubt
that it is much easier to plan the housing programme via the HIPs mechanism"
(PW2). A further observation illustrates why authorities are so concerned about
targeted mechanisms of capital allocation: "HIPs carry permission to spend and
leaves authorities free to decide how to use these. EA HIPs is completely different.
There is much less flexibility and means that the DoE gains control over part of the
capital programme. There is also the administration necessary and the inconvenience
of the annual process. HIPs comes in December. EA HIPs may come at any time
and because of its timetable, is an inflexible and unpredictable system" (SR3).
It is not just a matter of inconvenience and cost. It is also an issue about
control and decision-making in council housing programmes. A contrast to the
opinions discussed above is offered by admittedly, a small authority with only one
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scheme to plan and programme: "It is not too much of a problem because you can
predict when you will receive the final approval from EA and simply fit it into the
programming cycle. This is aided by the fact that the ROs are becoming more free at
telling you the allocation you are likely to obtain in advance ... but the official letters
are woefully slow in arriving" (SJ4), so it too experiences certain difficulties.
ii) The effect of EA HIPs on rolling capital programmes
EA operates on an annual basis. According to the case-studies difficulties arise
because it: "... allocates on a very different basis [to HIPs] - allocations are for
specific projects. Each neighbourhood must decide how it wants to use its HIPs
resources. In the case of EA bids, however, they must programme on the
assumption that they will receive additional borrowing approvals. We recommend
that they they work on schemes which will go though in the main programme
anyway, if EA backing falls through" (SR3): thus recouping what would otherwise
be lost investment. Another officer states that there is little doubt that: "The fact that
EA operates annually can be disruptive of that [housing] plan. It is a very, very
unsatisfactory way of programming a capital strategy. It's bad enough trying to
figure out what the reduction in HIPs allocation is going to be" (SR3). Despite the
difficulties that can arise, not all authorities feel it to be a huge disadvantage: "It is
only a minor problem - the programming in particular is short term ... but in general
the [two] systems are not so different in terms of the programming" (SJ4).
There are indications that authorities concur with suggestions by both EA
Central and the ROs (in chapter 7) that things are improving: "In terms of the
procedures, there have been improvements with Form A dates being moved forward
to approximately the same time as the other allocations. However, it is still taking
EA much too long to process the bids, especially the continuation funding bids"
(PW2). Another officer agrees, illustrating the remaining problems: "While this will
help planning and programming, it would be better if there was some degree of
certainty. The potential for much abortive work would be controlled if uncertainty
was removed. We have experienced severe delays in the past because it has taken
them [EA] so long to process Forms B. It means that the tender documents have
expired and we've either had to re-tender or renegotiate, usually at higher prices ... it
would be better if we had a three year rolling capital programme ... We operate on
'guesstimates' but even then, a pattern does not exist for EA HIPs as it does for
HIPs" (SR3). Problems remain which must be overcome in order to improve the
operation of the initiative.
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iii) Continuation funding
The lack of guarantees of EA funding for schemes in subsequent years and
phases is also regarded as being as much of a problem as suggested by the survey
results (section SAvii): "We simply do not have the resources to carry schemes
forward on our own. This means that we have to trust EA to approve the
continuation funding ... We do not hold back uncommitted resources until we have
received final approval... This would be impractical and might result in
underspending" (PW2). A suggestion is made about how to improve this: "... ROs
have on occasion given us a letter which indicates the level of continuation funding to
be expected. This should be a more common practice - EA could qualify it by
saying: 'subject to further allocations from the Treasury' or whatever else it likes but
at least there would be a little more certainty for authorities" (SR3). If such a letter,
(with the appropriate caveats) could help, then perhaps this should be instituted.
Authorities are prepared to make serious representations if the DoE were to
simply refuse them continuation funding: "I am sure that the council would not pick-
up the 'tab' if continuation approval did not come through. There could be severe
repercussions but the DoE simply tells us not to worry" (SJ4). The likely course of
action would probably be that: "We would start by making some sort of
representation to the DoE ... As to whether there would be any problems, that would
depend on how the capital programme stood. Schemes might have to be shelved or
delayed" (SR3). But in fairness: "... they have always come forward with the
allocations and even provided written statements more or less to the effect" (TPl);
and there is a determination that in future, "... we have to tie down EA into giving an
indication of the likely level of continuation funding" (SR3). This appears to be a
wise course of action since 24.5% authorities surveyed suggest that on certain
occasions, continuation funding was not obtained from EA (see section SAviii).
iv) Difficulties arising from late approval
The experience of local authorities varies but all four acknowledged a degree of
EA HIPs underspend. As discussed previously, in some ways this is inevitable - the
important issue is to what extent this occurs because of the manner in which EA
operates. Experience varies from: "We do not underspend significantly - last year
97% of the allocation was spent ... it is not unusual for the balance to be slightly out"
(504), to: "We've had lots of problems but we've always managed to get around
them by carrying the allocation forward ... The real problem is in the form of a loss
of credibility with the tenants. It is a stupid way of doing things and as schemes
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become larger in size and scope [as is expected], so will bigger problems be
presented to authorities and EA" (NS1).
Underspend as a result of late notification of approval by the DoE is
reconfirmed as a serious problem at the locality. The following quotation captures
the dilemma: "The level of allocation must be tied very closely to what we can spend
[this estimate can be seriously flawed because of delays], otherwise we run out of
time. The contractors also have to gear themselves up. When we submit Form Bs,
we must have a quick response partly because tenders are only valid for a period of
about 13 weeks. If anything goes wrong, we may have to go through the whole
process again or to renegotiate the costs. In principle the EA allocation is not tied
specifically to a scheme and as a result of delays, we may use the allocation to
supplement mainstream HIPs. Although we may benefit from undertaking other
schemes we must finish the original EA scheme from our own resources the
following year. No additional allocation is made by EA" (SR3). Ear-marked
resources must then be diverted to meet the EA obligations, which means that
programmed schemes may have to be delayed or scrapped.
One authority was very pragmatic in its attitude to the above: "..• in order to
avoid underspend, we may not accept all the allocation offered by EA. Another way
to cope is to pay the staff overtime to put the programme together and get the work
done in the time available. A last method is to simply have schemes on the 'shelf
which can be pulled out and slotted in ... [but] the best thing to do is only to accept
the level of allocation which we can spend in the time remaining ..• If we were to
underspend, then such schemes have first call on the next year's programme but .••
Normally we are able to accept additional resources when EA underallocates because
we can pull out pre-prepared schemes" (SJ4). This authority is in a fortunate
position relative to the others who argue that this is simply not an option available to
them because of the lack of spare resources.
Although evidence has been obtained about the problems faced by authorities in
using the resources they manage to obtain through EA, the four case-studies echo the
survey findings in indicating that they have coped reasonably well: "We have never
underspent EA HIPs resources. We've been on the margins but fortunately we have
been able to transfer these bits" (PW2). The fact that they have to take 'flyers' (by
starting schemes prior to receiving EA approval and hope for the best) also helps.
Similarly: "On one or two occasions we have had problems with tenders and various
procedures but by and large, we have either managed to spend all our EA HIPs or it
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has been carried forward ... If the amounts involved were substantial and if there
was regular underspend, then there would be a problem ... the difficulties would
surface the following year" (SR3). It is obvious that authorities regularly experience
difficulties: "To my knowledge, the authority has not underspent although we
certainly have adjusted the figures to make it look as if we are on schedule" (SJ4).
It helps if the financial situation is monitored closely and some forward
planning is attempted: "As the end of the financial year approaches, we have two
meetings per week to review the performance of contracts ... We do have other
proposals ready around January or February which we can use just in case. There is
then less adherence to what complies with the council's policy. More important is
what 'fits' the spend profile because it is a matter of short-term gain. Councillors
sometimes complain about this but this is the practicality of the financial system"
(SJ4). The general attitude is that little can be done to forestall these difficulties but
that dialogue helps: "These days there is more contact between authorities and ROs.
This is the only way to keep things going, especially towards the end of the financial
year. There has been a learning curve for both organisations" (SR3) and things
could certainly have been a lot worse: "The fact that we have had quite mild winters
in the last few years has helped" (SJ4).
To conclude while the case-study authorities have not underspent wildly,
problems still recur and a variety of methods have been devised to 'mop-up' the
potential underspend. The danger must be that if schemes become larger in scope as
is planned, the authorities' flexibility at the margin will be reduced and that much
more resource will be wasted.
v) The authorities' contribution and revenue costs
An important change in EA policy has been its insistence that authorities must
also subsidise schemes from their own resources. Much dismay was recorded about
this particular rule: "The contribution expected is onerous [50%] ... A high input is
necessary to achieve any sort of result in the estates but if the rule is applied more
strictly, I can see that schemes will have to be compromised. Either we'll extend the
completion dates by bringing down the size of the phases or by reducing the level of
input to something which is affordable to the council. The new emphasis on
'flagship' schemes does not seem to square with this rule, especially as councils
continue to be restrained in terms of their capital investment" (TPl), via the shrinking
capital receipts and HIPs allocations. In other words, councils will simply be unable
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to meet half of the costs of these larger initiatives. This does not appear to have been
fully considered by EA Central.
But even for the 'ordinary' schemes. strong views were recorded along the
same lines: "Our feeling can be likened to a culture shock ... we were greatly
disappointed that this was changed and we had to re-adjust our bids accordingly.
This is doubly annoying because the dwindling size of mainstream [HIPs] allocations
means that it is very difficult to support our contribution. That is part of the reason
why we have had to sell half of the estates in some of our bigger schemes. This rule
certainly acts against the generation of bigger schemes" (PW2). But at least: "The
DoE has said that a 50% contribution is the bench-mark figure ... the 50% rule is not
a rigid one and its up to the authority to decide whether it can afford it" (SR3).
Finally the opinions regarding the revenue costs associated with many EA
schemes are well summarised in the following quotation: "EA has never covered
these costs. It wants greater management presence and localisation but it does not
want to take account of local authorities' abilities to afford those increased costs. We
have been able to open two new area offices through EA. but only by splitting two
existing area offices and transferring staff. We have also had to employ extra staff
but we have somehow been able to afford the extra costs" (PW2). For others, the
fact that EA refuses to meet any resultant revenue costs: "•.. is not really a constraint
because the council had a policy of decentralising anyway so it must have felt able to
cope with the increased revenue costs" (fPl). Naturally: "This is something which
the Neighbourhood Offices must weigh up - whether the capital and revenue costs
would be self-financing in the long term" (SR3). However, EA help with such costs
would probably encourage more authorities to experiment and innovate with
alternative housing management initiatives such as decentralisation.
vi) Speculations on recent financial effects
1. On EAfinance
During the final period of research (until January 1990), a great deal of
uncertainty surrounded the extent to which the latest legislation would affect EA and
how this would be translated into interaction with local authorities: "Nobody really
knows but it seems that the DoE will give us an authority-wide annual capital guide-
line rather than being merely for housing investment. It will be made up of Basic
Credit Approvals [BeAs], capital receipts accumulated and any additional resources
will come through Special Credit Approvals [SeAs - as discussed in section 2.6.2].
We should be able to start the year knowing what is the total amount that they will
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allow us to borrow" (PW2). Another high level housing officer admits: "I have no
idea of the likely impacts of the latest Housing Bill on EA. There were rumours that
EA would be abolished because the Treasury was arguing that EA had been designed
to get authorities to think about new and alternative management initiatives and that it
had gone as far as it could go. However, EA has moved the 'goal-posts' yet again
with the introduction of the employment initiatives. The problem is that there will be
even more agencies involved and the procedures will become even more complex and
cumbersome" (SR3). This must be an issue which EA Central itself is pondering on.
One officer did have definite views about the likely effects: "Because EA
resources will come under the BCA in future, it will become more difficult to
programme with confidence. In the past we were able to programme independently
of other resources or commitments ... we have been able to develop a model and get
a pattern going on its own momentum. With the new system and the likelihood that
we will receive substantially less capital allocations, the whole thing is back in the
melting pot. Even if we receive EA allocations, the whole process will be much
more subject to political involvement and decisions" ([PI). The main point to come
out of the interviews was the vagueness and uncertainty despite the fact that SCAs
and BCAs were about to be introduced.
2. On EA's timetable
Uncertainty about the changes has also resulted in confusion about the likely
impacts on the timetable - a key element behind the current implementation
difficulties. One interviewee felt that: "SCAs will force future EA schemes to comply
with within-year spend. The emphasis will be on bidding for schemes small enough
to be completed within the year. Any schemes which involve longer timescales will
fall into the BCAs ... So large scale 'enterprise' schemes will have to be broken into
small phases" (TPI). This would also work to make EA's emphasis on enterprise
schemes dubious but more positive consequences were also envisaged: "It should
result in a less tight timetable as well as greater scope to plan the initiatives although
problems will remain." (PW2). A further advantage foreseen in contradiction to the
above (and which underlines the obvious uncertainty), is that: "Under the new
system, the SCAs don't have to be done on an annual basis. If EA was to come
under the SCA system, an allocation could be made over two or three years. Such a
system would be a lot better" (SR3).
Other views about the likely future impact include the belief that: "Next year
will be EA's test. It may well fold if the enterprise initiative does not work" (SR3);
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and another authority felt that: "The government will try anything to undermine local
authority control and it is likely that these [topsliced] financial systems will continue
to exist. EA may not last much longer but targeting will continue under another
banner" (TP1). What is beyond doubt, is that authorities are very unsure about how
the changes will affect their relationship with EA. This is particularly disturbing
because the new financial regime was then due to come into effect three months
hence. The changes are likely to result in turbulence and yet more underallocation
and underspending under the EA programme.
3.EA in context of recent housing legislation
Suspicions about the government's 'true' motives via EA and its implications
for centre-local relations resurface time and again: "EA is a mechanism whereby
Government can reduce total expenditure. It can argue that it is not cutting resources
- it is 'targeting' them, but this also removes control from local authorities. While
targeting does put resources where they are needed, these are channelled to those
areas which the government sees as requiring them" (PW2).
EA is additionally regarded as being part of a chaotic but purposeful housing
strategy: "EA is about greater control. It is not part of a central government strategy
designed in steps and stages. Government housing policy has come together almost
by chance. In this sense, EA accidently fits very well with the Housing Act, 1988
which is the clearest expression of government's housing ideology" (LJ/SR3). This
quotation refers to the recent housing legislation discussed in section 2.6 which
argues that the government may now have 'de-municipalisation' in mind. A more
directly critical view is that: "I can't imagine that council housing is being helped in
any way by EA. It ... is improving those estates that don't have a 'cat in hell's'
chance of being renovated, but EA can also be seen as a central government con.
There may be a hidden agenda such as to try to bump-up the 'right to buy'. We
always expected the information we provide via EA to be used by the DoE for other
purposes, such as to help in the designation of HATs" (DP/MW1). Deep suspicions
continue after five years and stem from a complete absence of consultation at the
preliminary stages of the initiative (as identified in section 4.7).
4. Change in emphasis: employment and 'enterprise' initiatives
There were unanimously favourable opinions about the concept of stimulating
employment and training opportunities in housing estates: "It represents a recognition
that ... the factors which contribute to well-being are broader than the dwellings
themselves and include socio-economic factors ... I do not think anyone can quibble
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with the the principle" (PW2). Likewise: "The basic concept cannot be criticised -
simply upgrading the dwellings and environment is not enough. That is merely the
tip of the iceberg and we must consider the wider socio-economic issues." (SR3).
Such views augur well for they fit snugly with those expressed by both EA
Central and the ROs (section 7.4), but they also point to what some suspect the
government may have been hoping for: "The problem arises if gaps are left between
the good estates and the 'flagship' estates. There is a potential for even greater
physical deprivation to occur. Herein lies the link with the Housing Act, 1988. If
councils do not sort these out, the tenants in the intermediary estates will simply buy
their own properties or get themselves a different landlord. The government did have
a clear strategy in mind for council housing. In the beginning there were calls for a
need to restrain public expenditure; then cuts in HIPs; then the 'right to buy'. Shelter
is a basic need and the government could not overtly and speedily attack it as it would
not have been politically acceptable. Nowadays they just build upon the councils'
poor image and let them take the blame." (PW2). Such deep-felt fear and mistrust of
government policy and where EA fits into that, is widespread among the housing
officers interviewed at all levels of the hierarchy.
The second issue relates to whether authorities feel that such an emphasis on
enterprise schemes is viable. The qualified optimists suggest that: "It is workable. I
do not see any reason why we cannot work with the various other local and central
departments if there is support for it at the highest levels of the authority" (SL4) and
secondly, that: "I suspect it will not be too difficult to get these up and running but
the failure rates will be high" (DP/MWl). The others did anticipate problems in
implementing 'flagship' schemes: "The mechanics of the idea have not been thought
through properly, such as how to combine the employment and training elements
with the capital works issues ... Its good if you can set up some shops on these
estates thus providing the opportunity for some training but what happens when the
scheme is completed? What about their wages and conditions? There are a number
of other problems such as the number of agents involved, the various council
departments as well as the civil service. There will be an additional layer of
bureaucracy" (U/SR3).
It is clear from this research that effective interaction between EA, the ROs, the
local authorities and the tenants is difficult enough to generate. To introduce
additional institutions (such as the Training and Enterprise Councils) and central
departments (such as the Department of Employment and the Department of
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Education and Science), will be an extremely difficult undertaking which will require
exceptional goodwill and co-operation on all sides and at all levels. Unfortunately
these organisation tend to be known less for their collaboration and more for their
intense desire to protect their policy 'turf.
A host of other factors bearing upon the success or otherwise, of the new
emphasis can be identified: "EA is going to be hoist by its own petard. Its timetable
and spending arrangements are far from perfect but authorities move their sums
around and make the thing work. However, if we are talking about large sums such
as £3m or more, if one does not get the whole scheme right, it can result in very
serious problems indeed ... The crucial point is whether authorities will be prepared
to risk so much if there are no guarantees of funding or of continuation funding.
Larger, complicated bids will only be submitted if the authority is certain of the value
of the initiative and that it will fund the initiative from mainstream HIPs if EA was to
reject them" (LJ/SR3). Nevertheless recognising a need to become involved in
issues other than housing is an important first step, but one which brings an
awareness that there are even wider considerations which should be addressed more
fully than has been the case thus far.
5. EA's prospective medium-term
Some interviewees were optimistic, if somewhat cynical about the future of the
initiative: "EA is going to be around for a while because of the element of central
control it gives the government and because it has had some success. It represents a
very obvious return on the government's investment. When the DoE takes the
ministers around the estates and shows them the effects, it is easy for ministers to be
impressed and thus to want to keep supporting EA" (SL4). In an analogous vein:
"Let's face it, ministers are only interested in those things which they can be
associated with and can present to the press and public. That is exactly what these
'flagship' schemes are about. That is the way its [EA] going in the future and thus
will survive a bit longer" (PW2).
In terms of government policy, EA can be seen in a interesting way: "Coercion
on the part of the government is one of the important reasons why HATs have been
unsuccessful. EA's emphasis of flagship initiatives will have exactly the same effect
_it will concentrate resources and deal with the wider socio-economic issues as
HATs were envisaged to. The difference is that it will not be as intrusive and
coercive" (PW2). Inevitably there is another view which springs from aconviction
that EA has not fully met government objectives (as suggested in chapter 6): "At
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some point the Treasury is going to ask ifEA is good value for money and it will 'get
the chop' because housing as an issue has gone 'off the boil' in governmental terms,
as witnessed in the last election. Unfortunately, housing was not much discussed in
either the Labour or Conservative manifestos" (DP/MWl). This echoes the civil
servants' views (section 7.4.3) in fearing that central government's concern is
rapidly drifting away from housing. The latest information is that with the arrival of
Michael Heseltine at the DoE, the EA initiative has been given a further boost.
8.6 .Policy effectiveness: the results of partnership
It was argued earlier in the chapter that it is not sufficient to analyse EA in terms
of the official's (and to a lesser extent, tenants') views on the effectiveness of EA
schemes in their authorities. One must also analyse the effectiveness of EA's
procedures and financial mechanisms. This chapter has now done so, however, it
remains to draw out the degree to which EA had been influential to local housing
authorities in wider, policy respects. Accordingly a variety of issues are discussed to
ascertain the ways in which involvement with EA may have had 'knock-on' effects in
terms of the authorities' attitudes to housing management, difficult-to-let estates and
general housing policy.
The discussion begins by assessing just how important EA HIPs resources
have become to local authorities; goes on to discuss the extent to which EA has
helped achieve stated government policy for housing authorities; how much council
attitudes to difficult-to-let estates have changed; why the government has been so
keen on creating other specific schemes similar to EA; and whether, thorough the EA
programme housing aid is really targeted at the areas most in need of them.
i) Impact of EA resources: collaboration and significance
All authorities made it abundantly clear that resources figured prominently in
their relationship with EA: "Our HIPs allocation was very low and the authority was
not earning very much out of capital receipts so the idea was to obtain additional
resources in order to fulfil our own policies. EA was always seen as an additional
source of funding" (LJ/SR3). Housing executives in two other authorities aired
similar views but the next quotation illustrates EA's importance in a wider context:
"In our case it was both the fact that additional resources were available and the fact
that we were trying to develop a 'package' for our estates. EA provided us with a
vehicle to push forward with our plans. OUf own housing investment was
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decreasing so we were seeking to obtain additional finance to keep our management
impetus going." (DP/MWl)
When asked whether it was the resources that had convinced firstly, the
Housing Department and secondly, the local politicians to become involved in EA,
one authority contained itself to stating: "Yes on both counts" (SU). Others
preferred to expand on their initial attitudes to EA: "In the early days of UHRU, there
was a view among local authorities that its primary purpose was to privatise estates.
In some ways, our proposal was to test the DoE and to see if they were serious about
renovating estates, as opposed to selling them off ... We are a small, pragmatic
Labour council. If someone offers cash which will benefit the tenants we will go for
it" (PW2). A parallel view was that: "Councillors didn't need much convincing.
They saw it as another pot they could dip into ... there was no disagreement between
Labour and the Liberals over the desirability of estate based management ... we were
lucky that we had already begun to decentralise ... Our members never saw it as
anything more than an additional source of cash. We've had an element of
decentralisation to our [EA] schemes but this has been coincidental in that this is what
the authority was trying to do anyway" (U/SR3).
, EA's significance to authorities cannot be overstated - the value of EA HIPs as
a proportion of mainstream HIPs (excluding capital receipts), ranged from 20% to
about 160%. The following quotation suffices in demonstrating the increasing
importance of EA HIPs: "Absolutely crucial! In the first year the value of EA HIPs
was £4.5ni which is equivalent to 25% of the HIPs. This year we expect to receive
50% of our investment from this source [1989-90: £4.5m EA HIPs / £8.17m HIPs].
This excludes a further £9m in capital receipts, which would mean that EA HIPs
constitutes approximately a quarter of all the potential capital investment" (PW2).
The other issue of course, is that it also concentrates resources: "We would not have
had the cash to put into these estates and certainly not at the same level. If we had
gone ahead on our own, the estates would not have looked very different or special
because of the usual conflict over resources. The advantage of the EA system is that
its resources are sacrosanct to that particular project" (TP1). Further advantages are
clearly that such funding is scheme-specific andfree of the usual political conflicts.
An issue worth further investigation is the extent to which EA involvement has
skewed investment in favour of certain areas or estates. One officer insists that: "The
proportion of capital resource spent on such estates has not swung towards difficult-
to-let estates. The bulk of the investment is going to post-WWl properties which are
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highly desirable and much sought-after" (DP/MWl) but the majority did feel that:
"The proportion has to have increased ..., however, this is due to the way problems
have arisen rather than because of EA itself. If we had the same real levels of
funding as in 1979, then the proportion going into such areas would have been the
same" (PW2). The fourth case-study with its particular background, does indicate
that now: "A much greater proportion of resources go to these estates" (SL4). When
all the 'ifs' and 'buts' are removed, it must be the case that more investment (as a
proportion) is now finding its way into these sections of council housing. That is
without doubt part of what EA was supposed to achieve.
ii) EA's impact in achieving government policy
1. The clarity ofEA's policystatement
This section tries to gauge the degree to which EA's objectives were clear to
local authorities when it was launched. Two interviewees indicated that they were
very uncertain: "Not many people claim to know what EA was exactly about. There
was a belief that it was about selling estates. It has not turned out that way. In the
first year, it was fishing about for schemes to spend on" (PW2), and also: "There
was quite a lot of ambiguity surrounding EA. We didn't quite appreciate how it fitted
into their [Conservatives'] policy to de-municipalisation. While it was seen as
another form of central control, it was not recognised in its wider context. It has
become another instrument of fulfilling Tory ideology. The Treasury has now forced
them [EA] to move forward with sales and disposals and to begin to achieve what it
is supposed to be about" (LJ/SR3). A third authority did not experience difficulties
over the clarity of the policy but acknowledges its debt to other organisations: "The
philosophy has been quite clear - their approach has varied according to the differing
circumstances, as they had stated. Things have been facilitated by the back-up we
have had in particular from PEP and our Regional Office which have been very
supportive" (SIA). Not all authorities flounder in confusion but a little 'steering'
helps, particularly where the concepts are untried.
2. Influencing attitudes to thevalue ofmanagement
Three authorities were concerned to make the point that in their case, an
emphasis on management had already begun to occur independently of EA. Where
EA has been positive is in extending the process: "EA has enabled us to decentralise
even further ... What is important is that it has given us the financial opportunity to
pursue our plans and policies" (PW2). The fourth authority also acknowledges EA's
positive influence in this respect: "EA has been a strong incentive for us ... The
principle of decentralisation had been debated but it is the availability of resources
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that actually makes you get on with it. Because the scheme has been successful and
promoted tenant consultation, the point has been made to both officers and councilors
that tenant involvement can be made to work successfully." (PIA). The EA Unit has
been useful in this respect and not purely in facilitating matters financially.
3. Influencing thepredisposition toprivate sector involvement
It is significant to note that no single officer now expresses vehement
opposition to the principle of private sector involvement and disposal of council
housing or land. An attitude of pragmatism seems to have developed as exemplified
by one of the Labour-controlled authorities: "We do not plan to dispose of our stock.
That is basically against the members' view but we have been pragmatic. The units
which we have sold have been genuinely surplus to our needs. Except for 43 units,
all have been family flats, the least popular and least in demand by our tenants. We
do this as a last resort" (SL2), and manage to obtain significant EA backing as a
bonus. The SDP/Liberal controlled council made a point of stressing that it had been
pursuing this option independently of EA: "... private sector involvement has been
going on for some time, prior even to the change in balance of local political control
towards the Liberals ... As councils are pressed [financially], this is an option which
we had to explore. We are currently negotiating the transfer of a set of empty
dwellings to Housing Associations." (LJ/SR3)
But an awareness that such deals are much harder to organise than expected is
reinforced by the authority that on the face of it, would be the most likely to pursue
this option to the fullest: "Our experience has demonstrated how difficult it is to try to
involve the private sector. Even the DoE has accepted that this has failed. The
market is flat and its very difficult to get it going. Nothing works" (SIA). He is not
the only person have arrived at this conclusion (see comment in section 7.4.3 about
Sir George Young's disappointment with the lack of progress with privatisation).
4. Undermining council housing policy?
The themes of 'pragmatism and realism' recur in authorities' responses
regarding whether EA involvement erodes or enhances wider housing policy. On
one hand there is the belief that: "EA does not undermine our housing programme at
all, in the sense that we have not been forced to do anything which we did not want
to ... We have not had to compromise except to an insignificant extent." (U/SR3).
Others were less enthusiastic: "It may mean that we invest in areas which are not our
own highest priorities. We face the choice of either doing something ornothing at
all, since we will not obtain borrowing approval. EA may not be achieving its aim of
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targeting resources onto the worst estates but this is be academic since estates suffer
from different things anyway" (DP/MWI). This underpins the observations obtained
in the survey about resources not necessarily being used where authorities, given the
choice, would have invested them (section 5.6ii).
The 'love/hate' relationship between authorities of all types and EA is neatly
encapsulated by the following quotation: "If we had not had EA moneys we would
have had to continue with properties which were unpopular, standing empty or not
meeting housing need .oo Refurbishing those units means that we have retained
income for the city as a whole, through rents and rates. There have also been spill-
over effects. These developments have helped bring-up the whole area by pulling in
additional housing investment together with other things such as office development.
However, it must be stated that if we had had equivalent resources in basic HIPs, we
would have done exactly the same thing oo. These were all developments which the
council was prepared to undertake prior to the creation of UHRU" (PW2). The
above two paragraphs illustrate EA's difficult position. Authorities do not give it
credit for positive developments because most believe that these developments would
have occurred anyway; would have been done elsewhere; or would have been
undertaken more effectively without EA involvement.
In all the case-studies there was the impression that authorities tolerate EA:
"There is no doubt that EA has helped to deliver what the tenants want in particular
estates. If we had sufficient resource we would have done the whole of the areas.
As it is, we now have to sell about 50% of the estates to meet our contributions. On
the other hand, without EA we may well have had to sell them entirely!" (PW2) But
to conclude, there seems to be a threshold beyond which the advantages of
partnership may evaporate: "Overall, EA has been positive in our estates in terms of
the environmental issues and the facilities ... because it has created more housing
finance and helped get additional works done. However, now that authorities have
to contribute a proportion of the allocation from their own HIPs, our relationship
with EA must be reappraised. If our top priorities are compromised or delayed while
we must also contribute financially, then this is a penalty and a judgement must be
made about whether it is worthwhile continuing to participate in EA" (DP/MWI).
There also remains the feeling that: "There is an element of tokenism about it. It can
attract attention away from the housing under-investment which is apparent in all
sectors of the [housing] stock." (SlA)
5. Overall effect onauthorities
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In terms of an authority-wide perspective on EA, there is common agreement
that it has been positive overall: "Many of our tenants are now living in improved
dwellings and environments. It has halted the slide into the trough and even helped
reverse the decline of certain areas ... Both the security and the image of the places
have also improved" (NS1). Moreover: "We have been able to refurbish estates
which we would not otherwise have been able to and it has allowed us to do the
things which we'd never had the money for before, such as establishing two
additional area offices" (PW2). Lastly there is the view that: "The experience ..• has
been obviously constructive because the authority has been able to capitalise on EA
funding ... Obviously, it has also allowed improvements to the houses, the
environment and established local management facilities" (S04).
But there are also perspectives about the negative side of involvement with EA.
At one extreme there is the following opinion: "There has been little that I consider
negative other than that there is not enough of it [EA HIPs]. There are all sorts of
other works which are necessary and EA involvement does not necessarily result in
the comprehensive improvement of the area or estate" (S04). The intermediate level
ofcriticism is: "We need to get away from the annual financial cycle, EA is becoming
more tight-fisted over time and environmental issues are now being neglected"
(NS1), and at the most extreme level, there is a sustained critique about the price of
EA involvement: "It is yet another way for central government to control local
authorities. It is not actually providing more resources on a national scale. It merely
redistributes them. It has been very advantageous to us, but not overall. EA is
administratively cumbersome and bureaucratic, it does not reflect the need for
housing investment, it is a way for the government to promote its own views and
ideology and it is also concentrating resources in order to dangle the carrot of the
'right to buy' and 'Pick a Landlord'. Its another instrument aimed at breaking-up
'monolithic' council estates and its main advantage to central government is the
element of control which it presents" (SR3). No doubt many councils can identify
experiences which relate to the last quotation but the (somewhat reluctant) general
opinion, is that EA has been beneficial to the authorities, estates and the residents.
The results of this thesis certainly uphold such a conclusion.
6. Impactofschemes and replicability
Despite the confident assertion that the schemes are having propitious impacts
on the ground, only one authority actually had instituted any sort of systematic
evaluative process to assess the impact of the schemes: "Capita are involved in
evaluating the schemes ... [and] Harris have been commissioned to conduct a
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'snapshot' study of the estate. We are also independently monitoring the estate and
collecting 'soft' data" (SL4). Two other authorities were concerned to emphasise
that: "We are very pleased with the results ... The residents are also happy but at the
end of the day, they are ourown schemes" (PW2, Original Emphasis); and similarly:
"EA-funded schemes are no different to the others in our authority. They are just an
extension of our capital programme" (PL4). Another point is that: "The other big
problem for the authority is now going to be how to keep the momentum going or
even how to maintain the improvements because otherwise, with the capital
constraints the estates will regress once again" (DP/MWl). There are no grounds for
complacency regarding EA's achievements. It is not certain that resources will be
available to maintain the gains.
One authority down-plays the discussion of whether it had plans to build upon
the experience of the EA-funded model for the rest of the stock: "The authority is
building upon its own experience of decentralisation, not upon anything which EA
has taught us" (LJ/SR3). Another did have plans to replicate certain aspects: "The
only things we have undertaken which were different or novel, as opposed to things
which we were trying anyway, were environmental improvements ... whether these
will be built-upon and used elsewhere, ... is difficult to say because there will always
be different situations and estates with different layouts" (DP/MWl). However,
another authority did see much merit in copying the estate based management model:
"Yes, we are using essentially the same model. We are also trying to tease out the
lessons with which to develop the most appropriate style of management" (SlA). So
EA has also had a degree of influence in this respect. Some authorities are now
confident and willing enough to attempt some of the schemes on their own.
iii) Changing attitudes to 'difficult' estates
It has been argued that part of the rationale for conceiving the EA project was
the fact that the DoE did not feel that sufficient investment was flowing into certain
estates and hence, that there was a need for a 'targeting' mechanism (chapter 4.3iii).
One authority agreed partially with such a DoE assessment: "Yes they have [been
neglected], but only because there was a lack of resources. The [councilors']
priorities were such that virtually all the allocation went on private sector housing"
(SL4). This points to what all the others also perceive to be at the base of the
problem, namely lack of capital.
The other three authorities rejected vigorously the notion that 'problem' estates
were previously neglected and chose to attack central government policy instead:
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"The council spent an incredible amount on maintaining the property. The problem is
that it could not keep pace with the investment that was required. This is because of
the capital constraints which central government has imposed upon councils. EA has
not affected our attitudes - it has just released resources. The government has
develop all sorts of other schemes on similar principles which we cannot afford to
ignore" (DP/MWl). One must expect these DoE schemes, such as the Private Sector
Renewal and Homeless Initiatives, to also demonstrate some of the problems (and
advantages) discussed with respect to EA. Another interviewee stresses that it is
quite wrong for the Government to blame Housing Departments: "The problems
associated with these estates are not necessarily related to housing. They have wider
socio-economic connotations and the DoE cannot argue that we did not put cash into
these estates. The problems were then not identifiable to such an extent. We were
targeting cash to these areas but it wasn't enough to do what was necessary. We
were also squeezed by the cuts in revenue and the change in demand for houses [as
opposed to flats]" (PW2).
Naturally different opinions exist regarding whether the initiative (and its
objectives and principles) has influenced their stance and behaviour towards
'difficult' estates. Two authorities are in agreement that: "EA has not greatly
modified our attitudes to our estates primarily because they were fairly similar
anyway, such as an emphasis on the environment" (DP/MWI). One officer is clear
about the value of EA in influencing his authority: "The councilors have seen the
benefit of a comprehensive package instead of just capital works, such as security
and environmental works" (SL4), but the larger authorities were convinced that:
"We've already done all that EA proposes and we would have done it more
comprehensively if more cash had been provided for authorities" (DP/MWl). Such
views are largely supported in another case-study authority: "The council had
various aims regarding housing management. It simply lacked the cash to do those
things" (PW2). But the smallest authority viewed this issue as one of the advantages
of the initiative: "EA has very definitely forced 'problem' estates, management and
new housing management initiatives into the authority's agenda" (SIA), which must
be regarded positively.
iv) Focussing resources to where they are most needed?
1.The popularity of targeting: central control?
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Suspicions abound as regards the DoE's keenness to target a greater proportion
of capital allocations: "Apart from the underlying political motives, it is an attempt to
undermine the public rented stock. Nobody would consider buying our estates until
we have carried out the EA-funded types of work" (fPl). Another view much in
currency is that: "This is all to do with control and centralisation. Many powerful
central mechanisms have now been removed [ego various housing subsidies]. EA is
one means of attempting to bring that back and to reassert central control" (PW2).
There is also the opinion that targeting is all about tokenism along with control:
"The government must maintain political credibility and if these [schemes] work, it
can say that it is doing something [about those Inner Cities]. On the other hand, if
authorities do not respond, central government can always argue that it is the
authorities' fault. In principle EA is a laudable idea ... [but] The government is
trying to give the impression that it is doing something, whereas it is actually offering
'small beer' ... EA is part of an approach to target resources into specific areas.
However, the question is whether it is intended just to 'do up' estates or whether it is
to 'set them up' by making them more financially attractive for third parties and for
tenants to exercise their latest powers ... via EA, the government is dictating to us
what we can spend our capital resources on" (SR3). A whole gamut of fears are
expressed in the quotation above and one officer also retorted, regarding EA's
primary focus: "I firmly believe that EA exists because it allows the government to
decide which authorities and which schemes get resources, as well as how much and
how it should be spent. If you do not 'play ball', you lose resources. Its all about
central government wanting to control what councils do and how they do itl"
(DP/MWl, Original Emphasis). There is little need to elaborate on these points.
Positive views also exists as to the government's concern with targeted
resources: "Everyone suffers from reduced resources but it provides the incentive for
most councils to actually do something. If it wasn't for this method, they would
simply carry on as they have done for years and years" (SJ4). A very high degree of
consensus does exits, regardless of political background, about the main reason why
EA's resources have been increasing in the recent past and what the government is
hoping to achieve through EA. The key question is whether EA is motivated mainly
by political or managerial considerations. There are as many views as there are case-
studies. None is particularly complimentary to EA:
• the 'conspiracy' view: ilEA resources are simply increasing because the scheme
allows them [central government] to target capital funds to where they want them to
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go. It takes discretion away from authorities and enables central government to
manipulate things and pick and choose the authorities, towns, estates and schemes
they like." (DP/MWl);
• the 'Cynical' view regarding EA as a whole: "EA is part of the move towards
targeting resources to specific areas and no doubt the government hopes that either
tenants or other landlords will want to take-over the properties once the estates have
been improved to a satisfactory condition ... its underpined by a belief that local
government should not be left to make-up its mind about local issues" (U/SR3).
• the 'symbolic' view: "The basic HIPs allocations are being cut. The government
has realised that it cannot go much further without a major political outcry. By
'topslicing' and 'targeting', it can spend resources in ways which meet the
government's own criteria. and it is a means of increasing central controls over local
expenditure in a subtle way. It basically results in a step backwards to the pre-HIPs
system of project control, where the government decides which individual schemes
are approved" (PW2); and finally
• the 'Yes, but' view regarding the schemes: "It is fair to say that it gives the
government more control over what is going on. However, the schemes have been
quite successful, therefore, EA is having an impact and is value for money" (SIA).
All agree that centralisation does occur, although they stress different elements.
2. Outcome ofuse oftargeting
It has already been argued that it is not always the estates in greatest need or the
councils' highest priorities which are subject to EA bids and funding (section 5.6ii).
Such a position is supported by the experience in the case-studies: "As an estimate
none of our EA schemes could be considered to be in our worst 20% of the housing
stock, except for two. Our very worst stock has been left aside because it would
need very substantial investment on its structure and we know that we wouldn't get
approval for those buildings" (LJ/SR3). In a perfect world: "It would be even better
if we had more control over the way that resources are targeted. However, given the
under-investment in public sector housing, targeting resources to the worst areas is
better than not targeting them." (SIA). This highlights a weakness (and a strength)
in the targeting system: "We have to juggle between letting some estates sink
completely or do a bit for all the estates. In one case, without substantial EA
funding, we probably would have sold the lot or demolished and sold the vacant plot
..• Therefore, EA has produced effective targeting on ENs criteria but it may be
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concentrating resources too narrowly since there are too few overall resources"
(PW2). A last authority with only two problem estates stated: "Its always our worst
estates that get EA HIPs" (SL4), implying that targeting works as optimally intended.
A slightly different but revealing line of criticism, is offered by the second case-
study: "Authorities do not need to be told about how to target resources. Ministers
have recognised that there are special problems but there is then a question of what is
perceived as being the priority. We started a programme to deal with central heating.
That was identified as being a priority but the DoE ignores the fact that we were
targeting resources to where our tenants saw a problem. We targeted the estates that
are now EA-supported before EA even existed ... Their view of 'effective' is only if
the scheme fits their criteria. Why shouldn't local authorities do what their tenants
want, as opposed to conforming to national objectives?" (PW2) A word of warning
is timely for those who disapprove of the concept: "The latest housing finance Act
has important consequences ... which mean that the authority will come to rely even
more on targeted allocations" (SJ4). All sorts of targeted initiatives now exist and the
amount of this type of resource is, therefore, also increasing.
3. Are resources really focussed to where theyaremostneeded?
When phrased in such a way, a more positive response is forthcoming from
those interviewed: "The estates which have received EA funding are the ones which
would have been high in our priorities but I cannot in all honesty say that they are
necessarily those which we, as a housing authority, would have chosen if we had a
choice ... In the first year the bids made were for schemes ... [which] definitely
aligned themselves closely to EA criteria, such as those which had local
management" (SR3), but this was not necessarily the case with subsequent bids.
Other positive opinions were also obtained: "By and large, these are the estates
which were in greatest need ... In future the bids will begin to reflect a need for
balance or fairness across the city. This may not necessarily be the same as the
neediest estates." (TPl). Also: "The more targeted it is the more it focuses views
because officers know that if they are not spot-on, they will not obtain extra
resources. EA has been a phenomenal success in this authority in terms of tenant
involvement, the appearance and management of the estate" (8J4). A further
comment from the same authority illustrates how useful the notion of targeting
mechanisms can be: "The point is that this housing problem had been known for
quite a while ... people were aware of the structural and social problems. The only
thing that was missing was the political will to meet the requirements which dealing
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with such estates would pose ... Since most of the councillors were Conservative
[whereas the bulk of the resources would be directed at the Labour-controlled estate],
they wanted to show the electorate that the cash was being spent evenly, not just on
the worst estates" (SJ4). Herein lies a further advantage of targeting - in this
particular case, as a way around the political impasse. At their best, instruments for
spatial targeting can be very useful tools.
8.7 Conclusions
Chapter 8 completes the empirical part of the thesis. This chapter has
concentrated on analysing the effectiveness of the EA initiative at the micro level by
using case-studies and semi-structured interviews with key local authority officials.
Effectiveness was defined in terms of both quantitative information (such as
procedural, financial and housing management statistics) and qualitative evidence
(effectiveness of the procedures, the financial mechanism and EA's impact in
influencing housing policy).
The chapter began by describing the four case-studies (estate based
management, concierge, refurbishment and public/private sector schemes) in terms of
the history of the estates and the EA elements, so as to provide important background
for the subsequent discussion. All were estates in need of substantial investment
from the environmental, physical fabric and housing management viewpoints.
Section 8.3 started to grapple with the notion of effectiveness by dealing with
the quantifiable side of the question. There is a dearth of statistical information on
EA schemes but an attempt to compile financial and procedural details on the four
schemes revealed that there is very poor record keeping on the part of both the local
authorities (many of the EA application forms were missing) and the Regional
Offices (some standard application forms were sometimes not requested). The data
that are available back the findings of the local authority survey that delays were
endemic and that this affected the procedural and financial operation of the initiative,
certainly in the first years of EA's operation. This has subsequently improved.
Only two authorities had actually collated housing management statistics for the
schemes but the results (albeit subject to caveats) demonstrate that EA resources and
schemes are having a considerable impact. This result is in line with earlier survey
findings (Table 5.24). All the housing officers who were approached for their
opinions about the developments which have occurred in the four estates find that the
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improvements are noteworthy. Some reference was also made to a rudimentary
attempt to canvass the opinion of the residents themselves (Appendix 7). All the
schemesreceivedvery positiveratings by the residents in terms of the effects on the
environment, the changes to the inside and outside of their dwellings and the
contributionof the new management arrangements. The overall conclusion at this
stage was that pronounced improvements were occurringin the four estates but that
the discussion of EA effectiveness had to be extended further. Three other
dimensions of 'effectiveness' were then analysed.
Section 8.4 moved to a discussion of the 'procedural' effectiveness or the
degree to which EA's procedures can be considered to workas well as possible. The
conclusionswere mixed. It was always the HousingDepartments that assumed the
'lead' role in interacting with EA but the other departments have generally beenvery
supportive andresponsive. Regarding the timetabling arrangements, most authorities
agreed with the EA Central and Regional Officeclaims that it was gettingbetterbut
maintained that there is still room for improvement (see the concludingchapter for
some recommendations). Local authorities still argued that the EA administrative
burden was onerous, that the application forms could be streamlined and
amalgamated and thatEA'scriteria for selecting bids submitted was stillvague.
All the local authorities argued that their tenant consultationexercises for the
case-studies were conductedrigourously but that this occurred irrespectiveof EA.
Even if this is true, it is likely to characterise only the first year of EA's existence
because the bids submitted were essentially the authorities' most long-standing
housing problemswhichalso tended to be focused on the better-researched housing
estates. Tenantconsultation is unlikely to havebeen as effective with the subsequent
bids because of the limited time available to prepare bids. This has ensured that
effective tenantconsultation remains a problem. EA's influencein shapinghousing
schemes ranged from nil to estate visits - it was the Regional Offices which were
much more influential in determining the nature of EA bids. Lastly the Committee
Stage, the preparation of tender documentation for EA schemes and the staffing,
union and employment issues relating to EA were minor for the case-studies and
most authorities have sought to 'capitalise' upon the EA programme, but only where
the schemes proposedconformedto their housingpolicies. There is some doubt as
to whetherthis would necessarily be the case in the future.
Section9.5 analysed the issue of 'financial' effectiveness or the extent to which
the EA HIPs targeting mechanism operated well. In contradiction to the Treasury's
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argument that they represent additional funds, all those interviewed argued that EA
HIPs was topsliced or recycled. Nevertheless, the conflict hinges on how far one
considers that the 'old' money would have been available to local authorities without
EA. It is unlikely that the authorities participating in the EA initiative would have
received the same levels of housing allocation without the existence of the
programme. Turning next to the notion of 'continuation funding', while this
procedure may enable EA to circumvent its one year financial timescale (thus
enabling it to fund longer scale projects), it was still regarded locally as being
cumbersome and restrictive. Despite the decentralisation of responsibilities from EA
Central to the Regional Offices, delays in processing forms remained common and as
a result, some authorities continue to underspend and/or have to renegotiate tender
agreements with contractors. Even though this has improved substantially since
EA's first year when £5m in EA HIPs allocations were lost, this is remains a
worrying inefficiency.
In addition local authorities complained that the 50% contribution to EA
schemes which is expected of them is too onerous, that it will work against EA's
new emphasis on large enterprise schemes (since authorities will have difficulties in
meeting their half) and that it would be a great advance if EA could find a way of
subsidising the increased revenue costs which are implicit in the new management
practices encouraged by EA Central. A great deal of uncertainty surrounds the
introduction of the latest Local Government and Housing Act and its financial
implications for the operation of the initiative. No one knew whether it would
improve EA's financial effectiveness, but then neither did EA Central nor the
Regional Offices. Local authorities are still suspicious of the government's 'true'
reasons for creating targeted housing programmes, however, the new emphasis on
employment is welcomed in all the case-studies and most of the local officials are
optimistic that EA will be around for a few years more, which is mu~h longer than
such initiatives normally last for.
The chapter then analysed EA's 'policy' effectiveness or the extent to which the
existence of the EA programme has had other,less direct but nevertheless, important
policy impacts upon local authorities, such as influencing their attitudes to the
importance of localised management, difficult-to-ler estates and so on. One of the
conclusions is that the authorities' main reason for being involved with EA continues
to be the possibility of acquiring additional housing resources at a time of severe
fiscal retrenchment. Also as EA HIPs have increased over time, so have these
targeted resources come to become critical to local authorities' ability to maintain their
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housing programmes. EA HIPs now constitute between 20-160% of authorities'
HIPs allocations. The advantages identified are that targeting results in the
concentration of resources, funds are 'ear-marked' for specific projects and are thus
freed from the usual local political conflicts and finally, much more resource is now
directed at problem housing estates.
Most authorities contend that decentralisation of management practices was
occurring independently of EA but that the programme has enabled them to go even
further by releasing resources. One case-study did find that the benefits of estate
based management had been debated but that it would not have happened for
financial and the political reasons. Significantly, none of the case-studies reject the
option of privatisation out of hand. All are now quite pragmatic about this issue and
accept that this is a strategy that may have to be employed in times of retrenchment,
although the ones that have dabbled with the principle conclude that privatisation is
very hard to achieve in the type of housing estate which attracts EA support. As to
the issue of whether involvement with EA results in compromised local housing
policies, there are mixed views. The 'love/hate' relationship continues but local
authorities accept that overall, EA has been positive to their authorities. Some of
their housing estates have been refurbished, they are better managed and the quality
of the tenants' lives has improved, however, three out of four still reject the argument
that such estates were neglected in the past. Nevertheless since the creation of the EA
programme, problem estates do seem to have been accorded higher priority in the
participating authorities and more resources have undoubtedly been funneled their
direction.
All the authorities still mistrust the underlying political motives behind the
creation of targeted initiatives such as EA. There is a belief that this is often
'tokenistic' (although with its current level of resourcing, this criticism can no longer
be applied to EA) and that it inevitably results in further increases in government
control over the housing sphere. Turning lastly to the issue of targeting, it is not the
case that EA has directed resources at the very worst council housing estates, for that
would involve a change in EA policy which would enable authorities to direct
resources at the structural problems inherent in many types of housing design. It
may also be true that housing resources have been focused too narrowly and that the
setting of priorities has been removed from the local level to the national one.
Nevertheless all the case-study estates have been high priorities for the local
authorities in question, concentrated levels of resources have been directed at the
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refurbishing and management of problem estates and this funding effectively by-
passes the usual political conflicts and processes.
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Chapter 9
Synthesis, Conclusions and Future Research
9.1 Introduction
A wealth of material has been presented in the previous empirical chapters.
This was necessary because this thesis has investigated a recently established
housing programme about which very little has been written in the academic
literature. The main emphasis of the empirical chapters has been on the presentation
of the survey and interview material. The thrust of this final chapter is to synthesize
the main findings (from the local authority survey, the semi-structured interviews
with both the DoE Regional Officials and the EA Central team based in Marsham
Street and the case-study authorities) and to use them to address the five issues
introduced at the start of the thesis namely: EA and the issue of central-local relations,
the managerial implications, the implementation of EA schemes, the operation of the
financial mechanism of targeted EA HIPs and EA's impact in influencing housing
policy at the local level.
Effort is also put into discussing the implications of the findings of the thesis
for the theoretical frameworks introduced earlier in the thesis. Chapter 3 analysed
various concepts which are of relevance to an understanding of the way the EA
initiative operates: the Agency/Partner debate, the Dual State Thesis, the conception
of Local Social Development and the analysis of Sub-Central Government are all
plausible arguments in explaining the purpose, mechanisms and implementation of
EA. The findings of this thesis have implications for our understanding of those
theories and section 8.3 discusses the significance of the research in broadening our
comprehension of the applicability of such concepts. Inevitably this thesis has not
been able to cover every important aspect of the EA programme, not least because EA
has evolved since the thesis started, however, the conclusions point to other issues
which must be analysed in order to develop our understanding of this important
central housing initiative (see section 8.4).
9.2 Overall conclusions: synthesizing the evidence
The thesis has employed a mixture of methodologies in order to investigate a
housing programme of which little has been known. This has meant that as a first
stage, the origins of the initiative had to be investigated. As there was no published
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information on this issue, semi-structured interviews had to be employed and the
results are presented in chapter 4.
Discussion of EA's policy community revealed that there are three key elements
to the EA programme: the local authorities, EA Central and the DoE Regional Offices
(chapter 3). Therefore the purpose of the second stage of the research was to obtain
a through understanding of the operation of the initiative at the aggregate level. This
meant that a postal survey methodology had to be employed which could deal with a
range of issues while also reaching all the authorities which were participating in the
initiative (chapter 5). This resulted in the identification of the key areas of concern to
local authorities and the implementation, financial, central-local issues to bepursued
in the subsequent investigation (chapter 6).
The method that was considered to be most apposite at the next stage was the
use of semi-structure interviews (chapter 7). This was for two reasons. Firstly,
there were just 10 Regional Offices and only a limited number of key EA Central
personnel which had to be investigated and secondly, the survey had identified the
key issues (such as the quality of tenant consultation and the underspending of
resources) which had to be pursued on an interactive basis with those responsible for
determining EA policy. Semi-structured interviewing was a demanding and time-
consuming technique, but one which added depth and dynamism to the analysis.
The element which remained to be dealt with, was that of specific localities and
the extent to which the EA programme was having positive impacts. This was
achieved through the use of case-study research concentrating on an estate
management scheme, a concierge, a public/private sector initiative and a
refurbishment scheme (chapter 8). The use of case-studies was deemed to be the
most relevant method because it could also add the dimensions of background,
politics, history of the estates and the impact of the EA initiative on the basis of
statistical, procedural, financial and policy effectiveness criteria.
The biggest disadvantage of such a methodology, despite the detailed conclusions
provided for each empirical chapter, is that its very nature requires a synthesis of the
main issues arising from the four sources of evidence. This is the task set for the
concluding chapter and is undertaken by reference to Table 9.1 which is integral to
the analysis to foIlow. Table 9.1 refers to the five main issues posed at the start of
the thesis and presents the main conclusions by pulling out the results of the four
sources of evidence. Symbols are used for clarity and simplicity.
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Table 9.1 Overall Synthesis: conclusions according to sourceof evidence
Thesis Themes & Main Issues Postal DoE FA Case
Survey Regions Central Studies
A) Administrative/Implementation Issues
1. Quality of the timetabling +
2. Whether EA Keeps Changing Criteria + +
3. Quality of Administration ++
B) Management Issues
1. EA's Impact on Number of Schemes + + + +
2. EA's Impact in Aiding Innovation + + +
3. EA's Impact in AidingDecentralisation + ++ ++ ++
4. EA's Impact in Aiding Tenant Consultation + -/++
5. EA's Overall Impacton Management ++ ++ ++ ++
C) Financial Issues
1. Whether EA HIPs is Additional/ Topsliced ++
2. Whether EA Results in Underallocation -/+
3. Whether EA Results in Underspending
4. Problems Due to Continuation Funding ++ ++
5. Quality of EA's Targeting + ++ ++ +
D) Housing Policy Issues
1. Whether EA Results in More Investment -/+ ++ ++ ++
2. Whether Influences Management Styles 0 + ++ +
3. Degree of Replication of EA Schemes ++ ++ +
4. Impact on Run-down Estat~s ++ ++ ++ ++
5. EA's Overall Impact on Policy +/++ ++ ++ ++
E) Centre-local Relations
1. Degree of Conflict . + + -1+
2. Degree of Co-operation ++ + +
3 Degree of Privatisation + + +
4' Number of Alternatives Organisations + + +
5: EA's Impact on Local Policies/Autonomy 0 0
-I--
Code:
Very Poor (--); Poor (-); Neutral (0); Good (+); Very Good (++)
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9.2.1 Implementation issues
1. Fairly clear-cut conclusions can be reached on the implementation issues.
The evidence on the timetable, administrative issues and the changing nature of the
criteria does suggest that EA is administratively cumbersome and that the
implementation process could be improved (see Table 9.1). Confirmation of this is
obtained from the survey, the ROs and the case-studies. At the same time, the
evidence of chapters 7 and 8 also indicates that EA has been aware of the difficulties
which operate on local authorities and that there has been some attempt to adjust the
EA timetable so that it coincides more closely with that of the HIPs timetable.
Authorities argue that this has greatly improved the situation, although many remain
unhappy with it. EA Central itself maintains that the timetable is dictated by the way
the Treasury/government operates; that this is now the best possible timetable that can
beachieved; and lastly, that authorities are partly to blame for their difficulties.
2. The effect of changing EA criteria is heavily criticised by authorities in the
survey. However the changes are defended by both the ROs and EA Central who
contend that they are justified because EA in supposed to encourage 'innovation' and
as such, has be free to generate different elements. There should be no 'hard and
fast' rules. What is supported by EA is dictated by what tenants want and what is
needed in the particular estate. This suggests that the burden is on local authorities to
prove that what they wish to undertake is genuinely needed and supported by their
tenants. In addition EA has taken two important steps to clarify the situation.
Firstly, it has issued Guide-lines for EA bids which at least one of the case-study
authorities finds adequate in clarifying its queries over EA criteria. As long as
authorities are aware of these issues, the problem should diminish. Secondly, EA
has begun publish guide-lines which focus on implementation (see DoE, 1989b;
1990b and 1990c) which have proved to be very useful to authorities. This difficulty
should, therefore, become less important in the future.
3. The survey results indicate that authorities are very concerned about EA
administration, although the case-study evidence is that this has slowly improved
over time. EA has tried to 'decentralise' the administrative burden. The smaIl EA
Central team has (somewhat reluctantly) agreed that it cannot cope with so many bids
and continuation schemes. The result is that the implementation structure presented
in Figure 3.1 has changed to the one depicted in Figure 9.1, which is much more
streamlined. The Regional Offices are now in charge of virtuaIly all the
administrative elements: they prioritise the local authority bids, consult with the
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Figure 9.1: Evolution of Relationships in the EA Policy Context
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authorities, determine which schemes to fund (subject to EA Central veto), monitor
progress and finance of schemes, and are also in charge of the continuation schemes.
Two important developments to come out of the EA Central and Regional Office
interviews, are the fact that in order to reduce underspending, the Regional Offices
can overallocate their EA HIPs slice by 15% (more in the case of London); and a
Central Reserve Fund has been created which 'pools' all the EA HIPs resources
which are very likely to be underspent. This is then offered to those regions which
can spend the allocation late in the financial year before the EA HIPs is 'lost',
This new structure has arisen because the ROs now understand the EA
initiative's 'ethos', have developed a good working relationship with local authorities
and are, therefore, seen to be capable of taking on a much more comprehensive role
as regards the day to day operation of EA. This is much more satisfactory to all
concerned although local authorities stress that delays still occur and that further
improvements could be made for example, to the application Forms, the need to
prepare tender documentation and the processing of bids.
The evolution and contrasts between Figures 3.1/9.1 and 3.2/9.2 merit further
comment. Figure 3.2 represents what the literature (e.g. Houlihan, 1988) suggests
is the the overall public or social housing policy community, both in terms of the
main relationships and the key organisations. Following ENs recent change in
emphasis towards larger scale, enterprise initiatives, it would be more appropriate to
suggest that the overall policy community (certainly as far as the EA initiative in
concerned), has become more complicated. While still concentrating on housing
issues, EA has accepted the logic that housing problems cannot be considered in
isolation and that an attempt must also be made (albeit through housing initiatives) to
improve the situation in problem estates by also dealing with training and
employment issues. This means that EA must increasingly operate in an inter-
departmental manner which goes beyond the previous model of policy community.
,The argument is that as soon as the DoE goes beyond the accepted 'housing'
threshold into areas such as employment and training, it has to interact with other
departments such as the Department of Employment (and to a lesser extent, the
Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Education and Science).
With the creation of the business-led Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) now
in charge of the Youth Training and Employment Training budgets, EA and local
authorities must communicate with TEes in order to support the employment and
training initiatives, such as Community Refurbishment Schemes (CRSs). CRSs
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involve the refurbishment of housing estates using an element of local labour which
is trained as a result. This means that the EA Central team will have to liaise with the
private sector. If the CRS schemes are to be the main model of EA involvement in
these issues, then EA Central will also have to become involved with private sector
developers such as Regalian, Laing's and Wimpey's (see Pinto, 1991c and for the
Scottish equivalent see Pinto, 199Id). The other point to note in this respect is that
in principle, there is a great deal of scope for CRS type involvement. A £19bn
backlog of council housing disrepair exists alongside the highest concentrations of
unemployment in the country. However, turning back to the issue of the policy
community, while it is widely accepted that employment and training elements should
be build into EA schemes, this development also throws up potential difficulties in
implementation as it results in a widening of the EA policy community.
The overall social housing policy community was translated into the EA policy
community in Figure 3.1. Based on the implementation conclusions of the research,
however, several aspects of Figure 3.1 can be refined and transformed into Figure
9.1. Firstly, The relationship with the Housing Consultative Council and the Local
Authority Associations is very weak and ineffectual. These organisations have failed
to influence the operation of the EA programme, rather the DoE Regional Offices
have been more important in this respect (this issue is developed in section 9.3). The
relationship with the private sector renovators is not particularly strong either.
Privatisation of housing blocks or estates has not occurred to any notable extend.
The other aspect of private sector involvement has been the CRSs. However, while
there is renewed interest in this type of scheme and a lot of potential exists, after a
good start, the number of CRSs supported through EA became insignificant, mainly
due to the change-over from the Community Programme to Employment Training
(see Pinto, 199Ic). This has meant that the link with the Private Sector Renovators
has been similarly weak.
Other aspects of EA's relationships have been found to be non-existent. Both
the case-studies and the local authority survey demonstrate that very few housing
jobs have been formed or restructured as a result of new management styles such as
estate based management. This has meant that Union issues have been minimal, as
has the role of contractors/Direct Labour Organisations (see Figure 9.1), however,
this finding conflicts with Anne Powers' work on estate based management
(Personal Communication). Lastly, the only local government department that
matters is the Housing department with some involvement from Finance due to the
complexity of EA HIPs capital programming.
282
By the same token, other relationships have been intensified. The key
evolution is the demise of the role of EA Central as that of the Regional Offices has
expanded out of recognition with the decentralisation of EA Central functions, the
creation of the Central Reserve Fund and the opportunity to overcommit EA HIPs.
The Regional Offices are now in charge of all aspects of administration, liaison with
local authorities, implementation and monitoring of schemes. EA Central retains
strategic control of the EA programme. Decentralisation is a very positive
development. Apart from making for more efficient procedures, it enables the
relatively small EA Central team to concentrate on what it can do best namely, devote
its time to issues such as policy development, lobbying the Treasury for further
resources, research and co-ordination. The other area of 'intensification' is the
importance attached to tenant consultation. While there may be questions as to the
quality of tenant consultation, the importance attached to this issue by EA and its
reaffirmation via the pioneering of Estate Management Boards controlled by tenants,
means that this issue remains central to the EA programme and, therefore, crucial to
authorities wishing to participate in the programme.
The evidence presented in the empirical chapters (4 to 8) leads to a number of
possible recommendations: first, it is obvious that a key improvement would be the
creation of a mechanism which would generate more effective consultation between
the main agents, namely the local authorities, LAAs, ROs and EA Central team.
Only then would each of the key players be aware of the problems, the changes
taking place and be able to share best practice. This would help reduce the mistrust
and antipathy which has always plagued the initiative, something which becomes
absolutely essential with the recent change of emphasis towards 'enterprise'
initiatives. This necessitates effective co-ordination and co-operation between these
agencies and others besides, such as Tenants' Associations and Training and
Enterprise Councils.
Second, EA's 'rule' that local authorities should contribute 50% of the capital
costs for each scheme could be modified. While it is true that EA uses discretion in
deciding each authority's capital contribution, this may still be problematic in, for
example, discouraging authorities from bidding for large schemes and thus is likely
to work against EA's emphasis on comprehensive 'enterprise' initiatives. It would
be better if some account were taken of authorities' differing abilities to afford the
contribution. A more effective strategy would be to replace it with a sliding scale of
support with those authorities with relatively greater need and fewer resources able to
283
secure greater EA support. This would build upon and extend the notion of
'targeting' resources.
Third, EA proposes nationally conceived solutions to nationally perceived
problems. This works if the needs experienced by housing authorities happens to
fall into those slots - it is not so good otherwise. Two improvements might be to: a)
take greater account of local needs so that authorities can be a little more flexible
about the projects and works which are conceived and also, EA could be more
flexible aboutwhat it supports; and b) a willingness to moveawayfroman insistence
on 'innovation'. Depending on the context, tried and tested schemes may be even
more relevant and effective.
Fourth, EA's timetable has beendiscussed in detail and theproblems identified.
Suffice to say that with the constraints faced by EA and the fact that government
budgetsoperate annually, the bestpractical adviceis for authorities to beginplanning
and designing the EA bids/schemes long before EA invites them to do so. In terms
of using resources as effectively as possible, authorities should considerformulating
only those schemes which they are prepared to fund from mainstream capital
allocations ifEA approval is not obtained. The advantages are thatwith the certainty
of being funded, there would be much more forward planning and greater tenant
consultation. It would reduce the risk of disappointing tenants and also help
eliminate underallocation and underspending as far as possible.
Fifth, the aboveapproach wouldfacilitate other useful changes. Currently until
final approval arrives, there is a lack of certainty at the point when authorities are
ready to spend the allocation. Perhaps what is needed is a more comprehensive
Form A (this would not be a problem to authorities committed to supporting the
schemes), which would mean that whenauthorities get FormA approval, theycan be
certain of receiving EA funding. This places a greater onus upon authorities to
generate more forward planning and costing, but the DoE could then 'ear-mark' a
certain amount of resources for the scheme, basedon those detailedForm A figures.
It would be worth the extra month or so which would be necessary for the ROs to
process the forms and also result in greater certainty for all concerned. If, as EA
Central recommends, local authorities maintain a continuous dialogue with the
Regional Offices, local authorities are less likely to lose investment on bids which do
not succeed.
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Sixth, the EA bid process is separate from the HIPs round and involves a
different timescale. It has been demonstrated that the one year timetable results in a
plethora of difficulties, not least a scramble to spend all the EA HIPs allocation at the
end of the financial year. At the time of writing, it still remains unclear how the new
financial regime will affect EA (but see chapters 7 and 8). It is to be hoped that in
future there will be a projecttimescale to work to, for the large and complex schemes
which the government has in mind. This is important so that authorities do not rush,
underspend and have, as currently happens, to repair peoples' roofs and windows
during winter. A sensible and compatible timetable will become even more crucial.
Seventh, an obvious difficulty is that the DoE insists on 'hard' tender figures
and documentation before allocations are approved. While the motives are
understandable, this constitutes a problem. An improvement might be to allocate
approvals based on Quantity Surveyor estimates and on housing authorities
undertakings that the project costs will not exceed those estimates. There would thus
be an incentive for authorities to assess those estimates as minutely and accurately as
possible since they would be responsible for meeting any extra costs arising. While
this would also accelerate the whole process, the real advantages would lie in the fact
that it would allow for both greater certainty and much better forward planning.
9.2.2 Management issues
In chapter 4 the argument was introduced that political motives were involved
in the formation of the EA initiative but that the managerial issues were uppermost in
the minds of the civil servants. A key general concern at the time, was that of
improving the management organisation in 'run-down' estates. For its part central
government does not believe in the traditional, centralised and hierarchical model of
council housing management and in line with government's objectives of creating a
new sector of 'social' housing (see chapter 2), EA attempts to provide incentives for
authorities to experiment and innovate with alternative forms of housing management
and ownership, as set out in EA's remit.
1. The general opinion obtained from the survey (see also chapter 6) is that
authorities are primarily implementing those schemes and initiatives which conform
to their housing policies although some indicate that, were it not for EA
considerations, they might have implemented them elsewhere. A related point is that
if there is a further tightening of the financial situation confronting authorities, this
degree of freedom may well be impaired in future. All the sources ofevidence also
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suggest that EA has enabled more schemes to occur than would otherwise be the
case. This is an important finding in EA's favour (see Table 9.1).
2. As regards helping authorities to innovate, the results of the survey would
suggest that the EA initiative has had little impact and that the great majority of
schemes were either 'under discussion for future implementation' or 'in the process
of being implemented from mainstream HIPs'. This would imply that a large
proportion of EA HIPs is simply 'dead-weight' investment, however, both the ROs
and EA Central disagree with this conclusion.
3. The survey suggests instead that the options placed in front of authorities
together with the resources, have forced authorities to both consider and implement
different types of management and ownership schemes. Whether EA really aids
innovation depends on the authorities' attitudes to it. The results of the case-studies
suggest that there is truth in this argument and that some authorities have been able to
put into effect schemes (such as Co-operatives and 50% sales to the private sector)
because of EA's very existence. Therefore EA has helped both the process of
innovation and decentralisation in run-down estates (see Table 9.1).
4. In dealing with the topic of management efficiency, a key issue of concern is
that of tenantconsultation. The local authorities examined in the survey suggest that
although improving the level and quality of tenant consultation is a key EA objective,
most believe that this has not occurred in their authorities mainly because the
'Authority/officers were satisfied with the existing levels of consultation' and
secondly, that effective tenant consultation may have been impaired by the way EA
operates. Further research suggests that EA has had a positive impact in pushing
authorities to confront this issue more fully.
Both the ROs and EA Central argue that local authorities may be underplaying
EA's impact in this respect and the evidence of the case-studies indicates that
certainly in EA's first year of operation, the level of tenant consultation was very
great indeed. Undoubtedly this is in part because the schemes implemented in ENs
first couple of years of operation would have been the authorities' top priorities. As
such, they are likely to have been researched and the tenants reasonably well
consulted, although this may not necessarily be the case with subsequent bids (see
discussion in section 8.4). Nevertheless the fact that EA has given this issue so
much emphasis, made it a pre-requisite for EA funding, required local authorities to
monitor impacts and encouraged local authorities to create Estate Management Boards
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among other factors, simply has to have impacted upon the tenant consultation
practices of many authorities. Nevertheless this remains a difficult issue and the
evidence from all the other sources suggests that the quality of tenant consultation
could be improved and that more attention needs to be given to this issue, an opinion
with which both the ROs and some EA Central officials concur.
5. In any event, EA is having a very positive overall impact on management.
Despite the fears about the true aims of the initiative, those authorities which are
experimenting, for example, with security and environmental works, concierges and
estate based management, report very encouraging results. This is true of the
national survey (chapter 5), local authority staffviews (5 and 8), RO and EA Central
assessments (7), tenant opinions and case-study schemes (8). In view of this
consistent evidence and despite all the other difficulties identified in the empirical
chapters, there can be no denying that targeting resources in specific ways and
localities does work. It would work more effectively if the recommendations
presented in the section above were implemented. The value of this achievement
should not be underrated. The 1980s was the decade when the key council housing
concerns were related to the issue of management and the Estate Action has made a
contribution to an understanding of how to improve management organisation and
style in the most problematic portions of council housing.
9.2.3 Financial issues
Chapter 4 has introduced the argument that there is a feeling amongst politicians
and civil servants that the HIPs system of block allocations was failing to provide
sufficient resources for what the government saw as a housing priority, namely run-
down council estates. In terms of the government's objective of achieving economic
or financial effectiveness in public resource use, a key idea is that of 'targeting'
resources. Much is being said about targeting but there has been virtually no
research on it. The government's key targeting mechanism in the housing field is
that of EA HIPs, whose experience is useful in that it also sheds light on similar
systems, such as the Homeless Initiative (see Figure 3.2).
1. The research has demonstrated that all local authorities agree that EA HIPs
resources are topsliced from mainstream HIPs, centralised and redistributed
according to government or DoE determined priorities (see Table 9.1). This is a
criticism that has dogged the EA initiative since its inception and the mechanism is
resented by authorities who regard this as clear-cut evidence of further centralisation
of control and autonomy. The authorities in both the survey and the balance of the
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Regional Officers' opinions suggest that virtually everyone now accepts the notion of
'topsliced' finance and secondly, the increased central control that it implies. Only
the Treasury and EA Central maintain that EA resources are 'additional', rather than
re-circulated. This perception has never been shaken off and has made EA's role
more difficult to implement. Nevertheless the dire local government financial climate
has made certain authorities that had originally refused to participate with the initiative
swallow their pride and also bid for EA HIPs (see Table 4.1).
There are additional problems which can arise from the EA HIPs mechanism.
The analysis in chapters 5 to 8 makes it abundantly clear that a side-effect of targeting
resources is that in the case of EA, there are two timetables in operation - one linked
to the general capital allocation system and another relating to the targeted resources-
which are not necessarily compatible and may be very difficult to co-ordinate and
synchronise. This has already been discussed in detail above.: Suffice to say that
two important problems may spring from this difficulty and these are discussed next.
2. Firstly, the Regional Offices may underallocate the targeted resources. The
survey results suggest that this does happen. EA Central itself confirms that it
occurs, although it argues that it only happened in the first year when about £5m was
underallocated. EA Central argues that this has not occurred in subsequent years
because ROs can now over-programme their allocations (by 15%) and there is now a
Central Reserve Fund which pools all the potential underspend and allows EA to re-
allocate it before the end of the financial year (see Figure 9.1). The ROs also reveal
that underallocation occurs and the contention is that this is almost inevitable,
although the London RO is particularly prone to underallocate. The research
indicates that certain authorities obtain 'reputations' based on whether they can
achieve spend. In turn, this affects their success rate in the EA bid process since a
'credibility' factor comes into play. A similar sort of reputation can develop among
the ROs themselves. For example, the London RO complains that EA Central does
not allow it to invite its authorities to submit bids for resources which become
available at the last minute (via the Central Reserve Fund mechanism). This has
implications for those authorities excluded and thus for their residents. ~
3. Secondly, the local authorities may underspend EA HIPs. One must not
lose sight of the fact that under/overspending also occurred under the HIPs system
(see Gay; 1985; Malpass and Murie, 1987), although authorities suggest that the
problem is much greater with the EA schemes, mainly because of the uncertainty of it
all. All the evidence from the survey and the EA Central and RO interviews bear out
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the fact that underspending occurs. As to the reason, the local authorities blame
delays and inefficientprocedures on the part ofEA while naturally, EA Central and
the ROs point in the opposite direction. In one of the case-study authorities, it was
argued that authorities had only themselves to blame,although this authorityonly had
one EA scheme to programme. The recommendations presented in section 9.2:1
would help the situation.
4. In addition an important issue is that of continuation funding, The survey
indicates that authorities were very critical of the EA constraint of two years of
funding per scheme (see Table 9.1). The EA team has sensibly accepted that
schemes may take longerand now encourages authorities to think in termsof bidding
for differentphaseseach year. This enables substantial schemes to be take placeover
several years. The other important development is that all the control, supervision
and monitoring of continuation funding schemes has now been devolved to the ROs.
This is a measure which has come about through the ROs' insistence that they were
better placed to deal with this aspect. Both the ROs and EA Centralargue that this is
no longer an issue but the authorities are not so easily convinced. They maintain that
there are still no guarantees of 'promised' continuation funding being received and
that this hampers their financial programming and threatens the success of the new
type of 'enterprise'or 'flagship' initiative which EA hopes to generate in future. EA
Central counters that it is almost inconceivable that the Treasury would disband the
EA initiativewithoutmeetingits continuation fundingobligations. If this is the case,
perhaps it could be betteradvertised to authorities.
5. It is becoming increasingly common for central government initiatives to be
targeted at specific areas, groups of people, types of housing etc. The DoE has
several such instrumentsemploying the techniqueof 'topslicing and targeting'. The
conclusions of this thesis point to the fact that these may well work in terms of their
objectives but that unless careful attention is given to the issues of local authority
timetables, council procedures, political processes and consultation, the
government's objective of financial efficiency may be compromised because of
problems such as underallocation and underspending, not to mention mistrust and
reluctant co-operation. The importance of consulting with local authorities, their
associations, the tenantsand the Regional Officescannot be over stressed.
That said, the government's concern that more resources should be directed to
run-down estates and that the EA initiative would be a good vehicle for this, must
have been fulfilled. By originallytargeting 69 authorities, (and later on) by requiring
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that bids for EA support must only be made for estates with certain indices of
deprivation (see Table 6.3), and lastly, by securing an increasing supply of EA HIPs
allocations from the Treasury, the EA initiative has ensured that this aim was met.
The survey results imply that the notion of targeting was not being fully
effective, since a number of authorities argued that they would have used the EA
HIPs resources in different areas/estates or in different schemes/ways. However
both the ROs and EA Central insist that the policy of targeting has been very
successful. In addition the case-studies reveal that the EA scheme estates were the
four authorities' greatest priorities and that even where they weren't, the estates were
in severe need of additional investment. The local authorities maintain that they
would have directed more resources into these estates if their financial situation had
enabled them and one of the biggest critiques of EA, in terms of financial targeting,
must be that it shirks the responsibility for investing in structural disrepair. EA
argues that it only concerned with management and innovation and that the costs of
structural repair must come from the local authorities' own mainstream HIPs, yet
numerous reports have highlighted not only the severe problems which exist, but
also the huge level of expenditure which is necessary. The government has yet to
come to terms with this major issue.
9.2.4 Housing policy issues
1. We start with the level of investment as this links with the previous
conclusion that as far as targeting was concerned, EA was meeting much success in
directing resources towards the areas it felt was in need of them. A major finding of
the thesis is that there can be little doubt that more investment is now finding its way
into run-down estates (see Table 9.1). Local authorities see this as being one of the
essential virtues of the initiative. While they argue vigorously that these estates
would have been given much greater priority if centrally determined financial
resources had been more directly and freely available, the case-studies in particular,
leave little doubt that a large proportion of local authority resources is being directed
in the way the government hoped.
This is not simply because EA HIPs are targeted at particular authorities and
tied to public housing estates exhibiting above average problems of various sorts.
The way EA has changed over time has accentuated the direction of the authorities'
own investment. The survey material has revealed that to start with, virtually all the
capital allocation was provided through EA HIPs but that in subsequent years, EA
began to 'encourage' authorities to meet approximately 50% of the investment from
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their own mainstream HIPs. This has meant that an even greater level of
commitment, both financial and political, was required to maintain the authorities'
involvement with the EA initiative. While authorities bitterly criticise this
development (indeed, this has encouraged a few to part company with the initiative),
all the same, the great majority have gone along with it and committed their resources
accordingly. The tenants in the most run-down estates have benefited.
2. The survey information reveals that authorities were engaged with EA
primarily to obtain additional resources, although the second most important factor
was because of the fact that it espoused decentralised or innovative management
structures. However, the implication is that EA was not affecting authorities in terms
of the management issues because they planned to implement these anyway. EA
merely released the resources to make this possible. Of course, 'a different
perspective was obtained from the ROs and EA Central. The case-studies suggest
that EA involvement (not least the availability of resources), certainly affected the
predisposition of some authorities to undertake initiatives such as private sector
involvement and co-operatives; and one case-study had been convinced of the value
of setting up localised management structures and involving the tenants more closely.
EA has certainly begun to affect some authorities' perception of management issues
very positively, as evident from Table 9.1.
3. As regards the issue of whether authorities have been encouraged to replicate
EA management models, most authorities maintain in the survey and in the case-
studies that the schemes they were implementing were their own schemes and not
EA's. Nevertheless, one authority was definitely planning to bid for a similar
scheme (because of its success) and the others were also considering replicating the
schemes analysed in the case-studies.
4. Bearing in mind the methodological caveats discussed in section 3.4, the
management indices discussed in the survey; the ROs' and EA Central's opinion
(based primarily on the information provided through the Annual Assessment
Forms); the local authority housing officials; and the tenants' opinions, another key
finding of the thesis is that the EA impact on the run-down estates and overall, has
been very positive (see Table 9.1). With hindsight, the research might have
benefited if there had been a more rigourous discussion of issues such as: the
counterfactuals (what would have happened without EA); the opportunity costs (what
alternative uses the same amount of money, including the bureaucratic elements,
might have produced); and some comparison with what has happened on other
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estates without EA funding, both within the authorities and elsewhere. Nevertheless
there is strong, consistent evidence across the four methods used to suggest that
involvement with the EA initiative has resulted in very positive effects in terms of the
impact on run-down estates.
5. We come now to the overall effects of EA identified in the Table 9.1.
Traditionally authorities' attempts at ameliorating the situation in 'problem' estates
have been flawed. They have been half-hearted and have often excluded the tenants
altogether from the proposed alternatives, thus it was almost inevitable that their
impact would be limited. For all its administrative and implementation difficulties,
the EA initiative has presented various 'tried and tested' management models to local
authorities; provided capital allocations to carry them out; forced authorities to
consider alternatives and make novel choices; courted tenant consultation; and
insisted upon authorities providing firm tenders and monitoring the financial and
management developments closely. It is, therefore, not surprising that Table 9.1
demonstrates that according to all the sources of evidence presented in this thesis,
EA's overall impact on management is viewed as having been very positive.
As the discussion in this section has pointed out, the EA initiative has been very
successful from the point of view of the government's pro-council housing aims.
This is part of the reason why EA has survived so long for this type of initiative, that
the Treasury has been forced to relax its rigid policy towards investment in public
housing and to provide additional resources for it (amounting to £450m over five
years). As far as the more radical housing objectives are concerned (such as
transfers of portions of the housing stock to Trust and Housing Associations), the
success has been very limited and the initiative may not survive close inspection by
politicians keen on rapid and substantial change to council housing.
9.2.5 Central-local relations
1. It is clear that the initial reaction by local authorities to EA was one of
dismay and conflict (see chapter four). Some authorities were so set against the
initiative and in particular, its principles of topslicing resources and partnership with
the private sector, that they refused to participate at all. What has happened,
however,' is that in the subsequent time, most authorities have had the opportunity to
reflect on the various housing options that are possible to undertake under EA (see
Table 9.1). Most came to appreciated the scope offered by the initiative to further
their housing policies and have sought to capitalise on the initiative as far as possible.
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The realisation that it could be profitable to 'do business' with EA has meant
that there has been a steady diminution in the level of overt conflict and criticism of
the EA initiative and the onus has shifted perceptibly from ridiculing the initiative, to
more constructive suggestions of how to improve its operation. Because there was a
ready-made channel for authorities' views to be aired and passed on to EA Central,
through the Regional Offices, not much use was made of the Local Authority
Associations, although they were involved. The ROs in particular, note that there
has been a complete change in the local authority attitude to EA and that the words
'pragmatism' and 'realism' frequently cross their lips.
2. This co-operation has arisen, of course, because most authorities were
predominantly motivated by the fact that EA provided an additional source of finance,
rather than the other aspects that the initiative espoused (chapters 5 and 6).
Throughout the empirical chapters, it is apparent that authorities are being forced by
the capital restrictions and reductions to engage in the initiative and that they have
managed to do so mainly on their own terms. Nevertheless it is also evident that
with time, EA has begun to gain the upper hand in the relationship. Authorities make
more EA bids and even formerly dissenting authorities now actively bid for EA
support. EA HIPs allocations have steadily increased while HIPs allocations have
dried-up and capital restrictions further constrain financial flexibility. With so few
alternative sources of finance, authorities have had to consider and often implement,
many of the options offered under EA, particularly in view of the fact that EA expects
authorities contribute and to innovate.
All the local authorities (those surveyed and the case- studies) agree that EA's
'power' is bound to increase, resulting in further centralisation of control (chapters 5,
6 and 8), rather than rolling back of the frontiers of the state. Local authorities must
dance to a central government tune, nevertheless, most have benefited from it and
have been able to fulfil their aims (and EA's) without compromising their housing
policies. Such a trick becomes harder with time and as EA's expectations of such
authorities rise. The topslicing and targeting mechanism in conjunction with capital
restrictions undoubtedly provide great scope for central direction and control.
3. As regards the issue of privatisation, because of the hitherto lack of research
on EA, the popular or conventional view as to what the EA initiative is about, has
generally been as follows:
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"To ensure that local authorities would not be slow in disposing of their estates, the
Department of the Environment set up the Urban Housing Renewal Unit (UHRU)
in 1985 both to promote emptying and selling local authority housing (so that it
could be refurbished and resold) and to oversee the handing over of estates to
trusts. Within a year, 42 local authorities (half of which were Labour controlled)
had embarked on 80 estate sale schemes under UHRU, although with only £50
million at its disposal in 1985/86 UHRU could not be expected to have much
impact on a £20bn repair problem." (Balchin, 1989, p.224)
Such a view wildly over-estimates the extent to which EA has resulted in
disposals to the private sector and completely ignores the fact that the main emphasis
has shifted perceptibly to the encouragement of estate management. More
importantly, it also misses the point regarding the extent to which EA has contributed
to the acceptance of the notion of privatisation of council estates. While its resources
have been limited (but increasing), EA has played a crucial role in conditioning
authorities to the concept and value of selling either parts of their housing stock or
land parcels.
Whereas such a notion was absolutely taboo when EA was formed (and indeed
was part of the reason why a number of authorities refused to participate with it), the
case-studies demonstrate that this has gained credibility and even acceptance among
many authorities as a perfectly sound option to consider, especially at times of fiscal
stress. This is reflected in the 'pragmatism' demonstrated by authorities of all
political backgrounds throughout the research and also implies that authorities are
increasingly willing to form partnerships with the private sector, despite the findings
of the survey, where this was the housing authorities' least popular option to
undertake under the EA initiative. In terms of the wider housing policy, experience
and involvement with EA may also mean that authorities look more pragmatically
upon such policies as Tenants' Choice, Voluntary Transfers and Housing Action
Trusts.
4. As regards EA's aims of encouraging innovation and help stimulate
alternative management organisations, in line with government's social housing
policy, the overall conclusion is that EA has also had a degree of success in this
respect (see Table 9.1). The survey results indicate that authorities have only been
pursuing the initiatives which were in line with their housing policies, some of which
involved the formation of co-operatives and concierges. They do agree that EA has
enable more schemes to take place, which implies a degree of success for EA. Both
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EA Central and the ROs have no doubts that they have been influential in this respect
and the evidence from the case-studies confirm some authorities' greater willingness
to experiment with alternative organisations. In most cases this is done willingly but
in others, it is because of a lack of alternative, since the authorities do not have the
resources to undertake the schemes on their own. None have considered radical
options such as the transfer of stock/estates to Trusts.
5. One of the biggest criticisms of the EA initiative to start with, was the fact
that it was believed that the financial mechanism of topslicing and redistribution via
DoE determined criteria of what was relevant, resulted in centralisation, a reduction
in local autonomy and interference with local policies and priorities. Such a view
comes through very clearly in the survey (see chapters 5 and 6) and in the case-
studies (chapter 8). As mentioned above, there is also the expectation that the level
of EA control will accentuate because increasingly more authorities bid for EA
support and because alternative sources of funding are harder to find or yield less
resource.
These arguments have by no means disappeared and remain a thorn in the
operation of EA.. The Central team exhausts itself in arguing that EA HIPs is
separate from and additional to, mainstream HIPs with little success. There is some
recognition on the part of the case-study authorities that they are not forced to comply
with EA. They are aware that they have complete freedom over the decision on
whether to get involved and what to bid for, nevertheless, in both the survey and the
case-studies, authorities maintain that there has been a degree of compromise in local
priorities and a reduction in local autonomy.
Authorities argue that both these trends will increase in future (see survey and
case-studies), however, the reason why most authorities are not more critical of these
issues is because of the 'umbrella-like' nature of EA where virtually anything can be
funded, provided it is presented in the right way and with the right phrases. In this
respect, the ambiguity over EA criteria works in the authorities' favour. In addition,
the ROs have become very adept at advising authorities on the presentation of their
bids and now, with further decentralisation, the ROs' knowledge and understanding
of local needs and priorities will further aid matters. A great deal of scope exists
within EA for local authorities to benefit from EA support without necessarily feeling
as if it compromises local policies unduly. That is precisely why (together with the
additional resources) many authorities which originally refused to participate are now
heavily committed to the EA initiative.
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To conclude section 9.2. the few housing commentators who have paid
attention to the EA initiative have pointed to the fact that its resources are topsliced,
that they are inadequate in view of the scale of housing disrepair and that it is anti-
council housing. This thesis has shown (apart from the fact that there is a series of
other elements which are just as important) that while the first two issues may be
correct. despite its remit. the third is far from clear-cut (see also Table 9.1). The
essential point to note is that it is simplistic to try to conclude on whether the EA
initiative is 'pro-' or 'anti-' council housing. The evidence presented in this thesis
clearly demonstrates that although the programme is highly politicised, both views of
EA are partly true. EA can and sometimes does, work against local determination of
housing policy. However. housing authorities can also and have. made the initiative
work for themselves and their tenants.
9.3 Implications for the theoretical context
This thesis does not seek a direct appraisal of theory. Although there has been
a discussion of theories of the local state and central-local relations, this is meant to
provide a conceptual backdrop. rather than a rigid theoretical perspective. However,
this section presents an attempt to link the overview of the main findings of the thesis
to the theoretical perspectives introduced earlier in the thesis (section 3.3). This link
is attempted via reference to each of the theoretical concepts so as to draw out the
implications of the research for the theories.
1. As far as the 'Agent/Partner' debate is concerned. using Estate Action as an
example of a central housing policy. the main finding is that local government is
neither agent nor partner. but both in different contexts and at different times. This
dichotomy is also unhelpful because it ignores the crucial function performed by
another level in the governmental framework. namely the role of the DoE Regional
Offices in the EA initiative, its degree of flexibility, decision-making and impact.
The research has also demonstrated that authorities have the option of either ignoring
central government initiatives/policy, or of only implementing those aspects which
are acceptable to its local electorate/local policy thus resisting central control and
maintaining their own agenda. Beyond a certain time, the pressures may become too
great, especially if there are few or no alternative financial sources to tap into.
2. The 'Dual State Thesis' acknowledges that state activities have greatly
increased, that the 'state' is organisationally complex and fragmented into elected
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branches (such as local government) and non-elected branches (such as EA Central
and the Regional Offices) which is more in line with the EA policy context. It argues
that state intervention at central level occurs through a process of corporatist
mediation and is primarily concerned with social investment. This may well be the
case since EA can be seen as being about investing in social housing and the evidence
of chapter 4 has pointed out the government's obvious concern about the inner city
riots of the 1980s and the need to direct further resources in the direction of public
housing estates. The Dual State Thesis argues that at the local level, however, state
activity is geared towards social consumption by individuals or sections of the
population and that such policies are developed through a process of neo-pluralist
activity at the local level and is addressed at issues of social rights and needs
(Saunders, 1984; 1986).
The research suggests that this process may not be very applicable with respect
to certain central government policies. The EA initiative, its policies, funds, aims
and organisation were all centrally determined. In part it was designed to address the
centrally defined issue of directing a greater amount of resources to the 69 authorities
in greatest need of them. Local authorities were perceived as not wanting to invest
more of their resources in run-down estates. Through policies such as the EA
initiative, Saunders' locally based 'consumption classes' (such as council tenants) are
by-passed by centrally prescribed policies, even though such policies may be aimed
at this particular consumption class.
This is certainly the case for the great majority of council tenants because only
those tenants who live in estates which conform to EA's eligibility criteria are
'enfranchised' by such initiatives (and then only indirectly), and able to influence the
policy process. Any additional investment allocations which authorities obtain from
EA are determined by central priorities and since local authorities are expected to
contribute to EA schemes, their 'free' (HIPs) resources are also directed in the
manner that central government desires. In this case, central government wishes
only local authority tenants who live in EA designated authorities and estates to be
consulted in the policy process, but the general council tenant and the rest of the local
government electorate is not involved. Even within this sub-set of council tenants,
the options and opportunities are also largely centrally determined. EA may wish
those tenants to be consulted but it will not necessarily support whatever the tenant
associations or the majority of tenants wish. Neo-pluralist perspectives can thus be
applied only in a very limited manner.
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It would be true to argue that local politicians are involved in deciding whether
to be involved with the EA initiative or not. It has even been suggested in the
research that it tends to be the ward represented by the local Chair of Housing which
benefits most from EA support, implying that local politicians have some control
over where the greatest emphasis is to lie in terms of EA bids. Nevertheless, this is
not to imply that EA related policies arise primarily through competitive political
activity or that activity in run-down estates is necessarily influenced by the locally-
based council housing consumption classes, therefore, the concept does not appear
to be applicable with respect to the operation of EA. Policy and priorities, as regards
EA investment and schemes, is centrally determined. The key local concern in co-
operating with EA, has always been that through the initiative, authorities might be
able to obtain additional housing investment. However this decision also brings with
it major implications for the direction of housing policy and housing investment
which in part, wrests control away from local politicians, local consumption classes
or whatever the local policy basis (even if it conformed to local policies).
3. A similar conclusion may be reached as regards those theories which point to
the importance of 'Uneven Social Development' or the importance of 'local variation'
in determining outcome. Dickens et al. (1985) argue that it is crucially important to
analyse local social relations and the nature of local social institutions, as these
influence the form and course of housing action. EA by-passes local variation and
social processes. Local consumers such as housing tenants may have genuine local
grievances, address their actions at local state institutions such as local housing
departments and it may also be the case that:
"Each episode also needs to be understood as something with a complex pre-
history and equally complex wider implications both for housing consumers
themselves and for the shape of housing consumption." (p.233)
However, no matter what the general history of local politics or the specific
previous actions of council tenants as regards rents, squatting and other protests, the
history of these will not determine local actions with regard to certain policies such as
the EA initiative. The initial targeting of 69 authorities was done on the basis of the
local situation (annual HIPs returns), but this dealt with indicators such as the level
of voids, arrears and difficult-to-let properties which were compared nationally and
not on the basis of other relevant factors such as history of tenant activity or balance
of local politics. EA criteria were all centrally defined and there was no consultation
with either ROs or local authorities (see chapter 4). Local politicians had little say in
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the process except in whether to accept or reject EA involvement, and even here, we
have seen that authorities have increasingly had little financial choice but to accept
involvement in EA. Once agreed, the housing officers are allowed to determine
which estates and schemes to bid for, however, these are made within the boundaries
specified by EA criteria. Local processes of variation and history are thus by-passed,
except where they run tangentially to EA's priorities.
This is not to deny completely the persuasive arguments that the housing
question itself will vary according to time and space and that it is unrealistic to
suppose that local variations have no local effects. There is still local variation. For
example, because of its decentralised neighbourhood structure, the London Borough
of Tower Hamlets makes a much larger number of bids than other authorities and
partly as a result, it has also been disproportionately successful in gaining EA
support (see Appendix 8). Nevertheless, initiatives such as EA work againstthe
importance of local variation and the relevance of historical factors, because the
agenda for action and the policy alternatives are reduced to those determined and laid
out nationally by EA.
Local authorities which follow the desires of their politicians in responding to
activities on the part of their tenants' and their requests, for example for intensive
management structures, may be successful in biding for EA resources once or twice
(and then only because that particular local priority coincides with EA's own aims).
Nevertheless, although that authority may be responding to local circumstances, it
will find that EA will not support many more such bids unless the authority is
prepared to introduce other aspects which EA espouses, such as private sector
involvement or the creation of management co-operatives. This may run completely
counter to local policies and residents' wishes, however, there may well be little
choice in the matter if the authority hopes to attract further EA support in order to
maintain and improve its run-down estates.
4. Section 3.3 also discussed the relevance of the 'Sub-Central Government'
literature generally and then 'fitted' the housing context within this literature by
arguing that the notion of policy communities is particularly relevant and highlighting
Houlihan's (1988) conception of the Housing Policy Community. Some
conclusions may also be drawn as regards the operation of the EA policy community
within this context (see Figures 3.1, 3.3 and 9.1):
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Firstly. some elements of the EA policy community are more relevant than
others. The private sector was hardly of any importance and generally only became
involved at the request of local authorities (at tender stage) and the relationship was
contractual in nature. The trade unions were similarly unimportant as very few jobs
were created anew for EA schemes. In the great majority of cases. posts were
simply decentralised and in one of the case-studies, the officers had the option of
moving back to their old posts if so desired (see previous discussion in section 8.2).
Turning to the Local Authority Associations (LAAs) and the Housing
Consultative Council (HCC). these have not been very effective since the late 1970s
and their role was similarly marginal with respect to EA. This is by no means
surprising given the political climate as regards the notions of consultation and
corporatism (see Rhodes, 1988). The HCC did try to bring attention to ENs less
than perfect operation (see HCC. mimeo), however. this did not get far and it was
completely ineffectual in influencing the way EA operates. Firstly, the DoE and EA
Central largely ignored it and secondly, the authorities found other, more powerful
allies in attempting to influence central government policy. This role has largely been
taken over by the Regional Offices for two reasons. Section 7.2 has discussed the
ambiguity of the Regional Offices' role. This has meant that they have served as a
direct and vocal route (for local authorities) into EA Central. Also the Regional
Offices have long felt that they could perform certain roles more effectively without
EA Central supervision or control (chapter 7). Taken together, these two issues have
meant that local authorities found a much more effective ally in the Regional Offices,
rather than through the traditional route of the LAAs and the largely defunct HCC.
There was virtually no professional conflict between the various local
government departments in an attempt to protect their policy 'turf. The 'lead' role in
dealing with, co-ordinating and erecting EA schemes was always taken by the
housing department with a great deal of co-operation from the other departments
(particularly finance and the planners). once they were made aware of the quirks in
operation of the EA initiative, not least its timetable.
The EA policy community is not static and has evolved. There are several
components to this issue: firstly, local authorities have come to accept that EA is not
going to disappear, that it can provide crucial resources, that they need to work with
it and they have also began to get used to ENs operational mechanism and to adjust
accordingly. Nevertheless because EA's operation was so different from what they
were hitherto accustomed, there has been a 'learning curve' involved in dealing with
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initiatives such as EA and over time, local authorities have been able to modify their
operation and procedures in order to create greater flexibility and thus make better use
of the EA initiative. This has also made the process of implementation smoother.
Another important finding is that while the literature has been at pains to stress
the fact at the Regional Offices have more than a passive, implementing and
mediating role (see section 7.2 and Young, 1982; Houlihan, 1983; 1984; and
Rhodes, 1988). An interesting development which has not been picked up, is that
the DoE ROs have almost 'usurped' EA Central with regard to the EA initiative. The
important point is that rather than merely administering the more mundane aspects of
EA, the ROs have been able to amass a greater degree of autonomy at the expense of
EA Central. Over time, EA Central has been persuaded of the fact that the work load
was becoming unrealistic for a small central team and that the ROs would be better
placed to control various operations of the EA scheme.
More and more powers and functions have been devolved and in due course,
EA Central will only retain control of overall policy to ensure consistency and
direction in what is after all, a national housing policy. The ROs now have a fair
degree of power and have moved far beyond being largely concerned with informing
authorities of the existence and role of the EA initiative. They now administer most
of the operational matters, monitor the progress of schemes, have complete control
over continuation funding schemes and have recently acquired final decision-making
over new schemes. EA Central has been forced into a position where it had to accept
this progression, in part because the Regional Offices became so adept at this new
role; partly because they were soon overwhelmed by the amount of bids and
paperwork involved in the various application forms; and partly because local
authorities were keen on and encouraged such a process (see the contrast of Figure
3.1 and Figure 9.1). Essentially, EA is only left with a policy-making or strategic
role, however, as discussed above, this can be seen as a positive development.
Lastly, with its new emphasis on large 'enterprise' initiatives involving the
generation of employment and training elements within the housing schemes, the EA
policy community is set to change radically. In future the EA initiative will
undoubtedly come into greater contact with institutions with which it has had limited
contact thus far, such as the House Builders' Federation, the Housing Corporation
and the National Federation of Housing Associations. This will require EA Central
and the Regional Offices to be able to operate interactively with these organisations
whilst not jeopardising their contacts with local authorities and being able to meet
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tenants' needs and aspirations (see Figure 9.2). The EA initiative will need to
become involved with private, voluntary and central organisations (such as Training
and Enterprise Councils, The Department of Trade and Industry; the Department of
Employment and the Home Office), all of which have a legitimate interest in public
housing estates. How EA handles this transition will determine its future viability.
9.4 Future research
This thesis has made a detailed examination of the Estate Action initiative.
From its findings a number of fertile avenues for future research can be explored:
• Privatisation: various chapters have discussed the fact that authorities have become
more willing to pursue EA's controversial elements over time, therefore, an
important question is whether public/private partnerships in general and privatisation
in particular, will accelerate under greater fiscal restriction.
• The effects on (other) estates: Estate Action is targeted at the most problematic
council estates but little is known of the effects of such a policy on the 'intermediate'
estates, in terms of resource allocation, management and maintenance. A key
question is whether finite resources are merely displaced and the same malign
process of neglect starts elsewhere both within and between the authorities. Greater
attention must also be given to the opportunity costs associated with EA HIPs.
• Enterprise/Employment generation: Economic development has largely by-passed
council estates where the skill and employment levels remain low. Employment
generation is now EA's overriding commitment and although laudable in principle,
one must examine why this has occurred, its scope, ease of implementation and
effectiveness. Attention must also be focused on issues such as educational
attainment and skill levels so as to determine ways of improving both.
• Partnership and co-ordination: Enterprise initiatives inevitably depend upon
effective co-ordination between various agencies such as government departments,
local authorities, voluntary and community organisations and Training and Enterprise
Councils (see Figure 9.2). Workable and effective partnerships will be of crucial
importance in the future and an analysis must be made of similar policies (such as
inner city policy involving a multi-organisational context) to learn the key lessons and
to incorporate them for the benefit of the EA initiative.
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Appendix 1: Local Authority Postal Survey
ICONFIDENTIALI
JL§JE DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHYHOUGHTON STREETLONDON WC2 2AE
TEL: (01) 405·7686 x 2602
Survey of the Involvement of Local
Authorities With Estate Action
Organised by Ricardo Pinto
(1988)
Your Name: .
Your Authority: .
Your Address: .
.................. .
Your Telephone: .
Your DoE Regional Office: .
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Section (a) General Background Information:
1. HasyourAuthority appointed anyof the following (please tick as
appropriate):~ an Estate Action (EA) team
an EAco-ordinating officer
an officer with ad hoc EAresponsibilities
other - please specify
2 Indicate yourAiiiliorii"Y"s'maiIi'ieasons"for'6ein~'concemed with EAJmd EA HIP. Rank
the three most important ones per year. and tic othersignificant ones. Wasit simply that:
1986n 1987/8 1988/9
EA HIPis a rapidly increasing andmuch needed resource
yourAuthority wanted to try out:
decentralisation
diversification of tenure
private ~ector involvements/disposals
innovanve management structures
employment initiatives
homeless initiatives
concierge schemes
other- please specify
3. EAts official policy is thatsche'me's'ouiiiii'io'encompass'iiirihe'elements below, (although estate
based management underlies it all). Please indicate whatYOU thinkhas been stressed by EAin
the following years: (Please rankthe first three most important ones per year, andtick the rest)
1986/7 1987/8 1988/9
diversification of tenure
estate based management
private sectorinvolvement/disposals
innovative management structures
security andenvironmental improvements
concierge schemes
employment initiatives
homeless initiatives
other - please state .
4. Please fill-in theTable below. To make the questionnaire as easyto fill-in as possible, this,
and onelaterTable, are the onlystages where reference to files maybe required.
Everything elserequires onlySImple ticking or ranking of alternatives already provided.
Example Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3
Submission dateof FormB to EA 01.05.87
Approval dateof bid by EA 12.01.88
Scheme type(eg.TMC, concierge) estate manmt
Overall HIPallocation by EA(£ or %of total) £lmil or 50%
Contribution by othersources (£ or % of total) 0.5mor 25%
Capital contribution by Authority (£ or % of total) 0.5mor25%
Revenue costsof scheme perannum to Authority (£ 300.000
Number of newstaffemployed per scheme 3
Number of staffredeployed per scheme 1
Pleaseindicate also,for the following years: 1986n 1987/8 1988/9
Number of EA HIP bids madebyyourAuthority
Number of bidsaccepted by EA
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Section (b) Estate Action Administrative Procedures:
1. Referring back to the timeperiod between submission and approval dates(Question 4),
do youconsider this to have been an undue delay in general?
YesD No D
1.1 If Yes,what do youthink are the main reasons for this (please tick as appropriate)?
the time necessary on the part of Authorities in working up the bids
bids invited too late by EA,or with unreasonable deadlines
changing EAcriteria andthe need for Authorities to resubmit
administrative delays on the partof EA
the lackof an adequate timetable for bids
lackof clarity about EAcriteria
other- please specify ..
2. Do EA's administrative procedures andtimetables adversely affect anyof the
following (please tick):
~ the Authority's rolling capital programmethe timetabling of schemes (start/completion)~~~~:~~;~~;~~~~:~.i.~.~ ..~~.~~~.~.~.~.~~:.:~~~~~~.:.:.~ ..
3. DoesyourAuthority normally manage to spend all the EA HIPallocation by theend
of the financial year?
If Yes, D Is thisprimarily because:
B ~~e~~e~~~~f_~k~:l~p~cif~d.~~.~:~~~~~~~~:..~~~~~~~~~~ .
IfNo,D Is thisprimarily because:
~ inefficiencies anddelays on thepart of EAin getting out approvalinefficiencies anddelays on thepart of Authorities~~~~~;~~~~~: ~?e~~a:;e~rf~h.~.:..~~.~.:.~~~~~~~~~~~ .
5. Whatnormally happens if yourAuthority cannot spend the EA HIPallocation in the year?
g you arepenalised with no EA funds the following yearthe allocation is renegotiated with EAthe following yearEA allows you to spend the EA HIPon schemes across the authority (on understanding~hili~~~pf~:::~~~ci}~ ~~.~.~.~:.~~.~~~.~~~~.~.~~.~~.~:.~.~:.~~.~.~~.~~~~~~.~he following year)
6. If [mal~proval arrives late,which of the following are affected in EA schemes?(pleasellble-tjck the most important onesand sjngle-tick the other significant ones)
a needto renegotiate tenders
increased capital coststo schemes
disruption to normal planning procedures
increased staff workload/duplication
slippage in completion datesof schemes
increased tenant frustration
other- please specify .
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7. In terms of continuation funding and bids, please indicate whether:
such funding has always been secured from EA
suchfunding haseverexceeded two years in yourauthority
EAhasevergiven ANY form of guarantee What? .
sucha system of capital allocation causes problems for yourlocalauthority
Please indicate what typeof problems .
8. EA does not approve elements of schemes which do not meet theircriteria. Indicate if:
E3 thispolicy has varied within and/or between yearsyourAuthority know exactly what EA will not approve
Based on yourexperience, indicate which elements EAwillnot approve (eg.roofs):
.........................................................................................................
9. Monitoring procedures:
9.1 Does yourAuthority monitor EA-funded schemes? YeO NoD
Please specify in what ways .
9.2 Does EAdo anyof the following in orderto monitor its schemes:§ ask for all the annual scheme assessment formsask for all thequarterly scheme assessment formssendofficers to inspect schemes during work/after completion~~~~r~f~il~~:e t~p~~?g.~~~~~~:.~~.~.~~.~~~~ .
10.Please indicate thechiefadvantages to yourAuthority, of working to improve 'problem'
estates through the mediation of EA (double-tick the most important onesandtick the rest):
releases resources which enable necessary capital works to take place
enables more schemes to takeplace thanwould otherwise havebeen the case
timescale encourages accellerated consultation, planning andcompletion of schemes
allows innovative manmt structures/schemes to develop which wouldn't otherwise
enables comprehensive problem investigation to occur and solutions to be found
other- please specify ..
11.Please indicate the chiefdisadvantages to yourAuthority of working with EA and EA
procedures (double-tick the mostimportant ones andsingle-tick the otherappropriate ones):
inadequate timetabling for bidding, acceptance andallocation of EA HIP
EA administration resulting in delays to schemes
EA administration resulting in more work for staff
EA administration resulting in confusion for staff
EAcriteria not being clearly defined
EA criteria which keep changing
EA criteria lacking prioritisation or ranking
EA criteria which are not yourAuthority's
loss of control, autonomy anddemocracy overhousing
difficult andtime-consuming information required by EA
lackof feedback by EA on whyparticular schemes are rejected
inability to planfor the medium/long-term in EA schemes
needfor Authorities to make capital contributions to schemes
needfor Authorities to meet the revenue costsof schemes
other- please specify .
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Section (c) Updating Evaluation of EA Schemes:
The Table below is a slightadaptation of EA FormB andAnnual Assessment Formquestions. They havebeen
posed in order to gainsomenotion of howmuchestates have improved one yearafter the startof the schemes.
Please indicate whether, for example, the number of vacant dwellings has (J) Increased; (D)Decreased or (N)
NQ chan~ Please enteractual costs, fj~res, and percentae;es as well whenever possible. Pleasekeep thesame
order as for the firstTable.
Alternatiyely. simply attach the Annual Scheme Assessment forms normally sent to EstateActionand I
will look-up the appropriate information myself. All the information can be found in these.
0
-
N ~ '<:t In
'E. 0 0 0 0 0
~ 8 8 E 8 80 0 0 0
.J:: .J:: .J:: .J:: .J::~ a a a a r~UJ
Total numberof dwelJings (numbers) 1000
Outstanding requests for transfers (numbers/%) (D)50/5%
Average period to re-Iet thedwellings (weeks/months (D)4wks
Dwellings nowclassed as difficult-to-let(numbers/%) (D)70/7%
Vacantdwellings (numbers/%) (N) 1%
Currenttenants withrent arrears (numbers/%) (D) 10%
Actualmanagement costsper dwelJing no\\(£ p.a.) (I) £400
Incidence of crime (estimates) (N)
Incidence of vandalism andgraffitti(estimates) (D)
Opening date of office,scheme etc. 01.88
1. Wouldyou say that the situation in your Authority's estate(s) has improved:
Not at allD SlightlyD SubstantiallyD
2. And if things have improved, would you say that this is primarily because of:B intervention by EstateAction and its teamB your Authority and theeffort of its officers
~h~~~~~~a~~e;~~~f;~ .
The last twopagessimply require ticking and will not takemore than 10minutes to complete.
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Section (d) Tenant Participation and Evaluation:
1. Hasthe involvement with EAresulted in greater tenant consultation, participation and
inputinto the schemes thanwould otherwise have been the case in yourAuthority?
No DYes D If Yes, please specify in whatways:
..............................................................................
1.1 If it has resulted in the same or lesstenant consultation, is this because:
Authority/officers aresatisfied with existing levels of tenant consultation
fearof raising tenants' expectations while being unable to guarantee scheme delivery
costsincurred by Authority in preparing bidswhile there is no guarantee that they
will be approved by the EAbureaucracy
Authorities are expected to plan, consult, costand submit too quickly andtoo late
for full andeffective tenant consultation under EA's timetabling arrangements
other - please specify .
2. Which forms of tenant consultation tookplace in yourAuthority (Indicate whether this
occurred prior to sending Form A (A); priorto sending Form B (B); ongoing (0); or later (L):
adverts, posters andpresentations
public meetings andopen days
questionnaire surveys and/or door-to-door visits
feedback mechanisms in orderto incorporate tenant input
steering groups composed of tenants, officers, architects etc
other - please specify .
3. How many of the approved schemes were chosen primarily:
~ because they were suggested by the EAteamas a result of consultation between yourAuthority andthe EAteamas a result of consultation between yourAuthority andyourtenants~h~~:s~:~~fet~;e~f;~~~~~.~:.~.:.~.:.~~!.~.:~.~~~:..:~~.~~~~.:~.~.:~.eme
4. How much change to EAschemes has resulted from the tenant consultation exercises?
No ChangeD LittleD Substantial D Not Known D
.
5. Will yourAuthority be bidding for additional EA allocation in future?
IfYesD Is this because:
~ of the positive experience with EA andthe success of previous schemesEArepresents vital and increasing resources~fh~:~c~l~~~h~~~~i~~n=~.:~:~.~~.~~~~.~~~ ..~~.~~~~~~~.~~.~~.~~~~.~.~.~.ority
If No0 Is this because: ..
~ of the negative experience withEAand the failure of previous schemesthe resulting increased revenue cost to yourAuthority~~~~O_ri;~:~~~;:~f~t~~.~~.~~~.~.~:.~.~~ ..~~~~~~~~~~~..~~.~~~~~~~.
.......................................................................
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Section (e) If EA HIP Had Not Been available (counterfactual information):
1. Withregard to the EAschemes which have beenimplemented in your
Authority. how high a priority would they have beengiven if EA HIPhad not
beenavailable? .
in the process of being implemented anyway from main HIP
underdiscussion for future implementation
lowpriority
not previously considered
other- please specify ..
2. If EA HIPhad been available to yourAuthority to use as it sawfit, would the
allocation have been usedin a:§different areaor estatedifferent way or schememore effectively in general~~~~ :~f:~~~e~~:~:ya~.~.~.:.~~~.:.~~~~~~.:~ ..~~~~.~~.~.
2.1 If any of the above were ticked. would you say that yourAuthority's needs
andpriorities (andthus yourautonomy) havetherefore, been compromised in order
to get EA HIP?
No D Little D SubstantiallyD Not Known D
3. Do youexpect that as time progresses, and as capital and expenditure constraints
tighten up in future, yourEA bids and schemes willcometo reflectEAts objectives and
priorities moreandmore?
No 0 Yes 0 Not Known D
4. If you wish to comment further on any issueregarding EA, its procedures and
administration. and in particular, howthis affects the management andefficiency of your
scheme(s) , please do so here andcontinue on a separate sheet if necessary:
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
Please send a copyof your Authority's latestgeneral H.I.P. Statement, together with
any otherinformation which may be relevant. such as reports, committee minutes etc.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO·OPERATION!
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Appendix 1: follow-up
JJpdatine Evaluation of EA Schemes:
Please indicate, for the following years: 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9
Number of EA HIP bids made by your Authority
Number of bids accepted by EA
Example Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 S,
Submission date of Form B to EA 01.05.87
Approval date of bid by EA 12.01.88
Scheme type (eg. TMC, concierge) estate manmt
Name of sccme Fictitious
Overall HIP allocation by EA (£ or % of total) £lmil or 50%
Contribution by other sources (£ or % of total) O.5mor 25%
Capital contribution by Authority (£ or % of total) O.5mor 25%
Revenue costs of scheme per annum to Authority (£ 300.000
Number of new staff employed per scheme 3
Number of staff redeployed per scheme 1
The Table below is a slight adaptation of EA Form B and Annual Assessment Form questions.
They have been posed in order to gain some notion of how much estates have improved (or not)
since the start of these schemes. Please indicate whether, for example, the number of vacant
dwelljngs has (I) Increased: (D) pecreased or (N) NQ change please enter actual costs, figures,
and percentages as well whenever possible.
Alternatively.
simply attach the Annual Scheme Assessment forms normally sent to Estate Action
together with any other relevant forms/information and I will look-up the
appropriate information myself. All the necessary information can be found in these.
Example Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 S,
Total number of dwellings (No) 1000
Tenants with outstanding transfer request!'(No/%) (D) 50/5%
Average period taken to re-let the dwcllingfwecks) (D) 4wks
Dwellings now classed as difficult-to-let (No/%) (D) 70n%
Vacant dwellings (No/%) (N) 1%
Current tenants with rem arrears (No/%) (D) 10%
Actual management costs per dwelling now (£ p.a.) (I) £400
Incidence of crime (estimates) (N)
Incidence of vandalism and graffitti (estimates) (D)
Opening date of office, scheme etc. 01.88
Appendix 2: DoE Interviews
J. DoE Re2 ional Office(r)s Interview
Origins of the initiative
1Whatdo you see as beingEA origins?
2 What were its primary intentions (viaEA) regarding:
i) the management of problem estates?
ii) fulfilling Conservative policies towards public housing?
Has thischangedover time?andWhy?
Allocation of EA funds
1Does the RO experience anydifficulties in allocating its share in the timeavailable
2 What happens if RO is in dangerof underallocating - is it passedon to another?
3 Have you had to pass on any EA HIP to anotherRO? Why?
4 Are there anypressures for RO to allocate as quickly as possible to theirauthorities
so that theydo not lose out? Are thereany repercussions?
Relationship between EA, ROs and LAs:
Do tensions and pressures existbetween the following? Whichand Why (mainly
administrative, timetabling etc)?
1 Between EA central andRO
2 Betweenthe RO's?
3 Between RO's and LA's?
4 Is this situation improving over time?In what ways?
Underspending EA HIP resources:
1 Manyauthorities indicated that they haddifficulties in achieving spend(30%
underspent).
They blamed EAlROproblems for delays and allocations late in the financial year.
What is yourreaction - are theredelays?
2 What happens if an authority is aboutto underspend - what arrangements are
made?
3 What is EA central'sview on the 'informal' arrangenments?
4 Are underspending authorities penalised and How? (even though theyoften receive
allocations late in financial year?)
Specific issues arising from postal survey
A) TIMETABLING ARRANGEMENTS:
The source of mostcomplaints is that the timetabling arrangements are inadequate,
resulting in problems such as underspending. Do you agree with this?What are the
mainreasonsfor the fact that the 'targeted' method of capitalallocation results in
underallocation and underspending (30%)? Are things improving?
B) TENANTCONSULTATION:
Anotherfinding is that despite EA'scommitment to 'fulland effective tenant
consultation, this rarely happens because ofEA's operational arrangements. There is
so little time that LA's frequently only consult tenants at Form B stage,whenbroad
outlines already decided? What is your viewon this?
C) CHANGING EA CRITERIA:
Manyargue thatEA criteria keepchanging (70%) and that the reasonis because of
pressures
on EA not to underallocate - results in confusion for LAs and the funding of low
priority
shemes eg homeless schemes despite a separate initiative.
1Do criteriakeepchanging/Why?
2 Is part of confusion because of rushedapprovals late in financial year?
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D) SYSTEM OF CAPITAL ALLOCATIONS:
1 What do you think of the argument that EA HIP is 'Top-sliced'?
2 Is LA autonomy and controlover housing necessarily reduced?
3 Do you agree that thereare problems with this systemand that it can result in either
underallocation or underspending for many authorities?
4 Woulda betteralternative capital allocation system?
5 How will these issuesbe affected by the new financial regime?
6 Will this be moreefficientthan the previous systemof capitalallocations? How?
Implementing EA schemes
1 Whatdo you see as being the mainproblems and difficulties in implementing the
EA initiative?
i) EA bureaucracy/procedures
ii) plethoraof agents involvedin the formulation of EA schemes
iii) obstructiveness/inefficiency by LAs
2 Do you think that your interaction with localauthorities has beenimproving and
becoming quickerand lessproblematic over time?
3) How important is the role of ROs in achieving an efficient implementation
process?
4) How important is the role ofEA in achieving an efficientimplementation process?
Future of EA
1 Why has EA despite its problems, nevertheless receivedincreasingly more
resources?
2 Is this because it is achieving central government policy/priorities?
i) management and decentralisation
ii) privatisation
iii) any other political reasons
3 Do you see EA surviving in the future - and in what form?
Data chronology of processing bids
For 1986-90, when did you invite authorities to submitbids; when did you receive
the completedForm A's; when were Form B's solicitiedand received; when was
final approvalissued; and proportion of the Regional Office'sEA HIP
allocated/spent in financial year?
Year: InvitationA: ReceiptA: InvitE: RecE Final Appprov % EA HIP
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989190
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Za-EA Consultants Interview
Origins of EA initiative
1)What are theorigins of the EA initiative - studies, models which fed into it?
2) Whoput together the ideaand the team? And why?
3) Pleaseelaborate on whatwere the main concerns, aims and role of the following
in setting-up EA and its procedures?
• Advisory Groupespecially B. Soc (Melville-Ross) • private sector (Tom Baron)
• housingprofessionals/consultants
• civil servants (MikeBurbridge, Peter Emms, RobinSharp,Minister, PM)
• others (eg. treasury, architects etc?)
• How were the housing/management; political; financial issuesput together?
• EA launched in June 1985. Had details been workedout at that stage?What?
• Original emphasis on privatesectorinitiatived and diversification. EBM 3rd 'on
peckingorder'.How and why did this eventually change to 1st.
EA procedures and operation:
1)How and whydid EA, its aims and procedures take the form they did:
• Targeting - why was it necessary for DoE to intervene/target via EA HIP?Has it
done so?
• Financial - What is procedure/mechanism for gettingEA HIP? Is it 'top-sliced'?
Is this theonly way of obtaining additional finance in today's climate?
How and why has the EA teammanaged to persuade ministers and Treasury of the
needfor additional resources (against gov PSBRpolicyviz LA capitalexpenditure)?
• Tenantconsultation - Why was it felt to be crucial? Who waskeenest on TC?
Did theyexpectany difficulties in obtaining effective TC within timetable?
• Otherconsultation - Was thereany consultation withlocal authorities (housing,
finance) LAAs,HCC and ROs?
Future of EA
1) Do you believe EA is achieving its remit in terms of :
• disposal solutions (few TMCs, Trusts, HAs etc)
• 'New and relatively untried' solutions
• Adviseministeron 'needfor new machinery, incentives or legislation changes'
• Is 'targeting' by EA working as planned(and as efficiently as possible)?
2) In future it will try to encourage moreemployment/enterprise initiatives. Will this
work (even moreorganisations in the implementation procedure).
3) Focus on fewer, larger 'flagship' schemes. Positiveor negative; Less EA HIP?
4) Some believe EA will not survivefor long (6 months). What is youropinion?
5) In whatother waysdo you see EA changing (in the mediumterm) and why?
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3, EA' Central Interview
The EA resources
1)On what basis did EA manage to get additional resources from the treasury?
2) Whydoes it operate on a one year timetable?
3) What is theprocedure for obtaining additional resources from theTreasury?
4) How and why has the EA team managed to persuade ministers of the needfor
additional resources (at a timewhen all other housing expenditure is declining)?
The EA procedures
1) Form A: How are schemes decided upon? On what basesare the decisions made
to reject/accept schemes? (Hasthischanged over time?)
2) Form B: How are schemes decided upon?On what basesare the decisions made
to reject/accept schemes? (Hasthischanged over time?)
Specific EA issues of concern to authorities
Are authoritiesjustified in feeling that the emphasis on criteria change
continually; why has this (or perception) comeabout?
['goal-post keep moving': 1stprivate sect; thenEBM; nowemployment initiative
24% leads to delays; 37% ill-defined; 24% lack of ranking was a problem
Only 36% knewwhatEA wouldnot fund; 69% thateven thischangedover time].
Are theyjustifiedin feeling that the timetable is inadequate and makes
programming
extremely problematic?
[70% a chiefdisadvantage of EA is inadequate nature of its timetable
50% 'unreasonable delays' between B + final approval primarily because of
timetabling difficulty: even if IT is brought forward, more resourcess to process]
Local authortities believe the EA is overbureaucratic - is this the case?
74% experienced 'unreasonable delays' between Form b and final approval
71% saiddelaysprimarily because ofEA's administration in processiong bids
Resulted in delayed scheme opening dates (70%); increased tenantfrustration (87%)
LAs argue tenant consultation is invariably less than 'full and effective' despite
EA's emphasis on it. What is your reaction?
65% has not resulted in greaterTC thanotherwise (70% satisfied withexisting
levels;
30% because expected to consultplan and submitbids too quickly)
35% had not resulted in greaterTC because of fearof raisingTenants'expect
MostTC tookplaceat later stage, mainly at B + littleongoing Te. CounterEA?
They argue that it results in a highly inefficient capital allocation system (with
both underallocation/very late allocation and underspending). How do you respond?
LAs argueEA underspent proportion of totalEA HIP in 1986n and 1987/8
LAs point to ROs asking for schemes v.Iate in year+ homeless initiatives
87% saidEA admin andIT adversely affected whetherall allocation spent(most
could only do so by working 'at risk'; 39% underspent. Is it wasteful; can it be
improved?
Future of EA
1)Will new financial regulations affect any of the following changeand how:
• the timetabling arrangements
• theadministrative procedures
• thecapital allocation system
3) Will the system be more efficient and how?
4) How muchlongerwill theEA initiative last in this form?
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Appendix 3: Case-Study Interviews
L..Jjistory of the Estate and EA Scheme: Coordinator A
History of the estate (how did it come to acquire the label 'problem'estate and
what was the imageof the estateby press, LA staff, tenants):
• Whatexactlyis the authority's procedure for choosing EA scheme candidates: 'fit'
EA criteria; worstestates, LA priorities, TC etc?Is primary consideration LNtenant
or EA priorities/criteria?
Procedure for creation of bid/scheme:
Form A:
Whichis the leadprofession involved in coordinating theEA scheme, nature(and
stage) of it:
Housing:
Tenants and tenantconsultation (which formofTC at this stage?):
OtherImportant actors ego Architects; Planners; Finance: theirrole?
• What was thenature (andwhom) of involvement withROs/EA central
before/during/after formation of FormA?
• Mainproblems and issues arising at FormA stage(eg. in getting the bid together»
in general):
Form B:
Whichis the leadprofession involved in coordinating theEA scheme:
What is the nature (andstage) of the involvement of the following:
Housing:
Tenants and tenant consultation (which formofTC at this stage?):
OtherImportant Actors (eg. Finance; Planners and Architects):
Creation of tender documents: preparation:
what are the stages and whatexactly is involved? Whoare the agents/individuals
involved anddegree of coordination necessary?
How longdid it takefor thisscheme (andin general)?
Are there anycosts to theauthority (anything different as resultof EA involvement)?
Committee stage: whatis involved in getting approval?
Whatwas thenature (andwhom) of involvement withROs/EA central
Before/during/after formation of FormB? How important were they in the success of
bid?
Main problems and issues arising at Form B stage:
• Consultation exercises: exactly what form, when, how,quality, contribution and
degreeof change madeas resultpossible or not?Why (not) time,costs,
unwillingness, other?
• Employment/union issues: anydealings necessary with unions? changedjob
descriptions/ wages/safety/other issues arising?
• Implementation process: showdiagram. Maindifficulties with set-up regarding:
EA; ROs; Contractors/tenders; TA; Other
• Indication of success of the scheme: anyevaluations! basis to judge whetherscheme
is succeeding or not?
• Any othercomments, issues, problems, recommendations?
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, ""',·"1
2. EA, past. present and future; Coordinator B
Timetable: '
• Sufficient/do youfeel that its getting better?
• Do youfeel reasonfor complain is because LAs needed timeto adjustand gear
themselves up forEA and notproblem anymore?
• How to improve this?
Administration:
Still largeburden or getting better?; Ableto fill forms morequickly?
Is it easierworking withlargenumber of agents in implementing EA schemes?
How to improve things?
Criteria:
Is therenowlessconfusion over criteria themselves? Why (not)?
Is therenowlessconfusion over emphasis on criteria? Why (not)?
How to improve this?
Tenant consultation:
Does it stillonlyhappen at form B?Why (not)?
Is this improving over time?
Whatare themain problems involved?
Betterthanauthority would otherwise have done?
System of capital allocations:
Less underspending over time?
New fiancial regulations how will thigs change
Moreefficient system?
Policy commmunity: What kind of involvement does your authority have
regarding EA?
CCLGF; HCC; LAAs
7) How important has your interpretation of what EA is about/how it is changing,
been for the
1) selection of estates
2) selection of type of initiative
3) influencing councillor attitude to EA
4) influencing promotion of new housing management initiatives in authority
5) influencing willingness in involving private sector
How far has authority knowingly usedEA and manipulated it to own advantage; in
what ways?
8) Overall, has the existence of the EA initiative been positive to your authority?
• Specifically, in what ways hasEA beenpositive?
• Specifically, in whatother wayshas EA beennegative?
• Whatmorewould you like to see changed in the wayEA operates?
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3, Chair' of Housinl:/Councillor interview
The Importance of EA
1.Whathas beenthecouncil's attitude to EA initiative initiallyand now?
2. What is its attitude specifically to the fact thatEA forces investment into the most
problematic section of your stock?
3. How do EA aimsrelate to the council's policiesand priorities in termsof:
• 'top-slicing'
• involvement of theprivatesector
• diversification of tenure
• estatebasedmanagement/decentralisation
• employment initiatives
4. How significant is EA HIP to your authority's housing programme?
Programming for EA
1. Does bidding for EA HIP have any repercussions (+veor -ve) in termsof the
council's
own housing policy/priorities (in wider terms)?
2. What is the procedure for working EA HlP allocations through committee stages;
Secondly regarding continuation funding?
3. How does it differ from HIP, and what are the main problems/issues that it raise?
Usefulness of the 'targetted' finance system
1.DoesEA result in an increase or marginalisation of member input into schemes?
2. What is general attitude to distributional effectsof 'targeting' problem estates?
3. Has existence of EA neutered political debatesaboutwhereH investment is to go?
4. Are you generally satisfied with yourauthority's involvement with EA? Why/not
5. How efficient do you think thismethodhas been in achieving its statedaims
6. Whatare the advantages and the disadvantages of this initiative?
7. What other system of targetting wouldyou prefer and why?
8. Overall how successful has EA been in your authority?
The future of EA
1. How do you see your authority's involvement withEA in the future? Especially
regardingthe 'Employment Initiative'?
2. Why do you thinkEA has beenreceiving increasing resources at a time when
everything else is beingrationalised? (management issues; and government housing
policy issues)
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~ousinl: Director Interyiew
EA's Importance
1.How far was it the availability of resources whichled to yourcollaboration with
EA?
2. Was it resources which convinced a) H department and b) councillors to be
involved withEA; andwhathas beenboththeirattitude to EA? Changed in any way?
3.How significant is EA HIP to the authority's housingprogramme now?
4. How clear/precise waspolicystatement: hasLA usedthe ambiguity (how)?
5. EA usedprimarily to pursue LAs aimsand priorities or because of its objectives?
6. Has EA affected yourattitude towards the importance of management/HMls?
7. Has EA affected yourattitude to involvement withprivatesector/others eg HAs?
8. How far does involvement aid/undermine LAs widerh policyconsiderations?
'Targetted' HIPs
1. Did thecouncil tendto neglect suchestates in the past?Whatwas thepolicy?
2. Has EA affected yourattitude towards such estates (how)?
3. Whatproportion of resources wentintodifficult to let estatesbefore/now?
4. DoesEA increase targeting more effectively to where it is needed?
5. Is it always yourmostproblematic estates whichgetEA resources and Why?
Implementing EA
1. Whatdo you believe to be the worst aspects of the initiative, particularly in terms
of the implementation procedure (show EA policy community)?
• several agents withdifferent roles (coordination, agreement necessary)
• the administrative procedures (stafftimeand costs)
• the timetable (anypressures created - which)
• thechanging emphasis/criteria
• 'other'aspects worthraising (implications of all abovefor EA + schemes)
Impact of EA
1. Howdo youevaluate the impactof theEA schemes in yourauthority?
2. Are there plans to buildupon the experience of the pilot in therest of stock?
Why/not?
3. Why do you think EA resources have beenincreasing?
4. Is it primarily because of the management issues or the political?
5. What is the government hoping to do via EA?
6. Has it forced problem estates more into youragendanow?
7. Has it forced management and HMls, TC etc into your agenda?
Future of EA
1. How do youview EA in the context ofrecent housing legislation in general. Is it
part of tighter controls/decimation of council housing?
2. Whatdo you thinkof the changes in EA - empl issues+ fewer/larger schemes.
3. How do you see EA developing/surviving in the future?
4. To whatextenthas EA beensymbolic and how (whatways) far has it been
substantive (regardless od whether positive or negative to authority).
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Significance of EA
1.Locate EA andEA HIP system of capital allocations within thecontextof the
changes in thefinancial climate of housing authorities in the lastdecade?
2. Is EA HIP 'top-sliced or not in your view and why?
3. Is the authority 'in subsidy'? Can EA HIP be consideredas 'additional'?
4. Why are 'targetting' mechanisms morepopularwith DoE (eg homeless I)?
5. DoesEA achieve its aim of focusing resources where theyare most needed here?
EA HIPS and HIPs
1.How is the threeyearrolling capital programme affected as a resultof EA
HIP/schemes and whatareconsequences for medium/long termplanning (gearing
EA HIP to HIPs)
3. Whathappens if approval arrives late in the financial year; howis it
accommodated; difficulties of fitting it intomainstream; Anyconsequences?
4. Compare EA HIP withHIPs in termsof ease/efficiency of capital programming.
5. Whatare theproblems and side-effects? Is it improving as LAs become usedto it?
6. Whatcomplications arise fromyour authority's particular management structure?
EA HIP and Continuation Funding
1. Continuation funding is neverguaranteed. Whatare the problems/consequences
and contingencies which you set-up to cope with this?
2. What wouldhappen if EA was to renegeon its 'promised' funding?
3. Have you always received continuation funding?
Underspending and Underallocating
1. Has the authority ever underspent on EA HIPs?What proportions & why?
2. What are theconsequences if EA underallocates/authority underspends - lost?
3. Which stepsare taken to deal with the situation? Donefrequently? Problems?
4. Is it mainly LA, EA, Contractor's fault? Are things improving as LA gets geared-
up or not?
LA HIPs and additional costs to LA's:
1. Can authority cope with the 50%HIPscontribution? via capital receipts?
2. And whataboutrevenue costs/repayments - howare thesecovered?
>3. How do theseincreased costs affectauthority's financial position - especially if it
is rate-capped? Does it deter you from bidding for ego staff-intensive schemes?
EA HIP and housing finance:
1.LocateENEA HIP in thecontextof Government's latestBill for finance - better?
Issues brought up.
2. Will it result in a less tightEA timetable (to set-up scheme and spendresources)?
3. Will it be any moreefficient in terms of underallocation and underspending?
4. Will EA and similar'targeting' systems continuing to be usedin the future?
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Appendix 4: Canvasslng'I'enant Opinions
Date of interview: _____ Interview number:
Nameof theEstate/Area:
Typeof Dwelling: D semi!detached D terrace D maisonnette D mediumrise D highrise
Estate Action and its Role in Renovating the Area/Estate:
This questionnaire is concerned with the changes which have takenplace in this area/estatein the
recent past. It attempts to identify whetherthe changeswhich haveoccurredare what you wanted
to happen,and to find out whetheryou perceivethat the changeshave been worthwhile and good
for the area in general. Therefore a distinction is alwaysmade between the situation whichexistec
prior to the changes, and the current situation as a result of them.
1) In renovating the estate, your authorityworkedin partnership with a government bodyknow I
Estate Action. Did you know of the existence of this partnership?
o No DYes
(If no, tell them a little aboutEstate Action's role, and that you want to investigate the
relationship between them and the authority as well as the before/after situation).
2) Were you (at all) involved in the consultation processwhich took place to discuss the
proposedchanges to the estate?
o No 0 Yes (little) D Yes (greatly) How? _
3) What form did thisconsultation take and how effective/useful do you think it was?
~ Tenant surveys e~~~~dDoor to door visits and interviews QuitegoodPublic meetings and open days NeutralAdverts,poster and presentations QuitepoorOther Verypoor
4) How much change to the proposals occurredas a resultof the consultation process?
o Little D Substantial D Don't Knowo None
Changes: _
Evaluation of the Before and After Situation:
If imageof block
itself was different
&W those answers!
Options:
Verygood
Quitegood
Neutral
Quitepoor
Verypoor
1) Imageof the area: How would youdescribe what the generalattitude to this estate/block
was before the scheme,and how this has changedsince then, if at all:
Before:After:
~-f.--4 As seen by the residents
1---+---1 As seen by outsiders to the estate
1---+--1 As portrayed by the media (eg localpapers)
1---+--1 As understood by the housingofficers
L---.l.-.... As seen by the police
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2) The actual estate: Whatdid you personally perceive theestateto be like in terms of the
following?
Before'After
The friendliness, neighbourliness and atmosphere
Themanagement facilities available nearat hand
The levelof vandalism, graffitti etc
The levelof criminality (break-ins, muggings etc.)
The degree of safety bothinside andoutsidehome
Otherfactors
Options'
Verygood
Quitegood
Neutral
Quitepoor
Verypoor
If theactual block
itselfwasdifferent
add thoseanswers!
3) The stateof yourown dwelling, bothinternal andexternal: Onceagain, pleaseindicate
what the situation was like bothbefore theEstate Action scheme, and afterwards:
Before'After Internal:
The state of thedecoration
The stateof the doors and windows
The quality of sound-proofing
Theexistence of condensation, drafts etc
Theexistence of adequate (central) heating
The state of thekitchen
Before:Aftcr External:
EB The appearence of the dwellingThe general state of repairof thedwellingThe structural soundness of the dwelling
Options;
Very good
Quite good
Neutral
Quite poor
Very poor
4) The housing management of the areaand the services provided: This section looksat
how these havechanged andresulted in improvements:
Before:After
The general appearence andcleanliness of the estate (grass verges, fences, gardens)
J----lf--+ The general appearence and cleanliness of the dwellings (lifts,corridors, stairwells)
~--ll---+ The facilities provided for tenants (eg playgrounds, gardens)
J----lf--+ The degree and quality of consultation between tenants andcouncil
The usefulness of T. A. in meeting tenantdemands
Ease of getting access andcontactwithhousing staff
Staff friendliness, approachability and helpfulness
Degree of attention andpersonal service received
Staffcompetence and control over the housing functions
J----lf--+ The degree to which 'thingsget done'
J----lf--+ The speedof response by theHousing Department
The speed and quality of the repairs service
5) Do you believe that there willcontinue to be improvements in the future?
DNo DYes o Not known Why: _
336
6) Whatdo youfeel about thedifferent management arrangements sincethescheme started?
OUnchanged OVery satisfied o Quite satisfied
DNeither o Quite dissatisfied OVery dissatisfied
7) Please indicate whatmoreyou wouldlike to seedone to the following (in terms of your
ownpriorities):
The inside of yourdwelling: _
The outside of yourdwelling: _
The neighbourhood!estate/environment: _
The·management of yourestate/area: _
The local facilities (eg. shops): _
Otherfactors: _
7) Are youa council tenant or an owneroccupier?
D C.T. D 0.0. D H.A. D Co-Op D Other. _
8) Please answerthe following questions to finish the interview:
Before: Now:
WWereyou thinking of transferring out of the estate?Wereyou thinking of buying yourdwelling?All in all, are satisfied with living in theestate/area?All in all, are you satisfied with thequality of council's housing service?
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Appendix 5: Procedure and managerial information
Estate/Scheme:
Local Authority: _
Basic Information on the Estate
When built: _
Designmethod: _
Numberof unitson estate:--:_~ _
Numberof units involved in the scheme: _
Type of construction in the scheme: _
Basic Information on the Scheme
Form A
Date of EA invitation for submission: _-:---=- _
date when form was submitted to regional office/EA: _
closingdate: _
Form B
date wheninvitedto work-up scheme in greaterdetail: _
date whenform was submitted to regional office/EA: _
closingdate: _
Final approval: when was it received fromEA: _
How long to spend the allocation (in principle): _
How many weeks from A to Final approval: _
How much was bid for: _
How much approved: _
How much was final cost: --::-- _
How much was EA contribution: _
Form C:
How many forms sent to EA: _
Spending going to plan?: -:----::---:-- _
Historyof spendand costs involved:
Form D: (Much Improved; Improved; NoChange; Worse; Much Worse):
Housing Statistics: EA: before/after LA: beforeLafter
void levels
Re-lets
Vacancies
Transfer requests
R-T-B applications
Arrears
speed of repairs: house. lifts
Crime. Vandalism etc
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Appendix 6: Additional Postal Survey Information
Introduction
Chapter 5 presented a detailed analysis of a postal survey covering all the
housing authorities which were participating in the Estate Action programme at the
time. Not all the information which was obtained from the survey was presented in
chapter 5 since it was not considered to be directly relevant to the analysis.
Nevertheless, because this particular housing initiative is under-researched, further
details which may be of interest are presented in this appendix.
Background information: bids, procedures and finance
Table A6.1 illustrates that although the average number of council dwellings in
each EA scheme is 515.5 units, the majority of schemes are fairly small, primarily in
the 1-200 category. These represent fairly small and manageable areas or parts of
estates which conform to PEP guidelines about the optimum size of initiatives.
We now turn to an analysis of the basic EA bid statistics (Table A6.2). In the
first years of operation, 69%; 88%; and 100% (of the 40 authorities in our sample)
submitted EA bids. The success rates (bids versus approved schemes) were 71%;
46.4%; and 51.9% respectively. This confirms that increasingly more authorities
have become involved with the EA initiative in an attempt to obtain extra housing
investment resources. This made it easier for EA to pick and choose bids from the
second year of its operation onwards. By 1988/89, only 80 out of the 154 bids
submitted to EA were actually rewarded with allocations, thus underlining EA's
power relative to local authorities.
Since a frequent complaint was of unreasonable delays on the part of EA, an
attempt is made to gauge the average waiting period between the time local authorities
submit Form B's to EA and the time they were given final approval to spend. Table
A6.3 shows that EA has been steadily improving the amount of time it takes in
processing the bids, thus promising to ease some of the complaints raised in the
course of the survey. However, by disaggregating the figures, we can obtain an
understanding of whether and how the waiting period varies according to the type of
bid submitted to EA (see Table A6.4). The average waiting period for 1986-89, was
3.8 months, but the security & environmental and private sector schemes take longer
and CRSs take a disproportionately long time to be processed and ftnalised.
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Table A6.1: Mean Number of Dwellings per EA Scheme
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Source: Local Authority Survey
Table A6.2: Authorities Using EA HIPs: EA Bids Made and Success Rates
1986/87 1987/88 1989/89
No. Authorities Bidding 28 35 40
No. of Bids Made 69 157 154
No. of successful Authorities 26 34 25
No. of successful bids made 51 73 80
Missing Cases=O;1;8 (not approval by December 1988)
Source: Local Authority Survey
34 0
Table A6 .3: Average Time Period Necessary to Process EA Bids
1986- 1989 1986-19 87
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Vl
-5§ 7-8 ltf@11 9.8 %
~
5.6%
32.4%
15%
10 20 30 40 50
% of Schemes
60 70 10 20 30 40 50 60
% of Schemes
70
1987-88 1988-1989
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
67 .5%
1-2 ••••••••••am
5-6 0%
7-8
9-10
10- 12 0%
33.3%
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% of Schemes
60 70 10 20 30 40 50
% of Schemes
60 70
Note:
Number of schemes for the four periods was respectively: 71 , 20 , 27 and 24
Average waiting period for the four periods was respectively: 3.8, 5.1, 3.6 and 2.9
Source: Local Authority Survey
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Table A6.4: Average Time Period ecessary to Process EA Bids by Scheme type
Average Waiting Period in Months
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Table A6.5: EA's Average Contribution per Scheme (EA HIPs)
1986-89 1986-87
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Note:
Average % of EA HIP for the four periods was: 77.8 ; 74 .5; 82.6 and 75. 7
100% EA-fund ed for the four periods was: 43.3 ; 50; 46. 1 and 34.7
Missing Cases: II ; I; 1; I (for four period s)
Source: Local Authority Survey
343
/
The next table (A6.5) examines both ENs contribution (on average) in terms of the
total investment necessary for the schemes and analyses change over time. The
results reveal a high proportion of total funding via EA HIPs, normally over 60%.
10% of the schemes received no EA funding at all in 1986-87 but this becomes
negligible in the following years. While the average proportion of EA HIPs received
across all the schemes in the sample remained more or less constant, the most
'revealing figure is the proportion which was fully funded via EA HIPs. In keeping
with EA's decree that authorities must meet a proportion of the schemes' cost from
mainstream HIPs, there has been a corresponding decrease in the proportion of
schemes which were 100% EA HIPs funded, indicating the Unit's success in
encouraging this trend. In other words, not only are the EA HIPs resources
'targeted' by type of scheme, area and stock which the DoE decides, but
increasingly, the local authorities' own investment is being directed towards these
areas too, in order to support their bids and enhance the prospects of success.
The next logical step is to analyse the average amount which authorities had to
contribute towards these schemes (Table A6.6). This is naturally, the reverse trend
of the EA HIPs contribution with authorities rarely subscribing over 60% of the
schemes' .total investment. It is equally clear that over time, EA has forced
authorities to increase their input to the schemes (from their own resources),
something which authorities have vigorously complained about but are, nevertheless,
complying with.
The last table (A6.7) represents a compilation of all the financial information
together with indications of the jobs involved in EA schemes. The results are
discussed chronologically below:
1. Average amount of EA funding by type of initiative (£ EA HIPs): This indicates
the magnitude of the EA HIPs in real terms, again broken down by type of initiative.
The main point worth making, apart from the fact that Table A6.7 reveals just how
expensive these schemes normally are, is the disproportionate amount which
, schemes involving, the private sector command, but the limited sample can be
misleading (Missing =I concierge; I private sector; 6 Sec & Env.; and 5 'other').
2. Average amount of LA funding by type of bid (£ LA HIPs): The figures can
be translated from crude percentage points into real figures, giving a rough estimate
of the amount of resource which authorities must find for each of the various
initiatives which EA encourages. EA may have the intention of targeting resources,
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Table A6.6: Local Authorities' Average Contribution per Scheme (LA HIPs)
1986-89 1986-87
5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30
15.9%
5
5
26%
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8 1-10081-100 0%
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% of Schemes
5 10 15 20 25 30
% of Schemes
No te:
Average % of LA HIP s for the four periods was: 17.7%; 9.8 %; 18%; 24.4 %
Source: Local Authority Survey
Missing Cases: 11 ; 1; 2; 1 (for four periods)
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Table A6.7:A Compilation of Financial and Employment Statistics (1986-1989)
~
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o ~ ~ 0 l:::: 0~ p.. e= ..... ;) >.~ ..... 0 ~ 0:r:: :r:: .t:: ~ .... -
'P. .... II) 0-
-c s 9 :s ~ 0~ "2Type of Initiative: 0 CJJ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ Z ~
Concierges 8 (11) 248,286 0 625 54,667 4.8 0
CRS'~ 2 (3) 126,000 0 1,144,50( 35,000 2.0 0
Estate Manmt 17 (24) 954,353 325,514 20,059 28,093 1.1 0.3
Homeless Schemes 2 (3) 229,500 20,000 0 20,000 0 0
Private Sector 2 (3) 1,790,00C 0 42,000 0 0.5 0
Refurbishment 10 (14) 689,444 206,111 0 40,210 0.4 0
Security & Env. 21 (29) 533,733 204,798 44,857 39,747 1 0.9
Cooperatives 3 (4) 409,333 40,000 0 14,000 0 0.7
Other Initiatives 3 (4) 502,500 28,250 0 0 0.7 0.4
Source: Local Authority Survey
but authorities must 'pull their own weight', although the great bulk of finance
clearly comes from EA (Missing Cases: 1 refurbishment; 4 Sec & Env.; and 3 other).
3. Average amount of 'other' funding by type of initiative (£ 'Other'): In terms of
other sources of funding contributing towards EA schemes, these were rather limited
and came primarily from the Urban Programme in support of CRS schemes and not
from the private sector, whose contribution was fairly insignificant (No Missing
Cases). Whatever hopes the Treasury may have entertained about 'levering-in'
private sector funding, have been dashed.
4. Average revenue costs to LAs per scheme by type of bid (£ LA Revenue):
Over and above the 'one off capital costs, there are also additional resources that
have to be found in terms of the running costs involved or revenue costs per scheme.
In 1986-89, the mean revenue costs paid per EA scheme (p.a.) was £33,332.
Broken down, this translates itself into 1986-87 =£33,627; 1987-88 =£28,809; and
1988·89 =£38,597. Once again, these can be more meaningfully refined by
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breaking-down the revenue costs by typeof initiative (Missing Cases: 5 concierges; 3
estatemanagement; 2 Sec & Env.; and 6 other).
5. Average number of new/redeployed staff per EA initiative (New Staff &
Redeployed): The last aspectrefers to the employment generated by the EA schemes
(or the number of staffre-deployed as a resultof theseinitiatives). The meannumber
of new staff was only 1.3 and the equivalent figure for redeployed staff was a
minimal 0.4 (No Missing Cases). No attempt was made to elucidate whatproportion
of the new/redeployed staff came from within the estates themselves. This was
partly because EA emphasis on 'employment initiatives' is a more recent
phenomenon and partlybecause it would haveintroduced unbearable complexity into
the questionnaire survey which would have affected the response rates obtained.
Nevertheless, the impactof the initiative (in termsof job generation) seems to be very
low thus far, but is certain to change with EA's new-found emphasis on
employment/enterprise initiatives.
347
Appendix 7: Tenant's Opinions: EA's impact in renovating
estates
For reasons set out in chapter 3, this section was not considered 'robust'
enough to be presented in the main body of the text, nevertheless, the results are
considered to be important in adding context to the thesis and is, therefore, presented
here. A number of questions were posed to tenants living in the four case-study
schemes in an attempt understand the extent to which the developments on the estates
have impacted on people's lives via their housing environment. The questions are
presented below with an assessment of the conclusions to be drawn.
1) "Did you know of the existence of a partnership between your authority and a
government body known as Estate Action?"
The tenants in all the case-studies knew that their authority had worked in partnership
with EA, except for the private sector initiative, where the original tenants had been
decanted to properties elsewhere in the authority.
2) "Were you involved in the consultation process which discussed the proposed
changes to the estate?":
• Concierge: Yes (greatly), but this occurred: "... because of the tenants themselves
organising sit-ins, petitions and forcing the council to respond" .
• Private Sector: Not applicable (all former tenants were decanted)
• Refurbishment: Yes (greatly) but: "Because the TA had been campaigning for years
to get the GLC to do something. A detailed proposal had been worked out for a
number of the blocks, but independently of the EA bid".
• Estate Management: No: but aware of some consultation exercises.
3&4) This discussion tried to ascertain the form of consultation which took place, the
tenants' view of its usefulness, and the degree of change which had occurred to the
original proposals, as a result of the consultation process:
• Concierge: The only consultation which took place was in the form of four public
meetings which were poorly attended. The tenants were neutral about the value of
the exercise. Little change occurred to the proposals (eg. more lighting).
• Private Sector: Not applicable
• Refurbishment: A substantial degree of consultation occurred in preparing a
Greater London Council (GLC) proposal, but as regards the specific EA scheme,
there were several public meetings and open days with the council as well as adverts,
posters and presentations. Other forms of consultation with EA, the ROs and PEP
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representatives were also felt to be important. Overall, while the degree of
consultation was regarded as being very good, the tenants were able to effect little
change to the EA proposals: "It was presented as sfait accompli which could not be
meddled with, if it was to have a chance of succeeding. The only exception was the
asbestos removal where the TA took a strong line over safety procedures and won".
• Estate Management: There was a feeling that the door-to-door visits, public
meetings and open days represented very good consultation and that substantial
change to the original proposals had occurred, such as the installation of additional
central heating, window replacement and loft insulation.
5) "Do you believe there will continue to be improvements in the future?"
• Concierge: The residents believed that there would not be further improvements
because: "The council has now invested as much in the estate as it is prepared to".
• Private Sector: The general opinion was that: "It really depends on the people.
They are 'moaners' around here which is good. It means that things may get done".
• Refurbishment: The response was 'Not Known': "It depends on the availability of
cash by the council".
• Estate Management: There were positive expectations: "It will improve
environmentally once all the works on the estate are completed. There are now very
few voids and the quality of life has improved. There will also be further
improvements once the Tenant Management Board is set up".
6) "How do you feel about the different management arrangements?"
• Concierge: Quite satisfied
• Private Sector: Quite satisfied
• Refurbishment: Quite satisfied
• Estate Management: Very satisfied
7) Although there does seem to be a level of satisfaction with the current
arrangements (see Table A7), one cannot conclude that there is nothing else which
needs to be done to the estate. To find out if there were outstanding priorities, the
next section of the survey asked residents to: "Indicate what more you would like to
see done (in terms of your own priorities)?"
7a) "Improvements to the inside of the dwellings":
• Concierge: The wallpaper and the kitchen facilities need to be replaced; the water is
misty and tastes awful; the bathrooms leak and need to be replaced as do the
windows; and the piping is noisy and inefficient.
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• Private Sector: Three main problems were identified, apart from the awkward
location of the radiators. These included the replacement of some of windows which
generate condensation, the installation of additional cupboards in the kitchen, and
there were complaints about the lack of an airing cupboard.
• Refurbishment: The 'splash tiling' in the sink and kitchen should be increased; the
flats wall-papered; and the door handles and cupboards replaced.
• Estate Management: The kitchens need to be improved and re-wired.
7b) "Improvements to the outside of the dwelling":
• Concierge: More lighting outside the block and the stone-work cleaned up.
• Private Sector: There was strong feeling that the garden needed to be laid properly
and that residents' car parking space was being abused by visitors and others.
• Refurbishment: The fire escape exits should be looked at, but apart from that, better
security for the Ocean Estate as a whole, via TV-entry phones.
• Estate Management: The doors need to be made more secure and solid. Possibly
the houses also need to be re-roofed.
7c) "Improvements to the estate/environment":
• Concierge: There is a need for a playground, the outside benches and the broken
paving should be replaced and the estate needs improved lighting for safety reasons.
• Private Sector: Residents have two complaints, namely that the road leading to the
estate was a 'disgrace' and needs to be resurfaced, and something had to be done
about the noise from both trains and road vehicles.
• Refurbishment: More playgrounds, trees /landscaping, and better maintenance of
the block against vandalism.
• Estate Management: The estate needs to be cleaned up and better maintained.
7d) "Improvements 0 the management of the estate/area":
• Concierge: The need to book appointments to meet estate managers was felt to be
inconvenient; and the rubbish is dangerous and must be cleaned.
• Private Sector: There was agreement that two cleaners for the whole estate was
patently inadequate to maintain it.
• Refurbishment: There ought to be greater investment into caretaking and staffing,
greater attempts to make tenants obey their tenancy agreements, a permanent local
repairs office, and more management tasks should be devolved.
• Estate Management: The neighbourhood office could be better staffed and would
benefit from a community liaison officer, whose purpose would be solely to help the
tenants with their problems.
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Table A7.1: Tenant Opinions: Evaluation of the 'Before and After' Situation
Key: Codesfor the Responses
++ =VeryGood
+ =QuiteGood
o =Neutral
- =QuitePoor
-- =VeryPoor
• =No data/Don't know
1) Image of the area: How would you describe whatthe general attitudeto this estate/block wasbeforethe
scheme.and how thishas changed since then. if at all:
Concierge
Before After
Private Sector Refurbishment Estate Management
Before After Before After Before After
As seenby the residents
As seenby outsiders to theestate
As portrayed by the media(eg localpapers)
As understood by the housing officers
As seenby thepolice
--
++
--
+
_.
•
--
++
--
+
• ++
• ++
• •
• ++
• ++
--
+
--
+
0 +
0 0
• •
; 0
o
2) The actual estate: Whatdid you personally perceive theestate to be like in terms of the following:
Concierge
Before After
Private Sector Refurbishment Estate Management
Before After Before After Before After
Friendliness, neighbourliness and atmosphere
Management facilities available nearat hand
Levelof vandalism, graffitti etc
Levelof criminality (break-ins, muggings etc)
Degree of safetybothinside and outside home
Other factors
- -
+ +
-- --
-- --
0 0
• •
• ++
• +
• ++
• ++
• ++
• •
0 +
0 +
0
-
- -
0 0
• •
++ ++
-
++
--
+
• •
-
+
• •
3) The internal state of your own dwelling:Please indicate whatthe situation was likebothbeforethe Estate
Actionscheme, and afterwards:
Internal:
Concierge
Before Afler
Private Sector
Before After
Refurbishment Estate Management
Before After Before After
Stateof thedecoration
Stateof thedoorsand windows
Quality of sound-proofing
Existence of condensation, drafts etc
Existence of adequate (central) heating
Stateof thekitchen
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-- --
+ +
-- --
- --
+ +
- -
• 0
•
-
• 0
•
-
• +
• +
--
++
--
++
+ +
--
++
--
+
-- +
--
++
-
+
--
+
-
++
0 ++
.. +
4) The external state of your own dwelling: Pleaseindicate what the situation was like bothbefore theEstate
Action scheme, and afterwards:
m
++
o 0
• •
External:
Appearence of the dwelling
General stateof repairof the dwelling
Structural soundness of the dwelling
Concierge
Before After
m
---
- -
• •
Private Sector
Before After§§++• •
• •
Refurbishment Estate Management
Before After Before After
m
- ++
-- ++
+ +
5) The housing management of the area and the services provided: Howhave thesechanged and resulted in
improvements: Concierge
Before After
Private Sector Refurbishment Estate Management
Before After Before After Before After
Appcarence &cleanliness of estate(verges, fences)
Appearence& cleanliness of the dwellings (corridors, stairs)
Facilities provided for tenants (playgrounds. gardens)
Degree & quality of consultation between tenants and council
Usefulnessof TenantAssociation in meeting tenantdemands
Easeof getting access andcontactwithhousing staff
Staff friendliness, approachability and helpfulness
Degree of attention and personal service received
Staff competence andcontrol over the housing functions
Degree to which 'things getdone'
Speed of response by the Housing Department
Speed andquality of the repairs service
--
+
0 0
0 0
+
--
0 0
+ +
++ ++
+ +
0 0
+ +
• •
-- -
• +
• ++
•
-
•
--
• •
• •
• ++
• ++
• •
• •
• •
• ++
-
+
-
0
-
+
+ +
++ ++
--
+
++ ++
-
+
-
+
--
0
-
0
0 0
--
++
--
++
--
+
0 +
0 0
--
+
++ ++
0 0
--
+
--
++
--
+
0 0
6) Satisfaction with housing tenure Concierge
Before After
Private Sector
Before After
Refurbishment Estate Management
Before After Before After
Were/Are youa council tenant (owner occupier)?
Were/Are you thinking of transferring out of the estate?
Were/Are you thinking of buying your dwelling?
Were/Are yousatisfied living in the estate/area?
Satisfied withquality of council's housing service?
Source: TenantInterview
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y y
y y
N N
N •
Y y
• y
• N
• •
• y
• y
y y
N N
N N
N Y
• •
y y
N N
N Y
Y Y
N y
7e) "Improvements to the local facilities":
• Concierge: Tenants felt that they have very good common facilities.
• Private Sector: One tenant felt a clear need for more local facilities such as shops as
'You can't get anything at all in here" but concurred with the others that perhaps it
was 'just as well' as local shops would lead to youngsters being attracted to the area
and result in possible problems for the estate. The solution suggested was that
perhaps a van could be arranged which would sell basic goods.
• Refurbishment: The laundry should be re-opened and more playgrounds and
parking facilities provided for the residents.
• Estate Management: Residents felt that: "the council ought to be able to do
something for the teenagers, and not just clubs."
70 "Improvements to 'other' factors":
• Concierge: The council promised that it would put a better class of person in the
block, but: "They are throwing the same sort of people here which cause trouble and
problems for the other tenants in the building. They are very particular about which
people they put into houses and some flats, but they shove anyone here!"
• Private Sector: The main complaints related to the poor bus service and that the bus
stop was inconveniently located. Additionally, it was felt that since the great majority
of tenants are middle-aged/retired, a pedestrian crossing should be provided to allow
them to cross the busy main road, and also that lifts should be installed in the flats.
Lastly, dogs were seen as a nuisance and contravened the tenancy rules.
• Refurbishment: Tenants felt that too many families were living in over-crowded
conditions and that the council should consider enlarging some flats to cope with the
problem. A new roof also had to be provided as a priority.
• Estate Management: Efforts should be made to improve the estate's image even
though at the moment, its a bit like 'flogging a dead horse'.
8) Finally (see Table A7), only one tenant now wished to buy the dwelling, which
can be read as a good sign for both EA and the authorities though for different
reasons. Additionally, only one tenant wished to transfer out of the estate, and it was
the same tenant who had indicated that (s)he had planned to do this in the 'before'
situation. All those who answered, were now happy to live in their estate and were
also satisfied with the quality of the councils' service. These are rudimentary, but
useful indicators of tenant satisfaction with their living environment.
Given' the nature of the survey methodology, firm conclusions cannot be
proffered. However, within the context of this part of the research, the results are
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regarded as being important and useful. The first point is that the tenants' responses
both support and enhance the housing management statistics provided by the housing
officers for the four case-studies (Table A7); the positive EA Central. RD. and local
authority comments; and the survey results (Table 5.24). Taken together. this
constitutes a substantial body of evidence that suggests that. not only is the situation
improving in all the four case-studies (and beyond according to the survey results).
but more importantly, that these schemes are actually meeting tenants' individual
wants and needs.
Secondly, the degree to which the situation has changed demonstrates
substantial improvements in a short period of time, and often to opposite extremes -
from very poor to very good (see Table A7). Whereas many previous council
attempts to improve the situation led both to limited or nonexistent success and to a
belief that the problems in many of these estates so deep as to be almost intransigent.
the notion of targeting resources, not only to where they are most needed. but also in
larger amounts and in the ways prescribed by EA, is broadly having the desired
impact. Despite the centre-local antipathy that exists and all the implementation and
financial inefficiencies of the initiative (which have been amply demonstrated in
successive chapters), there remains little doubt that, in the case of EA, the notion of
directing resources in specific ways and localities does work. Broadly similar
processes may well occur in the other government-inspired targeting mechanisms
identified in Figure 3.2.
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Appendix 8i: Further Details on local Housing Stock and Success With the EA Initiative
District Authority LowRiSE MedRise HiRise Houses Total Stock TargetedIZ-SCore:Schemes Total EA HiPs EA HIPs/stock
I I
ROCHDALE 20 11 6 63 19,651 11 2.49: 11 18,956,994 964.68
TOWER HAMLETS 4 58 33 5 43,544 11 6.9! 26 18,558,875 426.21
~.':!.~Ef.!.~~!? "." _. 9 20 11 60 " .."~.~:.~!.? "._ n ~:.~?! ".._~~ _"~.!.t?~.~ ~~~ __.~~~:.~
GREENWICH 10 37 20 33 34,837 11 2.54: 8 14.218,930 408.16
SALFORD 12 18 16 54 38,134 1! 2.15! 7 13,626,799 357.34
NEWHAM N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 30.364 1! 8.111 19 13.566.345 446.79
MANCHESTER 19 12 9 60 92.102 11 4.981 3 10.656.061 115.70
...............................---- -_ __._ __ _ __._ _ __ .
COVENTRY 40 0 9 51 22,409 1! 3.71! 6 10,436,952 465.75
WIGAN 15 6 3 76 31,196 1! 0.14! 7 10.312.333 330.57
WALSALl N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 34.429 11 1.n! 7 10,216.953 296.75
WIRRAL N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 21.193 2! -o.14! 12 9.941.587 469.10
...............__ --_........ ._- _······1· ··········:···..··..·_··· _ _ .._.H __ .
BRADFORD 4 38 6 52 32.911 11 2.75: 12 9,349,082 284.07
NEWCASTlE-UPONTYN 13 19 11 57 43,294 11 0.94! 11 7,991,015 184.58
BIRMINGHAM 16 12 19 53 113,727 11 4.15: 14 7.784.500 68.45
SOUTHWARK N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 59.182 1! 5.38! 7 7.nO.470 131.30
KNOWSLEY 12 14 10 64 24.124 1! 3.04! 15 7,550,503 312.99
KiNGS;:ON"~HUiI N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. '--"4'1':470 "---·1T"·"·2~84r- ..·..i5 "'-7':1'75:639"--1:;3".03
GATESHEAD 13 9 7 71 32,244 11 0.65! 9 7.085.384 219.74
HYNDBURN 36 2 0 62 4.265 1: 2.271 6 6,787,208 1,591.37
LIVERPOOL 4 31 10 55 61.594 31 4.231 5 6,783,748 110.14
.......................................... . _ ,_ ,_._ _ -- -_ .
LEICESTER 12 17 4 67 31.n6 1: 5.12; 5 6.522.268 205.26
DERBY 19 8 1 72 18,927 11 1.05! 6 6,356.554 335.85
DUDLEY 24 0 7 69 33,204 1! -0.481 7 6,334,373 190.n
BLACKBURN 19 12 7 62 12.837 11 4.151 5 6.314.300 491.88
ROSSENDALE 27 4 0 69 5.370 11 2.071 7 6,222,063 1,158.67
ST. HELENS 19.8 0 0 80.2 18,395 41 0.811 7 6.069.857 329.97
STOCKPORT 26 5 14 55 14,926 11 -1.451 5 5.836.893 391.06
BARNSLEY 13 1 1 85 28.615 21 0.05! 6 5,531,461 193.31
BRENT N.A. NA. N.A. N.A. 21.414 1! 6.28! 3 5,516,817 257.63BO'LTON·"······..·....········.. "..·......25 5 2 70 ..•...."24:559 ···"_·..··;'j'"""·1':93l""..···"13 ····_;:·368:900· "..·······-218.61
PRESTON 27 10 6 57 9,851 2: 2.941 4 5,323.598 540.41
LANCASTER 13.5 14.9 2 69.6 4,843 21 -1.111 3 5.291.109 1,092.53
KIRKLEES 29 3 0 68 33.946 11 2.241 5 5.213.447 153.58
wEsr..LANcAsHiR·E·.... "'j"N":A: ..••....·N·.A: N.A. N.A...•••••••..9:94·8 ..······_..·lr······~:9r ...."·"·"·1 ..·".."5:213·:205 ··_···_..·..5·24:05
ISLINGTON 20 55 16 9 39,875 11 6.231 6 5.146.422 129.06
BARROW IN FURNESS N.A. NA. N.A. N.A. 4,204 11 -0.11 6 5,039,396 1.198.71
HARTLEPOOL 16 2 0 82 10,100 11 1.nl 15 5,019,810 497.01
SUNDERlAND 15 3 4 78 48,848 11 1.11 7 4,828.028 GS.84
WOLVERHAMPTON 19 11 9 61 36.392 21 4.551 6 4,574.418 125.70
WANDSWORTH 6 45 31 18 25.800 1! 6.15! 4 4,414.008 171.09
NOTIINGHAM 17 10 7 66 39.985 11 3.6! 10 4,201.121 105.07
~~~g~m9~ 1.~~!"..... ~ .." ~ 1~ _ ..".~ .••••••••~~~ .."".."·";i..·"·l~%ii·"·""·"·"~ "."~~¥~~j. "-'-"~~1~
BURNLEY 22 4 3 71 6,642 21 2.86! 2 3,653.271 550.03
LEWISHAM 20 42 10 28 38,576 1! 4.34! 6 3,520.849 91.27
C?l;.e!:!~.~ '"............ 17 " " .21 4 58 23.194 21 2.141 4 3,511,010 151.38
'HARINGEY 45'''5 14 36 " ..•••..23:682 ..···..···....lr..···s:ssr..···.."..·4 ..·..·..·3:510·:635 ·"··..·······"1·4"8:24
MANSFIELD 21 3 0 76 9.519 1! -1.24! 6 3.232.243 339.56
CANNOCK CHASE 11 7 0 82 7,925 11 -0.611 3 3.050,000 384.86
SANDWELL 17 9 15 59 49.465 11 3.85: 5 3.012.381 60.90
ENFIELD 39.4 4.8 25.4 30.4 17,233 31 0711 3 2909000 168 80WALTHAM··FO·REST..·.. 25 24 24 27 """-20:03'1 ·"·"·.._···1t.._··4~9t· .._········7 '--"2~:;:;2~'50o -"-'-"138:41
CAMDEN N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 34.154 1! 5.641 5 2.700,333 79.0e
HAMMERSMITH 7 59 20 14 19.124 11 7.041 4 2,597.331 135.82
~!.9£!9.:~..2~m!.~~:L 14 •__._.~ 6 _".."?1._..."~I·.~.~? ...._.""~.L.-~:~.~l ...."_._~ .."""~:.~~t~? ._.._"!ll.~~
PENDLE 26 2 0 72 4.666 11 1.8: 3 2.528,000 541.79
CAlDERDAlE 35 1 12 52 14.154 11 1.09; 2 2.490,144 175.93
BURY 38 0 0 62 10.826 11 0.06: 3 2.315,147 213.85
KENSINGTON_AND CHE 6 50 41 3 8.279 11 5.071 2 2,173.217 262.50
..................................r:....... . _ _ .
HALTON 16 5 1 78 8,671 2! 0.061 4 2,134.244 246.14
WARRINGTON 24 5 1 70 11.921 11 -0.931 4 2,109,943 176.99
WAKEFIELD 16 5 2 n 41,304 11 .1.221 4 2,104.483 50.95
LANGBAURCH 13 3 1 83 14,623 1: 0.85: 2 2,024.9n 138.48
TAMESIDE 28 2 5 65 19.483 1! 2.14! 2 1.926.200 98.87
......................................... . _... . _ _ .
WYRE FOREST 22 3 4 71 7,131 11 -0.881 2 1.915,248 268.58
Source: Estate Adlon Database
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BRISTOL 23 12 12 53 37,597 1i 0.7! 7 1,825,918 48.57
SOLiHULL 24 7 16 53 13,886 1! -2.53! 3 1,793,367 129.15
EAST STAFFORDSHIRE 30 37 0 63 6,588 3; .(l.26; 1 l,n5,OOO 269.43
SPELTHORNE 33.8 10.6 2.2 52.3 3,902 3= -2.82! 1 l,n2,OOO 454.13
~!!?~~~.~~~~.~~........ 16 2 ~ n ~~~.~? .J.l ~:!~l ~ 1~.~?:~.~ _ _ !~~:.~?
NORTH TYNESIDE 16 15 1 68 25,623 1i .(l.53! 5 1,686,305 65.81
COPELAND 0 15.3 0 84.7 5,213 2! -1.03! 2 1,626,000 311.91
VALE ROYAL 12.8 3.1 0 84.1 8,6n 2! -2.1! 1 1,600,000 184.40
WESTMINSTER 3 46 45 6 19,nl 1! 4.4! 4 1.511,930 76.47
.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• .................1' - •••••1'._••••••••••.. .•••••_ ..••..- .••....•.•_ .
SOUTH TYNESIDE 13.3 7.6 1.4 75.7 26,996 1! 1.59, 3 l,476,nO 54.70
REDDITCH 20 8 0 72 8,799 1! -1.04! 1 1,398,500 158.94
WORCESTER 34 7 3 56 6,030 2! .(l.55 , 2 1,360,000 225.54
CHESTER-lE-5TREET N.A. N.A. N.A. NA. 6,748 2! -1.321 3 1,310,764 194.24H·ACKNEy······..················ ..••····..·1·4 48.6 28.6 8.8 ·········:;6:279 ·..··..····..·3l""..·..S:62l""···..·..··..3 "'-"1',289:000' ··.._ ..··....27:85
L1CHFIELD N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 5,751 31 -2.591 2 1,255,000 218.22
SOUTH_KESTEVEN 11 7 0 82 8.305 3; -2.43; 1 1,201,200 144.64
LAMBETH 13.8 49.5 17.9 18.8 49,946 2: 7.19! 3 1,159,015 23.21
ALLERDALE 24 1 0 75 5.730 2! .(l.n! 1 1,156,925 201.91Du·RHAM·······.._········_·· ·······..:;:5 1.3 0 94.2 ··········10·:1·48 ···..·········3j"""·..:1:S7j"""···......··2 ·····....1·:1·46:153· ·····_....·•..'12·:94
CHESTERFIELD 13.9 16.8 0 69.3 12,406 2! .(l.63! 2 1,130.382 91.12
SEFTON 28.6 4.8 5.7 59.9 16.448 3! 0.01' 2 1,070,823 65.10
RICHMOND UPON THAI 24.6 33.7 4.9 36.8 8,881 4! .(l.24! 1 1,000.000 112.60
...................."...................... . ··· ········,··············t···..·-·..· _- _ _ .
DERWENSIDE 4 0 0 96 11,583 3, 1.82, 4 976,027 84.26
ROTHERHAM 18 2 0 80 32,402 2! .(l.35! 2 968.000 29.87
SOUTH_HOLLAND 6.3 0 0 93.7 4,958 2! -1.85! 1 929,400 187.45
MILTON KEYNES 2 18 3 n 6,345 1, -1.38! 3 899,631 141.79
EAST HERTFORDSHIRE 18.5 13.4 0 68.1 7,726 41 -4.06! 1 850,000 110.02
ELLESMERE PORT 21 5.1 2 71.9 7,886 21 -1.03! 2 850,000 107.79
BLACKPOOL 41.8 15.5 5.8 36.6 6,866 3; 1.47! 2 839.500 122.27
EASINGTON 0 9.3 0 90.7 16,662 3! 0.5! 1 825,306 49.53
BROMLEY N.A. N.A. N.A. NA. 12,945 4! -2.26! 1 825,000 63.73S·ASSeTlAvt·..·..·..········ N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. ••••••....··9:304 ··........····3!-..······:2r..··....··..2 ....·..···..809:966 ·..·_··......-87..00
HOUNSLOW N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 18.567 1! 2.46! 4 809,510 43.60
BATH 25 27 2 46 6,700 41 .(l.26! 1 800,000 119.40
BARNET 17.8 33.9 9.6 38.9 14,831 4! 0.86! . 1 720,000 48.55
....................................._- .. _ _........... . -_ .
SALISBURY 19 5.6 1.4 74 7,507 2! -2.11! 1 650,000 86.59
WAVERlEY N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 6,331 4' -3.25! 1 587,n8 92.84
ASHFIELD N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 9,788 4! -1.49! 1 573,600 58.60
CARLISLE 21 0 0 79 10.151 41 .(l.61! 1 548,000 53.98
NORWICH 24 21 2 53 20,798 15 0.44! 1 527,000 25.34
CLEETHORPES' 30 4 0 66 3,092 31 -1.315 2 519,942 168.16
CHORlEY 29.4 0 0 70.6 3,822 3! .(l.945 1 500,000 130.82
WOKING 27 17 0 56 4,644 4! -3.291 1 378,400 81.48
~!;J.!~!?f.!?~.~ ~;f.:; ~.A. N.A. N.A. 6.912 1! -2.68i 1 369,500 53.46
CHESTER 19 '12 ··..·..··8 61 ·..········7:778 ..······..····4r"···:1:SST"·..··_····1 ············368:00·0 ···•__·····..47..31
BROMSGROVE 26.2 8.4 0 65.4 3,922 31 -2.531 1 350,000 89.24
BRIGHTON 39.3 4.9 16.3 39.5 10,728 31 2.49! 1 343.000 31.97
T~~f.f.~.~!?..................... NA. ~:f.:: ~;f.:; N.A. 12,439 21 .(l.48! 2 328000 26.37
'HARLOW 13 20 4 ··63 ·..·..·..;·5:578 ..············:;r··..:O:6'j""..·..••....·,·..·•••••·..297;OOO ·..·······_..···;·9:07
THE WREKIN 12.1 11.9 2.1 73.7 10,323 4! 0.261 1 289,301 28.02
BLYTH VALLEY N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 9,022 4! -2.03! 1 233,088 25.84
WORTHING 34.3 10.8 0 52.5 2,895 4! -1.47: 1 211,500 73.06
TYNEDALE ......~.~~; •••••••••~:f.:: N.A. N.A. 4,345 41 -2.361 1 197,715 45.50RUSHMOOR···········..······· N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. ···········5:559 ··············1j""·..:2:0'j""··..······..;· ..···..·····165:000 ··..··..·····_··29:68
LEWES N.A. NA. N.A. NA. 4,067 45 -3.H 1 152,322 37.45
TEWKESBURY 28.7 7.5 0 63.8 3.815 2! -3.881 1 150.000 39.32
~~~fLE'iGH""""'"''''-''' _ ~ · ······..i~ ~ : ~:~~ ..·..·····..··~!···· ..~:~~I·······_··· ..i ··_·-~~H%~ ·__···· ··~t·~
SOUTHAMPTON 20 33.6 9.1 37.3 20,352 4' 1.58! 1 105,000 5.16
HIGH_PEAK 19 4 0 n 5,678 3: -1.04: 1 100,400 17.68
NORTHAMPTON N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 16,399 4i .(l.645 1 85.000 518
......................................-.. . _ _ _._.._ _..~ .
THAMESDOWN N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 12,537 1: -0.51 1 67,425 5.38
WOODSPRING 19 18 1 62 8,091 1: -2.71 1 18,982 2.35
SLOUGH 23 14 7 56 9,076 1: 3.561 1 9.100 1.00
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Appendix 81i: Allocation of EA HIPs Between DoE Regions (1986-1990)
Region London Region i Merseyslde TF Northern Region North West i East Midlands
1986-87 14,835,450.00 I 308,926.00
....".....~.:g.9.~:.~~!.:~..~. 11,215,330.00 I 1,816,827.00................... ............................................................................. .........................................-..................................
1987-88 14,093,706.00! 3,783,096.00 9,826,713.00 22,475,397.00! 3,543,377.00
1988-89 29,841,297.00 ! 10,896,740.00 19,325,845.00 44,508,694.00 ! 8,792,148.00
1989-90 37,408,938.00 ! 19,412,000.00 24,235,577.00 56,494,027.00 I 11,319,000.00
Total: 96,179,392.00 ! 34,400,762.00 58,593,722.00 134,693,448.00 ! 25,470,352.00
Schemes 121.00j 47.00 88.00 115.001 36.00
! !
Region West Midlands I Yorkshlre&Humbs South East South West IEastern Region
1986·87 6,419,946.001 3,437,178.00
..."...._..2~!:~~.9.:£~ 294,325.001 165,000.00................... ......................................:........................-....._... ........................._............:.._--..............._...- ..
1987·88 10,653,496.00 ! 8,743,672.00 57,000.00 497,OOO.00! 326,000.00
1988-89 14,875,551.001 10,703,107.00 2,115,000.00 456,000.00! 0.00
1989-90 25,594,000.001 14,370,958.00 1,540,000.00 1,465,000.001 0.00
Total: 57,542,993.00 ! 37,254,915.00 4,033,600.00 2,712,325.001 527,000.00
Schemes 62.00! 56.00 10.00 11.00! 1.00
i i,
i Source: Estate !Action Database
! i
Source: Estate Action Database
